Susanna Claire Siegel

Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy

Dept. of Philosophy, Emerson Hall

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138

fax. 617-495-2192

ssiegel@fas.harvard.edu

 

Employment

January 2011-present: Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University

January 2013-2016: Professor II, CSMN, Oslo, Norway

January 2013-2016: Distinguished Visiting Research Professor, University of Birmingham, UK.

2011-2012: Walter Channing Cabot Fellow, Harvard University

December 2005-December 2010: Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University

July 2004-December 2005: Associate Professor of Philosophy and John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University

July 1999-June 2004: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University

Education

September 1993 - May 1999: Cornell University, Ph.D. Philosophy, January 2000

Dissertation: Perception and Demonstrative Reference

M.A. Philosophy May 1996

September 1991 - May 1993: Yale University

M.A. Philosophy May 1993

September 1986 - May 1991: Swarthmore College

B.A. Philosophy, Minor in Social Theory June 1991

(1989-90: University of México, Morelos, Michoacán)


Awards and Grants

2014 National Science Foundation.

2013-14 David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. Faculty Grant. For Di‡logo sobre Filosof’a en Espa–ol.

2012 Walter Channing Cabot Fellow, Harvard University. For The Contents of Visual Experience.

2011-2014 Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Partnership Development Grant. The Senses. PI: Mohan Matthen, University Toronto. Partners: Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow), Alex Byrne (MIT), Barry Smith (London Institute of Philosophy).

2012-14, Co-Investigator, Belief and Mental Agency (Josefa Toribio, PI, University of Barcelona) MCINN Grant from the government of Spain.

2012-13. Mind, Brain and Behavior Faculty Award, for Postdoc Fellow (Eric Mandelbaum).

2011. Harvard-Australia Research Council, Grant for a workshop on Philosophical Progress, Harvard.

2010-11. Radcliffe Exploratory Workshop: Prediction, Goals and Stereotypes in Perception.

2010-2012. Mind, Brian and Behavior Faculty Award, for Postdoc Fellow (Sebastian Watzl).

2007-2009. Australian Research Council Grant, with David Chalmers and Ned Block."High-level Contents of Consciousness".

2006-2011. Provostial Fund for Arts and Humanities. Yearly grants for annual one-day workshops at Harvard on Perception.

2002. NEH Summer Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality, UC Santa Cruz.

1998. Buttrick-Crippen Award for best freshman writing seminar, Cornell University.


Named Lectureships

2008. The Burman Lectures, Umea, Sweden.

2012. The Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Oxford.

2013. Tamara Horowitz Memorial Lecture. University of Pittsburgh.


Publications

Monograph

The Contents of Visual Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010.

 

Articles

"Rational Evaluability and Perceptual Farce". Forthcoming in Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives Eds. J. Zeimbekis and A. Raftopoulos. Oxford University Press.

“Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?" In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4. Edited by T. Gendler.

"How is Wishful Seeing like Wishful Thinking?" Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. In Philosophical Studies , January 2013.

“The Epistemic Impact of Etiology of Experience. Symposium in Philosophical Studies 162: 697-722. January 2013. With comments by Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Richard Fumerton.

"Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification". Nous 46(2), 201-222. 2012.

“The Epistemology of Perception” (with Nicholas Silins), in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception (ed. M. Matthen). 2013.

"Are There Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality?" Analysis Reviews, Symposium on The Components of Consciousness by David Chalmers.

“Consciousness, Attention, and Perceptual Justification” (with Nicholas Silins), in Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, eds. D. Dodd and E. Zardini, Oxford University Press.

Attention and Perceptual justification” (with Nicholas Silins),Forthcoming in a festschrift for Ned Block, eds. A. Pautz and D. Stoljar, MIT Press.

“Affordances and the Content of Perception”. Forthcoming in Does Perception Have Content? Ed. B. Brogaard. Oxford University Press.

Symposium on The Contents of Visual Experiencewith Precis and replies to symposiasts: John Campbell, Jesse Prinz, Charles Travis. Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

“The Contents of Perception,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Fall 2010.

“The Visual Experience of Causation.” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 59 issue 236 (July 2009), pp. 519-540.           

“The Contents of Consciousness” in The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (eds. T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, and P. Wilken). Oxford University Press, 2009.

“The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (eds. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson). Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 205-226.

“Do we see more than we can access?” (with Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 30 issue 5/6 (December 2007), pp. 501-2.

“How can we discover the contents of experience?” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 45 (June 2007), pp. 127-142.

“Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 73 issue 2 (September 2006), pp. 378-410.

“Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 115 no. 3 (July 2006), pp. 355-388.

“How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 84 issue 3 (2006), pp. 429-441.

“Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives” (with M. Glanzberg). Nous, vol. 40 issue 1 (2006), pp. 1-42

“Which Properties are Represented in Perception?” in Perceptual Experience (eds. T.M. Gendler and J. Hawthorne). Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 481-503.

“The Phenomenology of Efficacy.” Philosophical Topics, vol. 33 no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 265-284.

Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 120 volumes 1-3 (2004), pp. 91-112.

“The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference.” Philosophers’ Imprint, vol. 2 no. 1 (June 2002), pp. 1-21.

Reviews

Review of Austen Clark’s A Theory of Sentience, in The Philosophical Review, vol. 111 no. 1 (January 2002), pp.135-8.

Edited Anthology

The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present (with T. Gendler and S. Cahn). Oxford University Press, 2007.

 

Review of John Campbell’s Reference and Consciousness in The Philosophical Review


Presentations

•September 2014. Inference and Selection Effects. UMass/Amherst.

•September 2014. Perceptual Inference and the Rationality of Perception. Sanders Seminar, University of Texas/Austin

•September 2014. Inferencia y Efectos de Seleci—n. UNAM, MŽxico DF.

•June 2014. Perceptual Inference. Keynote address at 4th Annual Edinburgh Graduate Conference in Epistemology.

•June 2014. Perceptual Inference. Conference: Perspectives on Inference. Center for the Study of Mind and Nature, Oslo.

•April 2014. Introduccion/Introduction. Dialogo Sobre Filosofia en Espa–ol

•February 2014. The Rational Evaluability of Perceptual Experience. Notre Dame.

•February 2014. The Rational Evaluability of Perceptual Experience. University of Edinburgh.

•February 2014. The Rational Evaluability of Perceptual Experience. University of Birmingham.

•February 2014. ÀCu‡ndo es que la pericia puede influir racionalmente en la experiencia perceptual? UAM Cuajimalpa, Mexico DF.

•February 2014. Can Perceptual Experience be Rationally Influenced by Expertise? College of Charleston.

•February 2014. Vice Epistemology. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Charleston.

•January 2014. How is wishful seeing like wishful thinking? Arizona Ontology Conference

•November 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Princeton University.

•October 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. University of Copenhagen.

•October 2013. The Rational Enrichment of Experience. University of Pittsburgh. Tamara Horowitz Memorial Lecture

•October 2013. Wishful Belief and the Basing Relation. Indiana University.

•September 2013. The Rational Enrichment of Experience. Boston University.

•September 2013. Comments on Nilanjan Das. Nyaya on Cognitive Penetrability. Mind and Attention in Indian Philosophy. Harvard.

•September 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Workshop on Evaluative Perception.University of Glasgow.

•August 2013. Introduction and Overview. Workshop on Imperatival Aspects of Perception. University of Oslo.

•August 2013. Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Workshop on Imperatival Aspects of Perception. University of Oslo.

•August 2013. Some Questions about the Unity of Consciousness. University of Bergen. Norway.

•August 2013. Comments on Nishi Shah's "Why We Reason the Way we Do". SPAWN. Syracuse.

•June 2013. Belief and the Basing Relation. Institut Jean Nicod.

•June 2013. Belief and the Basing Relation. Workshop on Belief. University Aut—noma de Barcelona.

•May 2013. Discussant on The Contents of Visual Experience Seminar at UCSD.

•May 2013. Roundtable Discussant, Workshop on Temporal Experience. Network for Sensory Research. University of Toronto.

•May 2013. How is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking? Rutgers Epistemology Conference.

•April 2013. Cognitive Penetration and Perceptual Justification. CUNY Reading Group on cognitive penetrability

•April 2013. Affordancias y Contendio . UAM, Mexico DF

•April 2013. Los Contenidos de la Experiencia Visual. UAM, Mexico DF

•April 2013. Wishful Seeing and Wishful Thinking. Cornell University, guest presentation in Nico Silins's Epistemology course.

•February 2013. How is Wishful Seeing like Wishful Thinking? Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Austin.

•February 2013. Comments on Matt McGrath, "A Role for Looks", Invited Symposium, Central Division APA.

•January 2013. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Stanford University.

•December 2012. Modularism and Top-down effects on Perception. Workshop on Modularism, NYU Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness.

•November 2012. Affordances and the Content of Perception. University of Geneva.

