An Index to
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals : The Academy Edition
Christine M. Korsgaard
When I prepared the edition of Mary Gregor's translation of the Groundwork for Cambridge's "Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy" series, I did an index that included both the pages of that edition and the pages of the Academy edition. Cambridge, however, declined to publish the Academy page numbers in their edition. Rather than let the effort go to waste, I am posting a version of the index with the Academy edition page numbers here. If you have corrections or suggestions for improving the index, please send me a message: korsgaar@fas.harvard.edu
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a priori vs. a posteriori, 391
analytic vs. synthetic judgments: imperatives of skill are analytic, 417; imperatives of prudence would be analytic if happiness were a determinate concept, 417-418; but imperatives of morality are synthetic, 420; 440; 444-445; 447; difficulties of establishing synthetic principles, 419-420; 444-445; how to establish synthetic propositions, 447
analytic vs. synthetic methods of presentation, 392
anthropology, practical, 388-389; 410; 412
appearance and reality, 451; we cannot cognize what we are in ourselves through inner sensation, 451; insofar as we are receptive we belong to the world of sense, but insofar as we are active we belong to the intellectual world, 451; 457; common understanding wants to make reality or things in themselves objects of intuition, 452; things in themselves must lie behind appearances, 459; see also intelligible world, two standpoints
autonomy, 433; appropriate motivation for a categorical imperative, 432-433; failure to grasp this is the reason why all previous moral philosophy has failed, 432-433; and free will, 446-447; 450; 452-453; 461; if we belonged wholly to the world of understanding, actions would conform perfectly to the law of autonomy, 453, 454; 458; see also: autonomy, formula of; heteronomy
autonomy, formula of: argument for, 431-433; stated, 440; formula of autonomy in the kingdom of ends corresponds to the complete determination of all maxims, 436-437; can be arrived at by analyzing the concept of morality, 440; but is a synthetic principle, 440
beneficence, duty of, as derived from the Formula of Universal Law, 423; as derived from the Formula of the Humanity, 430
beneficence, good-willed vs. naturally sympathetic, 398-99
categorical imperative: its content or principle may be derived from its concept, 420-421; as a synthetic principle, 440; 454; duty must be expressed in categorical imperatives, 425; categorical imperatives and autonomous motivation, 432-433; 441-444; relation between the three formulas of, 436-437; as the law of the free will, 447: see also: autonomy, formula of; humanity, formula of; kingdom of ends; morality, imperatives of; moral law; universal law, formula of
causality, of the will, 446-47; and the two standpoints, 450; 453; see also autonomy
character, 393; 398
circle, appears in the argument for the moral law, 450; argument not circular after all, 453
critique of pure practical reason, 391
determinism: apparent conflict between freedom and determinism gives rise to a dialectic of reason, 455-56; this resolved by appeal to the two standpoints, 455-58; only what falls under natural determinism can be explained, 459
dignity, 434-436; morality as the ground of dignity, 435; autonomy as the ground of dignity, 436; 438; 439; 440
divine will, not the basis of morality, 443; see also God
duties to oneself and duties to others, 421
duty, categories or divisions of, 421n; 423-424; see also perfect and imperfect duties; strict and wide duties; duties to oneself and duties to others
duty, 389; 391; defined, 397; 439; action from, distinguished from actions done from self-interest; 397; distinguished from actions done from immediate inclination, 397-99; moral worth of actions from duty depends on the agentıs principle of volition rather than his purpose, 399-400; 401; defined as the necessity of an action from respect for law, 400-01; 403; formula of universal law as the principle of, 402-04
ends in itself, 427ff; we are ends in ourselves in virtue of lawgiving, 434; morality makes us ends in ourselves, 435; autonomy makes us ends in ourselves, 435-436; ends in themselves are conceived as existing things not to act against rather than ends to be effected, 437; end in itself must be the subject of all ends, 437; see also ends, role in volition
ends: role in volition, 427-428; objective vs. subjective, 427-428; 428-429; relative ends vs. ends in themselves, 428; 428; rational nature is an end-in-itself, 428-429; rational nature sets ends, 437; see also ends in itself
ethics, philosophical treatment of, 387-91; need for an a priori part, 389-90
examples, relevance to moral philosophy, 406-408
exceptions, we make exceptions of ourselves when we violate duties, 424
false promise, example of, 402-403; under the formula of universal law, 422; under the formula of humanity, 429-430
forbidden, means the action does not accord with autonomy, 439
formal vs. material, 387; the will must be determined by the formal principle of volition; 400; defined, 427-428
