1. Introduction:

In 1880 Henry Adams, the historian and heir of two presidents published a novel, *Democracy.* Adam’s heroine, New York socialite Madeline Lightfoot Lee, suffers from *ennui.* She has lost interest in salons, in philanthropy, in business, “she had resorted to desperate measures”, Adams wrote, “She had read philosophy in the original German, and the more she read, the more she was disheartened that so much culture should lead to nothing – nothing”. Desperate, Mrs. Lee transplants herself in Washington, where enthralled by “the clash of interests”, she is revived. The

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*The Politician*, Alan Dugan

*Fiorello* (Jerome Weidman and George Abbott; set 1914-45; opened 1959)
human interest and energy of politics attracted her: the personalities and
ambition, the indignities and betrayals, the occasional successes of poet Alan
Dugan’s “winner”, whom people bet on and against. Party politics is a
dramatic contest, something of a gamble, and not surprisingly a favorite
subject for literature (and for American musical theater, as we hear in the
clip from Fiorello). Every writer on democratic politics, no matter how
severely analytic or social scientific, was once gripped by “the great game of
politics,” the high stakes waged by those who believe they are on the side of
the angels. I will try not to lose sight of it entirely.

Try, because in sober political theory today, political parties and their
partisan supporters are disparaged if not actively despised. They always have
been. Excoriation of politicians as power-hunger and treacherous, deformed
by cruelty and hypocrisy, tainted by personal and institutional corruption --
is as old as the dinosaurs. It preceded party politics and will doubtless carry
on after. For critics, distinctive pathologies mar parties and partisanship. If
nothing else, parties make the politics -- the ceaseless strategies, collective
efforts to exercise power and to deny its exercise to others, the sheer
partiality of legislating and governing (and shaping public opinion) -- vivid.
Antiparty theorists are appalled by what they see as the errant selfishness,
divisiveness and indignity of party strife, and they articulate their antipathy.
The canonical history of political thought is a record of relentless opposition to parties as institutions and of moral disdain for partisans. It is studded with precursors and echoes of the philosopher Hume who famously wrote: “As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honored and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated.”³ And of Jefferson, co-founder of the first popular political party, who nonetheless contended, “If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all…”⁴ Parties do have one classic defender, Edmund Burke.⁵ Of whom William Goldsmith wrote in 1774 “Here lies our good Edmund. Who, born for the universe, narrowed his mind. And to party gave up what was meant for mankind.”⁶

I have culled the Wesson Lectures from a larger study of antipartyism and attempt at rehabilitation of parties and partisanship. My first objective today is to introduce two high points on my map of the terrain of antipartyism, two “Glorious Traditions”. I’ll say just enough to point up that antipartyism has a distinguished, even brilliant pedigree and to make the litany of antipathy manageable. This lecture is historical but it will be apparent that my inquiry is from the standpoint of the present. I want to see whether these glorious traditions continue to define antipartyism -- whether contemporary political theorists are creative in their loathing. My second
objective is to retrieve early “moments of appreciation” of parties, tentative
defenses. These initial “moments” have been partially eclipsed, and I want to
bring them out of the shadows to serve as guides to the achievement of
parties.

In tomorrow’s lecture I explore a contemporary landmark on my map of the terrain: not antipartyism but antipartisanship. Parties may be
grudgingly accepted in stable democracies, but partisanship is not.
Antipartisanship is a central theme in American political thought, along with the belief that partisans’ undisputed moral superiors are “Independents”. My
goal tomorrow will be to chip away at the moral high ground claimed by Independents, and provide partisanship with at least an iota of dignity.

**Glorious Traditions of Antipartyism #1: Holism**

So: The character, shape, and purpose of political parties over myriad
periods, places, and political contexts are endlessly varied. The concept of
“party” is variable too. It is less the object of loathing that provides unity to
my discussion than the reasons why “party” and its counterparts, faction and
sect, are typically accusatory terms. “Party” may not have coherence, but
aversions do. The negative content of antipartyism is surprisingly steady.

The first glorious tradition of antipartyism insists that political society
should be coherent and undivided, and that divisions are unwholesome. The
formulations are familiar – an organic body politic, an indivisible nation or people, unitary royal or popular sovereignty, a general will that cannot err, one determinable common good. The basis of what I will call “holism” may be metaphysical (divine creation), ideological (classlessness), or prudential (the severe requirements of civil peace). Holism can be hierarchical or communitarian and egalitarian. Often it has a pronounced aesthetic dimension, which pictures divisions as hideous imperfections. Parts are disfiguring. (The monstrous image of a body politic with two heads captures this horror.) A common mark of this type of antipartyism is the identification of division with alienation – a falling off from original unity.

From a holist perspective, every partial group and association draws off loyalty and attachment and fosters particularist interests and opinions. Every division signals disunity. Even relatively stable social groupings or entrenched, aptly named social “orders” undermine unity. No form of pluralism is benign. That is why “harmony” and “balance” are poor formulations. Sweeping in their condemnation of pluralism, many philosophies have little to say about parties specifically. Parts just are partial, and every organized interest and opinion is an actual or latent political party. Antipartyism is a second order thesis of holism. Because parties’ raison d’etre is partiality and conflict, they stand out among parts as
the most aesthetically, morally, politically unabidable. But every part is a potential party.

To illustrate: Thomas Hobbes describes Leviathan as an artificial man in which the sovereign is the artificial soul, giving life and motion to the whole body.9 What Hobbes tellingly calls “bodies politiques subordinate and subject to a sovereign power”, formed for every imaginable business and to advance every imaginable opinion, are all dangerous. They are all liable to make political claims and demand political recognition, if not a share of political authority. (Hobbes’ fearful conviction is echoed today to opposite purpose in the hopeful claim of democratic pluralists that “any association however innocent it might seem, is potentially a center of resistance.”10) Hobbes’ revulsion was plain. He called corporations “worms in the bowels of the commonwealth”, which it is the sovereign’s duty to expel.11 *Leviathan* is a prescription for preventatives and purging.

Holist antipathy often owes to the timeless distance between philosophy and political practice, but this form of antipartyism is not the exclusive property of philosophers and designers of utopia, or “derive[d] from a thoroughly metaphysical compulsion”.12 All holists see parties as parts against not of the whole and partisans as public enemies. There can be only one, sole representative of the nation or people, vanguard of unity,
party of virtue, on the side of the angels. Partisans of holism aim to devour, crush, eliminate faction, erase pluralism, arrest alienation, resolve all contradictions, restore wholeness. Simply: “In the cracked mirror of parties the country no longer recognizes its image.”\textsuperscript{13} Holist antipartyism is not safely in the past.

**Glorious Traditions of Antipartyism #2: Fatal Division**

The second glorious tradition of antipartyism is not attracted to holism, recognizes and accepts pluralism and partiality, and incorporates social and political parts into the frame of government. It is one thing to accommodate divisions in a system of representation, however, and another to organize party conflict within and among them. What earns the accusatory label “party” here is not fracturing what should be an indivisible political whole but exploiting divisions and impeding balance or harmony.

Partisanship in the general sense of advocacy on behalf of groups and causes is natural and acceptable but parties as instruments for practicing partisanship are not. Parties are vicious expressions of partiality, intolerable ways of organizing particular interests and conflicting notions of the public interest. Parties turn acceptable divisions into warring factions. Or they invent needless, novel divisions as an excuse for contesting for power.
This distinction between parts and parties, divisions and fatal divisiveness, the signature of this tradition of antipartyism, emerges plainly if we consider the mixed constitution, a long-standing form that represented recognized social divisions in government. The contribution of different classes and their differential aptitudes for deliberative, judicial, and magisterial roles is one rationale for mix. Mixed government is not a matter of “privilege unredeemed by function”, then, and the dynamic is not balance but “fit”. A more common proposition in favor of the mixed regime is that arrangement of social groups or classes within government, each with a share of power, produces stability. “A state with a body of disenfranchised citizens who are numerous and poor must necessarily be a state which is full of enemies”, Aristotle advised.

In contrast, parties fracture, agitate, and produce disorder. They are wantonly selfish and sinister factions, engines of destructive partiality. Parties “are associated with painfully deep and unbridgeable differences...with religious bigotry and clerical animus, with treason and the threat of foreign invasion, with instability and dangers to liberty”. The language is telling: fury, madness, fatal divisions. Hume accepted politics, that is, divergent opinions on the public interest, the right to power, and the right to property. But partisans pursue these aims without check, spurring
one another on. In his words, they are passionate, zealots, extremists, exaggerators of merit and demerit, aggravaters without steadiness who speak only in terms of accusation and panegyric, begetters of “extraordinary ferment” and “violent animosities”. Partisans suffer “madness of heart”.¹⁷

Not parts but parties are anathema, then: “In all civilized societies, distinctions are various and unavoidable.”¹⁸ But the logic of pluralism does not extend to parties. We see Madison thinking this through. He insisted that the latent causes of faction are rooted in human nature. As long as reason is fallible and men have liberty to exercise it, different opinions will form. The connection between reason and self-love adds passion to opinion. Add to this the unequal capacity to acquire property and different kinds of property. Notice that up to this point parts are only latent factions. They are not yet organized to employ government at the expense of the rights of other citizens or the permanent interests of the nation. The decisive moment occurs when political men “divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for the common good.”¹⁹ Then the state is “violently heated and distracted by the rage of party”.²⁰ A proper understanding of the dynamic of party formation may inhibit at least
“artificial parties” and “unnecessary opportunities” for “designing men” to foment them.\(^{21}\)\(^{22}\)

