Marranos (Pigs), or From Coexistence to Toleration

Marc Shell

1. The End of Convivencia

How could a society as tolerant as Castille, in which the three great faiths of the west had coexisted for centuries . . ., ε lergy and population that had never lusted for blood except in war (Queen Isabella thought even bull-fighting too gory), gaze placidly upon the burning alive of thousands of their fellow Spaniards?
—Henry Kamen, Inquisition and Society in Spain

For hundreds of years, Muslim Spain was the most tolerant place in Europe. Christians, Muslims, and Jews were able to live together there more or less peacefully. The three religious groups maintained a tolerant convivencia, or coexistence, thanks partly to a twofold distinction among kinds of people that was essential to the particularist doctrine of Islam influential in Spain. Islamic doctrine distinguishes first between Muslim and non-Muslim peoples and second between those non-Muslims who are, like Muslims themselves, “Peoples of the Book” (that is, Christians and Jews) and those non-Muslims who are “pagan.” These two distinctions, taken together, could amount to the difference between life and death. For example, Muslim courts ruled on the basis of the Koran that those “others” who were Peoples of the Book could not legally be put to the sword for refusing to convert to Islam while

those “others” who were pagan could be. Christians and Jews had to be put up with, and usually were.²

Spanish Islam’s limited tolerance towards religious heterogeneity and towards national differences was something that Spanish Christendom, when it conquered Spain from the Muslims, was generally unwilling and perhaps ideologically unable to maintain. With this conquest Christian catholicism came to constitute the basis for a radically exclusionary definition of Spanish Christendom. (The word catholic comes from the Greek kata, meaning “according to,” and holos, meaning “the whole.”) For just as the Islamic division of humankind into particular groups encouraged a limited convivencia, the Christian union of all humankind into a single brotherhood encouraged a certain intolerance. The doctrine crucial to Christianity that “all men are brothers”—or “all human beings are siblings”—turned all too easily into the doctrine that “only my brothers are men, all ‘others’ are animals and may as well be treated as such.” The politics and metaphors of this transformation involving kin and kind is the subject of this essay.

These two interconnected historical hypotheses—that there was in Spain a basically Islamic particularist ideology of several siblinghoods followed by a basically Christian universalist ideology of one siblinghood—are not without historical complexities beyond our present purview: Islamic rule, after all, did not always foster coexistence³ and

---

² The Koran grounds the series of divisions outlined and is consistent with the well-known Pact of Umar I, which established special regulations for Christians and Jews living in Muslim lands: “There is to be no compulsion in religion. Rectitude has been clearly distinguished from error. So whoever disbelieves in idols and believes in Allah has taken hold of the firmest handle. It cannot split. Allah is All-hearing and All-knowing” (Sura 2:256; quoted in Norman A. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book [Philadelphia, 1979], p. 149). See also Sura 109:6: “To you your religion, to me my religion.”

³ First, there are some instances of forced conversion in the history of Islam. During the Almohad terror in the latter part of the twelfth century, for example, Jewish communities who refused to convert were sometimes put to the sword, as memorialized in the poetic lament by the twelfth-century Jewish scholar Abraham ben Meir ibn Ezra of Toledo (see David Kahana, R. Avrahamib. Ezra [Warsaw, 1894]). However, “there are no more than half a dozen [instances of the forced conversion of Jews to Islam] over a period

---

Spanish Christendom was sometimes tolerant. Nevertheless, Spain at the time of the Reconquest plays a central role in the European history of thirteen centuries (Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands, p. 76)—a remarkable record when compared with the history of Christian proselytizing. Some scholars—mostly Christians—have complained that the regulations of the Pact of Umar treat Christians and Jews with less dignity than brother Muslims; however, the Pact established laws protecting Christians and Jews, admitted them to the polity as human beings, and guaranteed them a dependable toleration. Second, although some interpreters of the Koran say that Sura 2:256 ("There is to be no compulsion in religion") means that the Muslims were not so much "tolerant" towards other Peoples of the Book as "resigned" in the face of obdurately believed belief (for example, see Rudi Paret, "Sure 2,256: lā ʾikhrāḥa fi d-dīnī.—Tolernanz oder Resignation?" Der Islam 45 [1969]: 299–300), the result was still coexistence instead of compulsion and murder. Third, the Koran includes Sabianism as well as Christianity and Judaism as religions of the book. And since at different times such varied groups as Zoroastrians in Persia and Hindus in India were said to be Sabians (see Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. "al-Sabīʿa" [article by B. Carra de Vaux], and Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam [Princeton, N. J., 1984], p. 20), the distinction between a non-Muslim People of the Book and a Pagan People was not always clear. Fourth, Islamic doctrine does not entirely lack the universalist impulse. The notion of universalism based on common descent, for example, is important: "Mankind is from Adam and Eve and all of you are alike in your descent from them. On the Day of Judgement, God will not ask you about your noble descent or your lineage; rather the most honoured of you before God on that Day will be the most righteous of you" (Ibn Kathir [A.1], commentary on Sura 49:15; quoted in M. "Umar Châ'pârâ, “The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature: Part I,” Islamic Quarterly 14 [1970]: 9. See Lewis, The Political Language of Islam [Chicago, 1988], p. 17]. S. D. Goitein ("The Concept of Mankind in Islam," in History and the Idea of Mankind, ed. W. Warren Wager [Albuquerque, N. Mex., 1971], pp. 72–91) discusses aspects of this Muslim universalist humanism. On the political significance of the Arabic term brother in Islamic political thinking, see my Children of the Earth (forthcoming).

4. There was a good deal of what appears like convivencia in such Spanish Christian societies as Aragon in the fourteenth century; however, there are a few exceptional circumstances here. First, the relatively short-lived convivencia in Spanish Christendom was, in terms of brotherhood, largely a holdover from the days of Islamic protection for dhimmis, or non-Muslim residents of Muslim states (see John Boswell, The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century [New Haven, Conn., 1977], p. 327; Lewis, The Jews of Islam, chap. 1; and Robert I. Burns, “Christian-Islamic Confrontation in the West: The Thirteenth-Century Dream of Conversion,” American Historical Review 76 [Dec. 1971]: 1386–1434). Certainly the Muslim doctrines influenced tolerant Christian monarchs. For example, Alphonso VI, called "El Bravo" (1065–1109), who recovered Toledo from the Moors in 1086, lived with and perhaps also married Zaida—a daughter of "Benabet" (Al Motamid), the Muslim King of Seville. She became a Christian and had a son, Sancho, whom Alphonso VI designated to be his heir. Alphonso protected the Muslims among his subjects. The tolerance of the quasi-Muslim Christian King Frederick II of Sicily may be an instructive parallel here, since he too showed great tolerance towards Muslims and Jews. Second, to the extent that Christian convivencia existed before 1492 it was usually a short-term practical political strategem to deal with the Muslim presence both within the Spanish Christian states, where Muslims often constituted a sizable majority, and also in such traditionally Muslim-ruled states as Granada, whose conquest by Christians and its cruel aftermath marked the end of any Christian pretense at convivencia. Third, it is hard to conclude in any case that Christian convivencia ever existed in anything like the way Spanish nationalist historians have argued. James II, for example, carried out the explicit orders of Pope Clement V when
of the idea of caste or race. And Spain serves well as one model for how the doctrine that "all human beings are siblings," in its collapse of the usual distinction between the human species and the family, cancels out terms mediating kind and kin (like "Peoples of the Book") and affects the politically sensitive definition of the term nation.

The Christian Reconquest, culminating in the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 and of the Muslims in 1502, was the nationalist event in Spanish history. (On the very day in 1492 that Christopher Columbus set sail from Palos for what turned out to be the New World, he noted in the log the shiploads of Jews and conversos leaving under threat of death their Old World home of a millennium.) The expulsion of the Muslims consolidated a brutal ideology of who was in the one family nation and who wasn't. The official view became that Christians with only Christian ancestors were Spanish nationals and that all "others" were not. There was to be no such intermediating term as fellow "Peoples of the Book."

The crucial events in the gradual historical evolution of the exclusivist definition of the modern Spanish nation probably occurred during the hundred years between the mid-fifteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries. First, there was the introduction of the famous Statutes of the Purity of the Blood [limpieza de sangre] in Toledo in 1449—and elsewhere a little earlier or later. These statutes distinguished between original Christians and conversos, those people who ostensibly had converted from Islam or Judaism or whose ancestors had converted.

---

he prohibited in 1311 under pain of death the çala—the public prayer ritual in Islam which is one of the primary duties of all Muslims (see Francisco A. Roca Traver, "Un siglo de vida mudéjar en la Valencia medieval [1238–1338]", Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón 5 [1952]: 127; and Boswell, The Royal Treasure, pp. 262–63). And while Muslim law codes referred to Christians as fellow Human Creatures of the Book, Iberian Christian law codes, linked with a religion that cannot easily recognize others who are not animal, "consistently referred to Islam as 'paganismo' and frequently classed Muslims in the category of 'slaves, horses, mules, donkeys, cows, or other animals'" (Gunnar Tilander, Los Fueros de Aragón según el manuscrito 458 de la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid [Lund, 1937]).


5. For the Iberian origin of the term caste, see Stephen Gilman, The Spain of Fernando de Rojas: The Intellectual and Social Landscape of "La Celestina" (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 113; hereafter abbreviated SFR.

The Blood Statutes made the distinction between Christian and *converso* solely on the basis of blood lineage.