formula of autonomy, see autonomy, formula of
formula of humanity, see humanity, formula of
formula of universal law of nature, see universal law, formula of
formula of universal law, see universal law, formula of
freedom: as independence of determination by alien causes, 446; positive and negative, 446-47; 458; why the willıs freedom must be autonomy, 446-47; a free will is a will under moral laws, 447; morality follows analytically from freedom, 447; points us to the conception of the intelligible world, 447; 458; must be presupposed as a property of rational wills, 447-449; rational beings must act under the idea of freedom, 448; presupposition of freedom leads to consciousness of moral law, 449; idea of freedom seems to presuppose autonomy and morality, 449-50; connection between freedom and morality seems to make the argument for morality circular, 450-53, since freedom and autonomy are reciprocal concepts, 450; but argument is not circular, 453; when we think of ourselves as free we think of ourselves as members of the world of understanding, 453; 455; 458; all human beings think of themselves as having free will and so as being obligated, 455; freedom not a concept of experience, 455; dialectic of reason arising from the apparent conflict of freedom and determinism resolved by appeal to the two standpoints, 455-58; objective reality of, cannot be proved, 455; 459; we cannot explain how it is possible, 458-462; see also autonomy
friendship, 408
God: as morally perfect, 408-409; as the sovereign of the kingdom of ends, 434; as a sovereign under whom the kingdom of ends and the kingdom of nature may be united, 439
good will, 393-97; as a condition of the value of happiness, 393; 396; as a condition of the value of talents and personal qualities, 393-94; 435; as a condition of value in general, 396; 397; value rests in the nature of its volition itself, 394; is good in itself, 394, 396; value is independent of usefulness or fruitfulness, 394; value is independent of its purposes; 399-400; 401; is the natural purpose of the rational will, 395-96; explication of the good will to find its principle, 397-403; is motivated by the representation of law itself, 401-02; must be autonomous, 444; why the good willıs principle must be that of acting on maxims which can be universal law, 402-404; its formula is the categorical imperative, 437; 447; even the most hardened scoundrel is conscious of a good will that constitutes a law for him, 454-55
happiness: value conditioned by the good will, 393; 396; not the natural purpose of the rational will, 395-96; 401; not the basis of morality, 410; 442; problems about seeking happiness through reason, 395-96, those problems arise because it is an indeterminate concept, 399; an end for all rational beings by a natural necessity, 415; and so can be presupposed a priori of human beings, 415-416; prudence defined as skill in the choice of means to happiness, 416; an indeterminate concept, 418; an ideal of the imagination, 418; this renders imperatives of prudence mere counsels, 418; as an indirect duty, 399; happiness pursued from inclination contrasted with happiness pursued from duty, 399
heteronomy, 433; 446; 452; 453; 460; as the basis of all spurious moral principles, 441-444; why acting on the principle of perfection is heteronomous; 444; insofar as we are members of the world of sense, our actions conform to the heteronomy of nature, 453, 458; see also autonomy
holy will, defined, 439
honor, 398
human nature, not the ground of morality, 410; 425
humanity, as an end-in-itself, 428-431; as a limiting condition of all value, 430-431; we are ends in ourselves in virtue of lawgiving, 434; morality makes us ends in ourselves, 435; autonomy makes us ends in ourselves, 436
humanity, formula of, argument for, 428-429; statement of, 429; duties derived from, 429-430; corresponds to the matter of maxims, 436
Hutcheson, Francis, 442n
hypothetical imperatives: defined, 414; either problematic or assertoric, 415-416; imperatives of skill, 415; imperatives of prudence, 415-416; technical vs. pragmatic, 416-417; possibility of, 416-419; duty cannot be expressed in, 425; see also imperatives
imperatives: defined, 413; expressed by an ought, 413; say that actions would be good to do, 413; do not hold for divine will, 414; express the relation of objective laws of volition to subjectively imperfect wills, 414; are either hypothetical or categorical, 414-416; possibility of, 417-420; and the two standpoints, 454
incentives, xiii, defined, 427
inclinations, 389; defined, 413n; actions done from immediate inclination distinguished from actions done from duty, 397-99; inclinations and their objects not objects of respect, 400; their objects have only conditional worth, 428; relation to needs 413n; inclinations, we wish to be free of them, 454; not regarded as part of our proper self, 457-58
instinct, 395-396; 396
intellectual world, see intelligible world, two standpoints