Over the long course of this antiparty tradition we find a set of recurrent themes. A thematic consistency so remarkable it is worth noting. For one, the touchstone of fatal divisiveness is cautionary histories of Rome, post-mortems about the decline of the republic. These “great necrological argumentations”\(^{23}\) converge on civil discords and hateful conspiracies fueled by the rancorous, rivalrous nobility’s consuming desire to hold office.\(^{24}\) Machiavelli famously used the Roman republic as touchstone for free Italian city states.\(^{25}\) “In Rome, as everybody knows…the discord between the nobles and the plebs emerged, and this division continued until the ruin of the republic.”\(^{26}\) In Florence things were more divided: “First the nobles were divided among themselves, then there was a division between the nobles and the popolo, and finally between the popolo and the plebs, and it often happened that one of these parties, having gained the upper hand, split in two. From these divisions there came as many deaths, as many exiles, as many destructions of families, as ever arose in any city whose history is known to us.”\(^{27}\) Florence’s citizens “never organized for the general good but always with the view of benefiting their own party, which instead of establishing order in the city only tended to increase disorders”, and
Machiavelli pointed approvingly to Roman Consuls who restored peace between patricians and plebeians by killing the chiefs of the opposing factions.\(^2^8\)

The cautionary tale of Rome is one constant in this antiparty tradition. Another is grim explanations for the ubiquity of parties. Their irrepressibility -- the hydra head of parties -- sparked catalogues of causes stretching back to Aristotle’s list of seven: profit, dignity, cruelty, fear, excessive power, contemptuous attitudes, and disproportionate aggrandizement; to which he adds that umbrella category -- “intrigue”.\(^2^9\) Finally, there were so many causes there seemed to be no cause. “Men have such a propensity to divide into personal factions that the smallest appearance of real difference will produce them”,\(^3^0\) Hume concluded; indeed, “nothing is more usual than to see parties, which have begun upon a real difference, continue after the difference is lost.”\(^3^1\) Madison saw that “frivolous and fanciful distinctions” suffice to kindle “unfriendly passions” and violent conflicts. We can almost see him throwing up his hands: “A difference of interests, real or supposed, is the most natural and fruitful source of them.”\(^3^2\)

The penchant for cataloguing causes was often accompanied by a typology of hierarchy of dangerousness. Hume contrasted “personal” factions” with “real” factions based on some difference of interest or
sentiment; these are “the most reasonable and excusable”. He added distinctively modern factions based on affection (i.e. dynastic succession) or principle; reserving unreserved animus for religious parties, which “in modern times...are more furious and enraged than the most cruel factions that ever arose from interest and ambition”. Tocqueville’s typology is better known. Great parties are attached to principles rather than consequences, to ideas rather than men. They convulse society. Between “centuries of disorders and miseries one encounters others when societies rest and when the human race seems to catch its breath”. That is the moment for small parties, “without political faith”. “Their character is stamped with a selfishness that shows openly in each of their acts...their language is violent but their course is timid and uncertain. The means that they employ are miserable, as is the very goal they propose for themselves.” There are only small parties in America now, he wrote disdainfully; the country swarms with them.

Despite insights into the innumerable bases for parties, thinkers tended to elevate a particular line of division into a universal. Tocqueville spoke of “two opinions as old as the world”, of “secret instincts” “found at the foundation of all parties [that] form as it were the sensitive spot and the soul of them.” Americans were particularly Manichean and their epithets
say it all: “Monocrat” and “Jacobin”. “Men have differed in opinion, and been divided into parties by these opinions, from the first origin of societies”, Jefferson wrote, “and in all governments where they have been permitted freely to think and to speak, the terms whig and tory belong to natural as well as to civil history.” For Adams, “The same parties which now agitate the United States have existed through all time. Whether the power of the people or that of the ruler should prevail were questions which kept…Greece and Rome in eternal convulsions…” In “A Candid State of Parties” (1792), a partisan essay, Madison refers to republicans and antirepublicans as the two “natural” parties.

Notice the dualism, the paired antagonism, long before a two-party system became a virtual tenet of American civic religion. Theorists in this antiparty tradition saw a recurrent partisan dynamic, which simplified present crises and provided a way to frame history as warring alternations between archetypical combatants or as a drama of elusive equilibrium. It is not hard to see that with a half conceptual turn it would be possible to represent parties as complementary, as antagonistic but necessary elements of a reasonable political order – party of memory/party of hope -- philosophically defensible parts of a whole. Their dynamic might be viewed
as mutually corrective, even progressive and I will return to this idea in a moment.

This glorious tradition of antipartyism gives rise to another insight that began as criticism but could be inverted and recast as appreciative. Detesters of party divisiveness charge that parties not only exacerbate and exploit deep differences and replay archetypical struggles but also invent conflicts. Recall: “The smallest appearance of real difference”, “differences of interest real or supposed”, “artificial and nominal” distinctions will do. Partisans are ambitious personalities moved by “ill-founded jealousies and false alarms”40, lovers of intrigue.41 Parties create rather than simply mirror social divisions. The creative role of parties is foreshadowed, aversively, in this antiparty tradition. Madison took the lesser evil view of the matter, hoping that party contests “will be either so slight or so transient” as not to threaten permanent or dangerous consequences.42 Tocqueville saw something more. He took what had stood as decisive proof of the arrant divisiveness of parties and subtly altered its tenor. Partisans begin with a private interest or opinion about the public interest, compose lines of division, discover a principle to justify this partiality, and “introduce[e] a new power into the political world”. Here is the full quote:
“Ambition must succeed in creating parties, for it is difficult to overthrow the one who holds power for the sole reason that someone wants to take his place. All the skill of politicians therefore consists in composing parties; a politician in the United States at first seeks to discern his interest and to see what the analogous interests are that could be grouped around his; afterwards, he busies himself with discovering whether there might not by chance exist in the world a doctrine or principle that could suitably be placed at the head of the new association to give it the right to introduce itself and circulate freely…This done, they introduce the new power into the political world.”

Tocqueville presented this as a willful, skillful achievement, a subplot of this lecture. To compete for office ambitious men are forced to form coalitions and articulate aims as systems of ideas in competition. That gives them the right to circulate freely.

**Parties of Constitutional Necessity: Hume’s Insight and Aversion**

Here is the point to which I’ve come. There is not a particle of appreciation for parties in holist theory. The demand for unity is categorical. Holists cast parties as *parts against* rather than *parts of* the whole.
Reconciliation is inconceivable. The second antiparty tradition accepts pluralism but does not follow the logic of pluralism to parties. In contrast to holism, however, reconciliation to parties is possible. For on this view, parties are less symptoms of deeper intolerable division than causes and drivers of arrant divisiveness, disrupters of fragile political equilibrium. They can conceivably be tempered and put to use. It is in response to this tradition of antipartyism that we get grudging acceptance of the divisions parties create and the trouble partisanship causes, tenuous moments of appreciation.

Before turning there, I want to pause at a half-way house between absolute condemnation and tentative appreciation. In the antiparty tradition that admits social divisions and political representation but abhors parties there is room for the possibility that on occasion a particular party might be necessary. Parties could have their moments.

No thinker offered a more nuanced account of parties of constitutional necessity than David Hume. Parties are inevitable in all regimes, but parties of principle are intrinsic to mixed constitutions like England’s, “The just balance between the republican and monarchical parts of our constitution is really, in itself, so extremely delicate and uncertain, that, when joined to men’s passions and prejudices, it is impossible but different
opinions must arise concerning it, even among persons of the best understanding.” Hume explored the contours of the disagreement during the reigns leading up to the English revolution. How Charles employed the royal prerogative in violation of constitutional limits: forced loans, benevolences, taxes without consent of parliament, arbitrary imprisonments, martial law. Parliamentary power could trespass its bounds too; “under colour of advice, they may give disguised orders; and in complaining of grievances, they may draw to themselves every power of government.” “From the shock of these opposite pretensions, together with religious controversy, arose all the factions, convulsions, and disorders, which attended that period”.46

The exceptional case is the Glorious Revolution itself. Hume rejects the Whig claim that they were battling to restore the ancient constitution as devious fiction, but accepts their assessment that “A free monarchy in which every individual is a slave, is a glaring contradiction.” He commends Tories too for holding back from the extreme of unchecked monarchy and passive obedience.47 The invitation to William to take the throne was possible because of partisans’ mutual moderation, what Hume called a “coalition of parties”.

But Hume refuses to concede that party moderation is dependable outside this exceptional, fortunate instance. “No sooner was danger past than party prejudices resumed, in some degree, their former authority”, and Whig and Tory “have continued ever since to confound and distract our government”. Moderation is not to be expected of them. At any moment “the controversy may appear so momentous [to partisans] as to justify even an opposition by arms.”

Constitutional necessity was the judgment partisans passed on their own activity, of course. Their association was temporary, required by circumstance, a dangerous instrument political men must occasionally employ for the public good. “The necessity of honest combination” to combat sedition and secure constitutional order falls short of regularizing parties without disavowing them entirely. The founders of American parties justified them “as temporary necessities to make the great experiment succeed”. Divided over the strength and scope of national government, Federalists and Republicans played out their opposition in the struggle over the ratification of the Constitution in 1787, then via unstable coalitions in the First Congress, solidifying party identification in the Second and Third. Each contested the other’s legitimacy. The Federalists did not think of
themselves as a party but as “the natural gentry rulers of society”. They identified their administration with the government, the government with the Constitution and “construed criticism...as an attempt to subvert the Constitution”. The Alien and Sedition act seemed designed to eliminate opposition. For their part, Republicans charged that their opponents’ aim was to restore monarchy and insisted that Federalists had no place in a government of the people. Here is Jefferson:

“Were parties here divided by a greediness for office, as in England, to take a part with either would be unworthy of a reasonable or moral man, but where the principle of difference is as substantial and as strongly pronounced as between the republicans and Monocrats of our country, I hold it as honorable to take a firm and decided part, and as immoral to pursue a idle line, as between the parties of Honest men and Rogues...”.