The Statutes of the Purity of Blood were at first denounced by the pope. The Roman Catholic creed traditionally stresses essentially not kinship by consanguinity but rather rebirth and kinship through Christ. Many powerful people with *converso* ancestry somewhere along the line argued for this tradition, as did the Grand Inquisitor Torquemada in his *Treatise against the Midianites and Ishmaelites*. On the other hand there were racists influenced to some extent by the Christian doctrine of Arianism, according to which Jesus was not entirely consubstantial with God his Father though he was consanguineous with Mary his mother. But even if Spanish Christendom were to have forgone


8. In Gratian’s *Decretum* and Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa Theologica*, there is “no invidious discrimination between Old Christians and New Christians,” since “baptism into the faith was regarded to bring a ‘regeneration of man and rebirth’” (Martin A. Cohen, *The Martyr: The Story of a Secret Jew and the Mexican Inquisition in the Sixteenth Century* [Philadelphia, 1973], p. 290 n. 9). Kamen writes, “In theory canon law limited the extent to which the sins of fathers could be visited on their sons and grandsons” (I, p. 121). Compare the specifically Jewish position that Marranos, or compelled Christians, were still Jews. For example, the Spanish Jew Isaac Abravanel, who served Ferdinand and Isabella, argued in his *Ma’ayene ha-yeshu’ah* (Amsterdam, 1647) that religious conversion cannot bring about the ethnic assimilation of the Jews: “The Ingathering shall be for the Children of Israel who are called Jacob, and also for the Marranos who are of their seed” (Comm. ad. Isa. 43:7; see also Netanyahu, *Don Isaac Abravanel: Statesman and Philosopher* [Philadelphia, 1953], p. 203).


10. Gothic Christianity, with its tendency towards Arianism or Origenism, did not disappear from Spain with the so-called Spanish Conversion in the sixth century from the Gothic Christianity of King Leovigild to the Catholicism of his son Recared. Under Muslim rule, in fact, Gothic Christians kept their old law code—according to the Pact of Umar (see Felix Ludwig Sophus Dahn, *Lex Visigothorum* [Würzburger, 1872]). And they maintained the old Arian heresy, according to which the Son, though He had a likeness [homoioité] to the Father, was not of absolutely the same substance [homousios]. It would seem to follow that kinship in Christ does not fully transcend consanguinity, and that spiritual religion is not all that matters. Blood counts.

The Gothic Christians who lived under Muslim rule were an element of considerable intellectual and commercial importance in medieval Spain. Some writers, including Salvian in *De gubernatione Dei*, have said that the Visigoths were more tolerant towards others than the Catholics, though there were limited discriminatory provisions against Jewish converts in the Visigothic codes. (See Salo Wittmayer Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 18 vols., 2d ed. [New York and Philadelphia, 1952–83], 3:35–46.) But the Catholics were unusually intolerant: they expelled Jews and sold into slavery anyone found engaging in a Jewish ceremony—intolerant practices that generally ceased with the Muslim conquest and began again only with the Catholic Reconquest. See Solomon Grayzel, *A History of the Jews: From the Babylonian Exile to the Establishment of Israel* (Philadelphia, 1961), pp. 302–3.
entirely the Roman Catholic notion that Christianity transcends blood kinship—as Gothic Christians and so-called tribal pagans may have wanted Spanish Christendom to do—how then would it be a crime to be a Jew? How would it be a crime to be a Jew when the Mother of God and all the Apostles were Jewish—as the distinguished jurist Alfonso Díaz de Mantalvo put it? And surely the Church was properly the home of the Jews and the Gentiles were the outsiders who had been invited in—as argued the Bishop of Burgos, Alonso de Cartagena, in Defensorium Unitatis Christianae and Bishop Alonso de Oropesa in Lumen ad revelationem gentium.11

Despite the powerful arguments against the Blood Statutes that focus on the polar opposites of spiritual kinship (isn’t a convert a brother in Christ?) and consanguineous kinship (wasn’t Christ a Jew?), a nationalism of exclusion finally took hold in Roman Catholic Spain in the latter part of the fifteenth century.12 The myth of Pure Blood [sangre pura] unmixed with Muslim or Jewish blood took hold. The joint sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella benefited, perhaps, as they unified Spain as a nation of one blood, from a Germania or “union of siblings-german.”13 In later centuries the Spanish myth of Pure Blood traced a tribal bloodline to a Gothic or Teutonic ancestor, Tubal, from the twenty-second century B.C.14 Transformed to suit contemporary ideologies of social class in subsequent centuries,15 Pure Blood eventu-


12. The sixth-century Spanish Catholic Saint Isidore of Seville was interested in this potentially nation-forming opposition between brotherhood-german and brotherhood-spiritual. Orphaned as a young child and raised in a monastic brotherhood, Isidore was the brother-german of Brother Leander. Both loved their common sister-german Florentine and wanted her to become a sister-in-Christ. Isidore’s Regula monachorum was adopted by many Spanish Catholic brothers in the seventh and eighth centuries; his history of the Gothic or Teutonic “brotherhood,” the Historia Gothorum, Wandalorum, Sueborum, is included in the nineteenth German national series Monumenta Germaniae historica (Scriptores, Auctores antiquissimi, Chronica Minora II).

13. Germa means “brother” in some Iberian dialects. Germania was the name for the agrarian revolt in Valencia in 1520 that included forced conversions to the Christian “brotherhood” of Muslims living under Spanish Christian domination. Mudéjares are so called from the Arabic word for “allowed to remain” (see Isidro de las Cagigas, Los Mudéjares, vol. 3 of Minorías Étnico-religiosas de la Edad Media Española [Madrid, 1948], pp. 58–64). Further, Ferdinand’s and Isabella’s hermandad was a system of “brotherhood” practiced by Castilian towns as a type of police force.

14. See Peñalosa’s fixation on imputing limpieza and hidalguía to the “true” Spanish person: “Among the Spaniards is found the most ancient nobility of any of the nations, retaining always the blood of their first progenitor, Tubal,” who, according to Peñalosa, came to Spain in the year 2163 B.C. (quoted in Yerushalmi, From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto—Isaac Cardoso: A Study in Seventeenth-Century Marranism and Jewish Apologetics [New York, 1971], p. 386; hereafter abbreviated IG).

15. The Spanish kept their fixations on blood purity even after there were in Spain virtually no more Jews and Moors. By 1788, the term limpieza de sangre came to refer to
ally informed the rhetoric of German Nazis and Spanish fascists. Italian fascists sought to cut off blacks and Jews from pure-blooded Italian “Aryans” (fig. 1). And Pure Blood is still cherished among modern Spaniards. In 1988, the “blue-blooded” president of a Madrid-based institute to promote cultural exchanges between Spain and its Muslim neighbors said that the Spanish “take pride in our sangre pura, pure blood. No Catholic wants to face the thought of Moors on the family tree.”

The final consolidation of Spanish nationhood followed on the strict enforcement of the blood regulations under Philip II in the latter half of the sixteenth century. One drop of “Jewish blood” might make a person non-Christian in Spain just as, in parts of the United States in the 1800s, one drop of “black blood” made a person nonwhite. “If it were proved that an ancestor on any side of the family had been penanced by the Inquisition or was a Moor or Jew,” writes Henry Kamen, “the descendant could be accounted of impure blood and disabled from office” (I, p. 121). The official Instructions of 1561 thus stipulated that “all the sanbenitos [penitential garments imposed by
class difference, the upper class maintaining its “purity” by refusing to do manual work because it was beneath their dignity and honor.


17. In fascist Italy, “racial laws” followed on the doctrine of the “Aryan Italian.” The Manifesto degli scienziati, for example, proclaimed on 14 July 1938 “that the Italian population was Aryan in origin, that a pure Italian race existed to which Jews did not belong, and that this race had to be defended from possible contamination.” For example, in Italian East Africa, laws prohibited conjugal relationships between Italian citizens and subjects in order “to prevent the growth of interracial marriage and to furnish the Italians with . . . awareness of their racial dignity and superiority” (Mario Toscano, “The Jews in Italy from the Risorgimento to the Republic,” trans. Meg Shore, in Gardens and Ghettos: The Art of Jewish Life in Italy, ed. Vivian B. Mann [Berkeley, 1989], pp. 41, 39). The Rome journal La Difesa della Razza [Defence of the Race] called on 20 August 1938 for the sword to protect Italian “Aryans” from Jewish and African contamination.

18. Rafael de Tramontana y Gayango—Marquis of Guadacorte and president of the Fundación Gayangos—is quoted in Thomas J. Abercrombie, “When the Moors Ruled Spain,” National Geographic 174 (July 1988): 92. Juan Antonio Llorente—General Secretary of the Inquisition from 1789–1801—pointed out in 1812 that “‘you will find hardly a book printed in Spain from the time of Charles the Fifth to our own days in which the Inquisition is not cited with praise’” (I, p. 44). The English phrase “blue blood” is a translation of the Spanish sangre azul; aristocratic Christian families of Castile, claiming to be of a light complexion that made their veins appear relatively blue, apparently used the term to characterize themselves as having never been “contaminated” by Jewish or Muslim blood. See Oxford English Dictionary, s. v. “blood.” Compare the royal Egyptian Queen Cleopatra’s proud reference to her “bluest veins” in Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, act 2, sc. 5, l. 29.

