Research
Published
articles
“Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis
of Rights,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2009, 8(2), 139-171. (working draft) (published version) (working draft doc)
(presentation slides)
If
you think groups should not have rights because they are not agents, then you
shouldn’t believe in individual rights either.
“Monopoly,
Ramsey and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003),” Economics Letters, 2009,
103(2), 99-100. (working draft) (published version) (working draft tex)
The relationship between
social and private pricing in the Rochet and
Tirole (2003) model.
Forthcoming
articles
“A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms” in the American
Economic Review. (draft pdf) (tex source) (appendix) (appendix tex source) (theoretical slides) (policy-oriented slides) (audio)
A
general theory of monopoly pricing by multi-sided platforms, emphasizing the
importance of the source of user heterogeneity, with applications to
regulation, measurement of market power and merger analysis.
Articles
under review
“The Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard
University. First version: December 2006, revised and submitted
March 2009. (pdf) (tex source)
Pass-through
provides a simple analysis of horizontal and vertical mergers in two-sided
markets, overturning conventional wisdom.
Active
working papers
“Simon
Kuznets: Economist of the Russian Jewish Diaspora,” Princeton University, May
2007. (pdf)
(tex source)
Much
of Simon Kuznets’s economic
thinking was closely tied to his Russian Jewish heritage.
“Psychic
Income, Taxes and the Allocation of Talent,” Princeton University, December
2007. (pdf)
(tex source)
Low
taxes encourage smart students to go into lucrative, socially unproductive
professions, like law and finance.
“Double
Marginalization in Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard University and TSE, July
2008.
(pdf) (tex source)
Vertical
mergers are still beneficial in two-sided markets.
“Pass-Through as an Economic Tool” with Michal Fabinger,
Harvard University. First version: July 2008, submitted April 2009.
The
pass-through rate simplifies, unifies, generalizes and extends many areas of
industrial organization models.
·
Paper: (pdf) (tex source)
·
Appendices: (monopoly appendix)
(tex source)
(GCS appendix)
(tex source)
(multiproduct appendix)
(tex source)
(CoPaDS appendix)
(tex source)
(taxonomy appendix)
(tex source)
(Apt demand appendix)
(tex source)
·
Software, joint with Yali Miao: (Apt demand toolkit lite)
(Apt demand toolkit full)
·
Slides: (theory slides)
(applied slides)
(short conference slides)
Older
working papers
“Biasing
Auctions,” Princeton University, April 2006. (pdf)
(tex source) (teaching slides)
Different
explanations of equilibrium winner’s curse have different implications for
auction design and are testable.
“Overconfidence
in Neural Networks,” Princeton University, May 2006. (request a copy)
Overconfidence
arises naturally in a classical neural network model.
“Universal
Speculation,” Princeton University, May 2006. (request a copy)
The
“Universal Portfolios” algorithm of Cover (1991) conflicts would not be used by a
Bayesian investor.
“A Simple Theory of Scientific Learning,” Princeton
University, September 2007. (pdf)
(tex source) (short summary) (presentation slides)
A model for testing theories
with precise predictions against theories with vague predictions.
“Is
Arbitrage Socially Beneficial?” Princeton University, October 2007. (pdf)
(tex source) (presentation slides)
Arbitrage
and financial innovation are harmful when arbitrage opportunities are created
by irrational investors.
Work
in progress with results
“Solving
the Holdout Problem” with Scott Duke Kominers,
Harvard University (request
a copy) (slides)
Cournot points the way to an efficient solution of the holdout
problem approximately preserving property rights.
“Mutualists
Don’t Look back in Anger” with Megan Frederickson, Doug W. Yu and Naomi Pierce
(request
a copy) (slides)
A
general, economics-based methodology for testing theories of mutualism supports
Partner Fidelity Feedback over Host Sanctions.
“Creative
Genius and the Free Enterprise System” with Jean Tirole (request notes)
We
use mechanism design to show Friedman was right that the free enterprise system
is best if and only if there are rare, materialistic creative geniuses.
“A
Practical Test for D-Stability” with Yali Miao (request notes)
A fast, simple algorithm for
testing the D-Stability of large matrices.
“Slutsky
meets Marschak: First-Order Identification of Multiproduct Monopoly,” Harvard
University (request notes)
The
econometric identification approach corresponding to Chetty’s “sufficient
statistics approach”, solved for multiproduct monopolists.
“Imperfect
Platform Competition: A General Framework” with Alex White (request notes)
Insulated
equilibrium (Weyl 2009) eliminates much of the
equilibrium multiplicity in platform competition, giving a simple general
framework for applied and theoretical analysis.
“The
Correspondence Principle and the Law of Demand” (request notes)
Weak,
intuitive stability conditions alone imply the law of demand (when applied
locally) and strong uniqueness (when applied globally).
“Communication and Innovation” with Jean Tirole, Harvard
University and TSE. (request notes)
Downstream
patents may discourage communication of upstream research ideas.
Popular/opinion
pieces
“Financial
Guidance from FDA,” Boston Globe, December 3rd, 2008. (published version)
“Put
the Bankers Back to Work,” Huffington Post, February 5th, 2008. (link)
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