Jefferson took a historic step when he sought to capture a legislative majority by popular election, and reluctantly called the Republicans a party. Still, he expected victory to bring “the complete suppression of party”.

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Decades later, when the second Republican Party was formed, spokesmen proclaimed it too a party of necessity to save the Constitution from perversion by the slave oligarchy, a “lordly caste”. Charles Sumner’s 1860 speech -- “if bad men conspire for slavery, good men must combine for Freedom” -- “vindicates at once [the party’s] origin and necessity”. The Party must not be a fugitive organization merely for an election. It would have to remain vigilant in its resistance to constitutional usurpation. It “cannot be less permanent than the hostile influence which it is formed to counteract.”

The halfway house party of necessity with its disclaimers of partisanship is still with us. We recognize its incarnations. A new progressive party to correct the corruption of established parties. An honorable combination of independent men to rectify the imbalance of partisan extremism. A nonpartisan party uniting people of all views in defense of the neglected national interest. An independent presidential candidate who, as one observer remarked of Ross Perot, “had held no public office, was all but unknown seven months before the election, did almost no campaigning in the traditional sense, and spoke a harshly antiparty message.” A party to transcend parties.
Returning to Hume, he confessed that “to determine the nature of these parties is perhaps one of the most difficult problems that can be met with….“ Regular party organization was just emerging, and the lens of British constitutional struggle distorted the picture. If defense of constitutional order is their sole justification, partisans are bound to launch accusations of fundamental illegitimacy. I don’t see any reason to take the reverse tack and say that by definition parties operate within a settled constitutional framework and that interpreting and challenging constitutional bounds or the character of the regime is no business of parties. Still, as Burke observed, “it rarely happens to a party to have the opportunity of a clear, authentic, recorded declaration of their political tenets upon the subject of a great constitutional event like that of the Revolution.” “Constitutional necessity” does not open out to viewing parties as ordinarily acceptable, even morally desirable institutional features of political life. What does?

**Three Moments of Appreciation.**

Sartori commented that “great achievements are accomplished in the mental fog of practical experience”. Parties were formed and began to manage not just enflame political conflict without a clear understanding of the process or structure of contestation. As one historian explains, “First,
parties had to be created, and then at last they would begin to find theoretical acceptance”⁶⁷ A recent account of American parties as the solution to politicians’ collective action problems makes the same point: “politicians confront such circumstances not as theoretical insights, but as practical, substantive problems affecting their ability to achieve goals.”⁶⁸ That innovations are made untheoretically is no reason to say that the “genius” of practices is what cannot be captured theoretically.⁶⁹ Only that “illegitimacy precedes legitimacy”, and demands for political principles often follow rather than precede institutional developments. Justifications come in the train of the creation of political institutions and ways of exercising power. Arendt made the point memorably: “What saves the affairs of mortal men from their inherent futility is nothing but this incessant talk about them, which in its turn remains futile unless certain concepts, certain guideposts for future remembrance, and even for sheer reference, arise out of it.”⁷⁰ My challenge for the rest of this lecture is to identify the traces of positive in the long history of antipartyism, before they were settled theoretical insights, to rescue them from futility, underscoring their significance. In the 18th century a number of thinkers tentatively acknowledged that parties were more than occasional political alliances, dangerous instruments, temporary
and contingent, required by circumstance. And they began to allow that partisans might rise above the moral dregs.

Three initial moments of appreciation provide concepts for unifying diffuse observations about party practices and effects. They give partisans terms with which to speak with one another. They are resources for a political theory of parties, refreshing what we ought to know but is eclipsed by other concerns, or taken for granted. At a minimum, they are antidotes to wholesale, reflexive antipartyism.

**Burke’s Moment of Appreciation: Regulated Rivalry**

The first moment of appreciation portrays party conflict as a form of regulated rivalry, and belongs to Burke. “Every good political institution must have a preventive operation as well as a remedial”, he claimed. Revolution and impeachment are recognized remedies for tyranny. Party conflict is the previously unrecognized preventative that makes these remedies unnecessary. The spirit of party is a “vigilant watchman over those in power”, and “rotation in office” institutionalizes suspicion and wards off conspiracy. Parties expose one another’s crimes and failures. “The Parties who are Out, are always a Curb, and a Bridle to those which are In, and the Parties which are In, are always a Terror and a Stirrer up to Vigilance in those which are Out.” So it is not the case as Hume implied
that the “country party” has no reason for being if “the court” upholds the constitution and acts responsibly. “The spirit of party” is permanently useful.

Burke’s regulated rivalry was a conceptual innovation. It introduced another form of institutional distrust into political life, a supplement to the mixed constitution (and later, to the separation of powers) designed “to encourage good behavior in the absence of good character”. Regulated rivalry added organized opposition within government to political opposition outside of government. It lifted parties above political clubs and secret societies excoriated as seditious cabals, nurseries of rebellion. A modicum of political liberty makes many forms of dissent lawful; this was a standard 18th century theme. But only parties bring opposition into the frame of government, regularize it, eventually legalize it, and make it politically mundane, a bid for office not power simply. Burke’s moment of appreciation is echoed in one political scientist’s exclamation: “The miracle of democracy consists in creating a condition of social peace by means of conflict rather than harmony”; the lapse in this otherwise welcome observation is that “the miracle” was the work of parties and preceded democracy.

Burke’s moment of appreciation was novel and demanding. When he insisted that partisans are not necessarily bent on mutual destruction or see
rivals as public enemies we should not imagine that he relied solely on a balance of forces or on prudent retreat, the realist’s strategic commitment not to resort to arms, giving up office without a fight as the best chance for reciprocity. Nonviolence -- the move from militarism to militancy, from private armies to verbal violence (as when Democrats called Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America” a Contract on America\textsuperscript{78}) -- is only part of the story. Regulated party rivalry entails enormous political self-restraint, and the true discipline is mental and emotional. Political aspirants channel their ambitions and goals through this collective, constraining, typically unheroic, institution. They endure the “terror” of the opposition’s vigilance and exposure. Partisans see themselves as firmly on the side of the angels, but regulated rivalry demands acknowledging their partiality, that they do not and cannot speak for the whole. The discipline consists of conceding each party’s status as just a part in a permanently pluralist politics. And with it the provisional nature of being the governing party; the charade of pretending to represent the whole.

All this mutual self-restraint, institutionalizing and taming of conflict is not to say that extremism or polarization should be defined out of parties, then or now. Partisanship does not mean moderation or temperate goals. It does not inhibit pursuit of radical change.\textsuperscript{79} Regulated rivalry does not
presume comity of the sort that produces what one 18th century commentator described as “a Kind of Methodism in Politicks”. Burke’s preventative function requires party conflict and is subverted by “barons dividing up fiefdoms”, collusion, or one-party dominance.

Burke’s formulation of regulated rivalry makes no appearance in democratic theory today (where often enough conflict is tamed, renamed “disagreement”, and ideally transformed into consensus, and where in any case parties are ignored). But regulated rivalry is a live consideration when entrenched or hegemonic parties weaken the “bridle” and “terror” of ins and outs. We recognize Burke’s moment of appreciation in studies showing that the conditions for achieving parties’ “preventative function” are not just material, a matter of rational incentives, but also of moral disposition. Burke’s moment is the heart of the matter when parties threaten civil disorder; when parties do not accept their status as parts but claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the nation; when parties are too weak or inexperienced to govern.

**Hegel’s Moment of Appreciation: Governing**

This last point alerts us that in one respect Burke’s moment of appreciation is modest. Regulated rivalry is preventative, “exposing one another’s crimes and failures”. We hear nothing of the positive purposes and
responsibilities of parties. The second moment of appreciation is constructive. By bringing opposition within the frame of government parties do more than manage political conflict; they organize the business of government. This moment belongs – perhaps surprisingly -- to Hegel.

Like Hume and Burke, Hegel came to his insight by reflecting on constitutional arrangements. Political representation in the German Constitution was a mess of historical property rights “which the parts have wrested from the whole”, the epitome of ‘privilege unredeemed by function’. The constitutions of the individual German states could not reasonably be described as mixed or balanced, either; Hegel called Wurtenberg “an anarchy made into a constitution”. He wanted more than rationalized representation, however, for the issue in representation is not the right of enfranchisement and therefore of who were to be the constituents but the result, the creation of a legislative assembly. That was Hegel’s great insight. Assemblies are governing bodies, and representation per se is not government. Whether an assembly comprises estates, corporations, or is formed through democratic elections, it is not properly constituted without parties.

“Whoever has reflected a little on the nature of an Assembly …cannot fail to see that without an opposition such an
assembly is without outer and inner life. It is precisely this antagonism within it that forms its essence and justification...Without it it has the appearance of only one party or of just a clump."  

Hegel argued that political (men) must form parties in order to govern, which requires more than temporary cooperation or a commanding personality. Party norms and incentives allow partisans to hold together over the relatively long-term, to generate leadership, and to act. Responsibility was Hegel’s theme. “Responsible” does not mean as it would later, a version of democratic accountability but responsible for rather than to; responsibility for the business of state. A party is an organized group capable of assuming authority and willing to do so, offering credible measures and presumably competent governors. Hegel knew that this was not well understood, and he said of the English opposition: “What it is often charged with, as if with something bad, namely all it wants is to form a Ministry itself, is in fact its greatest justification.” On this point, Hegel was an Anglophile: only the English have “an idea of what government and governing is.”