•November 2012. The Phenomenology of Efficacy. Fribourg University.

•November 2012. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Oxford University.

•November 2012. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Causes of Belief workshop, St. Andrews.

•October 2012. Can Selection Effects Influence the Rational Role of Experience? Colloquium. NYU.

•September 2012 Comments on Sebastian Watzl, How Attention Structures Appearances. Antwerp Conference on Attention.

•May 2012 The Epistemology of Selection Effects. Buddhism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. NEH Summer Institute, College of Charleston.

•May 2012 Affordances and the Content of Perception. Buddhism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. NEH Summer Institute, College of Charleston.

•May 2012 Comment on Celia Hayes. Workshop on Perceptual Learning, Network for Sensory Research, University of Toronto.

•May 2012 The Epistemology of Selection Effects. Wolfe Visual Attention Lab, Harvard Medical School

•April 2012 Replies to Block, Campbell and Dretske. Pacific APA Author Meets Critics, The Contents of Visual Experience

•March 2012 The epistemology of selection effects. Union College.

•February 2012 Replies to Schellenberg, Glüer and Bengson. Central APA Author Meets Critics, The Contents of Visual Experience

•December 2011 Stereotypes and Perceptual Belief. Psycho-ontology Conference. Shalem Center, Jerusalem, Israel

•December 2011 Stereotypes and Perceptual Belief. Workshop on Implicit Bias. Sheffield University.

•October 2011 Affordances and the Contents of Perception. Symposium on Phenomenality and Intentionality in honor of Charles Siewert, Rice University.

•October 2011 The Epistemic Significance of top-down effects on perception. Seminar at Yale University.

•October 2011 The Epistemic Significance of top-down effects on perception. Seminar at Johns Hopkins University.

•October 2011 Affordances and the Contents of Perception. The Johns Hopkins University.

•June 2011 Attention and Perceptual Justification. Columbia Perception Workshop. Columbia University.

•May 2011 Discussant, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, Rutgers University.

•April 2011 Attention and Perceptual Justification. Haverford College.

•March 2011 Comments on Kurt Gray, “The dual structure of morality”. Metro Experimental Philosophy Research Group, NYU

•March 2011 Solicitaciónes y los Contentos de la Experiencia Perceptual. Universidad Nacionál de Colombia, Bogotá.

•March 2011 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. Seminar on Epistemology, Cornell University.

•February 2011 Attention and Perceptual Justification. University of Miami.

•February 2011 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. University of Miami.

•February 2011 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. Brandeis University.

•February 2011 Introduction: The perceptual impact of racial stereotypes. Radcliffe Exploratory Seminar. Radcliffe Institute.

•February 2011 Comments on Eric Mandelbaum’s “A Psychofunctionalist Theory of Belief”. Workshop on Belief and its Cousins. Harvard University.

•January 2011 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning on the Basement. LOGOS. Barcelona, Spain

•December 2010 Commentary on talks Christopher Hill and Brain McLaughlin, Symposium on Appearance Properties. Eastern Division APA.

•October 2010 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. 44th Chapel Hill Colloquium. Comment from Jonathan Weisberg, Toronto.

•August 2010 The Epistemic Impact of Reasoning in the Basement. ANU

•April 2010 Perceptual Downgrades. Workshop on Evidence. ARCHE/St Andrews.

•April 2010 Perceptual Downgrades. Phenomenal Qualities Workshop. University of London, Institute of Philosophy.

•April 2010 The significance of cognitive penetration. Formal Epistemology Festival, University of Toronto.

•April 2010 The significance of cognitive penetration. New Directions in Philosophy of Mind. Barnard College, NYC

•March 2010 What are the epistemological consequences of cognitive penetration?. University of Texas, Austin

•March 2010 Cognitive Penetrators as Undercutters. NYU Mind and Language Seminar

•February 2010 "Cognitive Penetrators as Undercutters" University of Western Ontario

•February 2010 Comments on Matthew Conduct's "Naive Realism without Disjunctivism", Online Consciousness Conference

•December 2009 Comments on Robert Briscoe's "My Point of View", Eastern Division APA

•October 2009 "The Perception of First-Person Causation" Keynote Address, St Andrews Graduate Conference

•October 2009 "Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability" ZIF, Bielefeld. Knowledge and Performance in Perception

•May 2009 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" Jowett Society, Oxford University

•April 2009 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" Southern Methodist University

•April 2009 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" University of Kentucky Graduate Conference

