

# Book Reviews

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## GENERAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**Michael C. Williams**, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 236pp., £16.99, pbk.).

Of all the paradigms that have established IR as an autonomous discipline, Realism has undoubtedly been the most influential for the past decades and continues to attract, challenge, or repulse observers and contributors in the field. In an attempt to deconstruct the so-called fundamental features of Realism that disciplinary literature has strongly contributed to establishing as the absolute defining characteristics of Realist thought, Michael Williams draws our attention to one of the most powerful narratives of IR: the existence of a 'Realist tradition'. This stretches across centuries and testifies to the historical and conceptual 'wisdom' of a 'legacy' that has become self-legitimizing for neoclassical and contemporary Realist scholars engaged in the justification of the ontological adequacy of such concepts as 'power politics', 'anarchy' and 'state rationality'.

Embarking on a contextual and thorough reading of three of the main classical figures of the 'Realist tradition'—Hobbes, Rousseau and Morgenthau—the author successfully demonstrates that the traditional understanding of the key concepts of Realist thought is far from representing the theoretical premises and practical concerns of these thinkers who have been so highly acclaimed for—or accused of—being the defenders of political rationalism, the founders of a theory of power and interest, and the contesters of the relevance of morality in IR theory and practice.

In the first three chapters of the book, Williams explores the relation between the problem of knowledge and the construction of political order in the writings of the three main classical figures of the 'Realist' tradition. In particular, he shows that all three authors present a strong critique of rationalism—and of the concept of instrumental reason—which establishes their common ontological and epistemological position against the Enlightenment belief in the possibility of a universal, objective and rational understanding of nature and social reality. This *scepticism* towards the possibility of building political knowledge on the basis of scientific empiricism and rationalism is thus identified by the author as the key feature of what he calls 'wilful Realism', a Realism which, he argues, is founded on an ontological

assertion of the limits of knowledge and the consequent recognition of the importance and essence of subjectivity in the realm of social interaction. This particular philosophy of knowledge is thus presented as the basis for their political theory, which envisages the necessity of the construction of political order and authority, while viewing this construction as the corollary of the essentially *relational* nature of social and political order. From this perspective, the classical Realist concept of *power* is redefined within a broader sociological analysis of the concept of *the political*: politics is that realm of indeterminacy and change where no values can be absolutely and objectively asserted and where, as a consequence, power lies at the heart of knowledge claims, identity claims and political action.

This re-evaluation of Realist theory allows the author to challenge the paradigmatic classifications that have opposed Realism to contending theories in IR. Chapter 4 of Williams' book thus contributes to what is undoubtedly a healthy trend in recent writings on IR theory, by showing how 'wilful Realism' can be understood as a 'constructivist' and 'liberal' theory of the political, but also one that stands firmly opposed to a 'positivist' conception of knowledge and society and can therefore be identified within the so-called 'postmodern' school of thought, which conceives of political and knowledge claims as mutually supportive.

One of the most successful aspect of Williams' work is his ability to re-establish the ontological foundation of *power politics* as it is expressed in the thoughts of three of the most influential authors—and 'actors' in the myth of the 'Realist tradition'—and rid it of the simplistic formulations which have linked it to a theoretical and practical denial of ethics and ideas in the realm of political life, both domestic and international. By revealing the relationship between the problematic of knowledge and that of order, he allows for a deconstruction of one of the most long-standing ideas about Realism, that which establishes the inevitability of conflict and violence as a consequence of an immutable and essential *animus dominandi* defining human nature and determining its conflictual fate. 'Wilful Realism', as here presented, offers, on the contrary, an intrinsic commitment to an ethics of responsibility (Chapter 5) which seeks to reconcile the necessity for action with an awareness of the limits of politics as a cognitive sphere and of its openness as a social one.

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**Anthony D. Smith**, *The Antiquity of Nations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, 266 pp., £18.99, pbk.).

The latest book by one of nationalism's most prolific theorists is a feast for students of collective identity. Comprising three new chapters and seven previously published essays, the text examines several paradigms, with an emphasis on dissecting the dominant 'modernist' school. In doing so, Smith further refines his distinctive 'ethno-symbolic' approach to the study of historically constituted nations and the modern political ideology of nationalism. Smith's purpose throughout is to add weight to his earlier claims that nations existed prior to the modern epoch.

In the first part of the book, Smith critiques modernist studies of nationalism. Engaging Gellner's famous question (do nations have navels?), Smith argues that nations are neither created by nationalists nor emerge as mere by-products of modernity. Rather, they are composed of coherent cultural and ethnic groups—*ethnies*—prior to their modern incarnations. As evidence, he notes the omnipresent referencing by nationalists of the past, suggesting that prior cultural groups are constitutive of the modern political ideology of nationalism. In response, Smith notes that modernists are at best 'ambivalent' about the role of the past in the constitution of nationalism (p. 66). At worst, they reduce nationalism to a particular kind of elitist instrumentalism which does not hold up under logical or empirical scrutiny (p. 86). Hobsbawm and Ranger are faulted on this score. The very fact that the 'invented' elements of new traditions are grafted onto pre-existing social practices and beliefs suggests the continuing relevance of some traditions and leads one inevitably back to the ethnic origins of the nation. For Smith, 'later generations of a particular community are formed in their collective life through the memories, myths, and traditions of the community into which they are born and educated', and this 'communal past defines to a large extent our identity' (p. 89). To be viable, nations require a 'usable past' (p. 212).

While sympathising with many of Benedict Anderson's claims, Smith continues with an attack on the former for lacking a causal explanation of the imagined community (pp. 92-3). For Anderson, nationalism is the product of the decline in the use of Latin by elites, combined with its replacement by texts in the vernacular 'national' languages distributed *en masse* by print capitalism. Yet Smith argues that Anderson cannot explain why some nations emerge and others do not, for 'there was very little capitalism, let alone [print] industry, in early nineteenth century Serbia or the Ukraine' when their nationalists emerged (p. 94). Like other recent critics, Smith also argues that Anderson slights religion's role in the creation of the nation.

The second half of the text begins with an assessment of whether or

not the ancient Egyptian, Greek, Roman and Judaic civilisations could possibly constitute 'nations'. While admitting that none of these peoples evinced every element of the modern nation, Smith upends the orthodox definition of nations as not a 'pure analytic construct' but something that is 'clearly the product of a particular ideology and milieu' (p. 133). The social scientific 'nation' is itself the product of the nationalist ideological programme of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With an eye to the analytical gains of a more inclusive definition, Smith returns to his oft-cited *ethnie*, 'a named human community whose members share common myths of ancestry and memories, elements of common culture, and some measure of solidarity' (p. 131). The resulting definition is less Western-centric and chronologically chauvinistic; it is focused on the 'human community' elements of identity, as opposed to the state (p.135). Drawing on recent work by Steven Grosby, Smith then examines ancient Armenian and Judaic collective identity through this lens.

In the next chapter, Smith explores how nations are formed by war, arguing that wars have enhanced the sense of 'ethnic belonging' throughout history (p. 160). The analysis continues with further exploration into the role of bureaucracy that was decisive in ancient Egyptian identity and helped crystallise the 'ethnic core' of several European nations (p. 192). Smith next examines the invocation of a mythical 'golden age' by modern nationalists, which legitimates modern polities by creating a concrete 'continuity between the generations', cultural 'authenticity' that delineates self and other, and a sense of 'destiny' for a given people (pp. 221-3). The volume concludes by exploring the ties between nationalism and Romanticism. Smith disabuses us of various formulations of 'civic' nationalism, for all modern nationalisms are shot through with Romantic ideals of identity.

Smith stresses that the ethno-symbolic approach does not constitute a 'theory,' and that such a comprehensive vision of an inherently protean phenomenon is not possible (p. 78). But by providing a more inclusive, less historically limiting definition of the nation so as to facilitate historical comparison, Smith is in fact engaged in the enterprise of theory. Specific historical inheritances from traditions and shared memories help determine the character of modern nationalism, and some *ethnies* so strongly approximate nations that the historical continuity between their beliefs and praxis is more robust than more recently created nations. Both claims read much like a theory, despite their lack of parsimony.

For scholars familiar with Smith's vast corpus, there is little that is new in this volume. However, taken as a stand-alone testament to the ethno-symbolic study of the nation, this book is a triumph. Smith's vibrant prose is complemented by a sympathetic attitude towards both

his subject and his disciplinary opponents. His grasp of the cultural history of dozens of nations demonstrates breadth of knowledge unrivalled in the field.

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**Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore**, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2004, 222pp., £9.95 pbk., £23.50, hbk.).

Weaving together a variety of theories and approaches in sociology, public administration and political science, Barnett and Finnemore focus on the role of international organisations in terms of their bureaucratic culture and behaviour. By concentrating on the power and knowledge of international organisations in shaping and influencing policy outcomes, the authors have provided a framework for understanding and evaluating the autonomous role of international organisations in a variety of different circumstances. Choosing diverse case studies on the role of the IMF in regulating economies and promoting structural reform, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in determining assistance and protection mechanisms for refugees, and United Nations Peacekeeping missions in domestic conflicts, the book provides a good historical and interpretive analysis of international organisations' fulfilment of their original purpose and functions.

By comparing the original goals and mission with subsequent task expansion and mission creep, the authors provide an insightful critique of both organisational culture and behaviour within international organisations. Though there is a large body of domestic literature on bureaucratic politics, delegation and agencies, and organisational change, it has not been linked to the international relations literature that tends to perceive the scope and functions of international organisations as determined by state power, preferences and bargaining. Such functionalist and statist interpretations have assumed that international organisations conform to state interests, often under threat of sanctions, without acknowledging the autonomous role played by such expert bureaucracies. This is not simply an argument to focus on international

organisations as actors with distinct preferences and interests, but rather as organisations that make decisions based not simply on rational calculation but often on the basis of normative and ideological criteria.

Just as we examine decision-making in foreign policy analysis, bureaucratic politics in public administration, or organisational culture in sociology, so we must examine the same trends and patterns in international organisations. The focus is on the internal development of international institutions, including how these polities are organised, how they have adjusted and evolved over time, and how they have been influenced by internal preferences and values, that results in the institutionalisation of particular norms and ideas. Although the case studies point to the pathologies of global governance, where international organisations have themselves contributed to financial crises, genocide and refugee protection problems, their analysis is not a simple critique of international organisations. Certainly it draws attention to the impact of organisational evolution and expansion, and the possibilities of a mismatch between organisational capacity and goals and missions that can result in policy failure. Yet Barnett and Finnemore are equally concerned about the rational and liberal premise on which international organisations have been constructed.

This benign view of international organisations is challenged as the authors provide a more normative—and critical—assessment of the implications of international organisations to frame problems, determine solutions and justify their intervention in constituting new norms, rules and ideas for many societies in terms of market economies, rule of law and democratic governance. While addressing concerns about accountability and legitimacy, the implicit premise of international organisations as providing a positive outcome has faded, and the permissive consensus that allowed such international organisations to evolve has become a focus of increasing concern.

Barnett and Finnemore argue that even international organisations can have pathologies that drive them to become weak/indecisive and thus potentially harmful. This book is valuable in focusing attention on policymaking in different contexts as a response to politically-constructed problems, not simply as tasks given to international organisations where they rationally match problems and solutions. Yet in studying the pathologies and power of such institutions, the book offers few solutions in terms of policy design and improving performance evaluation. Whilst acknowledging that there may not be congruence between goals and expectations, they focus on the problematic aspects of international authority and the disadvantages that particular meaning of development of structural adjustment may have for domestic polities. Certainly, the goals and ethics of policy are important measures of policy—both in procedural and substantive

terms. Yet international and regional organisations are often studied within a framework in which the national context shapes our analysis. Our assessment of democratic liberal regimes tends to focus on democracies institutionalised in nation-states.

This book contributes much to the discussion about governance by focusing on non-state actors. Yet the long-term legitimacy of global governance is difficult due to the absence of mechanisms available at the national level, such as parties and elections. In fact the process evolving in international governance is about not just delegating authority to experts, a common feature of bureaucratisation, but the oversight and control mechanisms that ensure accountability and legitimacy.