The background condition for Hegel’s moment of appreciation was the growth of active government. It is no accident that the two great theorists of the modern state, Bentham and Hegel, scorned customary law
and advocated legislation on matters ranging from trade and taxes to “police” and welfare. Both assign a critical role to a professional civil service, a universal class. Both grasp the demanding *business* of government. But where Bentham prizes only impartial calculators of utility, Hegel perceives a need for parties. Parties promote governmental functions, seize opportunities to exercise governmental power, develop or respond to initiatives, provide rationales for them, and coordinate political action.

Attention to the business of government explains Hegel’s objection to the halfway concession that would restrict party opposition to “measures, not men”. Men matter, and not just occasional political brilliance. Collective governing has its own requirements. Selection should be organized to insure ability, political competence, and the disposition to get business done. Parties recruit and train political leaders; they regulate access to office. What Hegel called “political consciousness” is acquired through habitual preoccupation with public affairs, and partisanship is the school in which the competence and disposition to govern are developed. He applauded “the business routine” of party *hommes d’etat* and disdained *les hommes a principes* attuned to abstractions (their agenda “more or less exhausted by the droits de l’homme et du citoyen”).
The business of government also goes some way to explaining Hegel’s opposition to electoral reform. In his words, “There was no sustained and organized party activity among the electorate to stimulate the latter’s interest, to clarify political issues, and to simplify political decisions”.\textsuperscript{94} His chief fear was that the English Reform Bill would empower disconnected voters devoid of political culture, and bring self-promoted, doctrinaire radicals into government who are unprepared for governing.\textsuperscript{95} Responsibility for governing also explains Hegel’s tolerance for “corruption”, or places insured through “the influence of the Ministry and then through their party friends.”\textsuperscript{96} “Connections in politics are essentially necessary for the full performance of our public duty.”\textsuperscript{97}

Hegel, the metaphysicist, logician, and philosopher of right, turned attention to this least abstract of institutions. He articulated what had been an un-theorized, serendipitous course. We can catch a glimmer of the characteristically Hegelian in his moment of appreciation – a typically transformative vision of actuality. Where others saw irrationality or errant self-serving, Hegel saw parties as requirements of the modern state. “The rose of reason in the cross of the present”.

I want to retrieve a thought implicit in Hegel’s moment, and in Burke’s and suggest its importance. Neither regulated rivalry nor governing appears
to depend on parties mirroring deep natural or social cleavages, or on partisans’ sharing a philosophy. True, Burke defined parties as a `promoting by joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed’, but his preventative function does not seem to require that national interest rises to the level of constitutional interpretation or rest on a rigorous notion of “principle”. Both regulated rivalry and governing are forgiving when it comes to the character of parties so long as partisans have political objectives they can defend and govern reasonably effectively. It seems enough to say as Tocqueville did of “small” parties in America: they form almost “a government inside the government…it is true that they do not have…the right to make law; but they have the power to attack the one that exists and to formulate in advance the one that should exist.”

The claim to be a great party – an archetype of memory or hope, a party of high principle or constitutional necessity – was the sole justification for organization in an era before parties were acceptable. Greatness would become a standard again, at least episodically, in the context of democratic elections. Democratic parties would be judged by their representativeness which was often taken to mean divisions reflecting critical social cleavages, grounded in foundational principles or ideology. Moreover, once
partisanship became a matter of personal identity for ordinary voters, it is not hard to see that “party id” would degrading if it were anything less than a matter of conviction and identification with like-minded citizens on the side of the angels.\textsuperscript{101}

So small parties are despicable, “organised imposture”, waging “sham battles” in which “not the savour of a real distinction remains”.\textsuperscript{102} Historians judge Martin Van Buren harshly. In forming the Democratic Party, the first national electoral party in America, his goal was to erect an institution to win the presidency (and to make the presidency intersectional\textsuperscript{103}). His only principle was setting aside the issue of slavery. Unless we count what Van Buren called “the party principle”, that is, the value of a national party for achieving office and governing, and partisanship as a path to office that trumps social standing, family connections, local attachments, even natural aristocracy.\textsuperscript{104}

This note of disparagement of parties that invent divisions sounds loudly today. “The impression that it is the parties imposing cleavages on society...cleavages deplored as “artificial”\textsuperscript{105} is damning criticism. The implication of small parties is self-serving irresponsibility, not “the human race catching its breath” and certainly not political creativity. The only
complaint rivaling divisiveness is small parties without identities converging “dead center”. The insouciant lyrics of “Politics and Poker” say it all.

If we accept regulating rivalry and governing as achievements, however, Burke’s moment of appreciation and Hegel’s invite us to reconsider the assumption that parties must be “great” in order to serve valuable purposes, or that partisanship must be a matter of identification with critical social or ideological divisions or ardent adherence to principles to be justified. Small parties can do the work of regulated rivalry and governing, so long as they are competitive and competent, and they can serve as templates for great transformative parties or quasi-great ones. Hence Webster’s quip about Van Buren that the leader of the Free Spoil Party should so suddenly become the leader of the Free Soil Party.

**The Impartial Observer’s Moment: Humean Partisans**

That said, a third moment of appreciation *did* depend on the nature and quality of the lines of division distinguishing parties from one another. Party identity is vital to philosophical defenses of parties and partisanship. Like regulated rivalry and governing, this moment of appreciation assigns the advantages of parties to the very divisiveness that appalls antiparty theorists. Only here, the positive potential of party conflict extends beyond political institutions, and parties take on a kind of moral glow. Neither regulated
rivalry nor organizing government were purely pragmatic claims, of course. Still, the value of managed conflict, the orderly succession of governments, checking and exposing, competent governance did not need to be invented. It was enough to recognize parties’ capacity to serve these valued purposes. The philosophical moment of appreciation goes beyond the theory of practice. I will identify two versions of the philosophical moment. One points to a stringent ‘ethics of partisanship’ and the other to progressive expectancy. Neither has a place in political theory today; like regulated rivalry and governing, this moment of appreciation is worth recovering.

Hume offers a stern philosophy of parties. Here, as in ethics, he assumes the pose of “impartial observer”, a standpoint we saw in his account of parties of constitutional necessity during the Revolution. He assessed the actions and claims of Whigs and Tories from a perspective of reflective detachment. “Impartial” is understood relative to the parties; the observer is independent of connections, nonpartisan. But Hume wants to claim more: the position of impartial observer has its own center and ballast: what he calls “the proper medium”, no excessive praise or blame, “extremes of all are to be avoided”. Applied to parties, moderation means: “Though no one will ever please either faction by moderate opinions, it is there we are most likely to meet with truth and certainty.”

106
The puzzle is why impartiality should translate into an equitable assessment, an evenhanded distribution of praise and blame for Tories and Whigs, as Hume modeled in his political essays? Why is no one party alone on the side of the angels? Mill called Hume “the profoundest negative thinker on record”, and Hume argued sternly that no party can have a corner on right.

From the standpoint of the impartial observer, parties partition political purposes, good sense (and bad judgment, too) between them. Parties not only check and moderate one another, containing abuses. Beyond that they complement one another. This is clear when parties advocate for equally necessary constitutional powers: crown prerogative and Parliamentary remonstrance. Because each has hold of a salient social part or principle their antagonism is defensible. Substantively, they “add up”. Hume’s philosophical perspective posits complementarity between or among parties.

At the same time, the impartial observer discerns that parties are not as they present themselves, sharply dichotomous, sectarian, with positions inherently fixed and irreconcilable. Rather, the principles and values they serve are matters of degree. She assigns to each party its “proper poise and influence”. So the impartial observer is, like Hume, a critic, unveiling the partisan “frame” of arguments (Whig history), discerning when a party
deviates to the extreme, loses its poise, overreaches for influence, so that the parties are not fruitful complements and do not add up. The impartial observer discerns moderation of a kind “likely to bring truth and certainty”.

The striking thing is that Hume would impress the impartial observer’s perspective on partisans themselves. We know that he saw partisans as dogmatic and partisanship, like other social relations, rooted in impulses of affection bounded by “limited generosity”. Nonetheless, partisans might be injected with “a small tincture of Pyrrhonism” and hesitation. One proposed remedy was to read his own philosophical history. But readers or not, partisans should sometimes be in the frame of mind to assume the impartial observer’s standpoint, and Hume explains just what that entails. A sense of fallibility and accompanying humility, for one thing. A generous estimate of the opposition’s intentions (“there are on both sides wise men who meant well to their country”), for another. Hume then escalates his requirements: partisans must also “persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be sometimes in the right…that neither side are …so fully supported by reason as they endeavor to flatter themselves”. This requires partisans to acknowledge that no one party is in the complete interest of the nation, or even of those who advance it. We see that Hume proposes an ethics of partisanship equivalent to moderation, that is, moderation grounded
in philosophic insight into political complementarity rather than pragmatic accommodation or the checking function of opposition.