intelligible world (or intellectual world or world of understanding): a third cognition needed for deduction to which positive freedom points us, 447; conception of comes from the distinction between appearance and reality, 451; insofar as we are receptive we belong to the world of sense, but insofar as we are active we belong to the intellectual world, 451; our activity shown by the spontaneity of reason in the production of ideas places us among the intelligences, 452; freedom transfers us to world of understanding, 453-454; 454-55; 458; we have a will only insofar as we belong to the world of understanding, 453; 457; world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws, 453; world of understanding is therefore legislative for the will, 453-55; we identify our proper selves as intelligences, 457-58; 461; world of understanding an object of thought, not intuition or feeling, 458; 462; world of understanding is only a standpoint, 458; the idea of the intelligible world as an incentive or object of moral interest, 462; intelligible world as the kingdom of ends is the object of moral interest, 462-463; see also appearance and reality; two standpoints
interest: defined, 413n; acting from interest vs. taking an interest, 413n; our interest in the ideas of morality, 448-453; taking an interest, 449; and the need to explain the worth we assign to moral action, 449-50; this interest itself cannot be explained, 460; idea of the intelligible world as itself the object of moral interest, 462; intelligible world considered as the kingdom of ends is the object of moral interest, 462-63
Jesus, as ideal of moral perfection, 409
kingdom of ends, 433-434; defined, 433; rational beings as members and sovereigns of, 434 ; moral laws make a kingdom of ends possible, 434; compared and related to the kingdom of nature, 438; formula of, 438; as the object of moral faith, 462-63
law of nature, formula of, 421
law, 387-88; idea of law as the object of respect, 400-402; of what happens vs. of what ought to happen, 427; rational laws for the use of our powers distinguished from natural laws, 452; world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws, 453; see also determinism, moral law
lies, 402-403; see also deception; false promise, example of
logic, 387-388
love, practical but not pathological can be commanded, 399; see also beneficence, duty of; beneficence
maxims, 401; defined 401n; 420-421n
metaphysics, 388; of morals, 388-391; distinguished from groundwork and critique, 391-392; morality is grounded on metaphysics, 409; but it must be metaphysics of morals, not speculative metaphysics, 426-427
moral feeling, not the basis of morality, 442-443
moral law, 389-90, 390-91; as a motive, 390-91; must hold for rational beings as such, 408; must hold with absolute necessity, 408, cannot be derived from examples, 408-409; 419; must be entirely a priori, 425-426; follows analytically if freedom is presupposed, 446-447; 448-49; moral principle is synthetic, 447; cannot be arrived at by analyzing concept of the good will, 447; how synthetic principles are established, 447; presupposition of freedom leads to consciousness of the moral law, but does not explain the worth we assign to that way of acting and so the interest attached to the ideas of morality, 448-450; the argument from the presupposition of freedom therefore seems circular, 450; but it is not, 453; we are autonomous in the world of understanding, obligated insofar as we also belong to the world of sense, 453; moral law is the law of the world of understanding, and the world of understanding contains the grounds of the laws of the world of sense, 453; world of understanding is therefore lawgiving for the will, 453; laws of autonomy are therefore imperatives for the will, 454; this deduction confirmed by the practical use of common human reason, 454-55; limitations of the argument, 461-463; see also categorical imperative
moral worth, 398; 399; depends on the agentıs principle of volition rather than his purpose, 399-400; 401; a matter of inner principle, 407
morality, imperatives of, 416; are apodictic, 415; how they are possible, 419; must be investigated purely a priori, 419-420; 425-426; are the only imperatives which are laws, 420; are synthetic a priori, 420; see also categorical imperative; moral law
motives, 389-390; pure vs. empirical, 391; defined, 427
natural purposes, 394-96
necessitation, as the determination of a will not necessarily obedient to the laws of reason, 413, 414; is different for the three kinds of imperatives (skill, prudence, and morality), 416-418; takes the form of rule, counsel, or command, 416; duty is practical necessitation, 434; obligation is moral necessitation, 439
noumenal vs. phenomenal, see appearance and reality, intelligible world, two standpoints
obligation: defined, 439; and necessity, 389; must hold for all rational beings, 389; concept of, 391
ought: as the expression of imperatives, 413; does not hold for divine will, 414; is a ³will² for perfectly rational beings, 449; 454
perfect and imperfect duties, 421; 421n, examples of perfect duties, 421-422; 38/429-430; examples of imperfect duties, 422-423; 430; see also strict vs. wide duties
perfection: not the basis of morality, 410; 443; but nearer to the truth than moral sense theory, 443; why the principle of perfect action is heteronomous even though its motive is not the pursuit of happiness, 444
permissible, 439