The book will be a useful and welcome addition to courses on international organisations, as well as courses on decision-making and foreign policy analysis. The case studies can be used in a variety of settings in order to evaluate and assess the rules of decision-making, and contexts that will determine policy success or failure.

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**Noah Feldman**, *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, 154pp., \$19.95 hbk.).

The Iraq War has generated its share of partisan commentaries, memoirs and military chronicles. However, a thoughtful normative consideration of American obligations in the war's tumultuous aftermath has still been missing. This short volume begins to fill the void, without pretending to have the final word on a likely enduring dilemma for the United States. Incisive and judicious, *What We Owe Iraq* develops an ethical corollary to Colin Powell's 'Pottery Barn rule': having broken the Iraqi state, the US has acquired an obligation to fix it for the better. That duty, Noah Feldman contends, includes 'the creation of a stable, basically legitimate democratic state in Iraq' (p. 129). This is an increasingly unlikely outcome in the near term, but he offers good counsel regarding how to achieve such an end when it ultimately serves the interests of the 'nation builder', and what principles should guide the endeavour.

A law professor at New York University, Feldman has written a first-hand account with the authenticity of an eyewitness and

participant: he served as Senior Constitutional Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003. In developing an 'ethics of nation building' for application to Iraq, the book's scope is limited mostly to the one case, though the author gains useful comparative leverage by also invoking international experiences in trouble spots like Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia. A brief introduction precedes three full essays totalling about 130 pages, along with a modest but helpful set of endnotes. Chapter One explores the purpose of nation building, arguing for both its ethical defensibility and political necessity in a world where failed states pose unacceptable risks. Chapter Two grapples with the 'paternalistic impulse' (p. 70) so often afflicting nation builders, proposing a model of occupation-authority trusteeship that cultivates the participation of its occupied beneficiaries. Chapter Three reconsiders the place of elections in the nation-building process, emphasising their vital role in conveying information about popular political preferences and in limiting the arbitrary exercise of power. In an impressive rarity for policy-relevant American scholarship on the Middle East, Feldman speaks and reads Arabic, offering occasional commentary on translation matters and enhancing the reader's confidence in his observations. The book's tone alternates between an informal narrative—with anecdotes, insights and some humour—and clear-eyed, sober discussion of the weighty issues at hand.

A key strength of the book is its effort to articulate an ethically defensible and politically tenable position without recourse to moralistic hand wringing or partisan pot-shots. Accordingly, Feldman takes to task those liberal war opponents who assume that an illegitimate invasion is best remedied by a rapid American withdrawal from Iraq, or by the internationalisation of decision-making via UN involvement. He acknowledges the potential political benefits of the latter, but warns that an early US departure does not relieve the 'ethical burden' triggered by the US decision to launch the war in the first place (p. 91). The *status quo ante* is irretrievably lost, though the duty to reconstitute a broken Iraq extends to more than those who supported the invasion in 2003. To conservative sceptics of 'nation building', he argues that destroying even a heinous authoritarian regime is tantamount to smashing the only nationally oriented source of stability in the country. Doing so creates an ethical obligation and, for a global power like the United States, a political imperative to achieve a new equilibrium. Such a claim may appear to privilege order over justice, but Feldman emphasises the patent *injustice* of leaving Iraqis to their own devices after ridding them of Saddam's tyranny.

While the work's reasoning is generally meticulous, readers in the social sciences may be put off by the author's deployment of a few concepts. His use of the popular phrase 'nation building' follows current

practice in policy circles and media, but one might question whether it makes sense to frame the Iraq problem this way, especially when much of his argument relates to democratisation and state building, including the monopolisation of coercion and the establishment of new legal and administrative institutions. There is also a sinking implausibility in the best-case outcome envisioned by the author in 2004, before conditions went from bad to worse. As he might agree today, to expect that eventually 'the insurgents ought to realize the long-term futility of resistance' is to presume too much (p. 48). Nor is it clear how a US that launched the Iraq war in a fit of popular panic and administration hubris will be able to 'abandon the paternalistic idea that we know how to produce a functioning, successful democracy better than do others' (p. 70). Events on the ground since the book was released in October 2004 do not inspire optimism. Still, Feldman's sensible account tells us why elections and a new constitution in Iraq will not end the US's responsibilities, or its interest in achieving a worthy and durable outcome to a costly and consequential struggle.

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**Peter S. Temes**, *The Just War: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in Our Time* (Chicago: Evan R. Dee, 2003, 217pp., \$25.00, hbk).

Both academic and popular reflection on just war principles has risen to new heights in the wake of the Bush administration's avowed determination to fight terrorism by means of pre-emptive warfare. Peter Temes' book is a welcome, moderately dovish contribution to the popular arena of such reflection. Inasmuch as it addresses a popular audience, omits scholarly references and ignores contemporary scholarship in the field, *The Just War* is a book of marginal academic importance. Still, the author's humane spirit and accessible eloquence should endear his 'personal meditation' on just war thinking to his intended audience. Within the academy, it surely deserves inclusion among recommended readings for undergraduate courses in the ethics of war and peace.

Temes' reflections are ambitious in their historical and cultural scope, ranging from *The Epic of Gilgamesh* to *The Fighting Seabees*, and from *Deuteronomy* to the Bush Doctrine. This broad compass

undergirds one of his central guiding contentions: just war thinking in the age of terrorism must comprehend and resolve the tensions that persist (strangely) between ancient and modern mentalities (p. 8). Temes' explication of this world-historical division is fairly simplistic, though perhaps necessarily so. Whereas the ancient 'tribal' perspective sees warfare as a drama of 'individual character', the modern perspective sees warfare as a 'theatre of abstractions' in which 'states, civilizations, and even ideas themselves are the central actors' (p. 6). The limitations of both perspectives yield dire results.

Osama bin Laden's forces are characterised as staging tribalism's last stand, which is a self-destructive battle against the modern state as such (pp. 16-17). This tribalism is rendered even more self-destructive by a fundamentalist theology that reveres the Quran itself more than 'the civilization built around that text' (p. 102). In perhaps the strongest and the most pedagogically useful chapter, Temes adeptly describes some of the varieties of recent Islamic thought, separating the tribal 'fringe' from the modern 'centre' (p. 94). Representative of the latter is Wahba al Zoheli's notion (influential in the 1960s and 1970s) that a new 'abode of the treaty' (dar al ahd) should supersede the old division between the abode of Islam (dar al Islam) and the abode of war (dar al harb) (pp. 113-14).

On the modern side of the historico-cultural divide we are told that the shortcomings of, for example, US military policy are failures of technocratic abstraction which devalue the experiences of those who are most affected by war. Such terms as 'collateral damage' and 'application of force' tend, as we know, to erode sympathetic engagement with the sufferings of innocents and enemies alike (pp. 155 and 160-1); the policies of 'normalized' warfare which quickly and unceremoniously shuttled veterans home from Vietnam contributed to their demoralisation (pp. 173-4); and so on. Accordingly, Temes' heroes are often those, such as George Orwell, who insist upon cashing out the abstractions of modern military policy in honest terms of concrete, lived experience (pp. 10 and 148-9). His preferred distortions belong to the moral 'myths' that make the Civil War and the Second World War American favourites. It is a hopeful sign that the 'collective American conscience' continues to approve of itself for having defeated slavery at home and genocide abroad (pp. 196-7). Whatever neglect of history may be involved in the construction of this cultural mentality is compensated for in the way it preserves an appreciation of the tragedy of human suffering and the glory of moral triumph.

If Temes' book presents a candidate moral principle that might reconcile modern state power with the enduring dignity of individual experience, it would appear to be 'the Kantian test' of the individual yet universalisable will, which resists 'the domination of the many by the few' because it affirms the 'equal sanctity of all human life' (pp. 55, 180

and 197). Temes is not systematically Kantian; he insists that just war thinking in the twenty-first century must not only genuinely restrain warfare, but must also be essentially consequentialist or 'forward-looking' (pp. 75 and 175-8). It is in this progressive spirit that he charts the evolution of the Catholic just war tradition from the apologetics of imperialism to Pope John Paul II's revised catechism of military restraint, which allows self-defence only against 'lasting, grave and certain' damage, and which no longer pretends that Christian wars can be the 'peaceful pursuits' of spiritually pure states (pp. 78-81, 92-93). Just self-defence, to prove successful, may rightly employ the kind of 'overwhelming force' that ensures 'quick and decisive victory' (p. 81). But the prospect of successful conquest cannot be proven just by invoking the record of the past and employing 'propaganda' that characterises the enemy as absolutely 'Evil' (p. 151).

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**Simon Caney**, *Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 319pp., £32.00, hbk.).

This timely book addresses the big questions of global political theory. Are there universal moral values? If so, what do they look like? What types of institutions do they require in order to flourish? In a non-ideal system, what principles should guide decisions to use force? Should force be used to save strangers in distress? Readers familiar with Caney's past work will not be surprised to read that he thinks there are universal values and rights, that global institutions should be reformed to better realise them, and that force may—in certain circumstances—be used to defend and promote them. Such readers will not be surprised at the cogent manner in which Caney puts forward his argument, defending it against a bewildering myriad of counter-arguments from different types of universalism and cosmopolitanism, realism, nationalism and what he labels the 'society of states' approach.

Caney builds his argument in a pyramid-like fashion. Each chapter poses a big question and proceeds in an almost scholastic fashion to raise and discount alternative ways of answering it, before settling on a preferred argument and defending it. He begins by insisting that there

are universal moral values that apply to all people, pointing out, for instance, that even cultural relativism rests on a universalist claim—the idea that all communities have a right to live by their own moral codes. But what *type* of common moral values is there? Caney rejects deontological and globalisation-based arguments in favour of what he labels ‘well-being based justifications’. The well-being approach—a philosophically sophisticated version of John Burton’s ‘human needs’ theory—begins with the observation that the one thing humans have in common are certain needs for things like shelter, food and recognition. These needs create fundamental interests, which in turn give rise to duties and rights. People’s interest in well-being are best served—Caney argues—by a set of civil and political rights which encompass, among other things, a right not to be physically harmed and a right to some form of self-determination. The well-being approach also gives rise to a number of distributive rights, including a right to subsistence, equal economic opportunity and equal reward for equal work (pp. 122-3).

It is perhaps self-evident that a world of territorially bounded sovereign states is not necessarily the best structure to realise these civil, political and distributive rights. Caney argues, however, that it does not automatically follow that the society of states ought to be replaced by a single world government or other such superstructures. Caney identifies three cosmopolitan approaches to this problem. The ‘intrinsic’ approach insists that individuals ought to be free to choose which political authorities they wish to align themselves with. This approach, Caney argues, relies on the misplaced assumption that legitimacy depends on consent and would be highly impractical to instigate. The second approach he labels ‘rights-based’. This holds that global institutions be structured in such a way as to permit individuals to exercise control over their environment, a moral imperative created by the fact that globalisation means that events in one part of the world inevitably have an impact on every part. This, writers like Held and Linklater insist, requires the creation of new global institutions. Caney doubts the veracity of these arguments. He argues that the fact of globalisation is contested, that it is unreasonable to expect individuals to have a say in *every* decision that affects them, and the approach as a whole is incomplete. The ‘instrumental’ approach holds that the best institutions are those that further the cosmopolitan ideals defended in the ‘rights-based’ approach. The appeal of instrumentalism is that it does not demand that individuals consent to every decision that affects them and permits the creation of overlapping structures of authority, a form of neo-medievalism envisaged by Bull. Caney adopts this approach, suggesting that in the short to medium term useful reforms may include the democratisation of the World Bank and the IMF, and the creation of a democratically elected second chamber in the UN General Assembly.

Having considered 'ideal' theories, Caney completes his study by focusing on the 'non-ideal': the use of force in contemporary world politics for a variety of justifiable purposes. The book first articulates a cosmopolitan account of Just Wars, which retains much of the original, before moving on to defend the case for both a right and duty of humanitarian intervention on cosmopolitan grounds.