19. The relevant statute was instituted by the archbishop Juan Martínez Silíceo in Toledo in 1547, ratified by Pope Paul IV in 1555, and upheld by Philip II in 1556. See IC, p. 15.
Fig. 1.—Photo: Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York. Catalogue number 331.
the Inquisition to bring shame on the wearer] of the condemned, living or dead, present or absent, be placed in the churches where they used to live . . . in order that there may be a perpetual memory of the infamy of the heretics and their descendants'" (I, p. 122). Juan Escobar de Corro later argued in his Treatise on Testing for Blood Purity and Nobility that purity and honor are exactly synonymous and that any stain on an impure lineage was ineffaceable and perpetual. Costa Mattos wrote that "'pouco sangue Judeo he bastante a destruir o mundo (a little Jewish blood is enough to destroy the world!)'" (IC, p. 416).

Cervantes's tale in Don Quixote of people of Arab "race" whose families had converted under Christian rule to Christianity (Moriscos) may help to illustrate the dilemma. The tale concerns a young Morisco woman who learned her Christianity from her mother just as she had sucked milk from her: "I sucked the Catholic faith with my mother's milk." In terms of spiritual kinship she was a sister in Christ and in terms of colactaneous kinship she was a Christian daughter in milk. But according to the Statutes of Pure Blood, she was no Christian. The Roman Catholic inquisitors—and some of her consanguineous Muslim kinspersons as well—claimed that her Christian belief was a mere fiction [invención]. The young Morisco was thus expelled from Spain due to the "crime" of a nation [nación] to which she felt she belonged only by fiction. And her Christian lover suffered an imprisonment in Algiers like that of Cervantes himself. In the prologue, Cervantes says that he created the book as out of an imprisonment and that he stands in relation to its hero, Don Quixote, not as a father to a consanguineous son who is "like" his father and of his father's nation but as a stepfather [padastro] (DQ, p. 25). Cervantes knows the folly and horror of such attention to pedigrees as Don Quixote discusses in "one of the most important chapters in this whole History:" "From all this I wish you to infer, my dear silies, that the subject of genealogies is a most confused one" (DQ, pp. 502, 506). Fernando de Rójas, whose background was converso, wrote his famous Celestina a year after the expulsion of the Jews. There he seems similarly to "attack the concepts of external honor and purity of blood (always behind the mask of a servant or prostitute). In this he lent his voice [as Stephen Gilman says] to the protest of his fellow conversos whose blood was not pure and who, like the prostitute

Areusa, demanded that honor be attached to deeds and not to the distinction of birth.”23 Areusa paraphrases the complex historic proverb, “When Adam delved and Eve span / Who was then a gentle man?”24

But the Blood Statutes and the Inquisition’s peculiar attention to genealogy “triumphed and became the law of the realm in Spain and later in Portugal, spreading their rule over other races as well (black African, Chinese, and Moors) and into the Iberian colonies,” with dire consequences to the so-called indigenous populations of the New World and peoples in the Orient.25 The boundary of the Christian “nation” was now no more than race and genealogy, shorthand reports of which gave Spaniards easy access to a breeder’s-like “knowledge” of who was in the Germany and who wasn’t. Blood now defined the nation:

23. Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics*, p. 112. As Gilman points out, there are no direct references to conversos in the *Celestina* (see SFR, p. 366). However, Calisto describes Melibea as possessing “limpieza de sangre e fechos” (Fernando de Rójas, *Tragicomedia de Calisto y Melibea*, ed. Julio Cefador y Franca [Madrid, 1931]; trans. Lesley Byrd Simpson, under the title *La Celestina: A Novel in Dialogue* [Berkeley, 1955], act 12). In the preface, Rójas speaks of his “fellowmen” or *socios*; see Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics*, p. 90.

24. Is it essentially blood kinship with Adam and Eve or spiritual kinship in God that makes us universal kin? Disagreement about this matter informs the difference between King Alfred’s and Queen Elizabeth’s translations of a well-known passage from *The Consolation of Philosophy* (bk. 3, pt. 6) by the sixth-century Roman philosopher Boethius: “Unus enim rerum pater est.” King Alfred the Great, ruler of the West Saxon tribes in the ninth century, translates the line in such a way as to stress blood, or tribal, kinship. Boethius’s “one father of all things” becomes for Alfred “the father and mother of the race”; divine kinship becomes human ancestry. Five years after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, Queen Elizabeth offered a more accurate interpretation of Boethius’s words: “All humain kind on erthe / from like begininge Comes: / One father is of all, / One only al doth gide” (*Queen Elizabeth’s Englishings of Boethius, “De Consolatione Philosophiae, A.D. 1593, Plutarch, “De Curiositate,” A.D. 1598, and Horace, “De Arte Poetica” (pars), A.D. 1598*, ed. Caroline Pemberton [London, 1899], p. 54). For the historic proverb and King Alfred, see Albert B. Friedman, “‘When Adam Delved . . .’: Contexts of an Historic Proverb,” in *The Learned and the Lewed: Studies in Chaucer and Medieval Literature*, ed. Larry D. Benson (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), pp. 220–21.

25. Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics*, p. 17. See Cohen, *The Martyr*, on Spanish laws forbidding Jews, Muslims, and conversos to emigrate to the New World and on Spanish intolerance towards the Indians of the Americas. When Pernambuco (in Brazil) was conquered by the Dutch, Jewish New Christians, like other people in the New World freed from Spanish domination, established relatively free communities. (See Arnold Wiznitzer, *The Jews in Colonial Brazil* [New York, 1960].) Thomas Greene writes about the Iberian epic *Ôs Lusiadas’s “imperialism and nationalism” (Greene, *The Descent from Heaven: A Study in Epic Continuity* [New Haven, Conn., 1963], p. 220). *The Lusiads*, composed by the Portuguese poet Luiz de Camoens in the years following 1556 and published in 1572, concerns the discovery by Camoens’s kinsman Vasco da Gama of the sea route to India; it includes nationalist views of such major events in Portuguese history as the massacre in 1510 of every Muslim in Goa (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., s.v. “Goa”). See Green, *The Descent from Heaven*, pp. 231–39, for a discussion of *La Christiada* (1611) by Diego de Hojeda, the Spanish-born Dominican monk of Peru.
national kinship was literalized as consanguineous and consanguinity itself was upheld as ascertainable (even as fears of bastardy and foundling increased). Diego Laínez was right to denounce the Cult of Blood Purity as the “‘humor o error nacional (the national humour or error)” (I, p. 126). And Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus in 1540 who refused to associate himself with most racist aspects of the Inquisition, also said that the Spanish cult of Blood Purity was the “‘humor español [Spanish humor].’”

Spain, once the European model of convivencia and intellectual progress had become in the sixteenth century the least tolerant place in all Europe, and soon it was to become one of the most backward. Once there had been an influential Muslim ideology where there were human others (“Peoples of the Book” and pagans) as well as human brothers (Muslims), and some of those others (the fellow “Peoples of the Book”) had to be lived with, no matter how distressing their existence might be. But now, with the rise of specifically Spanish Christendom, all humans were brothers and all others were animal or may as well have been. Spain fulfilled its national aspiration in the Reconquest only at the loss of any specifically human term mediating between Christian human beings and other creatures.

2. The Taurean Nation

From this came the nationalist ideology of the bullfight. The rise in sixteenth-century Spain of the unique prominence of the bull festival, rightly called Fiesta Nacional or Fiesta Brava—not a mere sport [deporte]—corresponds to the rise of the ideology of the modern Spanish “nation.” The killing of bulls in urban arenas was developed to its still-present zenith during the last years of the Reconquest, which is associated with “the idea of the growth of some form of Spanishness.” Taurofilia and bullfighting in Spain express a national ideology of otherhood and brotherhood.

The Spanish fighting bull, like the creature in the ancient Minoan

26. The Marquillos de Mazarambros, who instigated the first discriminatory statute, calls the conversos “‘children of incredulity and infidelity’” (SFR, p. 191 n. 84).

27. Quoted by Eusebio Rey, “San Ignacio de Loyola y el Problema de los Cristianos Nuevos,” Razón y Fe 153 (Jan.–Feb. 1956): 182. The harsh judgment of Spain that this view of history would entail might be tempered with the observation that, during this period of the emergence of modern nationalism, few other states were called upon to live peaceably with strangers in their midst. There were no Muslims in England, for example; and the Jews had been expelled from England centuries earlier.

ritual of bull-leaping that some ethnographers say grounds the bullfight historically,29 helps to define the difference between human kind and animal kind—who is a bull and who is merely a taurean human being—and between human kin and non-kin—who is in my family, hence lovable only in the chaste way, and who is not? The Minotaur, son of the bestializing Pasiphaë and her bull-lover, straddles the line between human and nonhuman kind: he has a head at once human and bovine. And the Minotaur’s family straddles the line between family kin and non-kin: his “sister” (or half sister) Phaedra has an incestuous passion for her “son” (or stepson) that would be nonincestuous only if her family kin were not her species kind.

