E. Glen Weyl (doc version pdf version)

E-mail: weyl@fas.harvard.edu

Cell phone: +1 (617) 599-8919

Primary academic:

Harvard Society of Fellows

78 Mount Auburn Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

+1 (617) 496-2655

Office 15

Personal:

41 Kirkland Street, Apt. 305

Cambridge, MA 02138

Born: May 6, 1985

Citizenship: USA

Marital status: engaged to Alisha C. Holland

EDUCATION AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

A.B. in Economics (2007), Valedictorian; certificates in Finance and Applications of Computing; senior thesis: “The Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets”

M.A., Ph.D. in Economics (2008), dissertation: “Essays in Industrial Organization and Economic Methodology”

Economics fields: industrial organization, microeconomic theory, market design, labor economics, public finance, finance, history of economic thought, econometrics, behavioral economics

Research interests outside economics: evolutionary theory, political philosophy, philosophy of probability and science, applied linear algebra, machine learning and statistics

PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT

Junior Fellow at the Society of Fellows, Harvard University (2008-present)

Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Economics, Harvard University (2008-present)

Recurrent Visiting Researcher, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2008-present)

Summer economic analysis clerk at the Economic Analysis Group of the Department of Justice Division of Antitrust (2006)

Quantitative analyst at New York City hedge fund Blue Mountain Capital Management. Used statistical financial modeling to design an arbitrage strategy (2005)

PUBLISHED AND FORTHCOMING ARTICLES

“Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2009, 8(2), 139-171.

“Monopoly, Ramsey and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003),” Economics Letters, 2009, 103(2), 99-100.

“A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms,” forthcoming in the American Economic Review.

UNPUBLISHED (WORKING) PAPERS

“Biasing Auctions,” Princeton University, April 2006.

“The Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard University. First version: December 2006, revised and submitted March 2009.

“Simon Kuznets: Economist of the Russian Jewish Diaspora,” Princeton University, May 2007.

“A Simple Theory of Scientific Learning,” Princeton University, September 2007.

“Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial?” Princeton University, October 2007.

“Psychic Income, Taxes and the Allocation of Talent,” Princeton University, December 2007.

“Double Marginalization in Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard University and TSE, July 2008.

“Pass-Through as an Economic Tool” with Michal Fabinger, Harvard University. First version: July 2008, revised and submitted April 2009.

SOFTWARE

“Apt Demand Toolkit” with Yali Miao, Harvard University, April 2009.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Solving the Holdout Problem” with Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University. (Coming soon)

Drawing on Cournot (1838), we show that market design is more important for the holdout problem, as in land assembly and corporate acquisitions, than in auctions. To solve it, we propose the Concordance principle, inspired by Cournot's theory of concours de producteur: use objective information on value shares as a pivot. This allows substantial efficiency and approximate protection of property rights. Standard auction procedures enforce truth-telling, with well-known trade-offs.

“Mutualists Don't Look Back in Anger” with Megan E. Frederickson, Doug W. Yu, and Naomi E. Pierce, Harvard University. (Coming soon)

We use economic theory to propose a general methodology for testing whether natural Partner Fidelity Feedback (PFF) is sufficient to maintain a mutualism or whether Host Sanctions (HS) play a role. Implementing these experimentally on an ant-plant (Allomerus octoarticulatis-Cordia nodosa) mutualism and reinterpreting existing data on Rhizobia-legume interactions we find strong evidence for PFF.

“Creative Genius and the Free Enterprise System” with Jean Tirole, Harvard University and TSE.

It is difficult to provide a coherent defense of the free enterprise system (FES), and in particular patents, where temporary monopoly rewards innovation. We provide a mechanism design framework for analyzing the reward of innovation, under asymmetric information about the costs and eventual demand. Using variational calculus to analyze the resulting non-standard multidimensional screening problem we establish the Friedman conjecture that the FES is optimal if and only if the existence of rare, materialistic, creative genius is a primary source of gains from innovation.

“A Practical Test for D-Stability” with Yali Miao, Harvard University (Coming very soon…)

We propose an intuitive, quick algorithm for testing the D-stability of large matrices. The algorithm never gives a false answer and while it may fail to give an answer, we show through simulations that this virtually never occurs in practice. Accompanying software implements the algorithm.

“Slutsky meets Marschak: First-Order Identification of Multiproduct Monopoly,” Harvard University.