Let me try to illustrate Hume’s ethic of partisanship with an example from contemporary political philosophy. Take John Rawls. He characterizes “political liberalism” as a broad category that contains a family of related political conceptions, of which his own justice as fairness is one.\textsuperscript{111} The principle of equal opportunity is essential, but the conception of “fair equality of opportunity” that he favors is not. Some social minimum is essential, but the “difference principle” he sets out in his theory of justice is not. “These matters,” he says, “are nearly always open to wide differences of reasonable opinion.”\textsuperscript{112} So far, so Humean. Rawls even acknowledges that justice as fairness will be viewed in partisan terms. “As with any political conception, readers are likely to see it as having a location on the political spectrum;” as “left-liberal or “social democratic.”\textsuperscript{113} But as a partisan of justice as fairness Rawls does not represent it as a theory for the left that would be incomplete unless complemented by a theory of justice from the right. Rather, he identifies justice as fairness with “the idea of equality most appropriate to citizens viewed as free and equal.”\textsuperscript{114} At one moment Rawls is a partisan on the side of the angels proposing the best account of what needs to be done. At another moment, he is injecting himself with “a small tincture
of Pyrrhonism” and conceding that the opposition may sometimes be in the right.

The exemplary Rawls aside, Hume’s imperative goes against the grain of actual partisanship, where the conviction of being on the side of the angels is common enough and reserve rare. Partisans are not impartial observers. Mildness and moderation stand in contrast to enthusiasm. The attitude of “hesitation” is antithetical to much political action. Generous assumptions about the opposition’s intentions (“wise men who mean well”) are episodic at best. Only sometimes, and only some partisans, stand back from their rightness, and when they do it does not usually entail recognizing as Hume would have it that other parties share in being right. Hume’s pose is phenomenologically alien.

A less demanding ethics of partisanship might look like this. Partisans do not have to think that their truths are relative or relational, only that organized political disagreement is ineliminable and party conflict its form. Partisans can admit their own fallibility without conceding that their antagonist is sometimes in the right. No particular reason for reconciling themselves to the status of being just a part, one among others, seems necessary. Certainly not that partisan differences are continuous or that the parties “add up”. So long as partisans accept regulated rivalry, do not aim at
eliminating the opposition, and concede that political authority is partisan and contestable, there is no normative imperative for them to assume the pose of philosophic spectator. I’ll return to this theme tomorrow. The status of the ethics of partisanship I propose is not a Humean ideal. Its virtues derive not from leavening with philosophical moderation but from political structures.

For Hume, however, and Humeans today, the ethics of partisanship as well as an appreciation of parties depends on the impartial observer’s detached perspective, judgment of parties’ complementarity, and moderation of a kind “likely to bring truth and certainty”.115

**Antagonism and Improvement: A Proto-Millian Philosophy of Parties**

The most influential philosophical moment of appreciation shares Hume’s assumption that parties are parts that add up, their contributions complementary. Only here, the benefits of opposition do not depend on partisans’ stepping back to become impartial observers. Less stringently, more hopefully, the dynamic of party antagonism does the work. I call this moment proto-Millian.

We are familiar with Mill’s argument that in government and in all things the opposition of contrasting views is necessary to correct error, and with his signature argument about one-sidedness: truth “is so much a question of the
reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.” He called this “the social function of antagonism” without which any government suffers “infallible degeneracy and decay”. We seem to hear Mill ascribing this function to parties when he says that a party of order and party of progress are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life, each “deriving its utility from the deficiencies of the other”.

The claim that contestation corrects error, heightens awareness of arguments for and against propositions, stimulates both self-reflection and knowledge of the opposition, and produces better decisions and more legitimate ones was Enlightenment orthodoxy -- widely reproduced today and applied inside and outside politics and to a host of arguing agents. The political locus of “trial by discussion” is assemblies. In Cavour’s terse summary: “The worst chamber is still preferable to the best ante-chamber”. Of the innumerable expressions, I favor Benjamin Constant’s: deputies are “forced to debate together, “necessity always ends by uniting them in common negotiation.” Antagonism and negotiation just is “a natural accompaniment of any, even nominal, representation”.

116 117 118 119 120 121
Notice however that the link between opposition and improvement did not mean that parties are the agents of fruitful antagonism. Indisputably the most ardent voice of enlightenment, William Godwin, tied social improvement to “communicative politics” (his term) but insisted that the “shibboleth of party has a more powerful tendency, than perhaps any other circumstance in human affairs, to render the mind quiescent and stationery”.

This judgment should be familiar, for contemporary political philosophy deliberately severs deliberation from party rivalry.\textsuperscript{122} Theorists’ accounts are more refined than Constant’s view that “necessity” forces legislators to debate together. Only a certain form of “reasoning together” counts as deliberation “Argumentative scrutiny” is not enough. Often stringent criteria govern what counts as a legitimate argument in reaching decisions and “epistemic abstinence” dictates what considerations must be excluded as reasons.\textsuperscript{123} Insofar as “the internal telos of deliberation is consensus”,\textsuperscript{124} partisanship is anathema by definition. Even deliberative theorists who do not aim at overcoming disagreement typically associate partisanship with “coercion, negotiation, or, in its most discursive form, rhetorical manipulation.”\textsuperscript{125} In one confident statement: “That deliberation and partisanship are mutually exclusive does not seem particularly controversial. Deliberation is a process of weighing alternative courses of action.
Partisanship is the exercise of power on behalf of a chosen course of action.”

One last example of strict severance: “deliberation aims at judgments about the common good; partisanship advances the interests of a sector of society”. Deliberation is a balm and corrective of party antagonism.

Removed from party rivalry, the locus of deliberation in contemporary theory is ambiguous; the often invoked “public sphere” is everywhere and nowhere. When deliberation is identified with actual political institutions where decisions are made, the model sites are courts (judicial conferences producing reasoned opinions) or the controlled experiments of “deliberative polls” and “citizen’s juries”. Campaigns and elections are disreputably antideliberative. So are legislatures. A recent philosophical defense of legislatures, which elevates them over courts as forums of principle, does not mention parties. With rare exceptions, then, contemporary political theory does not afford parties a philosophical moment of appreciation, and I will say more about this devaluation tomorrow.

Mill erected the philosophical framework of corrective, progressive antagonism, located the contest of ideas in government, and insisted that this process requires actual advocates, not devil’s advocates or impartial observers. He explained in *On Liberty* that objections have force when they come “from persons who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest,
and do their utmost for them.” He looked for progress from “the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.”

The question is whether Mill’s “trial by discussion” and “social function of antagonism” is a defense of parties? When he speaks of “The great council of the nation; the place where the opinions which divide the public on great subjects of national interest, meet in a common arena, do battle, and are victorious and vanquished” does he intend a brief for parties? There are good reasons to think that Mill’s “party of order or stability” and “party of progress or reform” each of which “derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other”, were not actual political associations but “modes of thinking”. Mill has in mind the juxtaposition of subversive thinkers on the one side and those who look at received opinion “with the eyes of a believer”, on the other. Like Bentham and Coleridge. It is a leap to apply his declaration of tolerance for “one-eyed men, provided their one eye is a penetrating one”, which was a bow to two seminal minds in philosophy, to political partisanship.

That is why I call this moment of appreciation proto-Millian. To be fair, Mill could imagine a robust conservative and a “really advanced” liberal party but he despaired of them. Actually existing parties appalled him. “In the present situation of Great Britain, and of all countries in Europe”, he
wrote, parties are incapable of serving as the nation’s “Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinion”. Representative Government opens with a withering description of Conservatives and Liberals who have “lost confidence in the political creeds which they nominally profess” without making any progress in providing themselves with a better.  

Mill’s scolding goes on. Partisans engage in mock fighting. Parties are populated by “a people of place hunters”. Partisanship drags even able men down “to the level of the meanest animal who can give a vote” Mill reflected on the “bad morality of party”, by which he meant the jesuitry of “yielding in small things”. He spoke of “the immorality of omission” by which he meant willingness to accept “miserable palliatives” instead of “manly” effectual improvements. He excoriated parties, inveighed against partisanship, and refused to spend money on his own stand for election to parliament as a Liberal in 1865. He insisted on complete freedom to act. Gladstone called him “the Saint of Rationalism”.  

Mill turned to institutional arrangements for antagonism without parties and partisanship, the most important being his campaign on behalf of proportional representation. He imagined PR as a relief from the imperative that “all the opinions, feelings, and interests of all members of the community should be merged into the single consideration of which
party should predominate”. Hare’s plan (a STV arrangement he called “personal representation”) would be a stimulus to new breed of political men. “Hundreds of able men of independent thought” would enter the field and be voted into government, Mill wrote. Honorable, distinguished men “having sworn allegiance to no political party” would offer themselves in undreamed numbers. In place of party Mill fantasizes a “personal merit ticket”. His enthusiasm was boundless: the electoral change would be a prodigious gain “to our policy, to our morality, to our civilization itself”.

Mill’s contemporaries thought his confidence was misplaced. Proportional representation would fragment politics, and produce party lists and parties like churches, with doctrinaire tenets. “Voluntary constituencies” would be rigid, and subservience to party more exacting. From my angle, the question is whether “hundreds of able men of independent thought” could drive improvement on Mill’s own terms? The philosophical moment of appreciation assumes a dynamic of antagonism. Does independence insure “a serious conflict of opposing reasons” or describe a real struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners? True, Mill’s nonpartisan men of merit are not Humean impartial observers. But why should we think that Independents would spontaneously fall into complementary camps, partisans of order or progress? Or that they would provide actual liberal and
conservative partisans backbone and muscular reasons? Ardent partisans may not be deliberative personally and individually (though internally parties are necessarily arenas of trial by discussion), but at the level of the polity, deliberation depends on partisanship. They fuel collective deliberation.\textsuperscript{150}

Mill was right to be skeptical that coherent legislation could emerge from “a miscellaneous assembly”, and to approve of “concert and cooperation”.\textsuperscript{151} Yet we are left to imagine Independents doing the work. A party of Independents, I argue tomorrow, is nonsense.

