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**Office Contact Information**

Department of Economics  
Harvard University, Littauer Center  
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**Undergraduate Studies:**

B.A., Mathematics and Economics, Williams College, *Summa Cum Laude*, June 2007

**Graduate Studies:**

Harvard University, 2007 to present  
Thesis Title: "Essays in Microeconomics"  
Expected Completion Date: May 2012

References:

Professor Jerry R. Green  
Baker Library 469, Harvard Business School  
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Professor Alvin E. Roth  
Baker Library 441, Harvard Business School  
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Professor Iris Bohnet  
Taubman 110A, Harvard Kennedy School  
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**Teaching and Research Fields:**

Primary Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Social Choice Theory, Political Economy  
Secondary Fields: Experimental Economics, Gender and Economics

**Teaching Experience:**

Spring 2010 Decision Theory, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Tomasz Strazlecki  
Fall 2010 Normative Economics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Jerry Green  
AY 2010 – 2011 Behavioral and Experimental Economics Senior Thesis Seminar, Harvard University, section leader  
AY 2009 - 2010 Behavioral and Experimental Economics Senior Thesis Seminar, Harvard University, section leader  
Fall 2009 Psychology and Economics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Sendhil Mullainathan  
Spring 2008 Normative Economics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Jerry Green

### **Research Experience and Other Employment:**

Summer 2008 – Harvard University, research assistant for Jerry R. Green  
Summer 2011

### **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**

AY 2011 - 2012 Roger L. Martin Cornerstone Graduate Student Fellowship Fund  
January 2011 Harvard Program on Negotiation Grant for Research  
May 2011 Harvard Economics Department Summer Travel Grant  
November 2010 Harvard Lab for Economic Applications and Policy Grant  
May 2010 Harvard Kennedy School Women and Public Policy Program Grant  
AY 2010 - 2011 Harvard University Derek C. Bok Award Winner for Excellence in Graduate Student Teaching of Undergraduates. Also nominated for 2009 - 2010.  
AY 2010 – 2011, Harvard University Certificate for Distinction in Teaching  
AY 2009 - 2010

### **Publications:**

Baldiga, K.A. and J.R. Green. Forthcoming. Assent-maximizing social welfare functions. *Social Choice and Welfare*.

### **Research Papers:**

*“A Failure of Representative Democracy” (Job Market Paper 1)*

*Abstract:* In this paper, we study representative democracy, one of the most popular classes of collective decision-making mechanisms, and contrast it with direct democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals have the opportunity to vote over the alternatives in every choice problem the population faces. In a representative democracy, the population commits to a candidate ex ante who will then make choices on its behalf. While direct democracy is normatively appealing, representative democracy is the far more common institution because of its practical advantages. The key question, then, is whether representative democracy succeeds in implementing the choices that the group would make under direct democracy. We find that, in general, it does not. We analyze the theoretical setting in which the two methods are most likely to lead to the same choices, minimizing potential sources of distortion. We model a population as a distribution of voters with strict preferences over a finite set of alternatives and a candidate as an ordering of those alternatives that serves as a binding, contingent plan of action. We focus on the case where the direct democracy choices of the population are consistent with an ordering of the alternatives. We show that even in this case, where the normative recommendation of direct democracy is clear, representative democracy may not elect the candidate with this ordering.

*“Gender Differences in Willingness to Guess and the Implications for Test Scores” (Job Market Paper 2)*

*Abstract:* Multiple-choice tests play a large role in determining academic and professional outcomes. Performance on these tests hinges not only on a test-taker's knowledge of the material but also on his willingness to guess when unsure about the answer. In this paper, we present the results of an experiment that explores whether women skip more questions than men. The experimental test consists of actual practice questions from the World History and U.S. History SAT II subject tests; we vary the size of the penalty imposed for a wrong answer and the salience of the evaluative nature of the task. We find that when no penalty is assessed for a wrong answer, all test-takers answer every question. But, when there is a small penalty for wrong answers and the task is explicitly framed as an SAT, women answer significantly fewer questions than men. We see no differences in knowledge of the material or confidence in these test-takers, and differences in risk preferences fail to explain all of the observed gap. Because the gender gap exists only when the task is framed as an SAT, we argue that differences in competitive attitudes may drive the gender differences we observe. Finally, we show that, conditional on their knowledge of the material, test-takers who skip questions do significantly worse on our experimental test, putting women and more risk averse test-takers at a disadvantage.