A common empirical strategy (Chetty 2009) is to use a theoretical model to link an observable local average treatment effect (LATE) to some quantity of interest. I formalize the first-order identification problem of determining which LATEs must be observed to identify a desired quantity, given particular theoretical assumptions. I illustrate the problem with the case of multiproduct monopoly. The Slutsky conditions for firm optimization provide a strategy for identifying many things, from the effect of price regulation on investment to learning-by-doing/demand accumulation and two-sided markets models. They also provide tests of monopolistic behavior in a range of contexts.

“Imperfect Platform Competition: A General Framework” with Alex White, Harvard University and TSE.

Perhaps the longest-standing problem in the theory of two-sided markets is developing a general model of competition. We are taking a crack at this, using Weyl (2009)’s insulated equilibrium as a solution concept to eliminate much multiplicity. Our framework allows essential arbitrary preference and heterogeneity structures. Generalizing classic structural IO models (Berry et. al. 1995, Gentzkow 2007) it lends itself to empirical applications. At the same time its simple equilibrium conditions allow explicit comparative static analysis.

“Persuasion by Argument” with Barry Mazur, Harvard University.

Arguments often show that A is equivalent to B. Whether on hearing such an argument we should believe that the joint probability of A and B is what we formerly thought the probability of A was, or that of B, depends on which probability was more self-evident. Based on these ideas, we develop an axiomatic probabilistic semantics for rational persuasion.

“The Correspondence Principle and the Law of Demand,” Harvard University.

The law of demand is perhaps the most fundamental principle of economics, yet conventional wisdom in game and general equilibrium theory suggests it holds in equilibrium only under stringent conditions. We show, to the contrary, that Samuelson (1941)’s local correspondence principle, that stability conditions sign basic comparative statics, holds extremely generally (N-player games, non-differentiable payoffs) so long as a reasonable notion of stability is considered. We also establish a global correspondence principle: the global version of the appropriate stability condition is equivalent to a strong form of equilibrium uniqueness. Systems governed by the dynamic our notion of stability suggests obey the law of demand.

“Unions as Tax Collectors” with Ben Sachs, Harvard University.

Optimal tax theory calls for economic profits to be taxed and redistributed, but corporate profits taxes in practice are capital taxes. Unions may overcome this problem using their private information allowing them to distinguish economic profits. This offers a general theory of why unions may be desirable. We are working on theoretical, empirical and legal questions surrounding this argument.

OPINION ARTICLES

“Financial Guidance from FDA,” Boston Globe, December 3^rd, 2008.

“Put the Bankers Back to Work,” Huffington Post, February 5^th, 2009.

HONORS

Milton Fund research grant, Harvard University (2009)

J. Wallace Ely ’32 Fund, Princeton University (2008)

Supplemental Merit Fellowship, Princeton University Department of Economics (2007-2008)

Princeton University Graduate School Fellowship (2007-2008)

Elected Valedictorian by a vote of the Princeton faculty (2007)

Halbert White ’72 Prize to the most outstanding economics major (2007)

Wolf Balleisan Memorial Prize for best economics senior thesis (2007)

Birch Family Prize, to the Finance Certificate student with the best grades in finance classes (2007)

Awarded Highest Honors (Summa Cum Laude) in economics (2007)

USA TODAY All-USA College Academic Team (2007)

George B. Wood Legacy Junior Prize for exceptional academic achievement in the junior year at Princeton University (2006)

Josephine De Kármán Fellowship (2006)

Elected in the fall of senior year to Phi Beta Kappa with a dozen other students (2006)

Humane Studies Fellowship (2006)

Merit Scholarship from National Scholars Honor Society (2005)

Merit Award from the National Society of Collegiate Scholars (2005)

Twice, Shapiro Prize for Academic Excellence to top 35 students in each of the sophomore and junior classes at Princeton (2004, 2005)

Quin Morton ’36 Writing Seminar Essay Prize to the top 10 essays by freshmen at Princeton (2004)

Walter E. Hope Prize and Spencer Trask Medal to best freshman debater at Princeton (2004)

The Daily Princetonian Arts Writing Award (2004)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Invited guest lectures: Special lecture to masters 1 and 2 students at Toulouse School of Economics and ECO321 Industrial Organization (Princeton, undergraduate, Professor Swati Bhatt) on “Pass-Through, Double Marginalization and Two-Sided Markets” and COS444 Electronic Auctions (Princeton, undergraduate, Professor Ken Steiglitz) on “Frontiers of Behavioral Auction Theory” (2008).

Teaching assistant for Professors Markus Brunnermeier and José Scheinkman in Financial Economics I (PHD asset pricing), Princeton University, Fall 2006. Average course evaluation rating: 4.22/5.0.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Referee: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, Journal of Finance, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Political Economy, National Science Foundation, Network and Spatial Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Network Economics