This is an impressive and important book that goes a long way towards articulating and defending a cosmopolitan approach to world politics. It is original, engaging and well researched. This reviewer would like to see Caney follow it up with more empirical work. Although Caney's argument for universalism is compelling, I still have doubts about its empirical import. Do people have rights in an empirical sense just because the weight of argument suggests that they do? How is institutional reform to be realised? What direction are global institutions taking? What common values are there in an empirical sense? This is not a criticism. Instead, I am suggesting that *Justice beyond Borders* should provide the starting point for a new stream of exploration in International Relations. The theoretical groundwork has been superbly completed in this volume.

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## GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS

**Gargi Bhattacharyya**, *Traffick: The Illicit Movement of People and Things* (London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005, 220 pp., £13.99, pbk.)

**Kamal Kempadoo with Jyoti Sanghera and Bandana Pattanaik (eds.)**, *Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered: New Perspectives on Migration, Sex Work and Human Rights* (Boulder & London: Paradigm Publishers, 2005, 247 pp., £68, hbk.; \$21.85, pbk.)

When does the beneficial activity of trade become the social danger of traffick? This is the question answered in Gargi Bhattacharyya's refreshing and excellent new book: *Traffick: The Illicit Movement of People and Things*, a polished macro-investigation of the phenomenon of modern trafficking.

Bhattacharyya looks at epochal change in human history, at what she describes as duelling periods of tumultuous change. Her book is not so much an anti-capitalist critique of globalisation as much as the construction of a framework for understanding 'the trade in highly profitable but often illicit goods' (p. 153). The work examines 'forms of trade and global movement that have become a cause of international anxiety' (p. 189). Its main thesis is the notion that the 'global structures we inhabit have not emerged spontaneously, inevitably and without historical context' (p. 5).

While some envision globalisation as a battle between forces of chaos and order, Bhattacharyya argues that 'the globalization we encounter today is a product of earlier and ongoing international aspirations' (p. 4); that while economic forces are important in the quest for global integration, they are not the only force acting to cajole poorer nations into participating within the global economy. In this context trafficking is an element of a dark world filled with 'the illicit traffic in drugs and arms, the trafficking of illegal immigrants, the trafficking of women and children for sex work and other forms of bonded labour, the trade in body parts and the laundering of money, all variations of the trade in despair somehow made respectable' (p. 32). Here, in this shady post-periphery domain, lies what is alternately described as the worldwide criminal, informal or shadow economy, distinguished not by its seedy underbelly but by 'its ability to connect this illicit trade to the formal networks of the global economy proper' (p. 32).

*Traffick* is a book grounded in political and economic thought (the history of the Bretton Woods Agreement and the roles of the IMF and World Bank within a framework of Keynesian understandings, for example). It applies these understandings to unravel some of the relationships populating globalisation's more nefarious leanings, such as the illicit activities of organised crime that lubricate the shadow economy under the broad protection of formal economic transactions. Regardless of whether the illicit owes its resource to labour, sex, guns, drugs or sweatshop goods, for Bhattacharyya it is a type of value added social capital that 'despite its similarity to other forms of trade' suggests it 'can be a destructive force' (p. 93); destructive because through trade 'powerful states can shape the manner in which less powerful nations enter and participate in the global economy' (p. 95). In its entirety, the book takes as an ongoing theme 'the suggestion that interventions to further global integration also yield other unexpected consequences: often with effects that are destabilising to global integration' (p. 148).

Whereas *Traffick* is very much one individual's vision, Kamala Kempadoo's edited volume of essays, *Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered: New Perspectives on Migration, Sex Work and Human Rights*,

presents a diverse collection of anti-trafficking and pro-migration perspectives. If Bhattacharyya's is a reasoned, even detached account of the dark side of globalism, Kempadoo's collection is frequently passionate. The reader is presented with a weave of essays that contemplate contemporary manifestations of trafficking coupled with human courses of action to derail it.

The book transports the reader to the field: Josephine Ho's clever recount of the 'fast changing social reality' of the Taiwanese anti-trafficking movement (p. 83), where church-led paternalistic concern quickly turns to rescuing missions; Natasha Ahmad's description of the challenges of ascribing a 'trafficked' status to women and children in India, because 'for every trafficked person from Bangladesh, there are hundreds who migrate illegally'; that 'whether considered trafficked or not, all arrive in India because of a dream' (p. 211), a dream, one can imagine Bhattacharyya suggesting, of attaining their piece of the global pie.

The reader learns that one of the risks of the forced human migration discourse is that the rhetoric of trafficking can 'serve as a front for undocumented economic migrants to be hounded and rounded up, followed by forced eviction or deportation' (p. 227), because some will have migrated 'willingly, with an explicit intention and expectation to make a living, even if it was as a sex worker' (p. 224). Essentially, it is as Vachararutai Boontinand indicates: 'although the term trafficking [is] often used to describe situations of illegal migration and/or situations of women going into prostitution' (pp. 177-8), we need to recognise a tendency towards conceptual conflation; that while each of these phenomena may be interrelated, they may be very separate as well.

To this end, Melissa Ditmore considers broad ideological movements through the application of a historical perspective to contextualise the shaping of recent policy. She asks, 'is all participation in the sex industry (including prostitution) trafficking? Is such participation an inherent violation of human rights?' (p. 107). Ditmore questions the focus on the 'very visible sex industry' while 'neglecting the larger numbers of people trafficked into domestic work, construction, agriculture and sweatshops' (p. 121).

For Aftab Ahmed, 'depending on the person questioned, human trafficking can be defined in a number of ways: as a legal problem, a human rights problem, a gender problem, a child labour problem, a health problem, a migration problem or a combination of more than one' (p. 199). It is here, within this tangle of definitions, that we may find what John Frederick calls 'the trafficking myth', a myth which 'serves several purposes: it is the consensus description of a typical trafficking episode, around which the discourse revolves; it encapsulates the issues of the media, public, government and donors; and—in the absence of a firm body of knowledge—it is the basis upon which some, but not all,

anti-trafficking interventions are determined' (p. 127). This is a problematic basis, Frederick suggests, because it 'has perpetrated unrealistic stereotypes' of all the mythological characters: women, families, sex workers, migrants, traffickers and anti-trafficking actors themselves (p. 144).

With such impassioned positions, the diplomacy of Kampadoo with co-editors Jyoti Sanghera and Bandana Pattanaik (and photographer Roshini Kempadoo) is evident. Nevertheless, not all authors in the volume fully avoid succumbing to stereotypical conclusions, such as the suggestion that certain types of research must continue in order to challenge 'these types of violations of women's human rights' (p. 195). Conceptually, perhaps, it is a finely woven thread that balances a woman's rights on one side, and premeditated violation on another. Further, while the volume effectively juxtaposes a variety of viewpoints and considerations, it would be very interesting to see more of this writing tackle the macro-processes considered in the book by Bhattacharyya in equal depth.

For Sanghera:

[I]t is no secret that the anti-trafficking arena is a beleaguered one. It has been made murkier by the melding together of complicated categories, constructs and players. Issues of migration, trafficking and sex work are peppered with constructs of sexuality, gender and vulnerability, threaded through with categories of victim and agent, consent and coercion, and stirred together in a cauldron by cooks, who are far too many in number, much too disparate in their culinary skills, and have at their disposal a budget which is far too lavish for a mere broth. (pp. 3-4)

As Bhattacharyya notes, human migration is not new: 'if anything it is immigration control that is the recent phenomenon' (p. 171). For the hungry reader interested in new ways of looking at age-old stories of trade and traffick, both new books offer substantially satisfying food for thought.

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## CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES

**Lorraine Elliot and Graeme Cheeseman (eds.),** *Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, 333pp., £55.00, hbk.).

The events of 11th September 2001 confirmed that the twenty-first century would be an age where the threat of asymmetric warfare would be felt globally. In ensuing policy debates, it became clear that the security of peoples and not just that of the Westphalian system of nation-states was a matter for concern. That the twentieth-century saw four times as many people killed by their own governments than those killed in international and civil wars (p. 1) provides a chilling precursor to the current debate on postmodern threats and military responses to them that underpin this ambitious and comprehensive volume.

Immanuel Kant once remarked, 'A violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere' (p. 18) and it is this principle which underpins cosmopolitanism—the notion that a moral and universal community of humanity exists, and must be protected by all for the good of all. The end of the Cold War brought a reassessment of roles, doctrine and capabilities for many militaries, with the perceived change in threats to nation-states leading to a promulgation of peace support operations (PSOs). Herein lies the key issue for the advance of cosmopolitanism. Whilst humanitarian issues and the alleviation of suffering seemingly became the concern of others, Alan Ryan argues in this volume, 'Universal moral truths may well exist, but a good part of humanity devotes a substantial portion of its time to denying them' (p. 65).

*Forces for Good* undertakes a thorough exploration of the motivations of certain states and international institutions to engage in PSOs and other associated activities, and their willingness to sacrifice the lives of soldiers for those of 'strangers', demonstrating that the capability and resolve of international actors varies greatly. Chapters by Annika Bergman on the Nordic Forces, Michael Rostek on the Canadian Defence Force, Robert Ayson on New Zealand and Eiichi Katahara on Japan demonstrate that varied, problematic, but ultimately strong commitments to cosmopolitanism are possible. However, elsewhere cosmopolitanism is more restricted. In spite of its role as a 'pluralistic security community' (p. 122) promoting wider stability, Terry Terriff demonstrates that NATO is primarily a defence organisation for its members, limiting its cosmopolitanism. Andrew Dorman's exploration of the UK similarly highlights cosmopolitan-

like actions such as support for the EU's Rapid Reaction Force (Terriff's 'embryonic cosmopolitan military', p. 150). However, he also notes how UK involvement in Iraq was framed in terms of national interest, concluding that the UK is only likely to engage in cosmopolitan-style missions directly linked to the War on Terror. If we take Gwyn Prins' view that the 'American imperial moment' (p. 33) signals that US-led coalitions are the only forces fully capable of securing cosmopolitan goals, then Holt's argument—that foreign policy is now guided by a 'neo-conservative ambit of the Bush Administration ... [for whom] a "force for good" is now one capable of fighting and winning wars'—certainly skews cosmopolitanism.

Whilst Marrack Goulding, Prins and Ryan all argue that the present UN is less capable of delivering cosmopolitan objectives, the relationship between individual states and the UN is seen as a 'measure' of cosmopolitan intent throughout the book. Thus it perhaps follows that Nordic states specialise in UN training, and Canada is a contributor to the UN's Stand-by High Readiness Brigade. In the case of Australia, Graeme Cheeseman tracks political shifts that led the country from being a 'good international citizen' (p. 221) with a strong commitment to PSOs, to realignment with the US and a move away from the UN. More unexpectedly, in the case of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Emmers shows that faith in the UN means that the ARF rarely contributes to PSOs thereby restricting their cosmopolitanism.

The purpose of this book is to 'investigate whether and to what extent current military policy and practice reflects cosmopolitan ideals and prescriptions' (p. 276). The conclusion is that it does not and yet there is optimism in this volume that 'cosmopolitan-minded' states and militaries may contribute to the improvement of human security. In addition to the quality of arguments made in the wide-ranging and stimulating chapters of *Forces for Good*, the delivery of ideas invokes an inspiring and concerted debate that must have characterised the conference that preceded it.

Whilst my own research interests leave me wanting more commentary on the impact of cosmopolitanism on soldiers on the ground, incidents such as that relayed by Cheeseman - on Australian mine clearers preferring to resign their commissions than be redeployed- went some way towards this. The inclusion of Susan Smith's chapter, considering the debate at a logistical level, was also refreshing. Overall, this book has wide appeal; its broad analyses at the level of policy and institutions should engage those in various fields. *Forces for Good* demonstrates excellent editorial decisions and conscientious contributions, making it a key resource for anyone

interested in conflict analysis. If this volume is anything to go by, the cosmopolitan debate will continue with vigour.

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**Chris Hables Gray**, *Peace, War, and Computers* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005, 213pp., £12.99, pbk.).

The rapid diffusion and present ubiquity of computers and information technology has made a theoretical understanding of their impact on international politics a crucial endeavour, and nowhere more urgently than in the vital matters of war and peace. This is the subject of Chris Hables Gray's new book in which he returns to some of the themes previously explored in the excellent *Postmodern War* and *Cyborg Citizen*, reconsidered now in the light of 9/11 and the War on Terror.

