Papers Page
Loukas Karabarbounis
Papers
Working Papers
The Political Economy of Intergenerational Income Mobility, forthcoming
with Andrea Ichino and Enrico Moretti
One Dollar, One Vote, September 2008
with Igor Barenboim
Abstract:
We revisit the relationship between inequality and redistribution in a panel
of advanced OECD countries. Using panel data methods that hold constant a
variety of determinants of the public redistributive policy, we find a
non-monotonic relationship between distribution of income and
redistribution. Relatively to mean income, a more affluent rich and middle
class are associated with lower, and a richer poor class with higher public
spending for redistribution. These results are consistent with what we
define as a one dollar, one vote politico-economic equilibrium: When the
income of a group of citizens rises (relative to mean income), aggregate
redistributive policies are tilted towards this group's most preferred
public policy.
Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores, November 2007, VoxEU summary
with Alberto Alesina, and Andrea Ichino
Abstract:
Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's optimal criterion by taxing
less the more elastic labor supply of (married) women. This holds when
different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and
primitive. But in this paper we also explore differences in gender
elasticities which emerge endogenously in a model in which spouses bargain
over the allocation of home duties. GBT changes spouses' implicit bargaining
power and induces a more balanced allocation of house work and working
opportunities between males and females. Because of decreasing returns to
specialization in home and market work, social welfare improves by taxing
conditional on gender. When income sharing within the family is substantial,
both spouses may gain from GBT.
© 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College