\textbf{Assessing the Philosophic Moment of Appreciation}

In assessing the philosophic moment of appreciation of parties, caveats come promptly to mind. From Humean and proto-Millian perspectives, parties have value as carriers of complementary positions, reciprocally corrective forces. They are indefensible if they fail to divide along dimensions necessary for improvement. There is reason to be wary of this moment of appreciation if only because it threatens to eclipse Burke’s insight, and Hegel’s. A great deal is lost if intellectual boredom blinds us to the value of regulated rivalry and responsibility for governing; if these moments of appreciation are taken for granted or overshadowed by the drama of progressive antagonism.
Parties do sometimes assume the character of complementary antagonists – though it is not obvious that the most politically important or creative moments of partisanship are these. In any case, there is no reason to imagine that principles or values or interests arise in antagonistic pairs. Often enough parties stand for disparate, unmatched positions. Or important values are assumed, taken for granted, unopposed. Or parties collude and agree to leave things out of politics, ducking problems, or suffering jointly a failure of political imagination. That is my second caveat. To rest a defense of parties on complementary differences and a dynamic of progress is to rest it on alluring but contingent grounds.

My final caveat has to do with the consequences of progressive antagonism as a standard. The philosophical moment of appreciation invites disappointment. We’ve seen that historically, political theory harbored no great moral promise parties could disappoint. The philosophic moment raises expectations. Partisans disappoint when they are resistant to “a small tincture of Pyrrhonism”, a moment of impartiality. Parties disappoint when “men not measures” dominate, or when the justifications for measures are not sufficiently grounded in right reasons. It disappoints when contest leads to the stasis of compromise or to paralysis. As we know from personal experience, exasperation can seize even those friendly to trial by discussion.
Indeed, the failed promise of deliberation fuels ferocious attacks on parties and partisanship, most famously Carl Schmitt’s. Parties stand or fall on the proposition Schmitt traces to Mill: a confrontation of differences, governed by persuasion through arguments of truth or justice. Schmitt called this “the metaphysic of the two-party system”. Once it is no longer “a question of persuading one’s opponent but rather of winning a majority in order to govern”, government by discussion “counts as moldy”. When Schmitt wrote in *Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* of “the dominance of parties, their unprofessional politics of personalities … the purposelessness and banality of parliamentary debate… the destructive methods of parliamentary obstruction”, the antithesis he commends is “decisionism”. Schmitt’s antipartyism makes Hobbism the necessary response to existential threats. The proto-Millian function of parties appears fatuous, “chatter and intrigue”. The disappointed expectation of “trial by discussion” of “great public interests” is a recipe for antidemocratic rancor. It invites judicial, bureaucratic, and of course executive alternatives to party politics. In less virulent form, as I will show, it is an invitation to nonpartisanship; it vaunts political “Independence”.

I believe the proto-Millian moment of appreciation can be rescued by restating it more modestly. Parties don’t add up to a comprehensive,
philosophically defensible whole. They are not complements whose antagonism is dependably countervailing, much less progressive. But parties do draw politically relevant lines of division, reject elements of the others’ account of projects and promises, and accept regulated rivalry as the form in which they are played out. It is enough that party antagonism focuses attention on problems, information and interpretations are brought out, stakes are delineated, points of conflict and commonality are located, the range of possibilities winnowed. And that relative competence on different matters is up for judgment. We can preserve the proto-Millian position in paler shades as long as parties create lines of division and define themselves in relation to one another. For, caveats in view, it is still the case that politically salient values, preferences, programs, interest, and principles are unlikely to be cast in terms of Mill’s “serious conflict of opposing reasons” unless partisans do the work of articulating lines of division and advocating on the side of the angels.\textsuperscript{156} \textsuperscript{157} That is the main point to retain from a pared down proto-Millian position: without party rivalry, “trial by discussion” cannot be meaningful. It will not be if interests and opinions are disorganized and are not brought into opposition, their consequences are not drawn out, argument is evaded. Nor can it be fruitful if the inclusion of interests and opinions is exhaustive and chaotic; parties are about selection
and exclusion.\textsuperscript{158} Shaping conflict is what parties and partisans do, and what will not be done, certainly not regularly, without them.\textsuperscript{159} I have alluded all along to the creative part parties play. To hark back to Hegel, representation per se is not deliberation any more than it is governing.

I do not intend a rosy view of parties; simply one that mimics Hegel in seeing them as a rose in the cross of the present.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Except for Mill’s, these moments of appreciation arose as reflections on parties in government before it could be described as democratic and before their electoral face was predominant.\textsuperscript{160} Even the proto-Millian moment arose before elected officials thought of themselves as dependent on “grass roots” for justifying their place in the structure of what could finally be called representative democracy.\textsuperscript{161} My exercise in retrieval of “certain guideposts for future remembrance, and even for sheer reference” has value if it reminds us that parties need not be entirely identified as they are today with the activities of popular campaigns and elections, mobilization, and standards of representativeness and accountability. That is, my exercise has value if we think that these moments of appreciation – regulated rivalry, governing, and the creation of lines of division -- get at enduring achievements, are resources for assessing parties, and challenge
contemporary attempts, even in democratic theory, to embrace political pluralism without parties.

What remains of the glorious traditions of antipartyism with which I began? Holist antiparty sentiment based on an ideal of unity survives, the property of ardent nationalists, purists (ethnic or ideological), and theocrats. Echoes of the second glorious tradition of antipartyism persist because its premise is correct. Parties are divisive; political conflict is their business. If they don’t make trouble, they are inexcusable.”

The charge of divisiveness is seldom leveled promiscuously today; it is typically reserved for “extremist” parties and for party polarization. The meaning of extremist, of “off-center” as opprobrium, the strangely ardent objection to polarization particularly in the U.S., is an intriguing but separate subject.

Alongside these glorious traditions new aversions shaped by the experience of democratic elections organized by party competition erupted on the landscape of antipartyism. Democratization came earlier to America, though as we’ve seen there were few precocious justifications for parties and partisanship from this side of the ocean. But parties attentive to public opinion did bring advances in aversion. “Progressive antipartyism” takes aim at mass parties, called the “organization” before the label “machine” stuck, entrenched parties in what was aptly called a “party system”. Parties
are reviled as corrupt and corrupting, perverters of the democratic spirit. I call this “post-party depression”, and virtually every element of contemporary antipartyism and every scheme for correcting the system by eliminating or circumventing or containing parties has its roots there.

Another highpoint of antipathy takes aim at *partisanship* specifically -- at party identification among ordinary citizens. Even if parties have their uses, partisanship is abhorrent. While partisans battle one another, all claiming to be on the side of the angels, critics demonize them all and see Independents as virtuously above the fray. Antipartisanship and the idealization of Independence is my subject tomorrow. I will propose my own moment of appreciation. I take the side of partisans against Independents and argue for the moral distinctiveness of party id.

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[Political theory harbored no great moral promise parties could disappoint. There was no initial enthusiasm for the promise of parties followed by unusual depravity or the more mundane but inevitable dashing of hopes. These moments of appreciation were sober, philosophy reflecting on the fire dragon of politics and offering not utopian design or even regulative ideal but a bit of promise. ]

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2 John Rawls uses the phrase.


5 The best study of Burke and the origins of party government is Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Statesmanship and Party Government (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965)

6 OED Online 2004 entry for party.

7 For starters, a party is a group organized to contest for public office; it is avowed in its partisanship and operates not conspiratorially but in public view; it is not an ad hoc coalition or arrangement for vote-trading on a specific issue but an institution formed for on-going political activity; it can claim a substantial number of followers.

8 Ioannis Evrigenis pointed out to me that in Byzantium the symbol of sovereignty is a two-headed eagle. As this caution suggests, I am not making universalistic claims but identifying the main categories of antipartyism in the canon of western political theory.


11 Leviathan, p. 372; 279; 274 and ff; p. 375.


15 Aristotle, V,8 at Barker, 225; III, xi at Barker 125.


18 Madison, “To Thomas Jefferson”, 1787 in Rakove, ed., p. 150. A main theme of American political history (and of the longer chapter of my ms. from which this is taken) is that the mixed constitution was succeeded by the notion of separated powers. Madison is the chief theorist of institutional checking and balancing. Very quickly this vision, which is still a central tenet of constitutional law, was amended by parties and the changing dynamic of unified/divided government.

19 Madison, Federalist #10 in The Federalist, ed. Edward Mead Earle (New York: Modern Library ??), p. 55; 56. “A Candid State of Parties”. In later writings, Madison tempered his view. “Political parties intermingled throughout the community unite as well as divide every Section of it. Parties founded on local distinctions and fixed peculiarities which separate the whole into great conflicting masses are far more to be dreaded in their tendency”, Letter to Richard Lee, 1819, in James Madison’s Advice to My Country, ed. David B. Mattern (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997), p. 76.

20 Madison, Federalist No. 50, p. 335 (Modern Library).

21 “Parties” in Rakove, ed., p. 504-5.

22 When in Federalist #51 Madison declared that the remedy for branches of government encroaching on one another was not to be found in parties but “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”, meaning “the interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place” (p. 337) , he had it exactly wrong. Parties cross the boundaries of separated powers.