*Peace, War, and Computers* is divided into two parts: the first part paints the grim 'situation' of a world locked into a system of postmodern warfare—characterised by 'politics as an extension of war', as per Foucault's reversal of Clausewitz's dictum (p. 23)—and its latest incarnation in 'Terror War'. The second part deals with existing and potential 'responses' and an examination of the means of resistance and creation of a better world. Some may find Gray's prognosis of the future of humankind (or rather absence thereof) in a world in which war is not permanently banished overly pessimistic, but it is difficult to deny the apocalyptic potential of thousands of nuclear warheads and of the increasing accessibility to ever more powerful means of destruction. For the author, the War on Terror is a second Cold War, an outgrowth of the first and sharing in its terrifying paradoxes and absurdities. 'Where once we feared every day that some accident or demagogue would plunge us into nuclear war, now we fear that some terrorist will plunge our mundane life into terror' (p. 12). It is on the basis of this bleak assessment of a terminal crisis of war that Gray proclaims the urgency of promoting an alternative society.

Gray is quite explicit about the militant dimension of his work: 'War is always a struggle for meaning. Today, the most contested meaning of all is that of war itself. This book is an intervention into this "battle"' (p. xii). Gray's brand of anarchist politics may not agree with

every reader, but his forthright approach is to be commended and he generally avoids the simplistic dualisms that often mar texts inspired by such overt political stances. Indeed, the need to overcome the 'Jihad vs. McWorld dialectic' (p. 163), to go beyond left and right—'the Left has become tired, self-satisfied and dogmatic' (p. 169)—and to circumvent the dualistic pitfalls of past ideologies is central to Gray's advocacy. In accordance with this, his use of the 'cyborg' echoes that of Donna Haraway in that it is as much a conceptual category that serves the purpose of destabilising existing dichotomies (such as those between genders or between nature and society), as an empirical description of the increasingly intimate interpenetration of technology and the human body and mind.

One of the most interesting recurrent themes is that of informatics and the different uses of information in war and peace. Gray brings in complexity and chaos theory to undermine the claims to omniscience and predictability in warfare of the technoscientific military establishment, dismissing them as 'impoverished, instrumentalist, wishful thinking' (p. 37). To the centralised and hierarchical cybernetic management of human societies, the author opposes decentralised and emergent systems that he views as embodied by anarchist forms of political organisation. However, Gray risks setting up a new dualism that does not sustain a closer reading of the network-centric warfare literature, which draws its notions of self-synchronicity and swarming from the same scientific metaphors.

Another insightful chapter explores the transformative potential of artistic expression on politics, corporeal self-perception and human subjectivity, notably through the figure of the cyborg. We are also offered a lucid reading of the potential and limits of 'culture jamming', today's net-empowered offspring of situationism.

Ultimately, *Peace, War, and Computers* suffers from a somewhat scattergun approach, tackling the huge topics of war, terrorism, globalisation, technology, cyborgism, art and citizenship in a relatively short number of pages, and in a writing style that combines theorising, discourse analysis, personal anecdotes and activist toolkit. Such an ambitious project is admirable but unfortunately the book is not quite able to bring all these elements together satisfactorily. While Gray is always passionate and concise in his writing, the end-result feels unfocused and lacking in a real conducting thread other than the author's sense of urgency. Computers and information technology certainly feature prominently, but do not provide the consistent axis around which the discussion of peace and war, this alpha and omega of world politics, could have revolved. Sections of the book are nevertheless enjoyable and stimulating, as Gray remains a refreshing thinker with an original contribution to make. His *Postmodern War* is still

one of the most thought-provoking works written on the technoscientific way of warfare and its momentous implications for humanity. While perhaps less cohesive, Gray's call for the imagination of radical yet pragmatic responses is nonetheless infectious.

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**Johan Galtung**, *Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work* (London: Pluto Press, 2004, 192 pp., £15.99, pbk).

This book is about achieving peace at all levels in human arrangements. It will be known to be yet another step by Johan Galtung towards his aim of enlightening researchers and practitioners on how to approach conflicts and peace in a theoretical and practical way. The focus lies on normative conflict resolution at all levels of human society: individual, state, region and civilisation.

Besides being normative *Transcend and Transform* is also very much action-oriented. Indeed, Galtung argues that all true research is action research (p. 181). Peace research communicates directly to the reader what he or she can do to obtain peace by peaceful means. Although based on the experience of a well-known researcher, this book is not scientific in the sense that it does not carry references to previous peace research or ongoing debates and arguments. However, the reader should not be discouraged from taking Galtung's methodology seriously.

The overarching theme of this book is that conflicts are good, as long as they are dealt with by peaceful means that satisfy basic human needs. In supporting this argument, Galtung often refers back to 'the basic diagram in the theory of conflict: Two incompatible goals, Five outcomes' (p. 12). The diagram illustrates five likely outcomes when two interests clash: victory on part of actor A, victory on part of actor B, withdrawal, compromise and transcendence. The outcome chart is applied throughout the entire book as a reference point. According to Galtung, all of the outcomes are basically meaningless in the search for peace, apart from the preferable fifth one: transcendence. The two victory outcomes are based on a struggle in which one or the other actor loses. On the other hand, a solution based on withdrawal is seen as a

mere postponement of the conflict since none of the parties is satisfied in this 'neither/nor' position. The fourth outcome, compromise—reached by negotiations—is also undesirable, as both parties to the conflict are merely satisfied. This is the 'half-half' position, suggesting that compromise is a 'comfort of the poor' (p. 13). This leads him to the fifth outcome: transcendence, the 'win-win' situation. No conflict—no matter how light or complex—will be sustainable unless both parties to the conflict are satisfied. This ideal situation, Galtung argues, can only be reached through dialogue and by non-violent means. What, then, is transcendence?

Transcendence is a method; it is a way of understanding a conflict in all of its aspects. To transcend is to understand the root and heart of a conflict, not only based on the actors' perceptions, but also by taking an objective account of the underlying structures that have become manifest. This understanding is then to be transformed into a new, more controllable, situation. However, this transformation can only be achieved by bringing in creative perspectives previously not thought of, for instance by adding new dimensions to the conflict that have not been expressed explicitly, or by lifting up common denominators to which the parties to the conflict agree.

Sometimes this creativeness can work by changing language or by redefining concepts. One important formula is to complement diagnosis with therapy. According to Galtung, too many researchers are concentrated only on diagnosing and mapping conflict, when the real challenge lies in providing therapy to overcome a conflict stalemate. Therapy is based on empathy, creativeness and adding new dimensions to the conflict so that further options are born. To do so, the conflict worker needs to focus on a positive and constructive future rather than past incidents (p. 113). Galtung exhorts us to 'listen to what has not been said, listen to the inaudible' (p. 80).

*Transcend and Transform* spans difficult issues such as class, race and gender, and does so within the context of more than 40 conflicts (some being as complex as Israel/Palestine and the former Yugoslavia/Kosovo). Despite covering such difficult topics, this book is an easy read. There are two main reasons for this. The simple reason is that it is well structured and well disposed. But perhaps more important is that the comprehensive theory is so well developed and thought of that it makes the treatment of complex issues look rather simple.

Galtung's book is written in an almost evangelical language, but one where the essence of Christianity is exchanged with a philosophy of peace. As a reader, one cannot help but ask why each chapter is divided into weekdays. According to Galtung, each chapter could represent one learning day. However, God is said to have created the earth in seven days. Is Galtung calling for the same transformation, one might ask? In

some respects though, the book becomes compounded, covering too many complex areas at the same time. In fact the rapid tempo in the book easily takes over, making the reader a bit confused over the logical relationship between variable  $x$  and  $y$ .

Is the book then too simplistic and optimistic? Probably not. As Galtung himself puts it, 'Well, what is wrong with the optimist's moral heart and idealism, provided there is also some realism somewhere in the brain?' (p. 183).

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**Andreas Wimmer, Richard J. Goldstone, Donald L. Horowitz, Ulrike Joras & Conrad Schetter (eds.), *Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Towards a New Realism* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, 384pp., \$32.95, pbk.)**

In the aftermath of 9/11 the issue of ethnic conflict was superseded by terrorism as the dominant concern facing the international community. Prior to the 'war on terror' intra-state conflicts dominated international relations discourse and were widely cited as the primary threat to international peace and security. Despite the current primacy of terrorism studies, this book serves as an important and timely reminder that the problems associated with ethnicity have not disappeared. It may well be, as certain authors herein suggest, that the issue of ethnic conflict is in fact a catalyst for the recourse to terrorism.

Comprising a diverse range of eminent authors including both practitioners and academics from various fields, *Facing Ethnic Conflicts* aims to promote a greater understanding of ethnic conflicts and elucidate means by which to prevent them (p. 1). However, while the writing is informative and clear throughout, it is debatable whether these central goals have been achieved. There is no doubt that this book will increase one's understanding of the theories relating to ethnic conflict, but as no single theory is proffered, it is possible that it will serve to increase the confusion that surrounds the genesis of ethnic conflict. Differing conceptions are offered and one wonders whether the editors should have more modestly aimed to illustrate the differing views on this issue.

Aside from its possibly overly ambitious aims, this book comprises coherent and thought-provoking analysis that will be of great benefit to those engaged in research into this issue. A high level of knowledge and experience is evident throughout and there are few volumes that can boast such a comprehensive array of expert contributors.

In Chapter 1 Walker Connor examines the history of ethnic conflict and suggests that this phenomenon is not unique to the post-Cold War era, but neither is ethnic identity a timeless human trait: 'claims of a broadly accepted ethnonational consciousness prior to the late 19th century should be treated with healthy scepticism' (p. 29). Rogers Brubaker similarly criticises the tendency among those involved in this field to group people as though they were 'internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes' (p. 35). He argues that 'groupism' ignores the fact that ethnicity and race exist only in and through perception and identification (p. 45).

Peter Waldmann offers an interesting perspective on the role of external mediators in the resolution of ethnic conflicts and notes that three-quarters of all civil wars fought between 1945 and 1993 were ended by military means and half of those, which ended through negotiation, soon re-erupted. In his analysis of the causes of ethnic tension William Zartman asserts that 'Need alone is not the source of conflict... .When inferiors see injustice in their position and revolt, it is because need appears to be distributed differentially for unacceptable or unexpected reasons' (p. 142). Angel Vi?as' examination of the European Union's record of external democracy support suggests that increased attention paid to this issue by the EU is not wholly altruistic; 'the process of democratisation ... serves the interests of the EU' (p. 223). Hurst Hannum provides an excellent insight into the aims adopted by aggressive ethnic groups and suggests that the difficulty in reaching a negotiated settlement is closely related to the zero-sum policies adopted by warring factions. In his critique of the UN and NATO's role in Kosovo he states that 'the role of NATO in Kosovo seems to be to prevent Albanians from achieving independence and to prevent Yugoslavia from controlling its own territory: it does not seem likely that such a "lose-lose" scenario will stand the test of time' (p. 278).

Walter Kalin provides a convincing argument to suggest that decentralisation and the granting of autonomy, far from de-escalating secessionism, may contribute to a greater drive among ethnic groups for outright independence. He writes: 'Decentralised forms of governance may not solve but rather may reinforce and perpetuate the very causes of many of today's ethnic conflicts' (p. 306). Ulrike Joras and Conrad Schetter provide a very interesting and relevant analysis of the links, or rather lack thereof, between academic work on ethnic conflict and governmental policymaking in this field. They suggest that the

problematic relationship between academia and government may have much to do with the varying conceptions of the origins of ethnic conflicts rather than a conceptual fissure between these two groups.

In the concluding chapter Andreas Wimmer offers a bleak outlook for the future. The seeming inevitability of ethnic tension and the lack of any coherent means by which this phenomenon can be either prevented or resolved suggests that the international community will continue to be faced with this problem for the foreseeable future: 'The hope for a new world order in which governments, NGOs and researchers would jointly work toward "managing" and "solving" ethnic conflicts around the world by spreading multicultural justice and democratic participation has evaporated' (p. 355).

*Towards a New Realism* is essential reading for anyone engaged in this field. It provides a comprehensive overview of expert research in this field and will retain relevance for some time to come. It is regrettable, however, that many of the contributions are very short, and at times one is given what is at most only a flavour of a certain perspective. As many of the contributors note, the prospects of ever finding a long-term solution to this problem appear remote.