Rafael Campos de España writes that “in the bullfight the Spaniard has found the most perfect expression for defining his human quality.”30 The bullfight helps to fix ideologically the difference between national and nonnational. What is the unique nación of the toro bravo and the quality of its treatment by the nación of Spanish Christians? Nation means “a particular class, kind, or race” not only of persons but also of animals.31 Bravo, the term that the Spanish use to describe the nation they admire, means “wild.”32 Yet the toro bravo is not a “game” animal, like a deer, or a “domestic” animal, like a llama, or an animal sauvage, like a mountain lion. The toro bravo is distinguished among animals both domestic and wild in that, according to a long tradition of breeding, it is actually cultivated so as to be or become “wild,” or artificially natural. The bullfight itself, the great national festival of Spain, is merely a desbravando. The animal, bred artificially to be bravo, is “civilized” in the ring. The bullfighter’s technical term rompiendo, or “breaking,” is thus appropriate, as is Ernest Hemingway’s remark about the matador’s “educating” the bull almost as if it were a man.33 And so the bull, in a corrida that will “break” it as on the rack, is given a humanoid name.34 The bullfighter follows definite regulations to torture the bull, “outmaneuvering” it with the aid of painful harpoonlike pikes


30. Quoted as an epigraph in Marvin, Bullfight.


32. The Old Irish braido/brado (“wild,” “savage”) is apparently linked etymologically with the Spanish and Portuguese bravo. See Provençal braidin (“fiery,” “spirited” [horse]) and Latin (b)rabidus (“mad,” “fierce”). See Joh. Storm, Romania 5 (1876): 170–71.


34. See Marvin, Bullfight, p. 96.
[banderillas] in the neck muscles and the picador's bloodletting spikes in the enlarged hump on the neck. He “prepares” [lidiar] the bull for butchering as a sacrificial victim.\(^{35}\) (Easter Sunday is when the bullfighting season begins.)\(^{36}\) The bullfighter butchers or sacrifices the bull according to prescribed rites and with prescribed implements; if he should fail in this respect, the spectators call him asesino, “murderer,” as if the dead bull had been a human king and the matador a mere “assassin,” a term that derives from the Arabic hashshashin.\(^{37}\) It is worth adding that parts of the dead bull—principally the ears—are distributed as awards and several parts are eaten.\(^{38}\) Thus Spanish Christians, who are theoretically omnivorous—for them, unlike for Jews, all food is legally edible if not universally eaten—transform the Minoan rite of bull-leaping into a national festival incorporating such regulations regarding butchering and such restrictions regarding what can legally be eaten as generally characterize only particularist religions like Judaism and Islam.

In the sixteenth century, when the bullfight truly became the national festival, a universally proselytizing bullish Christendom freed itself from the discomforting burdens of any sort of Muslim convivencia or Jewish tolerance. No longer was there in Spain a specifically human intermediate term between national kin and national non-kin, between Christian brothers and others who were not Christian. Islam had had such a term in its notion of a People of the Book that is neither Muslim nor pagan, neither brother nor other. And the ancient Jewish Commonwealth had had such a term in its notion of a “Strange People in a Strange Land,” which is nevertheless protected as a human nation by distinctly humane laws and is promised, as by Rabbi Moses ben Maimon of Córdoba (Maimonides) in the twelfth century, a share in the world to come.\(^{39}\) But Spanish Christendom, in its unwaveringly univer-

35. The verb lidiar means something like “to outmanoeuvre the bull,” but it also retains the sense of its Latin etymon litigare (“to dispute, to sue at law”), as at an auto-da-fé (quoted in Marvin, Bullfight, p. 205). According to Luis Bollain, lidiar also concerns “the most efficient preparation for death of the bull” (Bollain, El Torer [Seville, 1968], p. 16). In this context it is worth noting that bullfighting in Spain has a role much like that of rodeo broncubusting in the United States, foxhunting in England, and cockfighting in Bali. See Paul Bouissac, Circus and Culture: A Semiotic Approach (Bloomington, Ind., 1976); Elizabeth Atwood Lawrence, Rodeo: An Anthropologist Looks at the Wild and the Tame (Knoxville, Tenn., 1982); James Howe, “Fox-hunting as Ritual,” American Ethnologist 8 (May 1981): 278–300; and Clifford Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” in Myth, Symbol, and Culture, ed. Geertz (New York, 1971), pp. 1–37.


37. See L. Gilpérez García and M. Fraile Sanz, Reglamentación Taurina Vigente: Diccionario Comentado (Seville, 1972), article 131, and Marvin, Bullfight, p. 140.

38. See Marvin, Bullfight, pp. 34–35, 61.

39. In Laws of Teshuba 3.5 Maimonides, who left Spain as a young man, says that the pious Gentiles have a share in the world to come and in Laws of Edu 11.10 he says that, in certain circumstances, pious idolaters have a share in the world to come. See Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (1930; New York, 1965), p. 273 n. 58.
sal aspect, had no such term—except in its peculiarly inhumane reworking of "pagan" bull-leaping. The Inquisition and its secular arm burnt alive those it called crypto-Jews and -Muslims, and those it did not burn to death it either proselytized or expelled wholly out of Spanish existence—much as Shylock is expelled from Shakespeare's Venice in act 4 of *The Merchant of Venice*. 40 Ferdinando the Bull, more taurine than humane, helped the Inquisition transform the idea of human others who are to be treated humanely into an ideology where all others are not fully human and must be either Christianized or—since the Statutes of Blood Purity often made Christianization impossible—destroyed. At the well-known Festival of the Christians and Moors in Spain even today the expulsion of the Muslims is re-enacted annually in the same Spanish cities and villages where the bullfight has its part in telling Spanish nationals who they really are. 41

3. *An Amsterdam of Religions*

T. S. Eliot got it right: "The Christian does not wish to be tolerated." He cannot tolerate difference without also wanting to sublate *[aufheben]* that difference. 42

The systematic political philosophy of religious toleration towards all men arose prominently in the seventeenth century thanks partly to certain thinkers' recognition that Christendom, unlike some polities or religions, requires an extra and perhaps extraneous theory of toleration, or "policy of patient forbearance in the presence of something which is disliked or disapproved of." 43 The New Testament says "All ye are brethren," but the politically needful policy of toleration would have to recognize that there are not only "brothers" in the world but

40. In 1594, Roderigo Lopez, court physician to Queen Elizabeth, born a Portuguese Jew but a convert to Christianity, was executed before a festive crowd that laughed at his dying assertion that "'hee loved the Queene as well as Christ Jesus.'" This was a few years before Shakespeare wrote *The Merchant of Venice* with its themes of forced conversions, racial difference, and relations between the three peoples of the book. Lopez's assertion, "'being spoken by a Jew, as it was,'" writes William Camden, "'was but onely laughed at by the people'" (quoted in Steven Mullaney, "Brothers and Others, or the Art of Alienation," in *Cannibals, Witches, and Divorce: Estranging the Renaissance*, ed. Marjorie Garber [Baltimore, 1987], p. 72). For an extended treatment of the problems of conversion, race, and religion in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*, see my *Money, Language, and Thought*, chap. 3.


also "others" who should be tolerated as they are, no matter how much they or their existence discomfort us. The work of John Locke on the idea of religious toleration confronts this tradition of a potentially intolerant Christianity—one that slips from the proposition, "All men are my brothers," to the proposition, "Only my brothers are men." Locke, who as a young man had rejected the idea of taking holy orders in the Church of England, gave expression in his treatises on toleration to the political dilemma inherent in any polity of universal brotherhood; his ideas are crucial to the development of pluralist and liberal toleration in the modern world.

The ideology of national toleration also has roots in the experience of the Iberian Marranos who fled the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions. Many Spanish crypto-Jews went to Portugal, where they were called and called themselves "The Nation," as also in France and Amsterdam. 44 This "Nation" was caught between a world of Christians who called them derogatorily Marranos, or "pigs," and a world of Jews, who called them anusim, or "compelled" and even "raped." 45 Yosef Yerushalmi writes that

the novelty of Marrano apologetics and polemics goes far beyond the relative degree of its Christian learning. The knowledge which these writers had of Christianity was derived not merely from books, but from their own personal experience of Christian life, ritual, and liturgy. They are thus the first body of Jewish writers contra Christianos to have known Christianity from within, and it is this which endows their tracts with special interest. [IC, p. 49]

Among such tracts is Isaac Cardoso’s Philosophia libera, one of the first works of general philosophy published by a professing Jew specifically

44. In Portuguese: nação. In Spain the Marranos became the nación and in France the nation. See the claim that the Marranos called themselves “the nation” in Vincente da Costa Mattos, Breve discurso contra a herética peripécia do Judaísmo (Lisbon, 1623), esp. pp. 148f. Duarte Gomes de Solis’s work, Alegación en favor de la Compañía de las Indias Orientales (1628), calls the new Christians the hombres de la nación and Philip IV in 1649 called them the gente da nação; see Antônio José Saraiva, Inquisição e Christãos-novos (Porto, 1969). The Latin term natio plays a role in the Marrano Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics; in book 3, proposition 46 he writes: “If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole same class or nation whereto he belongs” (Spinoza, The Ethics, The Works of Spinoza, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, 2 vols. [1883; New York, 1980], 2:160; my emphasis).

for a generally European audience. And there is also Cardoso’s *Excelecias de los Hebreos*, a treatise published in 1679 in Amsterdam, a haven for Marranos. Cardoso, having been raised as a Spanish Catholic and living as a devout Italian Jew, describes in this controversialist work the Spanish claims that the Jews are cruel and inhuman, and he counters those claims with an argument that the Spanish merely project onto others the faults they fear in themselves. In this context he describes how the Spanish kill both men and animals for pleasure at their *fiesta agonal* (or bullfight); how they regard the dead with exhilaration and joy; and how they sacrifice men to their gods, throwing them to the so-called wild beasts. In the same work Cardoso emphasizes the need for political toleration towards Jews not only because they are a loyal, industrious, and hence politically useful people—which was the usual argument for toleration—but also because Jews constitute “a Republic apart” (IC, p. 469).