25 Reconciling Machiavelli’s writings on parties in Rome and Florence, most importantly the Discourses and Florentine Histories, is convincingly accomplished by Gisela Bock, “Civil Discord in Machiavelli’s Istorie Fiorentine”, in Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, ed., Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990): 181-201, His shifting assessments of the
two republics, from parallelism to contrast, is her theme. For another reading see Harvey Mansfield, “Party and Sect in Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories”, in Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), on ancient parties led by “princes” and modern parties led by sacred as well as secular men – to the dishonor of the latter.

26 Cited in Bock, p. 182.
27 Cited in Bock, p. 182.
28 Discourses, Book I, Chapter 49 at 240; on consuls Book III, Chapter 27 at 490.
29 Politics, V.2 in Barker p. 207ff.
30 “Of Parties in General” at 78. old text
31 “Of parties in General”, Political Essays, p. 35; Federalist #10.
33 “Of Parties in General”, p. 36.
34 “Of Parties in General” at 39.
35 “To a stranger, almost all the domestic quarrels of Americans at first appear incomprehensible or puerile, and one does not know if one ought to take pity on a people that is seriously occupied with miseries like these or envy it the good fortune of being able to be occupied with them.”Letter to Eugene Stoffels, January 12, 1833 in Tocqueville, Lettres Choisis Souvenirs: 1814-1859, ed. Francoise Melonio et Laurence Guellec (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2003) at 296-97. He had not just America but also France in mind, where the political withdrawal of the legitimists left in play only the selfishly ambitious.
37 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 1813, Memorial Edition 13: 279
41 Sartori at 77.
43 Mansfield at 171; I, 2.2.
44 Edmund S. Morgan documents the way in which early “instructions” to representatives and “petitions” to government were often top-down in Inventing the People (New York: Norton, 1988), pp. 222ff.
46 Of the Parties of Great Britain”, in Haakonsen, ed. Hume, Political Essays, at 40; Hume at 234 discussing Charles I and the petition of right; Hume at 248 in a discussion of Charles I dissolution of the Short Parliament.; Hume at 249-50. “I would only persuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting pro aris et focis, and change a good constitution into a bad one, by the violence of their factions.”Hume, “That Politics May be Reduced to a Science” GET
47 Whigs held back from the idea that the crown was forfeited. For their part, Tories held back from insisting on passive obedience. “We, in this island, have ever since enjoyed if not the best system of government, at least the most entire system of liberty that was ever known amongst mankind.” Hume at 245. The contest over Hume’s own partisanship (“thinking Whig” or Tory) can be sampled in Coniff and Geoffrey Marshall, “David Hume and Political Scepticism”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 4 no. 16 (Jul. 1954): 247-57; Duncan Forbes at 212ff.
48 Hume at 238. He levels this stern judgment: “both parties, while they warped their principles from regard to their antagonists, and from prudential considerations, lost the praise of consistence and uniformity”, p. 241.
49 “Of the Parties of Great Britain” at 43.
51 Of the Coalition of Parties” at 93
52 Add Morgan, Inventing the People, pp. 116ff; 218ff.

Madison was convinced that parties acquiesced in electoral defeat only because they lacked military force. Cited in Hofstadter at footnote on p. 131.


Cited in Hofstadter at 107.

Aldrich and Grant, p. 298.

Cited in Hofstadter at 124.

Aldrich at 80.

Wood, at 298. Aldrich at 80. It did not put an end to parties, which were established by the time of the third or fourth Congress, p. 80; but constitutional stability gave way to “King Caucus” and altered forms of organizing elections and government, cf. Aldrich, 279. His explanation unites principle, interest, and institutions, p. 93.

Charles Sumner, “The Republican Party: Its Origin, Necessity and Permanence” in Library of the University Pamphlets, II, at 2; 14. “Prostrated, exposed, and permanently expelled from ill-gotten power, the Oligarchy will soon cease to exist as a political combination”, he promised.


(Getty FN “Parties of GB”). Whig and Tory labels were overlaid by court and country parties, issues of executive links to commercial interests on the one side and the “corruption” of crown in parliament, spearheaded by Bolingbroke on the other. Hume’s account of the real balance, dependent on patronage, was the view from outside, unacknowledged by any party. The added confounding element was the propensity of Tories in particular to move from principled defense of monarchy (indefeasible right) to affection for a particular line of succession, see “Of the Parties of Great Britain”, notes, p. 280-1.


Sartori, p. 18, borrowing from Oakeshott.

Hofstadter at 39.

Aldrich at 29; 69

GET FN.


Cited in Mansfield at 174.

A 19th century Albany newspaper, cited in Hofstadter at 251.


Not many thinkers shared Burke’s appreciation of defensive, preventative parties. To Madison, the expedience of creating parties to function as mutual checks on each other is as absurd as promoting new vices to counteract existing ones. “Parties” at 504.


See Morgan for a discussion of extra-Parliamentary associations in Britain and America. They were fewer and more discredited in Britain, pp. 232-3. Party government and later party democracy brought them together.


“The Sentiment of a Tory in Respect to a Late Important Transaction and in Regard to the Present Situation of Affairs”, in Gunn at 105.

For a discussion of party self-entrenchment and the cartel analogy see Rosenblum, “The Anxiety of Influence”, unpublished ms. Democratization changed the normative reasons for competition beyond Burke’s checking function to include voter choice; “cartel” suggests the norm of a political marketplace. Schattschneider’s famous definition -- “Democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties” in *Party Government*, p. 60.

Political scientists also study institutional rules that can enhance the power of a minority opposition weakened by uncompetitive elections and unified government.

I leave aside Hegel’s philosophy of the state as “a great architectonic edifice, a hieroglyph of reason which becomes manifest in actuality”, *Philosophy of Right*, addition to sec. 279.

Z.A. Pelcyzynski, *Hegel’s Political Writings* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) at 91. Pelcyzynski’s introductory essay describes Hegel’s reading, correspondence, and experience in the various German states; his persistent interest in politics. ADD NOTES HERE. In another essay I contrast Hegel’s with Sieyes’ account of representation: both made the activity of legislatures key but Sieyes rejected parties as inconsistent with the work of representatives.

“Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in Wurtenberg”, cited in Pelcyzynski at 89.

Aldrich at 4. The existence of parties, he argues, creates incentives for their use, p. 24. Of course, Aldrich emphasizes in addition parties as a solution to the electoral problems of ambitious political men. Perhaps his main point is that parties are “endogenous”, the creation of political men to address collective action needs specific to historical and institutional situations, different problems, hence there is no one party form.. Aldrich describes this work as “new institutionalist”, where structure induced incentives (rather than preferences) affect outcomes. His book is restricted to American parties in response to the problems endemic to a republican form of government, and it is unclear to what extent it applies to undemocratic regimes, p. 29.

Hegel’s moment anticipates discussions in American political thought of the advantages and disadvantages of disciplined parties (responsible party government), and of unified vs. divided government in a system of separated branches. American political history fluctuates between periods of unified/divided government (the norm in the second half of the 20th century), with proposals for antidotes to each. It also anticipates discussions of the relative merits of parliamentary systems in terms of responsibility, transparency, and decisiveness.

“Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Wurtenberg” in *Political Writings* at 258.

“The English Reform Bill” in *Political Writings* at 330. I do not mean to tie Hegel’s moment of appreciation too tightly to British parliamentarism. He studied the English but did not argue specifically for the Westminster model of party government.

For a history of English parliamentary activity – not just assenting or withholding assent from royal measures but initiation of petitions and then legislation see Morgan, pp. 46ff.


Historical accounts underscore this connection between party government and active business. The origin of parties in England stemmed from divisions within the Commons, and owed to the need to organize business within this body. Parties arose from “intra-estate” proceedings, Gunn, 12 ff. Earlier, Hume explained the development of sustained parties as an accident of British history. Until the 17th century, he observed, parties were rare because parliamentary sessions were short, and the members had no leisure to get acquainted either with each other or with the public business. Hume at 248. This is the parliamentary origin of parties Weber surveyed; it is in the hands “of those who handle the work continuously” “Politics as a Vocation”, pp. 102ff. It is one path of origin Duverger would later describe, in Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London: Methuen and Co., 1954) at xxiv ff. Contrast this historical view with accounts that define parties as modern electoral parties and see the origin of parties in need to incorporate unprecedented numbers of people into the political process; cf. Joseph LaPalombara and

93 “Wurtemberg” at 257-8; “The English Reform Bill” in Political Writings at 323. Hegel anticipates Weber in distinguishing “occasional” politicians, those “who, as a rule, are politically active only in case of need and for whom politics is, neither materially nor ideally, their life” from “the development of politics which demanded training…in the methods of this struggle as developed by modern party policies”. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, Gerth and Mills, ed., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1946), p. 90; 83. Hegel’s nemesis in this was Sieyes, who despised the mixed constitution and applauded a unitary National Assembly so long as no divisive parties were permitted to inhibit the emergence of a national will. “History teems with examples of such misfortunes.” Sieyes at 159.

94 Pelcyzynski at 80.

95 “English Reform Bill” at 328; more fearfully, appeal to uneducated and unorganized people would amount to incitement to revolution. See Pelcyzynski p. 91.

96 “English Reform Bill” at 323-4. Everything rests on “a number of brilliant men wholly devoted to political activity and the interest of the state”, Hegel wrote. Party influence over recruitment and funding officials is one element of campaign finance reform today; less noted than the direct influence of outside special interests, but as important as an indication of contemporary antipartyism.


98 Thoughts on Present Discontents. GET

99 Mansfield at 181-2; I.2.4. Among the conditions ripe for the emergence of regulated rivalry and party government in America one stands out: the experience of political leaders with conventions and constitution-making: they “had learned to do business with each other through discussion and concession”. Hofstadter at 74ff.; 76.