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**Thomas G. Weiss**, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, 274pp., \$22.95, pbk.).

**William Maley, Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur (eds.)**, *From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2003, 369pp., \$33.00, pbk.).

Massive humanitarian emergencies have punctuated the last fifteen years of international events. These disruptions within states have precipitated multilateral military actions and subsequent efforts to rebuild. The two texts reviewed here provide complementary insights into how interested scholars and practitioners should assess the relative success and failures of coordinated responses to complex humanitarian emergencies and their aftermath.

Weiss begins with a brief overview of the role of different sets of international actors involved in addressing complex humanitarian operations, noting that humanitarian actors such as donor governments, intergovernmental organisations, private organisations (such as non-governmental organisations and the International Committee of the Red Cross), and outside military forces must all be acknowledged as interacting parts of complicated efforts to address humanitarian problems. He succinctly traces the origins of the current constellation of actors, but focuses on the post-Cold War context. During the 1990s, the predominance of interstate conflict gave way to an increase in the frequency of internal conflicts, with sides often demarcated by ethnic or religious affiliations. Civilian victimisation is more common in these wars, making attention to the large number of international refugees and internally displaced people a matter about which the international community has expressed concern by both words and deeds.

Much of the text comprises seven cases in which multinational forces undertook military intervention with stated humanitarian objectives and in the absence of invitation from a functioning government. They include: Northern Iraq (1991-1996), Bosnia (1992-1995), Somalia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1994-1995), Haiti (1994-1996), Kosovo (1999-2000), and East Timor (1999-2000). This new edition of *Military-Civilian Interactions* also offers an evaluation and application of the content of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's (ICISS) report *The Responsibility to Protect*—for which Weiss served as research director. He also compares recent United States interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq to three invasions in the 1970s.

Weiss also introduces a tentative framework for thinking about the costs and benefits of the international community's efforts to address the cases he selects. Military costs for countries providing troops to address humanitarian disasters are on three dimensions: monetary, casualty and political. He also seeks some measure of comparison between the displacement of civilians, the suffering they undergo, and state ability to project sovereign authority over its territory and people before and after the conflict. Weiss notes the tentative nature of his framework and the difficulty of acquiring accurate data on the costs and benefits of his cases on the dimensions in the framework. But a side-by-side quantitative comparison in addition to his more impressionistic qualitative judgments might bring some additional clarity to his arguments.

Weiss concludes with several suggestions for future research, including the reasons why a unitary presence in complex emergencies appears impossible, the politics of prevention, the content and limits of the much-invoked 'CNN effect', the most effective time frames in which military and humanitarian interventions should occur, the 'repugnant notion of triage' in weighing the value of intervention in emergencies

instead of 'poverty's "silent" emergencies' (p. 208), and whether post-Cold War and post-9/11 politics enable better accountability concerning interventions with the approval of international institutions.

While Weiss focuses on a narrower set of actions, weighted towards US experience, Maley, Sampford and Thakur offer an edited volume with a wider range of perspectives and voices on the roles of military and civilian organisations in addressing the needs of what they term disrupted states—avoiding the monikers 'failed', 'collapsed' and 'disintegrated'. The collection provides a set of analyses that, most notably, include more attention to longer-term issues of sustaining peace and building civil society within previously disrupted states. The material for the volume comes from two noteworthy conferences: a July 1999 gathering under the auspices of Australian universities; and another at the United Nations University in Tokyo, Japan in January 2001.

With little additional comment, the editors of *From Civil Strife to Civil Society* bring together eighteen chapters in a volume of seven parts: the problem of disrupted states (1-3), challenges for the military in disrupted states (4-5), ending violence (6-8), reconstituting political order (9-10), reconstituting legal order (11-12), reconstituting social order (13-15), and transition to civil order (16-18). The editors' introduction frames the volume in terms of emerging aspects of the globalising world, an environment in which not only international commerce binds states, but also where a consensus concerning the value of 'the rule of law, human security, and the ability of ordinary people to change their rulers without bloodshed' has drawn the global community into projects to address the challenges of disrupted states (p. 1).

Suffice it to say that the collection, taken as a sum of its pieces, includes compelling treatments of the issues, though it suffers from the often unavoidable shortcoming of such compilations: its contributions do not often speak directly to each other. The intellectual challenge for the reader is in identifying the many fascinating threads that run between many of these disparate accounts and evaluating the many facets of humanitarian operations they illuminate. Particularly helpful in framing discussion are the earlier overview chapters by Saikal (Chapter 1) and Diehl (Chapter 2) that define concepts and lay out plausible ranges of state disruptions and international responses to them, respectively.

Weiss notes in *Military-Civilian Interactions* that his focus is primarily on the international actors that intervene in troubled societies, and one of the primary contributions of the edited volume is its attention to the challenges facing organisations (military and otherwise) in shaping the conditions under which societies may make constructive transitions to more trusting and cohesive polities with respect for rule of law (Plunkett, Chapter 11; Ganzglass, Chapter 18) and democratic institutions (Austin,

Chapter 10). Meanwhile, the increased complexity of current humanitarian operations, according to Terry (Chapter 14) is a function of the intervening actors, not necessarily the emergencies themselves.

Important points of contact between the edited volume and Weiss's more focused work include the issues of sovereignty and prevention of humanitarian emergencies as well as slightly different, but complementary accounts of peace operations in Somalia (Kelly, Chapter 12; Makinda, Chapter 16), Rwanda (Durham, Chapter 8), Kosovo (Chesterman and Malone, Chapter 3; de Rover, Chapter 7), and East Timor (Burkle, Chapter 5). Key to Maley, Sampford, and Thakur's work, as with Weiss's above, is a series of definitions of sovereignty and the manner in which the internal affairs of states lacking one or multiple attributes of traditional states may be subject to intervention by the international community. Weiss's account benefits from its engagement of the ICISS's ideas about sovereignty implying certain responsibilities of the governments of states towards their populations, a perspective that is not prominent among the writers in the edited volume, who wrote their initial contributions before the report's release. But a useful counterpoint to the more interventionist works is Vayrynen's chapter (Chapter 6) in which he is very sceptical of claims concerning the utility of intervention at the expense of traditional aspects of state sovereignty. Chesterman and Malone (Chapter 3) offer an argument that military intervention should be seen as a failure of prevention (and hence political will), while Weiss appears to take exception to such an emphasis in his critique of ICISS's focus on preventing future humanitarian emergencies as a central part of its recommendations for the international community's conduct regarding troubled states.

Taken together, these works contribute to the growing literature on the issues surrounding complex humanitarian operations in disrupted states. In coming years, new emergencies—and renewed conflicts—will again test the political will and organisational capacity of the international community. The humanitarian impulse, though not an imperative, will continue to drive the responses as these crises occur at the juncture of power, politics and law. States and intergovernmental actors will need to weigh the potential costs and benefits of action, but also inaction. A reader's inclusion of these works in their consideration of the issues will be rewarded.

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**Small Arms Survey**, *Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 352pp., £17.99, pbk.).

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) kill, maim and cause the suffering of thousands of people every year. The insecurity they produce can deny children their education and adults their jobs. Understandably, then, SALW are often analysed in humanitarian or developmental terms. However, these approaches do not always address what may be the most pressing concern of all: the direct relationship between the spread of these weapons and the occurrence of armed violence. It is no coincidence that SALW have become the 'weapons of choice' in today's new wars. Their size makes them easily concealable, thus facilitating transport. They are also light, which makes them accessible to child soldiers. In short, they play a crucial role in the strategies of modern combatants. By attempting to explain the role SALW play in fuelling violent conflicts, the *Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War* makes a very welcome addition to a remarkably sparse literature.

Like its predecessors, the fifth volume of the Small Arms Survey's annual yearbook provides an interesting and informative account of the small arms problem today. This year's edition breaks with the past, however, by combining an innovative theme—the link between small arms and armed conflict—with a new structure. The book is divided into two sections. The first provides an update on trends in production, transfers and stockpiles, as well as a new segment on small arms ammunition. The second part is dedicated to issues surrounding armed conflict and its aftermath. It includes analytical chapters on conflict sourcing and conflict use of SALW.

One particularly interesting chapter, 'Violent Exchanges: The Use of Small Arms in Conflict' (Chapter 7), examines how the types of weapons available, as well as the goals and organisational factors of armed groups, may determine the way weapons are used in armed conflicts. This therefore constitutes an important study, as it provides insight for policymakers on which are the most destructive weapons, and which should be targeted first.

The chapter, 'Behind the Numbers' (Chapter 9), also presents a novel piece of research. At present, there is no established methodology for gathering data on conflict-related deaths. This has political implications: for example, in Iraq, conflict deaths since 2003 have been underestimated. The *Survey* attempts to remedy the situation by reviewing the range of estimation techniques and examining the advantages and disadvantages of various methodologies. This chapter thus provides an important step towards a proper accounting of conflict-related deaths and contributes to our understanding of direct and indirect conflict deaths.

In turn, 'Managing "Post Conflict" Zones: DDR and Weapons Reduction' (Chapter 10) deserves close scrutiny. Two comments are in order. First, although the chapter contains an interesting discussion on the shortcomings of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration), it omits one of the key challenges. That is, how does one avoid raising tensions within a community when it is felt that ex-combatants get rewarded while civilians lose out? Second, despite the fact that the author criticises the disarmament bias of certain DDR activities, his own approach appears very much disarmament-focused. Indeed, more mention is made of weapons collection initiatives than of activities aimed at the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants. This is linked to another problem, which is that in drawing attention to the difficulties of measuring the success of DDR and Weapons Reduction programmes, little allusion is made to the recent efforts of certain agencies like the UNDP to integrate a wide range of both quantitative and qualitative performance indicators into their DDR projects. The UNDP has shown that success in these programmes can also be measured by a more diverse set of criteria, such as the number of ex-combatants who remain integrated in society two years on.

Moving on, this reviewer found the 'Shooting Gallery', a chapter dedicated to contemporary art, particularly engaging. It contains, among others, a description of Cornelia Parker's *Embryo Firearms*, a demonstration of how deadly weapons are merely pieces of metal. Although the gallery contains an example of a sculpture created from metal and guns (*For Those Left Behind*), this reviewer was surprised not to find Cristóvão Estavão Canhavato's *Throne of Weapons*. This spectacular piece was created out of decommissioned firearms used in Mozambique's civil war. Incorporating this example into the gallery would have reminded readers of the direct link between small arms and conflict while simultaneously representing the hope for disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants following conflicts.

None of these criticisms are meant to suggest that the *Small Arms Survey 2005* is anything less than a critical addition to an important field of emerging literature. Ultimately, the volume is valuable because it succeeds in illuminating the logic behind the proliferation and use of SALW in modern conflicts. It is only through a comprehensive understanding of violent conflicts and the arms that fuel them that a sustainable peace becomes imaginable.

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**Shireen T. Hunter**, *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2004, 592pp., \$89.95, hbk.; \$34.95, pbk.).

The main achievement of *Islam in Russia* is a detailed account of inter-Muslim relations in Russia. Shireen Hunter aims to assess the status of Islam and Muslims in Russia today, in regard to both the historical record and prospects for the future (p. xxiii). The purpose is to evaluate the impact of the 'Islamic factor' on the evolution of Russia's internal situation and external relations. The concept of security (indicated in the title) refers to the struggle for self-government of Muslim communities as well as to the possibility of inter-cultural clashes between Muslims and other Russians.

The book provides information on: first, the dynamics of political and religious organisation within Muslim communities; second, the interactions between Muslims and representatives of the broader political sphere in Russia; and third, the role of Islam in Russian foreign policy. These subject areas are covered in the three main sections of the book, each comprising two to six sub-chapters, plus a conclusion. The first section begins with an historical overview of interactions between Slavs and Muslims from the Mongol conquest in the twelfth century to *perestroika*, and proceeds to examine the representation of Muslims in contemporary Russian society. The latter part stands out for a diligent cataloguing of Muslim organisations, including religious, political and economic entities, mosques, Muslim schools, newspapers, magazines, and TV and radio programmes. Muslims in Russia, however, do not represent a cohesive group. Hunter explains the fragmented nature of Muslim communities in Russia by socio-economic and cultural discrimination in Russia. In addition, she observes an inadequacy of Muslim communities at establishing a common ground for action and this inter-Muslim rivalry prevents a cohesive Muslim approach to interaction with key actors in Russian politics.