Leo Strauss, in a work researched in the Weimar Republic, writes in reference to the Marrano philosopher Uriel da Costa—a Catholic who, after relinquishing Christianity and converting to Judaism, relinquished Judaism and took up a general critique of all religion—that “the situation of the Marranos favored doubt of Christianity quite as much as doubt of Judaism.” (One might think here of the anti-*converso* pamphlet of 1488 that argued that converts were like “the monstrous animal which carried Mohammed on his back from Jerusalem to Mecca and which, like the *conversos*, belonged to no known species” [SFR, pp. 191–92]). Certainly the unique philosophical stance of the Marranos, which was skeptical and liberal, helped to mark and make for a new sort

46. The *Philosophica libera* was published in Venice in 1673. I leave aside here such works as translations and commentaries by Elijah de Medigo and the neoplatonic *Dialoghi d’amore* (1535) by Judah León Abravanel (“Leone Ebree”), son of the Spanish-born Isaac Abravanel.


48. See Isaac [Fernando] Cardoso, *Las excelencias de los Hebreos* (Amsterdam, 1679), p. 389. Cardoso refers to such bullfights as that of 19 June 1630, where twenty bulls and three men were killed. And he probably refers also to the national *fiesta agonal* of 13 October 1631. Tigers, bears, bulls, horses, greyhounds—and “other less important animals which might enhance the laughter and entertainment” of the spectators—were thrown into the ring. The bull was triumphant among these creatures, goring most of them to death, after which King Philip IV himself donned his cape and killed the exhausted bull. In his earlier days as a Spanish Catholic, Cardoso had attended this *fiesta*. Don Joseph Pellicer de Tovar, the royal chronicler, includes in his *Anfiteatro* a sonnet by Cardoso that depicts Philip as a “Christian Mars” and the bull “as gratefully accepting his wounds at the hand of the monarch” (IC, pp. 96, 97–98).

of toleration. It is a stance defended in the Marrano skeptic philosopher Francis Sanches’s *Quod Scitur Nihil* [Why Nothing Can Be Known] (1581) and Sébastian Châteillon’s *De haereticis* (1554), in which he criticizes John Calvin for helping the Inquisition to persecute the Spanish anti-Trinitarian Michael Servetus and eventually to burn him at the stake.

"We know in part," writes Châteillon, quoting the German freethinker Sebastian Franck, "that Socrates was right, that we know only that we do not know. We may be heretics quite as much as our opponents." It is a stance that includes Montaigne’s freethinking *Essays*, written by the son of a Marrano at a time of brutal religious conflict in France where Catholics persecuted Protestants as if they were members of another race or even species. And it includes Pierre Bayle’s skeptical and tolerant writings as well as Spinoza’s treatment of freedom of thought and speech in his anonymously published *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670), which, with its celebration of the domestic liberty of Amsterdam, has been called the first philosophy of democratic liberalism.

50. Sébastian Châteillon [Castellio], *Concerning Heretics; Whether they are to be persecuted and how they are to be treated; A collection of the opinions of learned men both ancient and modern*, trans. and ed. Roland H. Bainton (New York, 1955), p. 102. This is an anonymous work attributed to Châteillon together with excerpts from other works by Châteillon and David Joris; compare Kamen, *The Rise of Toleration* (New York, 1967), p. 75; hereafter abbreviated *RT*.

51. Natalie Zemon Davis, in her excellent study of rites of violence, argues that the French Catholic killers at the Saint Bartholomew Day’s massacre in 1572 did not think of the Protestants that they killed as “a foreign race” (as Janine Estèbe had claimed in *Tocson pour un massacre: La Saison des Saint-Barthélémy* [Paris, 1968], p. 197) but merely as people who engaged in polluting, divisive, and disorderly actions. She also remarks, however, that the Catholics considered their Protestant victims to be “non-human” and that they forgot that their victims were “human beings” (Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Rites of Violence,” *Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays* [Stanford, Calif., 1975], pp. 160n, 175n, 180). As it seems to me, such dehumanization often amounts to racism, especially in the context of universalist or catholic ideology. Where “all human beings are siblings” and every creature’s status as human being is questionable, the anthropocentric butchering as animals of thousands of creatures called Huguenots or “kin of Hugo” amounts to the same thing as the racist massacre of them as nonsiblings. (On the sixteenth-century interpretation of Huguenot as “kin of Hugo,” see Willy Richards, *Untersuchungen zur Genesis der reformierten Kirchenterrinologie der Westschweiz und Frankreichs* [Bern, 1959], pp. 46–48.) For the universalist condition insisted upon by Saint Paul, “All men are brothers,” implies that all human beings are in one way or another of the same generation, or race. And from this condition it comes to follow all too easily that only my “brothers” are human—that is, only members of my race are human—and all “others” are animals.

Montaigne’s *Essays* shows the influence of his mother, the Marrano Antoinette de Louppes (Lopez), and of his father, for whose sake he translated the Spanish schoolman Raymund de Sabunde’s *Theologia naturalis* (1569).

52. See Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise*, *Works of Spinoza*, chap. 20; hereafter abbreviated *T-P*. Strauss writes that Spinoza “was the first philosopher who was both a democrat and a liberal. He was the philosopher who founded liberal democracy, a specifically modern regime” (*Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion*, p. 16).
Amsterdam was a haven for political radicals and religious outcasts from Europe, including such proponents of toleration as Henri Basnage de Beauval, Bayle, and Locke. No political refugee living in Holland in the seventeenth century needed reminding that Christianity in practice did not live up to its claims of universal love. Spinoza, haunted by the same memories of Spanish cruelty as many Hollanders, was no exception. "I have often wondered," writes Spinoza, "that persons who make a boast of professing the Christian religion, namely, love . . . and charity to all men, should quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display daily towards one another such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the virtues they claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith" (T-P, 1:6). Much of Spinoza's thinking starts from the contrast between the preaching of universal love based on universal kinship and the same persons' practice of persecution. Sometimes he flatters the majority of his readers by appearing to agree with them that Matthew's famous claim about the Jews—that the Jews believe in the doctrine "Love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy" (Matt. 5:43)—is correct. But indirectly Spinoza points out both that the Jews were bidden to love their fellow citizens as themselves and that there is an inevitable conflict between the requirements of universal love and those of politics: "Though the Jews were bidden to love their fellow-citizens as themselves (Levit. 19:17–18), they were nevertheless bound, if a man offended against the law, to point him out to the judge (Levit. 5:1, and Deut. 13:8–9)" (T-P, 1:250). Even as Spinoza pretends for heuristic purposes to agree with Matthew's assessment of Jewish hate and Christian love, he demonstrates that the link between the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount and that of Mount Sinai is one of polar opposition. He shows the connection between those teachings. For according to Spinoza, the difference between the commands "Hate thine enemy [the foreigner]," which Matthew attributes to the Jews, and "Love thine enemy," which Matthew attributes to the Christians, is due exclusively to the changed political circumstance of the Jewish people in the Diaspora. Moses

53. See Henri Basnage de Beauval's Tolérance des religions (1684), a Huguenot defense of religious toleration, and Pierre Bayle's Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jesús Christ: Contreins-les entrer (1686), a discussion of Luke 14:23, where the master tells his servants to force the guests to enter. For Locke, see A Letter Concerning Toleration, trans. William Popple (Indianapolis, 1955); hereafter abbreviated LT.

54. When Spinoza's former student Albert Burgh converted to Catholicism and tried to convince Spinoza to forgo philosophizing and likewise convert, Spinoza sent him an uncharacteristically angry letter. Spinoza reminded him how Burgh's own Netherlands ancestors had been tortured during the period of the Spanish Duke of Alva's "Blood Council" and how the convert Judah the Faithful had recently been burnt alive by the Inquisition. Judah the Faithful was Don Lope de Vera y Alarcon de San Clemente, who was burnt to death in Valladolid on 25 July 1644. See Spinoza, Correspondence, Works of Spinoza, 2:415, 417–18.
could think of the establishment of a good polity, whereas Jesus—like Jeremiah and Isaiah—addressed a people that had lost its political independence. Spinoza shows that, since “religion has always been made to conform to the public welfare,” Christianity and Judaism are political refractions of the same doctrine (T-P, 1:250).

A word about Spinoza’s “indirection” in argument is in order. Some historians have said that Spinoza wrote in convoluted fashion in order to hide an atheism that would have troubled his readers and hence interfered with his purpose. (In 1671 Spinoza wrote a moving letter about this matter to the Portuguese-born Isaac Orobio de Castro, categorically denying the charge that he “with covert and disguised arguments [taught] atheism.”) Be that as it may, Spinoza wrote in such a way as not to offend his readers unnecessarily. He did not want to jeopardize his larger political purpose, which was the support of free philosophical inquiry. Spinoza’s “esotericism” was pedagogic and political: he sought according to the principle of “economy” to speak to different men at their own planes of understanding. Spinoza remarks that Saint Paul was “to the Greeks a Greek, and to the Jews a Jew” (T-P, 1:53); Spinoza himself was something of an ideological Machiavelli.

Amsterdam, with its famous domestic tolerance, provides Spinoza with his purpose. The phrase “an Amsterdam of religions” meant something like “a universal [domestic] toleration” (RT, p. 223). And Spinoza praises Amsterdam as a place within which “men of every nation and

55. The two sentences previous to this one are adapted from Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), pp. 174–75.