100 More so if government unified by a strong party with ambitious programs and a majority in all branches is seen as the condition for significant legislation. The opposite concern, a unified government under the sway of an ideologically “great party”, inspires prescriptions for weakening parties and for reinforcing the conditions of centrism.

101 On the sufficiency of moderate differences for party competition see Schattschneider, Party Government, p. 93.

102 Hillaire Belloc and Cecil Chesterton, The Party System (London: Steven Swift, 1911) at 18, 25, 152..

103 I am grateful to Jack Rakove for comments on this point.

104 See Wood, 299ff. GET AND USE. Aldrich, 56.

105 Manin at 193.

106 Hume at 247. GET ESSAY


108 Tories are lovers of monarchy and of liberty; Whigs too, but each exaggerates one element in “Of the Parties of Great Britain”, Political Essays, p. 44-45. and see the notes on p. 278-9.

109 “Moderation”, then, is something other than anti-extremism in the sense of passion or in the sense of spatial (point on a political spectrum) or typological (antiliberal or antidemocratic, today) political extremism. It has to do with compromisingness, so long as the grounds of compromise are recognition of relative truths – and not just getting business done. On variations of the charge “extremist” see Rosenblum, “Centrism and Extremism in Party Politics”, unpublished ms.


Perspectives on Politics, March 2006.

114 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 49.
This is the position taken by Russell Muirhead, arguing that citizens should be both impassioned partisans and disinterested observers, double selves, in “A Defense of Party Spirit”, p. 31. unpublished essay.


Mill, On Liberty, ??50? (Robson edition 253)

Cited in Schmitt at 7.

Benjamin Constant, Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments, ed. Etienne Hofmann (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003) at 327; 328.

Representative Government, p. 58. Though Mill makes it clear that assemblies are not supposed to do the actual work of legislation or administration, p. 76. “The only task to which a representative assembly can possibly be competent is not that of doing work, but of causing it to be done; of determining to whom or to what sort of people it should be confided, and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed”, pp. 78-9. Bernard Manin’s explanation for the need to persist in discussion and negotiation is more modest and closer to Constant’s: “It is the collective and diverse character of the representative organ, and not any prior or independently established belief in the virtues of debate, that explains the role conferred on discussion.” Manin at 187.

Though institutional designs to insure and enhance it were legion, like Condorcet’s “Constitutional Plan” for legislative proceedings with structured occasions for discussion, built-in delays for gathering evidence, reports and publicity. It aimed at conditions in which representatives would have to “enlighten themselves as to the grounds and consequences of the decision proposed to them.”Condorcet, “On the Principles of the Constitutional Plan Presented to the National Convention (1793)”, in Selected Writings, ed. Keith Michael Baker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill: 1976), p. 159.

Intelligent or correct decisions and legitimate decisions are the two grounds, often intertwined, that figure in deliberative democratic theory. There are many variations on each position. In some accounts, values of “autonomy”, equality, and “respect” are separated out rather than implicated in cognitive and legitimacy justifications. The assumption is that reasons for opposing views are exchanged; learning is closely tied to rationales not exposure to perspectives or positions simply. The more stringent the criteria of what counts as a reason, the more remote from the normal incarnations of the social function of antagonism and trial by discussion. An additional consideration in much of deliberative theory is tolerance as either a condition for or product of this process. Again, political deliberation is not connected to parties or partisanship. Insofar as contemporary deliberative theory emphasizes the democratic foundations of deliberation: not the quality of decisions but the equality and mutual respect of participants, it pushes in the direction of participatory democracy. On the severance of parties and deliberation consider too: political decisions do not rise to the demands of deliberation if “all involved” means not just everyone who party and political representatives normally take into account but is universally, inclusive. For strategic parties the margin of victory may not matter. Strategic actors do not agree to forego enacting any theory until it has a majority (or all) of citizens (or participating parties) on its side. This is a paraphrase of Frobel, cited by Habermas in “Popular Sovereignty” at 49. For the ideal deliberative procedure that is not explained in terms of fairness (there is no reason on Rawls’ fairness terms why political debate ought to focus on the common good or why manifest equality is an important feature) but as a fundamental political ideal – an appropriate way of arriving at collective decisions. Here, decision-making is different from bargaining and market-like interactions and in which explicit attention is paid to common advantage and the way this attention alters motivation and forms the aims of participants see Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”.


Adolf G. Gundersen, p. 98.


For a critical view of deliberative hopes for civil society see Rosenblum, Membership and Morals (Princeton, 1998) and “Correcting the System”, unpublished ms. Social science converges on the view that most voluntary associations are homogeneous and not ripe sites for “trial by discussion” of conflicting political views. (The exception is professional associations.) The setting most likely to expose individuals to conversational opposition is the workplace, see Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy (Oxford: 2003). Social psychological work dilutes deliberation and tests simply exposure to oppositional political views in ordinary political conversation. These studies discusses the sites and consequences of face to face conversation in personal networks in which which political opposition is, pointing out that most of these networks are also homogeneous and conflict-averse so that exposure to divergent political views is rare, see Diana Mutz, Hearing the Other Side (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, New York: Oxford, 1999. One exception is Fishkin and Ackerman, Deliberation Day; Deliberation Day assigns major parties a role. Each party selects issues to be discussed (there is also opportunity for citizens to bring up other matters). The initial debate is between party representatives, and local party leaders answer questions. The structure is designed for back and forth communication between party candidates (or party leaders) and citizens. See Rosenblum, “Correcting the System”, unpublished ms.


Mill, On Liberty, Collini edition at 46???. 48 (Robson edition, 2252;254.)

Representative Government, p. 58.


“Bentham”, p. 151. Russell Muirhead uses this quote from Mill as a brief for partisanship, arguing however that partisans should not only bear powerful half-truths but should have a detached eye on their own partiality, in “Left and Right: A Defense of Party Spirit”, unpublished essay.


Representative Government, p. 2. “Without presuming to require from political parties such an amount of virtue and discernment as that they should comprehend and know when to apply the principles of their opponents, we may yet say that it would be a great improvement if each party understood and acted upon its own. Well would it be for England if Conservatives voted consistently for everything conservative and Liberals for everything liberal.” J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York, Library of Liberal Arts: 1958) at 108.

Representative Government at 66.

Edinburgh Review” at 315. His description of Sir Robert Peel is one of utter disdain: “He knows the House of Commons, and the sort of men of whom it is composed. He knows what will act upon their minds and is able to strike the right chord upon that instrument. He has, besides, all that the mere routine of office-experience can give to a man who brought to it no principles drawn from a higher philosophy, and no desire for any.” Cited in Kinzer, p. 109, note 15.

“Edinburgh Review” at 315.

Hare’s scheme was a single transferable vote form in which the nation was one constituency. Hare called this “personal representation” and it is distinctively individualist since it is cast preferentially for individual candidates rather than party lists. It has been described as the proportional representation of persons rather than parties, by Charles Beitz, *Political Equality*, p. 128. Mill offered standard arguments for PR: untethering representatives from districts and local interests; saving otherwise “wasted votes”; correcting for “the slavery of the majority” and giving voice to “the scattered elements”. PR would rescue democracy from failing even in its ostensible object – giving the power of government to the majority, in practice a majority of the majority, who are often a minority of the whole. *Representative Government*, p. 120; 123; 127; 104.

J.S. Mill, “Speech on Personal Representation” GET.


Representative Government, 114ff.; “Personal Representation” in *Public and Parliamentary Speeches*, ed. John M. Robson and Bruce L. Kinzer (Toronto: University Toronto Press, ?): 176-186; *Representative Government*, p. 113. Hare’s scheme would encourage representation “by the man who has most of his confidence in all things, and not merely on the single point of fidelity to a party.” Personal Representation” at 178.

Representative Government 122ff. Mill assumes a position opposed to that of advocates of “responsible party government”. There, the case was made for collective responsibility made possible by cohesive and ideologically distinct governing parties and by majoritarianism. For Mill, the only meaningful responsibility is individual, and that is conditional on independence.

“Personal Representation” at 177.

Mill *On Liberty*, 45 in Bobbs Merrill.

They are agents of deliberation, even if from the standpoint of the deliberative ideal they sacrifice some virtues in favor of others. John Ferejohn helped me see this point in his response to the Wesson Lectures at Stanford University, March, 2006.


Schmitt at 41. If the principle of public discussion were no longer believed in, “these arrangements would be unintelligible”.Schmitt at 3. Schmitt at 7.

Schmitt at 19. “In the face of all this”, Schmitt concludes, “the belief in a discussing public must suffer a terrible disillusionment,” at 50. “The proletariat must believe in the class struggle as a real battle, not as a slogan for parliamentary speeches and democratic electoral campaigns. It must grasp this struggle as a life instinct…”. Schmitt at 70-1. “Democracy seems fated then to destroy itself in the problem of the formation of a will”, Schmitt wrote, at 38.

Arendt, p. 274.


I should add that antagonism can be taken to the electorate to produce “mobilized deliberation” among at least some citizens. The phrase is Bruce Ackerman’s, *We the People I: Foundations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 285.

On “the chaos of unrepresented and unpurified opinion”, vulnerable to molding by a “strong man” see Arendt, p. 231.

“Some one has to politicize events, to define their political relevance in terms of a choice between or among parties…”. Michael F. Holt, *The Political Crisis of the 1850s* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978) at 183.

Also, before the expectation that parties link government and civil society, Hofstadter argues that machinery to organize a mass electorate was in place in the U.S. by the 1820s.


Mansfield at 14.