philosophy: divisions of, 387; 427; investigates basis of respect for law, 403; not needed to know what accords with duty, 404; whether practical philosophy is better avoided, 404; necessity of doing philosophy, 404-405; 410-412; need for a priori or pure philosophy, 388-391; 409-412, 425-426; practical vs. theoretical philosophy, 426-427; limits of practical philosophy, 458-461
physics (natural philosophy), 387, 410; rational vs. empirical parts of, 387-88; see also 427
pleasure, in following the moral law, produced by reason, 460
practical and theoretical reason, 391; 404-405; resolution of the apparent conflict between free will and determinism, 455-463; lead in different ways to the idea of a supreme cause of the world, 463; see also reason
promise, see false promise, example of
prudence, contrasted with morality, 402-403; defined, 416n; see also prudence, imperatives of
prudence, imperatives of, 415-416; are assertoric, 415; how they are possible, 417-419; would be analytic if happiness were a determinate concept, 417-419; are not laws, 420
rational being: acts on representation of laws, 412; distinguished by the fact that it sets itself an end, 437
reason: unity of, 391; as lawgiver, 406; commands what ought to happen, 408; must regard itself as the author of its principles, 448; contrasted with understanding, 452; shows its spontaneity in thinking the ideas 452; and so as pure activity, places us among the intelligences; 452; 458; limitations of, 458-463; seeks the unconditioned, 463; see also will
reciprocity, of freedom and autonomy, 450
relative value, 428
respect: duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law, 400; possible objects of, 400; idea of law itself as the object of respect, 400-402; 401n; 403; explicated as a feeling generated by reason, 401n; as a response to autonomy, 436; as the moral incentive, 440
self-conceit, 407
self-cultivation, duty of, as derived from the Formula of Universal Law, 422-423; as derived from the Formula of Humanity, 430
self-love, as a covert motive for moral action, 406-407; 419
skill, imperatives of, 415; are problematic, 415; are technical, 416; how they are possible, 417; are analytic, 417; are not laws, 420
Socrates, 404
standpoints, see two standpoints
strict and wide duties, 424
suicide: avoidance motivated by immediate inclination contrasted with avoidance motivated by duty, 397-398; duty not to commit, as derived from the Formula of Universal Law, 421-422; as derived from the Formula of Humanity, 429
sympathy, 398; 399; 454
synthetic, see analytic vs. synthetic methods of presentation; analytic vs. synthetic judgments
theology, 410
two standpoints, 450-55; we view ourselves from a different standpoint as efficient causes of our actions than when we view our actions as effects, 450; we distinguish appearances from things in themselves; 450-51; this leads us to distinguish world of sense from world of understanding or intellectual world 451; insofar as we are receptive we belong to the world of sense, but insofar as we are active we belong to the intellectual world, 451; our activity shown by the spontaneity of reason in the production of ideas places us among the intelligences, 452; freedom transfers us to world of understanding, 453; we are autonomous in the world of understanding, obligated insofar as we also belong to the world of sense, 453; we have a will insofar as we belong to the world of understanding, and regard our actions in the world of sense as appearances of that will, 453; we regard our actions as appearances of intelligible causality insofar as we are members of the world of understanding and as determined by desires and inclinations insofar as we are members of the world of sense, 454; world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws, 453; laws of the world of understanding are imperatives for the will in the world of sense, 454; appeal to the two standpoints resolves the apparent contradiction between freedom and determinism, 456-458; both standpoints necessary to our self-conception, 457, 461
universal law, formula of, 402-403; 421-424; is the principle of common human reason, 402-404; and the formula of the universal law of nature, 421; examples deriving duties from, 402-403; 421-423; corresponds to the form of maxims, 436; is the best formula to use for moral appraisal, 436-437
will: pure, 390; defined, 412; 427; wills of rational beings give universal law, 431; is a causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, 446; why the willıs freedom must be autonomy, 446-47; a free will is a will under moral laws, 447; freedom must be presupposed as a property of rational wills, 447-449; we have wills only insofar as we are efficient causes belonging to the intelligible world, 453; would be perfectly autonomous if we were only members of the world of understanding, but is obligated because we are also members of the world of sense, 453-455; all human beings think of themselves as having free will and therefore being obligated, 455; we claim for ourselves a will independent of sensibility, 457; and as such do not identify inclinations and impulses as part of our proper self, 457-58; will as intelligence is our proper self, 64/461
Wolff, Christian, 390
world of sense vs. world of understanding; see appearance and reality; see intelligible world, two standpoints
worthiness to be happy, 393; 450