•December 2008 "What Do We See?" Neuphi, Boston University

•November 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" First Annual Philosophy/Psychology, DataBlitz/Speed-Philosophy Exchange, Harvard

•November 2008 "Dreams and Intentionality" Center for Sleep and Cognition, BIDMC, Harvard

•November 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" The Ohio State University

•October 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" University of Toronto

•October 2008 "Phenomenal Intentionality and Cognitive Phenomenology" Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality, University of Arizona, Tucson

•September 2008 "What Do We See?" The Philosophical Society, University of Umeaa, Sweden

•September 2008 "The Varieties of Perceptual Intentionality" The Burman Lectures, University of Umeaa, Sweden

•September 2008 "The Contents of Visual Experience" The Burman Lectures, University of Umeaa, Sweden

•September 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" Stockholm University

•August 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" (with comments from Maja Spener), The Role of Consciousness in Thought, Dubrovnik Inter-University Center, Croatia

•August 2008 "The Weak Content View"(with comments from Charles Travis), SPAWN, Syracuse University

•August 2008 "Is Visual Experience a Propositional Attitude?"World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea

•April 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" Seminar Discussion, MIT

•April 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" Rutgers University

•April 2008 "Phenomenal Contrast and the Contents of Experience" Towards of Science of Consciousness 2008, University of Arizona

•March 2008 "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification" Basic Knowledge Workshop on Perceptual Justification, University of St Andrews

•December 2007 "The Visual Experience of Causation" General discussion, Bates College

•November 2007 "The Fact View and the Content View" Themes from Epistemological Writings of McDowell, University of Stirling

•November 2007 "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?" Glasgow Workshop on Perception and Introspection

•October 2007 "Do Experiences have Contents?" Seminar discussion, Brown University

•October 2007 "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?" University of Vermont

•June 2007 "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?" ANU Workshop on Phenomenology and Intentionality

•March 2007 "How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?" University of Glasgow, Conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience

•October 2006 "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?" University of London

•October 2006 "The Visual Experience of Causation" University of Warwick

•September 2006 "How Can We Find Out Which Contents Experiences Have?" Spindel Conference, Memphis, with comments by Joseph Tolliver

•September 2006 "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?" University of Mississippi, Oxford

• September 2006 "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?" Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, Berlin

• May 2006 "The Visual Experience of Causation" On-line Philosophy Conference

• May 2006 Comments on Sean Kelly's "Perceptual Normativity and Human Freedom" Cornell Cognitive Studies Symposium on Perception and Action

• April 2006 "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?" Amherst College

• March 2006, "The Visual Experience of Causation" Massachusetts Bay Philosophy Alliance

• February 2006, "The Phenomenology of Efficacy" University of California, Berkeley

• January 2006, "The Experience and Perception of Causation" Arizona Ontology Conference

• October 2005, "The Phenomenology of Efficacy" MIT

• October 2005, "The Phenomenology of Efficacy" University of Toronto

• April 2005, "The Phenomenology of Efficacy" UMass Amherst

• March 2005, Comments on Michelle Montague's "Russell's Principle and a Problem for Vision" Pacific Division APA

• February 2005, "Direct Realism and Perceptual Consicousness" Australian National University and Center for Consciousness

• January 2005, "The Phenomenology of Efficacy" Australian National University

• December 2004, "The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference" discussion at Yale University

• November 2004, "Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness" Conference on The Phenomenal, University College, London

• July 2004, "Object-seeing and the Sensation/Perception Distinction" Invited Symposium on Object Perception, SPP/ESPP, Barcelona, Spain

• June 2004, Comments on Mike Martin's "On Being Alienated", NYU Conference on Consciousness and Intentionality, La Pietra, Florence, Italy

• June 2004, Comments on Scott Sturgeon's "Apriorism about Modality", University of Konstanz, Germany

• April 2004, Discussion with Marc Hauser on Moral Judgments and Cognitive Science, Harvard Society for Mind, Brain and Behavior

• April 2004, "The Phenomenology of Efficacy", Tufts University

• April 2004, "The Phenomenology of Efficacy", Yale University Perception and Cognition Lab

• March 2004, "How Does Visual Phenomenology Constrain Object-seeing?", Pacific Division APA

• February 2004, "Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception", UCLA

• February 2004, "Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives", UCLA Philosophy of Language Workshop

• February 2004, "Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception", UC Irvine

• February 2004, Comments on David Chalmers' "Perception and the Fall from Eden", Concepts and Content Conference, UC Santa Barbara

• February 2004, "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?", New York Univeristy

• January 2004, "Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception", Univeristy of Miami

