Robin S. Lee is an assistant professor of economics at Harvard University. His research interests are in industrial organization, health economics, and applied microeconomic theory. His work blends together insights from theory and data to study bargaining and contracting between firms with market power, and the implications of exclusive or selective contracting and integration on industry structure, competition and welfare. Recently, he has examined the impact of insurer competition in health care markets on premiums and provider reimbursement rates, the determination of equilibrium health care provider networks, and the welfare effects of vertical integration in content distribution and platform markets.
Lee is also a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research and has previously served on the faculty at New York University Stern School of Business. He received his A.B. and A.M. in Economics and his Ph.D. in Business Economics from Harvard.
Hospital and Physician Prices and Treatment Choice in Labor and Delivery Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets Narrow Medical Provider Networks: Welfare Implications and Approaches to Market Design
Empirical Models of Bilateral Contracting Price Discrimination in Service Industries Signaling Preferences in Interviewing Markets
(with Kyna Fong and Patricia Foo), Summer 2017, American Journal of Health Economics, 3(3): 422-453.
(with Kate Ho), March 2017, Econometrica, 85(2), 379-417.
Previous version available as NBER Working Paper 19401. This paper subsumes a previous working paper entitled Insurer Competition and Negotiated Hospital Prices.
[Online Appendix | Related: Microeconomic Insights | LSE Business Review | Vox EU]
December 2013, American Economic Review, 103(7): 2960-3000.
This paper subsumes a previous working paper entitled Dynamic Demand Estimation in Platform and Two-Sided Markets: The Welfare Cost of Software Incompatibility.
(with Kate Ho), in preparation for More Equal by Design: Economic Design Responses to Inequality, eds. Scott Duke Kominers and Alex Teytelboym, Oxford University Press.
May 2015, Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, eds. Robert A. Scott and Stephen M. Kosslyn, Wiley.
(with Anja Lambrecht, Katja Seim, Naufel J. Vilcassim, Amar Cheema, Yuxin Chen, Gregory Crawford, Kartik Hosanagar, Raghuram Iyengar, Oded Koenigsberg, Eugenio Miravete, Ozge Sahin), June 2012, Marketing Letters, 23(2): 423-438.
(with Michael Schwarz), September 2007, in Computational Social Systems and the Internet, ed. by P. Cramton, R. Müller, E. Tardos, and M. Tennenholtz, no. 07271 in Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Dagstuhl, Germany.
Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
Narrow Medical Provider Networks: Welfare Implications and Approaches to Market Design
Empirical Models of Bilateral Contracting
Price Discrimination in Service Industries
Signaling Preferences in Interviewing Markets
"Nash-in-Nash" Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work
(with Allan Collard-Wexler and Gautam Gowrisankaran), 2017 (revised and resubmitted, Journal of Political Economy).
Available as NBER Working Paper 20641.
The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets
(with Gregory Crawford, Michael Whinston and Ali Yurukoglu), 2017 (revised and resubmitted, Econometrica).
Available as NBER Working Paper 21832.
The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers
(with Leemore Dafny and Kate Ho), 2017 (submitted).
Available as NBER Working Paper 22106.
[Coverage: APM Marketplace]
Markov-Perfect Network Formation: An Applied Framework for Bilateral Oligopoly and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks
(with Kyna Fong), 2013 (revise and resubmit, The Review of Economic Studies).