Papers

The bulk of my written work over the past couple of years has centered on my dissertation, The Structure of Thought. Here is a freestanding piece that draws from it.

The Generality Constraint, Analog Magnitudes, and the Structure of Cognition

Abstract: Although philosophers commonly debate whether perceptual states such as visual experiences are conceptual or nonconceptual, most philosophers accept that cognitive states such as beliefs are thoroughly conceptual. I challenge this view, drawing on empirical findings from the cognitive sciences concerning so-called “analog magnitude representations” to argue that some cognitive states are nonconceptual. I further argue that the existence of such nonconceptual cognitive states has the potential to explain the cognitive sophistication of animals and infants without over-intellectualizing them.

More recently, I’ve been working on a paper about the nature of concepts. Here is a truncated 3,000-word version of that paper.

The Mixed View of Concepts: A Defense

Abstract: Philosophers are divided on the ontological status of concepts. Fregeans hold that concepts are senses, abstract objects that exist in neither time nor space. Fodorians, by contrast, maintain that concepts are tokens of Mentalese, concrete mental representations located in the head. Margolis and Laurence (2007) entertain the possibility of reconciliation: a “Mixed View” according to which concepts are abstract and concrete. However, they go on to criticize this view, raising objections to the idea that concepts could be abstract, even in part. In this paper, I defend the Mixed View, arguing that there is a way of developing it that is immune to Margolis and Laurence’s objections. The key to this defense is to view Fregean senses as ability types that have Mentalese tokens as their categorical bases.

Several years ago, before starting my dissertation project, I fulfilled the “second-year paper” requirement for my program by writing a paper on cognitive phenomenology. That paper is available here.

Fishing for Content in the Stream of Consciousness

Abstract: A number of philosophers, including Terence Horgan, John Tienson and John Searle, have defended the thesis that cognitive phenomenology—the phenomenal character of one’s occurrent thoughts—is essentially linked to the content of one’s occurrent thoughts. This paper critically discusses such claims, arguing that while our occurrent thoughts do have phenomenal character, there is no essential link between cognitive phenomenology on the one hand, and thought content on the other.