• January 2004, "Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception", UC Davis

• December 2003, Comments on James Pryor's "What is De Re Thought?", Eastern Division APA

• November 2003, "Visual Experience and the Phenomenology of Efficacy ", Workshop on the Phenomenology of Agency, University of Arizona

• August 2003, "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?", University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

• August 2003, "Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception", Dartmouth College

• July 2003, "Two Phenomenological Constraints on Object-seeing", National Yang Ming University Workshop on Consciousness, Taipei, Taiwan

• July 2003, "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?", National Yang Ming University Workshop on Consciousness, Taipei, Taiwan

• July 2003, "Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives", ANU Workshop in Philosophy of Language

• June 2003, "Particularity and Presence in Visual Perception", Australian National University

• May 2003, "Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives", Language, Mind and World Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina

• March 2003, Comments on Noam Chomsky's Distinguished Lectures on Mind, Brain and Behavior, Harvard University

• November 2002, "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?", University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

• November 2002, "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?", Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson

• November 2002, "Object-seeing and the Mental", University of Virginia

• October 2002, "The Disjunctive Theory of Perception", Swarthmore College

October 2002, "Are Kind-Properties Represented in Perception?", Syracuse University

• July 2002, "Misperception", NEH Summer Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality, UC Santa Cruz

•April 2002, Comments on M. G. F. Martin's "The Limits of Self-Awareness", Oberlin Colloquium on Perception

• April 2002, "Misperception", Utah Colloquium on Self-Knowledge, with comments by Ned Block and Ram Neta

• February 2002, "Misperception", Vassar College

• August 2000, "Object-seeing and Phenomenal Character" European Society for Philosophy and Psychology,

Fribourg, Switzerland

• June 2001, "Object-seeing and Unfilled Propositions", University of Rijeka, Croatia

• May 2001, "The Contents of Visual Experience" Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Duke University

• April 2001, "Demonstrative Reference: What is it?" Amherst College, guest seminar in Philosophy department

• November 2000, "Object-seeing and the mental", Philosophy Department, NYU

• September 2000, "Object-seeing and the mental" Mental Phenomena III, Inter-university Center, Dubrovnic, Croatia

• May 2000, "Raw Feels, Truth-aptness, and visual differentiation", Cumberland Lodge, Birkbeck College, London.

• May 2000, "Visual experience and individuation", Birkbeck College, London

• May 1999 Viewpoint-invariance, visual experience, and the justification of demonstrative beliefs. Cognitive Science Conference on Perception, Art and Consciousness, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium.


Teaching (enrollments in parentheses)

Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience (10), Fall 1999

Proseminar on Perception (6), Spring 1999

Proseminar on Demonstratives (5), Spring 1999

Tutorial: Strawson's Individuals (4), Fall 2000

Grad. Seminar: Singular Reference and Perception of Particulars (9), Spring 2000

Philosophy of Mind (25), Spring 2000

Tutorial: Authority, Obligation and Disobedience (10), Fall 2001

Moral Reasoning about Social Protest

(90), Fall 2000

(141), Fall 2001

(125), Spring 2004

Philosophy of language: pragmatics

Grad Seminar: Referring Expressions

(on leave, 2002-03)

Introspection and Phenomenality (5), Fall 2003

Proseminar in Mind, Brain and Behavior (5), Fall 2003

Moral Reasoning about Social Protest (120), Spring 2004

(on leave, 2004-05)

Moral Reasoning about Social Protest (145), Spring 2006

Moral Reasoning about Social Protest (178), Spring 2007

Philosophy of Mind (15), Spring 2008

Moral Reasoning about Social Protest (136), Spring 2008

Moral Reasoning about Social Protest, Spring 2010

Grad Seminar: Perception, Spring 2010

Grad Seminar: Perceptual Justification (with Farid Masrour), Spring 2011

MBB ProSeminar: Perception and Action (with Sean Kelly), Spring 2011

Grad Seminar: Epistemology Meets the Science of Perception and Belief, Spring 2012


Professional Service

•Organizer. Annual Workshop on Perception. A one-day workshop for young philosophers of mind. Sponsored by Provostial Fund for Arts and Sciences.