56. Spinoza, Correspondence, Works of Spinoza, 2:366. Isaac Orobio de Castro was a fellow resident in Amsterdam who criticized Juan de Prado. Prado had been “excommunicated” together with Spinoza in 1656. Orobio’s Certamen Philosophicum, Propugnatae Veritatis Divinæ ac naturalis, published in 1684 with Fénélon’s Traité de l’existence de dieu, was a Cartesian response to Spinoza. Orobio’s Prevenciones Divisionas contra la vana Idolatria de las Gentes, published in French under the title Israel vengé (1770), was used as ammunition by French atheists against Christianity. On Orobio and the Marranos generally, see Yosef Kaplan, From Christianity to Judaism: The Story of Isaac Orobio de Castro, trans. Raphael Lowe (New York, 1989).


58. Economy, says John Henry Cardinal Newman, means “setting [the truth] out to advantage,” as when “representing religion, for the purpose of conciliating the heathen, in the form most attractive to their prejudices,” and the disciplina arcana is a “withholding [of] the truth” in the form of allegory, by which the same text may express the same truth at different levels to different people (Newman, The Arians of the Fourth Century [1833; London, 1919], p. 65). Economy is necessary to “lead forward children by degrees” and may employ similes and metaphors. Newman maintains, for example, that “the information given to the blind man, that scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet, is an instance of an unexceptionable economy, since it was as true as it could be under the circumstances of the case, conveying a substantially correct impression as far as it went” (ibid., pp. 72–73). See my Economy of Literature, chap. 3.

religion live together in the greatest harmony”—more as in an idealized Canadian mosaic, I might say, than in an American melting pot. In Amsterdam, says Spinoza, a man’s “religion and sect [before the judges] is considered of no importance” (T-P, 1:284):

Now, seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic, where everyone’s judgment is free and unshackled, where each may worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed before all things dear and precious, I have believed that I should be undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task, in demonstrating that not only can such freedom be granted without prejudice to the public peace, but also, that without such freedom, piety cannot flourish nor the public peace be secure. Such is the chief conclusion I seek to establish in this treatise. [T-P, 1:6]

Spinoza wanted religious tolerance for all men. And surely he would have applauded the efforts of his former teacher, the Lisbon-born Amsterdam Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel, to convince Oliver Cromwell to allow the return of the Jews to England. (In England, the question of the readmission of the Jews was mooted under the growing desire for religious liberty; such works appeared in the English language as Manasseh’s Vindiciae judaorum in 1656 and Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise in 1689.) However, the sort of religious tolerance that many of his well-meaning liberal contemporaries hankered after was not all that Spinoza wanted. What they wanted had existed already in the world—as in the old Spanish Islamic convivencia. Franz Rosenzweig wrote in The Star of Redemption in Germany in 1930, that

in a certain sense, Islam demanded and practiced “tolerance” long before the concept was discovered by Christian Europe. And on the other hand love of neighbor could lead to consequences such as religious wars and trials of heretics—not aberrations but legitimate developments which will simply not fit into any superficial conception of this love.61

This limited tolerance that defines Islamic Spanish convivencia, which earlier I idealized for heuristic purposes and which the tolerant Lessing

60. Had Manasseh not been absent from Amsterdam on his mission to England, says Israel Abrahs, Spinoza would probably not have been “excommunicated” by the Jewish community in 1656 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., s. v. “Menasseh ben Israel”). On the English translation of Spinoza’s Treatise, see Elwe’s introduction to T-P, 1:xxxiii, and Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London, 1880). On Marranos in seventeenth-century England generally, see Lucien Wolf, Crypto-Jews under the Commonwealth (London, 1894).

idealized during the Enlightenment in such works as Nathan the Wise, was admirable. But what Spinoza sought was not an ideal if limited freedom of religion based on theological principles but rather a separation of philosophy from theology. This break would mark an end to the terrors of religious inquisition and guarantee a safe place in the world for freedom of philosophical inquiry.

Locke, who knew both the political and Cartesian writings of Spinoza, himself lived in political exile from 1684 to 1689 in Amsterdam. Already interested since the 1660s in the limits of human understanding and the question of toleration, Locke attended a debate in the 1680s in Amsterdam between the Marrano Oorbio and the Remonstrant Protestant theologian Philip van Limborch. One of his first publications was a lengthy review of this debate, which appeared anonymously in the Remonstrant Jean Leclerc's Bibliothèque universelle et historique. (The debate is the subject of Limborch’s De veritate religionis Christianae amica collatio cum erudito Judaeo, and it influenced his Historia Inquisitionis, a massive critique of the Inquisition.) Locke’s review is connected ideologically both to his Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669), which emphasizes the principle of religious toleration, and to his Letter on Toleration addressed to Limborch in 1689. The liberal Locke’s various letters and essays on

62. Lessing, the friend of Moses Mendelssohn and himself the German translator of Manasseh ben Israel’s work, idealized the Pact of Umar in his Enlightenment drama Nathan the Wise. In the middle scene of the middle act of this play, Nathan, the Jewish descendant of Solomon the Wise, is asked by Saladin, the Muslim ruler, which of the three “Religions of the Book” is genuine. The three religions are squared off against one another in Lessing’s play in a way recalling the twelfth-century Spanish Jew Yehuda Halevi’s Kuzari: The Book of Proof and Argument in Defense of the Despised Faith, trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld (New York, 1946), a work written in Arabic and indebted to the fifth-century Islamic philosopher Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali’s Courteous Refutation of the Divinity of Jesus Christ According to the Gospel [Réfutation excellente de la divinité de Jésus-Christ d’après les Évangiles], trans. R. Chidiac (Paris, 1939). For the influence of al-Ghazali on Halevi, see David Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters von Saadja bis Maimon (Gotha, 1877), esp. pp. 119–40. See also Lessing und die Toleranz: Beiträge der vierten internationalen Konferenz der Lessing Society in Hamburg vom 27. bis 29. Juni 1985, ed. Peter Freimark, Franklin Kopitzsch, and Helga Slessarev (Dortrecht, 1986).

63. See Strauss, Persecution, p. 192.

64. For a catalogue of Locke’s library, see Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, rev. ed. (New York, 1963), pp. 149–61.

65. See Locke’s “commonplace books," which contain essays on the “Roman Commonwealth" (concerning religious liberty and the relations of religion to the state) as well as one entitled “Essay concerning Toleration” (1666).

toleration and his critique in Two Treatises of Government (1689) of the notion in Robert Filmer's Patriarcha (1680) that "Nations" are merely "distinct Families" are among the earliest systematic nonuniversalist arguments for specifically religious toleration in the Christian West. As we shall see, Locke and his liberal contemporaries introduced a new particularism into the debate concerning toleration.

4. Toleration

To belong to this omnipresent shepherd, it is not necessary for the entire flock to graze on one pasture or to enter and leave the master's house through just one door. It would be neither in accord with the shepherd's wishes nor conducive to the growth of his flock. [Do you wonder why] some people deliberately turn these ideas upside down and purposely try to confuse them? They tell you that a union of religions is the shortest way to that brotherly love and tolerance you kindhearted people so earnestly desire.

—Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem

Anti-Semitism is the Jewish aspect of Christianity—so goes the claim. The accusation that racism and anti-Semitism in Christendom are fundamentally Jewish—an accusation encountered with reference not only to the period of the Spanish Inquisition but also to European history overall—generally boils down to the claim that, since Judaism

68. Locke, Two Treatises, p. 285 (First Treatise, §144); compare p. 386 (Second Treatise, §110).
71. René Guyon offers a good example of the arguments that blame anti-Semitism on the Jews:

Alors que les autres dieux méditerranéens se manifestaient les uns aux autres une déférence de bon goût, le laveh israélite apporta brusquement l'intolérance dans ses relations avec ses congénères. Cette invention s'est, par un bien mauvais tour du destin, retournée contre la race élu: son esprit d'intolérance, passé par la suite dans le christianisme, s'est exercé contre les Juifs dispersés et leur a valu d'éternelles persécutions dont ils peuvent, avec quelque mélancolie, trouver le prototype dans leurs propres antécédents. [Guyon, Réflexions sur la tolérance (Paris, 1930), p. 87]

Not surprisingly in this context, Guyon argued in 1933 for the practice of universal incest, basing his views on the universalism of mankind; see the doctrines of the London-based pro-incest Guyon Society. See Guyon, Sex Life and Sex Ethics (London, 1933) and the conclusion to my The End of Kinship.
is supposed to heed consanguinity and tribal affiliation and Christianity is not, racist and anti-Semitic Christians are fundamentally Jewish. This charge has been refuted for myriad historical circumstances, including those of sixteenth-century Spain. That people continue to make the allegation, citing everything from the curse of Ham to the rules concerning monetary interest, is not the fault of those who have refuted it. Yet students of politics and religion have been slow to emphasize that Jewish particularism heeds tribal difference in such a way that it can become precisely the basis for a realistic tolerance.

