Bargaining on Networks, working

Efficiency, Payoff Equivalence, and Bilateral Trade (with Nenad Kos), working

Destruction and Mechanism Design (with Eric Maskin), working

Strategy-Proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism in Large Random Assignment Problems (with Fuhito Kojima), submitted

Competitive Claims and Resource Allocation by Deferred Acceptance (with Fuhito Kojima), revise/resubmit Econometrica

Unique Induced Preference Representations, forthcoming Journal of Mathematical Economics

A Constructive Proof of the Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem, forthcoming Journal of Economic Theory

Random Serial Dictatorship and Ordinally Efficient Contracts, forthcoming International Journal of Game Theory

Serial Dictatorship and Pareto Optimality, Games and Economic Behavior 2007

Cheating in Repeated Games with Behavioral Players, forthcoming Princeton Journal of Science

Core Tâtonnement, Journal of Economic Theory 2007