In section two, the Islamic factor is studied in the context of identity politics. Despite the observation of the fragmented nature of Muslim communities in Russia, the relevance of this disunity for Islam as a collective reference of identity is not problematised. Subsequent to a recapitulation of the well-known historical perspective of the war in Chechnya and the identity-experiment during the Soviet era, there is a review of contemporary debates on nationalism in Russia. The analysis of the reforms of federalism since the early 1990s pertaining to regional representation in national politics is both timely and interesting. Section three sets out to track the impact of Islam on Russia's foreign relations. The reviews of the main aspects of Soviet and Russian foreign policy (Chapter 6) and the role of Islam in foreign policy (Chapter 7) are followed by an assessment of the impact of the Islamic

factor on Russian policies towards Central Asia and Transcaucasus (Chapter 8), the northern tier countries (Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan) (Chapter 9), the Arab World and the Balkans (Chapter 10), and the West (Chapter 11). The broad conclusion is that the impact of Islam on Russia's external relations has varied considerably. The main relevance of Islam is noted in Russia's relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, due to their support for the insurgents in Chechnya. The 9/11 attacks made Islam relevant to relations with the West. This analysis raises questions on methodology: what are the indicators of the Islamic factor on the basis of which Russia's foreign policy is assessed? Indeed, what is the Islamic factor? To assess the impact of an Islamic factor on a country's foreign policy requires an at least rudimentary definition of this factor. Despite the vast array of information presented, this overly ambitious project shows its weakness in the poor elaboration of this key analytical concept.

The analysis of the interaction between Muslim communities and national politics makes clear that certain actors have succeeded in influencing Putin and other central figures in Russian contemporary politics. The personalised character of politics is a general feature of Russian post-Soviet politics. It is therefore questionable whether the religious orientation carries more weight in these interactions than the personal aspect does.

In regard to the diversity of Muslim communities in Russia noted in this study, a core concern is how different identities are interconnected within the Muslim community. For example, how does the identity of being Muslim overlap with other identity concerns? The illusion of a unitary Islamic factor provides the basic analytical concept of this study, but there are doubts about the usefulness of this concept as a guide to analysis. In fact, a main weakness of the security-as-identity approach is the lack of reflection on how the interconnectedness of different identities affects security. The lack of a comprehension of hybrid identities continues to influence analyses of security and identity, of which this book is a prime example. Even more astonishing, the thriving debate on the security-as-identity approach and the Copenhagen School is not mentioned at all in this volume. The weaknesses in this book nonetheless contribute to this debate by illustrating that there are certain weak aspects of an identity approach to security, notably the reification of an Islamic factor. For the purpose of critical engagement, and for insights into forms of representation of Muslim communities in Russia, this book is recommended.

The process of constructing identities is in itself a central aspect in assessing the ability of communities to express demands of self-

determination. Studies of the role of identity/ethnicity in violent conflicts have shown the necessity of addressing how identity questions are interconnected with political aspect and social and economic issues. These insights should also be transferred to the broader analysis of security and identity.

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## DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT

**Christopher Meyerson**, *Domestic Politics and International Relations in US-Japan Trade Policymaking: The GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 228pp., £50.00, hbk.).

Meyerson's book adds to the already extensive collection of publications on the GATT Uruguay Round, specifically focusing on the evolution of Japanese and US negotiating positions concerning market access for agricultural products between 1986 and 1994 and domestic level influence of the on the nature of agreements reached at the international level. Meyerson's addition to the field is well justified by the vast array of primary documents analysed in this work; according to the author, many of these documents were made publicly available only shortly before the time of writing. Furthermore, Meyerson advances his previous work by utilising a thorough application and extension of Putnam's famous two-level game, approaching trade policymaking by conceptualising the relationship between the domestic and the international level. Meyerson aims to advance Putnam's model by clarifying the key variables on the domestic level and their relationships with each other and lays the groundwork for exploration of the case study by identifying the key actors and their interaction at different historical phases.

The domestic level of American trade policymaking is conceptualised as consisting of the Executive Branch, Congress and other actors (e.g. farmers' associations). The common interest of these

three in increasing US agricultural exports enabled the negotiators to assume a coherent stance. This stance supported US efforts to find cooperation partners on the international level. Meyerson finds that, while the US negotiation proposal became increasingly specific over the course of the negotiations, the comprehensiveness of the proposed reform remained almost unchanged. The concessions the US had to make were considered to be of minor impact for US farmers.

In turn, Meyerson conceptualises the Japanese domestic level as consisting of the bureaucracy, the Diet (the legislative assembly) and other actors. Japan's agricultural policies after the Second World War were aimed at decreasing the country's dependency on food imports. Requests for market opening were therefore met with scepticism, and the Japanese government assumed a protectionist stance in the negotiations. However, the subsequent division between domestic institutions and interest groups led the Japanese government to become more inclined to compromise on the international level.

Chapter 6 contains an assessment of the effectiveness of the theoretical model and indicates a broad area for further research. The model, as described by Meyerson, hits on the limitations of Putnam's original model. To achieve parsimony, even Meyerson's extended model has to simplify the domestic structure. This provides scope for further research. In, for instance, the case of US trade policy it might prove useful to extend Putnam's model to a three-level game, incorporating not only the federal but also the state level (as has been attempted for the case of the EU).

A point that might be added to Meyerson's analysis is that the nature of an agreement and the impact of a country on negotiations might be connected to a country's power capabilities. The predominance of the US proposal in this case may be a result of the unequal power distribution between the US and Japan. Indeed, the success of the US might be explained as much by US power in the issue area, plus linkages to other issue areas in the WTO, as it is explained by the advantageous attitude of the US domestic actors.

However, within the constraints inherent in Putnam's model, Meyerson's book provides valuable insights into this specialist field. The depth and thoroughness of its theoretical analysis are captivating. The structure of the book is very straightforward and accessible, although the application of the theoretical model to the case study is at times almost mechanical. The author's long-term devotion to the study of US–Japanese trade relations is evident in the depth of his analysis: the description of the negotiating process in the US, Japan and the GATT provides an enormous amount of detail. Although this is certainly not a timely publication (it is not meant to be), it is of relevance to those with

a special interest in international agricultural policies, US–Japan economic relations and IR theory.

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**Norichika Kanie & Peter M. Haas (eds.)**, *Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004, 295pp. + xivpp., \$36.00, pbk.).

**Gabriela Kütting**, *Globalization and the Environment: Greening Global Political Economy* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004, 165pp. + x pp., \$40.00, hbk.).

The study of global environmental politics and policy (GEP) has established itself as a vibrant field of research within International Relations (IR) in recent years. Considering that scholarly attention has started to gain momentum merely from the late 1980s onwards, GEP has undergone both a remarkable broadening and diversification in hardly more than one and a half decades. In part, this fanning out mirrors the intricate and interdisciplinary character of environmental issues, as they encompass physical, biological, social, political, juridical and ethical facets concurrently. To complicate affairs further, IR's recent epistemological, ontological and methodological rifts have also markedly impinged on research approaches and interests. Hence, scholarship in the field is frayed and reminiscent of the state of current IR itself: like the Tower of Babel it resounds 'with a cacophony of different voices' (M. G. Hermann).

Before this backdrop, Gabriela Kütting's monograph and the anthology by Norichika Kanie and Peter M. Haas seem to be paradigmatic. Kütting's project roots in a fundamental criticism of International Political Economy's (IPE) most prevalent approaches since in her account they 'tend to sideline the environmental and social consequences of globalization' (p. vii). Therefore, *Globalization and the Environment* aims at bringing such negative costs centre stage by developing an 'eco-holistic conceptual framework' which does justice to

and hence addresses 'social, political, economic *and* environmental' aspects equally (p. viii). In contrast, Kanie and Haas's *Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance* is less of a conceptual but nevertheless an ambitious endeavour. Situating itself in the burgeoning literature on governance, it attempts to provide a broad and in-depth review of the complex and excruciatingly awkward architecture of current global environmental regulation. (As supplement, a sibling, forthcoming tome is given the task of suggesting cures for the diagnosed deficiencies.) However different these volumes appear, both stand in accord with the widespread discontent about the state of handling environmental issues but nonetheless choose utterly dissimilar departures in order to address the pressing issues environmental degradation and hazards pose to global politics.

Introducing a 'new concept' (p. vii) to an academic debate is usually a tough challenge. Gabriela Kütting's effort at *Greening Global Political Economy* by introducing an eco-holistic perspective follows a common strategy in such a case: a critique of IPE's dominant concepts of globalisation so as to demonstrate their theoretical and analytical shortcomings prepares the ground from which she suggests her blend of holistic and eco-centric approaches. This 'fresh', 'greened' perspective on IPE then results in an empirical amplification on the political economy of garments in West Africa, elaborating on the added value of the novel notions put forward.

Initially the book's criticism aims at both traditional liberal and traditional historical materialist approaches, but clearly the main focus of disapproval is with liberal and neoliberal thinking:

[This] hegemonic approach to global political economy ... denies the essential link between environmental degradation and wealth creation since it is excessive consumption and the use of resources and degrading sinks ... that causes most environmental degradation. ... Liberal IPE ... sees the environment as a problem of financial input and management rather than as a problem of resource use and distribution ... as an economic problem rather than as a problem of the interdependence of industrial society and the environment in which it exists and on which it is dependent. (pp. 16-17)

Yet, the main thrust of Kütting's argument is meant to free the analysis of globalisation's negative upshot not only from the ignorance of mainstream approaches but also from the domination of the discourse(s) on global civil society and non-state actors. In Kütting's perception, the latter are biased towards actors and agency whereas 'structural and systemic forces and constraints within which actors operate' (p. vii) tend generally to be ignored.

The suggested eco-holistic approach drawing on a variety of conceptual and theoretical strands—ecological world systems theory and historical materialism being among the key stimuli—promises to remedy such deficiencies by paying attention to the nexus between structure and agency and by focusing on three linchpins: the historical and temporal dimension of the relationship between society and the environment; the (neglected) role and impact of consumer politics; and the notion of equity. The miscellany of these focal points already portends the main limitation of *Globalization and the Environment*. It certainly puts forward some ‘new’ and original points; what is missing, however, is an overall logic tying together the all too divergent lines of reasoning. Hence, the book suggests at best some elements of, but hardly a consistent blueprint for, the envisaged alternative conception itself.

The main reason for this lies with Kütting’s eclecticism, which renders the read of her book uneasy and at times even bewildering. Two examples might underpin such criticism. Introducing the ecological world systems theory as a main inspiration, Kütting deals extensively with its ‘main argumentative thrust’, i.e. that the ‘rise and fall of world civilizations can be traced to environmental degradation’ (p. 26). The riddle this leaves to the reader is a twofold one: it remains open, first, how such a structural approach can be squared with Kütting’s structuralist credo and second, why such an extensive introduction is needed given the insignificance of the argument in the remainder of the book. Similarly puzzling is Kütting’s concept of globalisation itself. So her account almost completely passes over the decisive role of technology in globalisation’s advance. Without an assessment of technology’s function, though, Kütting leaves open how the dynamic of globalisation and consequently of the relationship between society and the environment has to be understood: are we dealing with processes, which keep going under their own momentum? And if so, what room for steering them remains? While Kütting stresses globalisation as a distinct phase of capitalism primarily accompanied by a domineering doctrine, i.e. ‘a new form of ecological imperialism that subjugates resource extraction and production to market ideology’ (p. 42), she overlooks the technological momentum of societies averred by some sociologists of technology, prominent among them Jacques Ellul.