The particularism of Judaism encouraged tolerant coexistence insofar as its ancient Hebrew Commonwealth had rules recognizing that there are not only Jewish siblings but also other human beings. Those "others" have specific legal and political rights as human beings. Judaism is not essentially a proselytizing religion; it provides a clear standard of goodness independent from being Jewish. Good human beings who are other than Jewish—they run the gamut from

72. See Netanyahu, "Américo Castro."
73. The history of defining nationhood and class in terms of the biblical "book of generations" includes Noah’s cursing Ham’s son Canaan as a slave. ("Cursed be Canaan; a slave of slaves shall he be to his brothers" [Gen. 5:1, 10:25].) On the one hand, Christian apologists for serfdom and slavery argued that their "white" serfs and slaves were descendants of the children of Ham. Friedman ("‘When Adam Delved . . .’", p. 228) cites Hugo von Trimberg’s Renner (c. 1300) and Heinrich Wittenweiler’s Ring [c. 1400]. On the other hand, people in Europe and the United States argued that all whites should be free. Canaan, they argued, was "black" (Ham presumably copulated with a raven on the ark—as suggested in the Sachsenspiegel [c. 1200])—and God gave Africa to Ham’s descendants, which is the gist of Cursor Mundi (c. 1300) and the famous "T-map" in Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae (Augsburg, 1472), bk. 14, chap. 1. They rarely mention that Canaan was not African—other sons and grandsons of Ham, like Egypt and Sheba, were (Gen. 10:6–7)—and they conclude that only blacks should be slaves. See note 91 below.

On the significance of the distinction between "brother" and "other" for the Old Testament rules concerning monetary interest, see Benjamin Nelson, The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood (Chicago, 1969), and my Money, Language, and Thought, chap. 3.

74. For example, in the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth members of all nations (Ammonites and Moabites excepted) were admissible to the rights of citizenship (Deut. 25:3).

75. Universalist Christians have sometimes criticized Jews in the diaspora for "exclusiveness." William Smith, for example, writes that "the liberal spirit of the Mosaic regulations respecting strangers presents a strong contrast to the rigid exclusiveness of the Jews at the commencement of the Christian era. The growth of this spirit dates to the time of the Babylonian captivity" (Smith’s Bible Dictionary [New York, 1976], p. 664). Smith neglects to mention that the liberal spirit of the Mosaic regulations respecting strangers—which he contrasts with Jewish exclusiveness—presents a strong contrast to the intolerance of Christians. Although for Christians exclusiveness and intolerance are theoretically always the same ("Be my brother—that is, be included in my brotherhood—or I will kill you"), for Jews they are distinct ("If you are not my brother I will still keep faith with you"). Particularist tolerance may not be possible without a polity (that is the gist of Spinoza’s remarks on the subject); universalist tolerance may not be possible at all.
"righteous gentiles" to "primitive idolaters"—are protected under the laws of the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth so long as they obey the Noachic laws. Such Quakers as William Penn, who wanted to see constituted a Christian commonwealth with tolerance towards "heretics" as well as non-Christians, argued that Christendom should emulate the coexistence promulgated by the Hebrew Commonwealth. Author of The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience (1671) and the Constitution for the Colony of Pennsylvania, which guarantees "religious freedom," Penn writes in his Life that "the utmost [the Hebrew Commonwealth] required from strangers . . . was an acknowledgment to the Noachical precepts."76

If it is not Jewish particularism that leads inevitably to religious discrimination and racial intolerance among Christian universalists, then what does? When we try to see past local issues—like the myths of tribal autochthony that might allow underprivileged social classes to think that they are "unpolluted children of the earth" even if they are not pure-blooded Spanish noblemen [hidalgos] (SFR, p. 147)77—a major factor would be the doctrinal absence, essential to the universalist dogma of Christianity, of the Old Testament category of "human beings who are other than siblings." Christianity, indeed, gains its fundamental New Testament intermediation between humankind and God (in the person of the man-God Jesus) only as a trade-off for the Old Testament intermediation between sibling human being and nonhuman others. The absence of the category of "nonsibling human being," expressed by the formulation "all human beings are siblings, none are others," is of the essence of Christianity.

The doctrine that all men are brothers was a frequently cited New Testament text in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century defenses, both Protestant and Catholic, of specifically religious toleration.78 For example, Franck insists that "anyone who wishes my good and can bear with me by his side, is a good brother, whether Papist, Lutheran, Zwinglian, Anabaptist, or even Turk, even though we do not feel the same way, until God gathers us in his own school and unites us in the


77. Hidalguía is a sort of nobility that is sometimes distinguished from Blood Purity.

78. Other texts often cited include the Golden Rule (Matt. 7:12), the parable of the tares (Matt. 13:24–40, 36–40), Jesus' discussion of the bruised seed (Matt. 12:20), and Rabbi Gamaliel's exhortation to the Jews (Acts 5:38–39). Another important text was Paul's statement that God "made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of the earth" (Acts 17:26; compare John 3:16).
same faith. . . even if he is Jew or Samaritan, I want to love him and do him as much good as in me lies.” (RT, p. 65). And in his 1530 translation of a Latin Chronicle and Description of Turkey by a Transylvanian captive, which had been prefaced by Martin Luther, Franck added a pro-Islamic appendix holding up the Turks as in many respects an example to Christians.79 The French Protestant Châteillon, attacking the Calvinists for their notorious persecution of Servetus in the mid-sixteenth century, quotes Franck’s saying that “‘my heart is alien to none. I have my brothers among the Turks, Papists, Jews and all peoples’” (RT, pp. 65, 78). Luis de Granada, one of the few Spanish Catholics to plead openly for religious toleration, writes in Libro de la Oración (1554) that “‘Christian charity and zeal for the salvation of souls oblige me here to say a word in warning to those who, out of a mistaken zeal for the faith, believe that they do no sin by inflicting evil and harm on those who are outside the faith, be they Moors or Jews or heretics or Gentiles. They deceive themselves greatly, for these too are brethren’” (RT, p. 100). Likewise the Socinians’ unitarian confession of faith—a catechism published at Rakow, Russia, in 1605 that was based on the unitarian teaching of the Italian Sozzini that Jesus was not divine—defines toleration in terms of brotherhood: “‘In so far as we are concerned, we are all brothers, and no power, no authority, has been given us over the conscience of others. Although among brothers some are more learned than others, all are equal in freedom and in the right to affiliation’” (RT, p. 124).80 Christians often conflated species with family, as we have seen, so it is not surprising that the argument that we should tolerate others’ religious views because they are our kin, or “brothers,” should take sometimes the form of a claim that we should tolerate their views because they are our kind, or “human beings.” During the Thirty Years War Hermann Conring based his appeal for toleration on the premise that “‘Protestants are men; they are human beings like everyone else’” (RT, p. 159). And in the American colonies Roger Williams wrote, “‘I speak of Conscience, a persuasion fixed in the mind and heart of a man, which enforceth him to judge and to do so with respect to God, his worship. This Conscience is found in all mankind, more or less: in Jews, Turks, Papists, Protestants, pagans’” (RT, p. 189).81 Benevolent people, then, used the rhetoric of universal brotherhood as part of an attempt to bring about a beneficent toler-

ance. However, their idea of universal brotherhood often constituted for them an entire politics or antipolitics, so they were generally blind to or uninterested in the totalitarian and intolerant tendency of the universalist fraternity they praised. For the traditional universalist argument that we should tolerate bothersome humanoid creatures for the reason that all human beings are brothers does not allow for conceiving a creature as being at once non-kin and kind and thus it encourages us to treat as nonhuman those we might already regard as non-kin.

In any event, the creed that “all human beings are siblings” is difficult to live up to. Politically speaking, one nation, or siblinghood, defines itself against another, and probably needs to. Psychologically speaking, a universal siblinghood seems to lead either to celibacy (as for the traditional saints) or to incest (as for the heretical Corinthians). 82 So most universalists, even as they uphold in some idealist fashion the view that “all human beings are siblings,” come to live as though they accept the particularist view that requires such attention to blood lineage as allows for national definition and for sexual reproduction without incest. Thanks to their peculiar combination of ideal universalism and actual particularism, however, benevolent and would-be tolerant universalists may fail to understand the multifaceted character of the category of “nonsibling human.” Why they should fail we have already seen. The Old Testament category of a being intermediating between brother and other contradicts too discomfortingly the cherished ideals both of universal siblinghood and of a being mediating between man and God. So universalists often fail to consider what sort of political rights, if any, “human beings who are other than siblings” should be accorded. In Christianity—if not in Christendom—there are supposed to be no such beings.

Moses Mendelssohn in his Jerusalem tried to steer the ideology of a universalist Enlightenment (“all men are brothers”) away from what he took to be its probably inevitable course towards barbarism (“only my brothers are men, all others are animals”). In the Germany of his day Jews were pressured to renounce their faith in return for civil equality and union with the Christian majority. 83 The pressure was kindly, but it was also a form of intolerance towards non-kin. So Mendelssohn attempted to insinuate between the two ordinary categories, “brother”

82. The Corinthian sect’s acts of incest were not “deed[s] done secretly out of weakness, but . . . ideological act[s] done openly with the approval of at least an influential sector of the community” (Adela Yarbro Collins, “The Function of ‘Excommunication’ in Paul,” Harvard Theological Review 73 (Jan.–Apr. 1980): 253; see Cor. 5:1 and my End of Kinship.