2012: Belief(Jane Friedman, Maria Aarnio, Lisa Bortolotti

2010: Time and the Unity of Consciousness (Matt Nudds, Adam Pautz, Philippe Chuard, Ian Philipps)

2009: Perception Beyond Vision (Mark Green, Casey O'Callaghan,Frederique de Vignemont, Matt Fulkerson)

2008: Consciousness and Thought (Imogen Dickie, Declan Smithies, Matt Soteriou, Cheryl Chen)

2007: Proprioception and Bodily Awareness (Barbara Montero, Brian O'Shaughnessy, Jose Luis Bermudez)

2006: Perception: Fundamental Questions (Maja Spener, Chris Mole, Austen Clark)

•Organizer. Conversation in Mind, Brain, and Behavior. Harvard University. 2014.

•Organizer. Conference: Cognitive Penetrability: Psychology and Ethics. Harvard University. 2014. Sponsored by Provostial Fund for Arts and Humanities and MBB

•Organizer. Di‡logo Sobre Filosof’a en Espa–ol. Harvard University. 2014. Sponsored by el Instituto Cervantes and David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies

•Organizer. Workshop on the Epistemology of Cognitive Penetrability. 2013 Harvard University.

•Organizer. Mind and Attention in Indian Philosophy. with Parimal Patil and Sebastian Watzl. 2013, Harvard University.

•Organizer. Imperatival Aspects of Perception. with Sebastian Watzl. Sponsored by CSMN. 2013, Oslo.

•Organizer. Worskhop on Cognitive Penetration. with Nico Silins.

•Organizer. Philosophical Progress, with Daniel Stoljar, sponsored by the Harvard-Australia Research Grant. September 2011, Harvard University

•Organizer. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, with David Bennett and the Network for Sensory Research. November 2011, Brown University

•Organizer. Worskhop on Cognitive Penetration. with Nico Silins. Cornell University, September 2010.

•Organizer. Radcliffe Exploratory Seminar. with Moshe Bar. Harvard University, Spring 2011.

•Organizer. Annual Symposia for Juniors in Mind, Brain and Behavior.

2011: Social Vision (Keith Payne, Lisa Barrett, Brian Scholl)

2010: Concepts and Conceptualization (Susan Carey, Bernhard Nickel, Larry Barsalou)

2009: Violence and Aggression (Ed Kravitz, Richard Wrangham, Alan Stone)

2008: Autism

2007: The Creative Mind (David Kravitz, Charles Roe, Alice Flaherty)

2006: Minds and Machines (Rodney Brooks, Alex Byrne)

•Organizer, Sophomore Symposia on Mind, Brain and Behavior

2011: Attention in Philosophy, Psychology, and the Neurosciences (Nico Silins, Declan Smithies, Gary Hatfield, Takeo Watanabe)

2008: Undergraduate Colloquium: Knowledge and Reality (Daniel Wegner, Alex Byrne)

2007: Philosphy and Neuroscience (Don Goff and Sean Kelly)

•Faculty Advisor, Women in Philosophy Undergraduate Club, 1999-present.

Organized talks by Prof. Veronique Munoz-Dardeé, University College London, Prof. Ruth Anna Putnam of Wellesley College, Prof. Nancy Bauer of Tufts Univeristy, Prof. Mary Kate McGowan of Wellesley College, and a dinner/discussion for undergraduate women concentrators in philosophy with Prof. Lisa Rivera of U-Mass Boston, Prof Amelie Rorty, Harvard

•Departmental affirmative action officer for graduate admissions, 2000-01, 2007-08, 2010-11, 2011-12

•Departmental Placement Officer, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12

•Colloquium Committee, 2001-02

•University Standing Committee on Program in Mind, Brain and Behavior, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12, 2013-14

•Steering Committee for Program on Mind, Brain and Behavior: 2010-11

•University Standing Committee on Women, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08,2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2013-14

•Faculty member of the Undergraduate Dudley House Co-oop, 2001-02

•Mind, Brain and Behavior advisor to undergraduate concentrators in Philosophy, 2003-04, 2007-08, 2009-2010

•Member, Advisory Committee to Eastern Division APA Program Committee, 2013


Referee for Philosophical Review, Erkenntnis, Oxford University Press, Mind, Philosophical Studies, European Journal of Philosophy, MIT Press, Frontiers in Consciousness Studies

Associate Editor, Inquiry

Editorial Board of Thought

Subject editor for Philosophy of Mind, Thought

Member, Implicit Bias and Philosophy Workshop, Sheffield University


Supervisor of Postdocs: Farid Masrour, Harvard College Fellow 2010-2012; Sebastian Watzl, MBB Postdoc, 2010-2012; Eric Mandelbaum, MBB Postdoc, 2012-13

Mentor in Louise Antony's Mentoring Women in Philosophy Project