Robin S. Lee is Associate Professor of Economics at Harvard University and Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He received his A.B. and A.M. in Economics and his Ph.D. in Business Economics from Harvard, and previously served on the faculty at New York University Stern School of Business.
Professor Lee's research aims to deepen our understanding of how firms bargain, contract and form supply relationships in imperfectly competitive markets. His work develops and applies formal analytical frameworks that are flexible enough to capture important institutional details of real-world settings, and tractable enough for use by researchers and practitioners. He has examined several policy-relevant areas of debate across a variety of industries, including: narrow networks, selective contracting, and insurer-provider consolidation in health care markets; vertical integration, mergers, and exclusive deals in cable television and technology markets; and market design innovation in financial markets. His research is supported by the National Science Foundation.
Research fields: industrial organization, applied microeconomic theory, health economics.
Working Papers (Updated May 2019)
11. The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers
(with Leemore Dafny and Kate Ho), Summer 2019, RAND Journal of Economics, 50(2): 286-325.
Previous version available as NBER Working Paper 22106.
[Coverage: APM Marketplace]
10. Equilibrium Insurer-Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets (with Kate Ho), February 2019, American Economic Review, 109(2): 473-522.
Previous version available as NBER Working Paper 23742.
9. "Nash-in-Nash" Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work
(with Allan Collard-Wexler and Gautam Gowrisankaran), February 2019, Journal of Political Economy, 127(1): 163-195.
Previous version available as NBER Working Paper 20641.
8. The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets
(with Gregory Crawford, Michael Whinston and Ali Yurukoglu), May 2018, Econometrica, 86(3): 891-954.
Previous version available as NBER Working Paper 21832.
6. Hospital and Physician Prices and Treatment Choice in Labor and Delivery 5. Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
3. Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets 6. Narrow Medical Provider Networks: Welfare Implications and Approaches to Market Design
5. Empirical Models of Bilateral Contracting 3. Price Discrimination in Service Industries 1. Signaling Preferences in Interviewing Markets
(with Kyna Fong and Patricia Foo), Summer 2017, American Journal of Health Economics, 3(3): 422-453.
(with Kate Ho), March 2017, Econometrica, 85(2): 379-417.
Previous version available as NBER Working Paper 19401. This paper subsumes a previous working paper entitled Insurer Competition and Negotiated Hospital Prices.
[Non-Technical Summaries: Microeconomic Insights | LSE Business Review | Vox EU]
December 2013, American Economic Review, 103(7): 2960-3000.
This paper subsumes a previous working paper entitled Dynamic Demand Estimation in Platform and Two-Sided Markets: The Welfare Cost of Software Incompatibility.
(with Kate Ho), in preparation for More Equal by Design: Economic Design Responses to Inequality, eds. Scott Duke Kominers and Alex Teytelboym, Oxford University Press.
May 2015, Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, eds. Robert A. Scott and Stephen M. Kosslyn, Wiley.
(with Anja Lambrecht, Katja Seim, Naufel J. Vilcassim, Amar Cheema, Yuxin Chen, Gregory Crawford, Kartik Hosanagar, Raghuram Iyengar, Oded Koenigsberg, Eugenio Miravete, Ozge Sahin), June 2012, Marketing Letters, 23(2): 423-438.
(with Michael Schwarz), September 2007, in Computational Social Systems and the Internet, ed. by P. Cramton, R. Müller, E. Tardos, and M. Tennenholtz, no. 07271 in Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Dagstuhl, Germany.
5. Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
3. Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
6. Narrow Medical Provider Networks: Welfare Implications and Approaches to Market Design
5. Empirical Models of Bilateral Contracting
3. Price Discrimination in Service Industries
1. Signaling Preferences in Interviewing Markets
Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation (with Eric Budish and John Shim), May 2019.
Available as NBER Working Paper 25855.
Markov-Perfect Network Formation: An Applied Framework for Bilateral Oligopoly and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks
(with Kyna Fong), September 2013 (revise and resubmit, The Review of Economic Studies).
Health Insurance Menu Design: Managing the Spending-Coverage Tradeoff (with Kate Ho)