83. “I will love you if you will be my kin” also became the French Revolution’s nationalist promise to the Jews.
and "other," an intermediating term that would allow long-term "strangers" the status of human beings: "Regard us, if not as brothers and fellow citizens, at least as fellowmen and coinhabitants of this country" (J, pp. 106–7). And Mendelssohn tried to warn his contemporaries against the sort of person who "outwardly . . . may feign brotherly love and radiate a spirit of tolerance, while secretly [and perhaps unbeknownst to himself] he is already at work forging the chains with which he plans to shackle our reason so that, taking it by surprise, he can cast it back into the cesspool of barbarism from which you had just begun to pull it up" (J, p. 108). 84

Locke in his Letter on Toleration writes that

It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion. [LT, p. 57; emphasis mine]

Locke may be overstating his case. Diversity of religious opinion probably can be avoided—at least in the public sphere. After all, it is the universalizing impulse of Christianity precisely to homogenize diversity

84. The "barbarism of universalism" has not disappeared. Consider, for example, the popular contemporary Russian nationalist ideologue Igor Shafarevich. In his Russophobia, published by the Union of the Russian People, he writes that "one of the most wonderful phenomena and enigmas of our Earth [is] belonging to one's [own particular] People." And he insists that everyone fully human should convert to this nation. Confusing thus the polis with the family (nation), Shafarevich writes of Jews in the Soviet Union that they must "make the choice between the status of aliens without any political rights and citizenship based on the love of the fatherland." If a person does not share the same Ur-father—or have the same autochthony from an indigenous fatherland—as do "genuine" Russians, then he is an "alien," without political rights. According to the usual universalist principle of Christendom, every alien is nonhuman ("nothing human is alien to me"). So aliens in Shafarevich's universalist Russia would be worse off than strangers in a particularist commonwealth. Not surprisingly, the nationalist Shafarevich makes the old accusation (like Arthur Schopenhauer's) that Jews regard non-Jewish human beings as animals. "Well known are the pronouncements from Talmud," he writes, "which from many points of view explain that a person of another religion cannot be considered human, . . . [that non-Jews] are animals with human faces, etc., etc." (quoted in Liah Greenfeld, "The Closing of the Russian Mind," The New Republic, 5 Feb. 1990, pp. 34, 35). As I have shown in my essay "The Family Pet" (Representations, no. 15 [Summer 1986]: 121–153), however, there are universalist Christians who say that those who are not essentially (or potentially) Christians are nonhuman. And there are particularists who, as Locke reminds us in his First Treatise of Government, not only guarantee specific political rights to human strangers but also reserve special protections for animals. See, for example, Locke's discussion in Two Treatises (p. 203; First Treatise, § 39) of how, though man was intended to be a shepherd, he was not permitted to take "a Kid or a Lamb out of the Flock, to satisfy his hunger." Compare Shafarevich's Socialist Phenomenon, trans. William Tjalsma (New York, 1980), with its foreword by the nationalist exile Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn.
of religious opinion by converting non-Christians and Christian heretics. And, where conversion proves difficult, it is the tendency to void, or empty, Christendom of these elements by whatever means.

But should Englishmen put up with non-Christians? Those who said “no” bolstered their view by claiming that the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth did not tolerate idolatry and that the Christian polity ought to be like the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth. Locke, though, felt that Christians should tolerate different religious opinions. He strengthened his argument first by contradicting the view that the ancient Jews did not tolerate idolaters. He points out correctly that, although the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth did compel Jews (brothers) to observe the rites of the Mosaic law, it did not compel non-Jews (others), even idolatrous strangers: “in the very same place where it is ordered that an Israelite that was an idolater should be put to death [Exod. 22:20, 21], there it is provided that strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed.” Locke then argues that the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth is, in any case, an inappropriate model for actual states. The Commonwealth was distinct from actual polities of Europe in that it was “an absolute theocracy” exhibiting no “difference between that commonwealth and the church.” (The same point is made by Spinoza.) And, according to Locke, “there is absolutely no such thing under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth” (LT, p. 43). Although certain states have “embraced” Christianity, all maintain an older form of government with which Christianity per se does not meddle. In this way Locke rejects the aspect of the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth that conflates religion and politics while at the same time he uses the rhetoric of Jewish particularism to bolster the practice of toleration towards non-Christians and Christian heretics or schismatics.

Events in the Middle East in the early 1990s remind us that an Islamic or Judaic particularism with a tendency towards universalism, however much it may provide one precondition for a tolerant society in a state where one religion or another clearly dominates, is not in all historical contexts gentler than a universalism with a tendency towards particularism. (It is this quality of tolerance as a merely paternalistic noblesse oblige that Immanuel Kant criticizes as “haughty” in his 1784 essay, “What Is Enlightenment?”) Locke himself does not extend toleration to all groups. He excepts atheists and philosophical freethinkers

85. Compare Oliver Cromwell’s statement that “‘I had rather that Mahommedanism were permitted amongst us than that one of God’s children should be persecuted’” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., s. v. “Oliver Cromwell”). Cromwell was not tolerant towards Roman Catholics and Anglicans.

86. Compare John Milton’s forceful advocacy of the separation of church and state in his Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes: Shewing that it is not lawful for any power on earth to compell in Matters of Religion (1659).

from "religious" toleration (LT, p. 52). And more significantly in view of the suggestion of his English translator William Popple that Locke believes in "absolute liberty" (LT, p. 12) as well as modern-day critiques of so-called pure tolerance. Locke also excludes from toleration people who commit even as part of their religious rites illegal acts associable with child sacrifice and incest (LT, p. 39).

Locke calls tolerance "the chief characteristic mark of the true church" (LT, p. 13). He would not seem to require tolerance towards free inquiry, as would Spinoza. His influence on the legislation of toleration was at first disappointing. And fraternal liberalism had such inherent problems as are suggested by the history of the idea of brotherhood in the United States, with its connection with race slavery and civil war and by the Dutch imperialists' cruel treatment of Africans.


89. Locke was concerned to rule out child sacrifice and incest not only because he viewed them as crimes against the sovereign laws of England—which would have been reason enough to rule them out—but also because child sacrifice can all too easily make palpable the dangerous ideology of an absolute universalism (catholicism), and incest is one sign that that ideology can become acceptable. Concerning child sacrifice: Blood from the sacrificed Son provides the extraordinary substance of universal communal Siblinghood to which, according to Christian doctrine, all men essentially or potentially belong. Concerning incest: Incest or celibacy of one sort or another is always the sign of universal Siblinghood.

Christian sects, both in primitive times and in the seventeenth century, were frequently accused of "lustfully pollut[ing] themselves in promiscuous uncleanness," as Locke remarks (LT, p. 39). Locke says the accusation about the primitive Christians was false, though modern historians might disagree, claiming, for example, that the Corinthian sect's incestuous deeds were "ideological act[s] done openly with the approval of at least an influential sector of the community" (Collins, "The Function of 'Excommunication' in Paul," p. 253). There were similar incestuous heretics in seventeenth-century England. Abiezer Coppe, a member of the Ranter sect, argued that through the intermediation of Jesus sin was "made to disappear"; and promoting "sexual licence," he praised the Pauline state beyond "good" and "evil," or chastity and incest (John Carey, foreword, A Collection of Ranter Writings from the 17th Century, ed. Nigel Smith [London, 1983], p. 7). See also Norman Cohn, "The Cult of the Free Spirit: A Medieval Heresy Reconstructed," Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review 48 (Spring 1961): 68.

90. In 1689 William and Mary were crowned as joint sovereigns in England; one of the new sovereigns' first bills was the Act of Toleration, which granted freedom of worship, on certain conditions, to Dissenting Protestants. See James Tyrrell's letter to Locke of 6 May 1687 in which Tyrrell says that "your Discourse about Liberty of Conscience would not do amiss now to dispose people's minds to pass it when the Parliament sits" (quoted in Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, p. 67).

91. In the American republic, where it was declared that "all men are created equal," proponents of abolition and equal rights for blacks looked to common generation, or racial descent, to guarantee equality. Their favorite biblical universalist passage was Acts 17:26—God "made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of the earth." Diehard slavers, on the other hand, liked to question whether blacks do share the same blood, as in the essay "Are the Human Race All of One Blood?" (American Ladies
and Indonesians. 92 Yet the larger sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
discourse on toleration did guide the separation of church and state
that nowadays we suppose to inform modern democracies’ attempts to
thwart religious inquisitions and witch-hunts and to respect what we
call “the rights of others.” In this sense the influence of the Amsterdam
group’s exploration of religious and national toleration probably
extends to such present-day liberal democracies as concern themselves
a little less with the circus tragedy of the bull, which so discomfited
Queen Isabella of Spain, and a little more with the agonies of human-
kind.

Magazine 6 [July 1833]; 359–62). Herman Melville’s Mardi includes the bitter inscription:
“In-this-re-publi-can-land-all-men-are-born-free-and-equal”—to which is added, in
smaller print, “Except-the-tribe-of-Hamo” (Melville, Mardi and a Voyage Thither, vol. 3 of
the Writings of Herman Melville, ed. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas
Tanselle [Evanston, Ill., 1970], pp. 512, 513; this passage is quoted by Werner Sollors,
Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture [New York, 1986], p. 38). Opposed
to the tenor of the debate between abolitionists and slavers as to the homogeneity of the
races’ blood is the perhaps quintessentially American insistence that blood doesn’t count.
Just as in Christianity blood ultimately does not matter, only kinship in Christ, so in
America what matters is political consent, not biological descent. Regeneration in the
nation—a conversion or rebirth that transcends consanguinity—qualifies all Americans
for inclusion in the national siblinghood. See my Children of the Earth.

92. It is important to consider whether the cruelty of the relatively tolerant Ameri-
can colonists towards the black slaves within their own borders—and of the relatively
tolerant Dutch towards the indigenous peoples of Africa and the Malay Archipelago—
was based in greed, as Locke might have liked to believe, or in a racialism that follows
from a potentially intolerant universalist creed that conflates family and species (“only my
brothers—my generation, or race—are men worthy of humane treatment”), or in both.
One might consider in this context specifically Christian arguments for apartheid
(“apartheid”) and Muslim arguments for slavery in “Black” Africa. Compare Lewis, Race