In conclusion, *Globalization and the Environment* offers some interesting, original arguments and an empirical case study well worth reading. However, its overall aim of introducing a new concept fails due to a lack of conceptual consistency and by dint of its all-too-selective eclecticism leaving aside subjects such as ‘anticipatory politics’, the ‘precautionary principle’ or ‘risk’, which could have figured highly in an eco-holistic conception. Alas, the book’s concluding policy-section

serves to confirm this scepticism once more, as the new eco-holistic approach appears to generate more or less common (policy) strategies. Hence, Gabriela Kütting's conception is not a way out of GEP's quandaries, even if many analysts would follow her opinion 'that a separation of environmental policy from social and economic policy leads to the marginalization of environmental matters' (p. 129).

In fact Kanie and Haas's *Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance* agrees with Kütting's analysis in this point. They disagree, however, in their judgement of sustainable development, the central reference point in current environmental governance: whereas Kütting attacks it vehemently as neoliberal window-dressing, Kanie and Haas take it as an 'integrative approach to economic development' which shows at least the potential to include 'environmental protection along with other goals of growth, social equity, and ... democratization' (p. 265). Consequently, *Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance* investigates 'how well the system [of GEP] has performed, and potentials for its reform' (p. 264). Drawing on (mainstream) findings on globalisation and governance, the volume highlights the complex division of labour within the system of GEP, meanwhile encompassing a multitude of public and private actors at different levels of the international system.

This intricacy is mirrored in the aspects touched upon, spanning from the design of international and regional organisations to the nexus of the domestic and the international in multilevel governance, and from the role of scientific knowledge and policy to the growing involvement of private actors such as NGOs, business and industry in international environmental regulation. Overall, *Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance* offers insightful and informed analyses of current environmental governance which will prove worthwhile for both students and teachers of global public policy alike. Concerning the potential for reform, Kanie and Haas remain bound to an incrementalist, sober perspective: 'Traditionally international institutions have been designed according to an organizational logic that addresses problems individually'. So what is required is 'a reorientation of collective understanding and of formal institutions to focus on the key intersecting and interacting elements of complex problems' (p. 264). However, 'the system remains fragile ... and requires continual support ... [whereas] the current political climate does not bode well for massive reform efforts' (p. 276).

Typically, the plurality of perspectives in the study of GEP has caused various sentiments, among them irritation on the part of those scandalised by the lack of comprehensive research agendas in the face of major environmental threats, relief on the part of those who feel the urgent need for a liberating move away from traditional, all-too-narrow

views of GEP. As the two volumes reviewed here indicate, neither attitude stands necessarily in opposition to the other. Doubtlessly, the study of GEP will be characterised by an increasing multitude of ‘voices’ in the near future. However, the Tower of Babel might be a metaphor less alarming than Borges’ Library of Babel. A temptation for bibliophiles, a library filled with an endless string of books covering all possible permutations of the alphabet would be the ultimate nightmare for GEP.

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**Atul Kohli, Chung-in Moon and Georg Sørensen (eds.),** *States, Markets and Just Growth: Development in the Twenty-First Century* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003, 295pp., \$21.95, pbk.).

**Gerard McCann and Stephen McCloskey (eds.),** *From the Global to the Local: Key Issues in Development Studies* (London: Pluto Press, 2003, 260pp., £13.99, pbk.).

Development Studies is a relatively young field within academia. Although the Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester was established in 1958, many universities in the US—such as Harvard—and in the UK—such as Birmingham and Reading—have added Centres or Departments of International Development only in the past decade. As a result there is an unfortunate lack of books reviewing the state of the discipline. These two co-edited books have attempted to address this gap in the literature. That one of the two of them succeeds to a remarkable extent is cause for celebration, despite the other’s failure.

The Gerard McCann and Stephen McCloskey edited volume is disappointing. *From the Global to the Local* comprises 14 essays from a pool of mostly Irish and Northern Irish authors: six of the 13 contributors are either staff or alumni of Queen’s University, Belfast, while another three have associations with the Irish Catholic development agency, Trócaire. However, the authors not only fail to develop a distinctly Irish or Northern Irish perspective to Development Studies, but also do not draw significantly upon specific activities of Trócaire or Irish Aid.

None of this would be a problem if the essays were good in and of themselves. Sadly, they are not. The book has high ambitions in attempting to provide ‘a reference text or research aid for those active in the field of development’ (p. 19). It therefore tackles such broad topics as gender, aid, trade, the environment, debt, child poverty, education, globalisation and others in separate chapters. However, few of the essays succeed in providing an overview of the subject material. For instance, McCann’s chapter on ‘The Colonial Legacy’ does little justice to the very important topic of European imperialism and its continuing impact, focusing instead on contemporary EU relations with the developing world. Other chapters deal with issues quite peripheral to development—for instance Paul Hainsworth’s essay on the International Criminal Court—while such vitally important aspects of economic development as import substitution industrialisation, inequality, land reform and others are almost totally neglected.

Those chapters in the book that do address key issues in development are often poorly written. For instance, Madeleine Leonard writes in her chapter on gender that, ‘prior to 1975, ... less than 1 per cent of standard textbooks referred specifically to women’ (p. 76). Yet Leonard never describes what types of textbooks she is referring to—one assumes she means the social sciences, but this is not clear—and the statement is not backed up by any reference, leading one to suspect the figure altogether. Later Leonard paraphrases one critic’s point that ‘dependency theory viewed women as the satellite that was no-one’s metropolis’ (p. 78). Not only does this sentence make very little sense on its own, Leonard fails to explain the analogy to her readers. Other authors suffer from a similar paucity of references and abundance of jargon, especially evident in McCloskey’s chapter on Paulo Freire’s theories of development education.

*From the Global to the Local* is not, however, a total loss. Andy Storey’s chapter entitled ‘Measuring Development’ is an excellent introduction to the varying definitions of development, while Denis O’Hearn’s chapter on trade provides readers with a good overview of trade theory. Two of the later chapters on refugees and the environment are also well written and informative. However, like too many other books in the field, the work as a whole does not live up to its ambitions as a reference tool.

In contrast, *States, Markets and Just Growth* is one of the best overviews of Development Studies this reviewer has come across to date. While like *From the Global to the Local* it also left-wing—in that both books attempt to critique the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal agenda in general—*States, Markets and Just Growth* is much more powerful and effective in its argument that ‘just growth’, or pro-poor growth, requires both state action and functioning markets. The book has an impressive list of contributors, including such luminaries as Robert Kaufmann, Atul Kohli, Mick Moore and Richard Sandbrook,

among others. It is divided up into two sections, the first entitled 'Globalization, Democracy and Just Growth', and the second being a collection of regional case studies. The first half is especially strong, starting with Barbara Stallings' essay on globalisation and liberalisation, where she focuses on the changing nature of capital flows to developing countries. She argues forcefully that the increase in short-term capital investment has often had a disastrous effect when it is withdrawn, and that policymakers must adopt reforms to the international finance system in order to prevent repeats of the 1997/98 East Asian crisis.

Kohli's chapter on democracy and development is another excellent overview of the subject matter. He rightfully questions the standard arguments that democracy will necessarily lead to development and vice versa by citing such well-known examples of development in non-democratic countries as China, South Korea and Taiwan. Moore and Howard White's essay on poverty and inequality is equally strong and controversial, in that they argue that attacking the growing inequality in the developing world must be a high priority if global poverty reduction is to be successful. Moreover, Moore and White claim, 'it is impossible not to give public action a central role' in poverty reduction if poverty is to be understood as much more than merely having a low income (p. 81), i.e. including such factors as poor health and a lack of education, among others. This statement flies in the face of right-wing policies aimed at reducing state activity rather than increasing it, but Moore and White argue that ineffective states tend to lead more towards armed secession than poverty reduction.

The second half of *States, Markets and Just Growth* is slightly weaker than the first half, in that none of the chapters on East Asia, Africa or the Middle East were particularly revelatory. However, all three chapters do a good job of summarising the existing literature on development in each of the three regions. They consistently make the point that the neoliberal development policies of the past two decades have largely failed to deliver their promised benefits. Stronger chapters include those by Kaufmann on Latin America and Kohli and Rani Mullen on India, where the authors claim that India's famous 'Hindu' rate of growth up through the 1980s was the result both of a 'mismatch between a statist model of development and the limited capacity of the Indian to guide social and economic change' on one hand and an emphasis on political goals over economic goals on the other (p. 194). While India has recently seen more substantial economic growth, poverty has nonetheless continued to grow in absolute terms, thereby providing yet more evidence that neoliberalism has not met the expectations of its protagonists.

*States, Markets and Just Growth* concludes with an awkward summary and an attempt to justify the book's publication by the United

Nations University Press with a “policy brief” containing the task that the UN system must confront in order better to further the promotion of just growth’ (p. 259). One could hope for a better conclusion, as well as a separate chapter on Eastern Europe and the CIS, where poverty has risen dramatically in the past 15 years, and an expansion of the chapter on India to include other South Asian countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan. However, these are minor quibbles with a major book. It is one that, unlike *From the Global to the Local*, will hopefully serve as a reference book for Development Studies in years to come.

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## GOVERNMENTS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

**John N. Clarke & Geoffrey R. Edwards (eds.),** *Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 295pp., £50.00, hbk.).

The problems that confront governments and international organisations are entwined and often asserted as requiring cross-disciplinary responses. A problem arises in actually getting researchers to think and duly write about these interlinked problems in a sufficiently multidisciplinary way. Academics and policy researchers tend to stick within their own field and it is rare for them to seek dialogue with those outside it, even though other disciplines deal with related issues. Too often, researchers are talking past each other when it would be more useful for if they talked to each other. The tendency to develop their own specific vocabulary and concepts further militates against the interchange of ideas.

John Clarke and Geoffrey Edwards attempt to break with this pattern of well-trammelled thinking with a thoughtful edited volume that brings together academics from an eclectic array of disciplines to discuss an issue that cuts across them all: the elements, institutions and processes of global governance. Contributors are drawn from disciplines that include geography, theology, law, international relations and political science.

The book is divided into three parts. The first, focusing on normative and legal principles, contains chapters by Graham Ward, a theologian who divines Christian roots in contemporary market forces. Central to his idea is 'globalism' or an ideology that is distinct from the empirical process of globalisation. Mervyn Frost, in turn, focuses on the embedded nature of ethical actors within different communities and how their relative locations and roles affect both the nature of the judgements they are called upon to make and the actual judgements themselves. The final essay comes from David Schneiderman who considers—through a case study in Bolivia—how global investment rules are intruding into the legal decision-making processes of individual states.

Part II of the book moves the focus on to policymaking processes. John Agnew uses the concept of 'distance-decay' and other spatial concepts, that are central to geography, to explain globalisation and the imbalance between the social science emphasis on state territory and the diverse world that territorially bound governments are increasingly unable to manage. Geoffrey Underhill develops a model that integrates the state and the market into what he terms a 'condominium', which he then applies in order to draw out a number of practical and policy implications. In the third chapter, Robert Pastor focuses the changing nature and distribution of power among the Great Powers and the ways in which this shapes the international system. For him states remain central to the system, now competing in more subtle and indirect ways than before.

The final part of the book focuses on policy challenges, with Fen Osler Hampson examining the concept of human security. For Hampson, the growing body of human rights conventions and the creation of the International Criminal Court all indicate a normative change in the international system. Ronnie Lipschutz looks at the reorganisation of production since the Second World War—a process that has resulted in the increased blurring of market and political mechanisms in the Kyoto mechanism. Finally, Michael Doyle builds on his foundational work on the democratic peace thesis, exploring the relationship between global governance and global democratisation. Clarke's conclusion synthesises the material and is extremely useful; in particular his breakdown of 'global governance' into three dimensions: normative, technical and institutional.

*Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century* is an extremely useful volume but on occasion reveals the scale of the task that confronts attempts of this sort. Breaking from ingrained patterns of discourse is shown as being a real challenge. Some authors tend not to stray too far from their own vocabulary and concepts, sometimes assuming too much knowledge from readers of other disciplines. Wading through some chapters can be hard work. Nevertheless, this is a tome that is very much

worth persevering with and contains much food for thought. Clarke and Edwards are to be strongly commended for assembling such a diverse collection of scholars as well as—in their introduction and conclusion—providing a forum for them to express their ideas. One hopes that it will inspire further collections to aspire to interdisciplinary commonality.

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**David Chandler**, *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 238pp., £45, hbk.).

**Heikki Patomäki and Teivo Teivainen**, *A Possible World: Democratic Transformation of Global Institutions* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2004, 242pp., £55, hbk.; £17.95, pbk.).

Since the end of the Cold War non-state actors and liberal-minded International Relations (IR) scholars have increasingly promoted the values of human rights and democracy in world politics through various practices and proposals. However, many states have not shared their enthusiasm, particularly for attempts to bring about a form of global democracy, at the most only demonstrating symbolic commitment to such proposals. This hesitant response begs several questions that the books under review critically assess: Are these explicitly normative proposals based on a consistent assessment of present world politics? To what degree are these proposals plausible? And what kind of a role may nation-states maintain in the context of these proposed changes?

The central thesis of David Chandler's *Constructing Global Civil Society* is that proponents of global civil society overstate the role of non-state actors in prompting normative changes in international relations, and instead there is an urgent need for governments to gain further domestic legitimacy in order to articulate accountable foreign policy. The book is divided into two parts. The first provides a critical analysis of the constructivist account (and also of the realist and rationalist stances) of the emergence of non-state actors after the end of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, constructivists theorised that nation-states have 'lost a coherent framework for understanding and managing "national

security” and that non-state “moral entrepreneurs” [are] central to shaping a more norm-driven international agenda’ (p. 196). However, Chandler argues that the constructivist project of global civil society was not built upon a realistic empirical understanding of the international system, which would consist of an explanation of the complex relationship between morality and power. Instead, constructivists’ ‘actually existing global civil society’ has been constructed upon the normative implications of global civil society.

In the second part, Chandler explores the foundations of the normative project of global civil society. Normative global civil society theorists argue that a less exclusionary and more just global political space can be constructed by new social movements (from the bottom up) or by international law and other regulations brought upon states (top down). Chandler argues that in conceptualising individuals as the socially autonomous objects of rights, the ‘critical normative project of global civil society reflects the undermining of social and political bonds essential to the constitution of political community’ (p. 199). The emancipatory mission of the project would not only free people from those ‘unnecessary’ constraints (the exclusionary nation-state) that keep them pursuing their cosmopolitan rights, but, as Chandler argues, would also detach people from their collective social responsibilities and ties of social engagement (associated with democratic nation-states).

Drawing these critiques of existing works together, Chandler suggests that since the end of the Cold War states have justified their foreign policy in terms of morality, but not because of non-state actors’ calls for more just, value- and norm-driven foreign policy. Instead, contemporary governments have had difficulties justifying foreign policy in terms of their national interest because of the problems they have had clarifying and making coherent a sense of political mission at home (p. 20). In other words, the increased focus on global civil society in IR has enabled the overlooking of the declining domestic legitimacy of states. In conclusion, Chandler’s thesis adds up to the suggestion that, in order to extend or restrict the possibilities for democracy and accountability of international politics, state actors and citizens must work together to better institutionalise domestic legitimacy through well-defined political programmes.

This book is an original and challenging read that makes an important contribution to the global civil society literature by clarifying the intellectual and social histories of the project in the post-Cold War world. In so doing, Chandler provides a forceful critique of the constructivist project with regard to non-state actors. However, his persuasive critique of existing IR accounts of global civil society would have been strengthened with a clearer definition of his own theoretical stance. For example, it is not clear whether or not such a stance could

conform to an existing position in IR theory, or if one needs to find a perspective outside IR theory to offer a critique as broad as the one Chandler provides. It also would have been interesting to read more on the author's views about the practicalities of how particular states can strengthen their domestic legitimacy in order to project national interests abroad, and what, hypothetically, the effects of this might be for the existing non-state actors.

Patomäki and Teivainen's book provides complementary reading to Chandler's book, as it puts forth a strategy for actors of global democratic change. The authors argue that 'global democracy' is not to be seen or acted upon as an alternative to domestic political conditions: instead it should be seen as overlapping, partially existing systems of democratic governance (p. 185). Patomäki and Teivainen outline a framework for assessing global democracy initiatives, including the need to evaluate how the initiative is justified; whether it has any political support; whether the initiative can respond to its stated aims; and whether the initiative is feasible or has prospects of being so (pp. 1-9). The way in which the authors ground their project in a meticulous assessment of actually existing practices and institutions of international relations is notable. Overall, a critical realist philosophy, familiar from Patomäki's earlier work, can be seen to underlie this project.

A Possible World is divided into three parts. The first deals with reformative proposals aimed at democratising parts of the UN system. The second part of the book explores the plausibility and prospects of proposals for new institutional arrangements, particularly empowering global civil society; a Global Truth Commission; referenda and World Parliament; a debt arbitration mechanism and global taxation.

In Patomäki and Teivainen's view, the strategy for global democratic change must start from the realisation that the emerging global civil society opens up 'real political possibilities for global democratic reforms' (p. 187), and that its empowerment and making other institutional reforms real are intimately connected (p. 187). Democratic reform of the existing institutions, argue the authors, is 'virtually impossible' (p. 209): 'all reviews or amendments of the UN Charter depend on the will of the permanent members of the Security Council' (p. 194). Due to the hegemonic power of the US and the dominance of the neoliberal international economy, reform of the UN system is unlikely. As such, Patomäki and Teivainen emphasise that the 'world historical context has to change first' to accommodate global democracy proposals (p. 195).

This is precisely the window for the transformative proposals. The authors argue that such proposals are about altering relevant parts of the background context, so that some of the established interests and identities are potentially redefined in the long run (p. 191). Many of the

transformative proposals, including further support for transnational civil society organisations, for example the World Social Forum (WSF), would in Patomäki and Teivainen's view warrant political support from both a range of states and civil society actors contemporarily, yet many may not be feasible in the long run. The establishment of a debt arbitration mechanism and global taxes emerge as the most plausible possibilities in the long run, as 'they would relieve the dominance of global finance over states, and thereby enhance the rule of law and democratic politics' (p. 210). The support of all states would not be needed in the short and medium terms for a democratically organised debt arbitration mechanism, a global currency transaction tax and greenhouse taxes proposals. Instead, as in the case of the ratification of the International Criminal Court and other initiatives of the 1990s, a grouping of states could initially proceed without the consent of others (p. 210). The WSF could provide a democratic forum for the negotiation of views on the issues.

Patomäki and Teivainen's book is an impressive and accessible piece of scholarship. It will be of interest not only for those active in the practices aiming at global democratic change, but also for students of IR theory, particularly of international political theory and international social change. The authors deliver a clear and consistent argument for global democratic change, drawing on an extensive body of literature and data, including IR theory and economic theory. A further achievement is that they base a global political programme in both existing ideational and material elements of contemporary world order. This makes their case ever more convincing to a wider audience, although political programmes for global democratic change always remain inherently open for contestation.

Some IR commentators have already noted that the 1990s was an exceptionally suitable historical context for transformative global institutional rearrangements. In the environment of early twenty-first-century world politics, states seem less willing to support normative changes to international order. Provided that contemporarily only particular states can make the decisions to alter the practice of this order, Patomäki and Teivainen's call for states to agree upon global financial reform and Chandler's appeal for attempts to increase domestic legitimacy in states seem very worthwhile democratic pursuits.

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**Isabel V. Hull**, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005, 384pp., £23.50, hbk.).

Isabel Hull's fascinating account of the German army's military culture between 1870 and 1918 is no doubt primarily intended for an audience of historians, yet it should also prove fascinating to read for any scholars of International Relations or Strategic Studies interested in the cultural dimension of warfare. Hull argues that the army's resort to what she terms 'military extremism' in its policies of conquest and occupation cannot be fully explained as a reflection of political ideology, rational calculation or even bureaucratic procedures, but must be understood in the context of a distinctive organisational culture that conditioned German military behaviour.

At the heart of this culture were the mutually reinforcing 'basic assumptions' of the General Staff—a tendency to regard all warfare as existential and unlimited, an equally absolute conception of victory, and a vision of perfect order in occupied zones. Once these basic assumptions were codified in military doctrine and routinised in standard operational practices, they created a relentless dynamic which, in the absence of any tradition of civilian oversight of the military, overrode any legal limits on the use of violence. Hull locates the origins of this ultimately dysfunctional military mindset in Imperial Germany's unique political culture—as institutionalised in the constitution—and the formative experience of the Franco-Prussian war, and traces its expression through colonial atrocities to its culmination in the suicidal refusal to admit defeat in the final months of the First World War. Her narrative of this period is so persuasive that it is all the more disappointing, given her use of the inevitably suggestive term 'final solutions' to characterise these practices, that the legacy of this military culture for the Nazi era is left largely implicit (save for one short paragraph at the end of the book).

Rather than adopting the concept of 'strategic culture' that remains influential in International Relations literature, Hull prefers the narrower concept of military-organisational culture. This allows her to analyse the relationship between distinct German 'political' and 'military' cultures to great effect, rather than subsuming them into a single, more amorphous concept. In recurring comparisons between military culture in Germany and in the other Western powers she makes it clear that the differences were often only matters of nuance and degree ('Germany was at the end of a spectrum it shared with the rest of the Western world'—p. 326), a view that will disappoint those who regard

cultures as analogous to clearly distinguishable 'species'. Although she does not acknowledge the parallel, for this reviewer Hull's contention that the German officer corps defined victory more absolutely than other European powers and tended to separate military art from political ends is tantalisingly reminiscent of Russell Weigley's argument in his 1973 classic *The American Way of War*, specifically, Weigley's notion that an American view of strategy tended to exclude from consideration the purposes for which a battle or war was being fought.

Despite her qualification of cultural uniqueness, however, Hull still makes a powerful case for the indispensability of cultural interpretation. Her analysis of the Schlieffen Plan, for example, demonstrates eloquently that it cannot be understood as a 'rational' response to strategic predicament; on the contrary, it only 'made sense' in the context of a culture that valued recklessness over prudence, operational art over logistical competence, absolute over limited victory, and narrow military concerns over broader political or strategic expediency. In relating the efforts of individual officers to question or resist the logic of the military's basic assumptions, Hull also shows how cultural constraint operates in practice; even Ludendorff and Hindenburg, she suggests, to some extent became prisoners of roles defined by a culture they had done much to create.

The theoretical component of Hull's thesis, although persuasive, is not startlingly original—she herself acknowledges her intellectual debt to earlier theorists and the sociological sub-field of organisational culture. In terms of the conceptual divide between positivist approaches to the study of strategic culture and those interpretive approaches that regard culture as a contextual filter through which agents make sense of the strategic environment, *Absolute Destruction* would seem to fit firmly within the latter school (there is no talk of 'testing' the effect of culture against other 'independent variables' here). The book's true value, however, lies in its rarity as a full-length study that rejects sweeping cultural generalisations (such as those associated, for example, with the influential concept of a 'Western way of war'), in favour of complete immersion in one particular military culture over a period of a few decades. The result is that it joins those very few studies, such as John Lynn's *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, that provide richly satisfying accounts of how culture is expressed in military behaviour.

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**Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (eds.),** *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004, 296pp., £42.00, hbk.).

In the early twentieth century, Turkey and Iran followed quite similar political trajectories towards modernisation. As an irony of history, the former proved itself to be the most successful experiment with secularism in a Muslim country to date, while the latter ended up with a theocratic state. In this respect, Atabaki and Zürcher's book is a stimulating contribution to debates over the different outcomes that have appeared after similar processes of 'authoritarian modernisation' in both countries. This study's novelty stems from its comparative historical analysis, which has been a deficiency felt strongly in this area. Its scholarly review offers invaluable insights that extend our understanding of recent developments in the region as well.

*Men of Order* is constructed as an elite-type research focusing on the political and cultural endeavours by Atatürk and Reza Shah to replace the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar state with secular nation-states. Turkey and Iran are unique within the Muslim world due to their 'sustained social engineering'. Both countries retained their sovereignty throughout the 'heyday' of European imperialism (p. 225). They initiated a 'defensive modernisation' programme under their 'men of order' with a pragmatic attitude: modernisation was not an end for them, but a means to save or improve the state (p. 2). The process was analysed from certain aspects such as the consolidation of Atatürk and Reza Shah's powers, party politics, civil-military relations, and cultural top-down reforms.

According to the contributors of the book, the pivotal cause for the positive and negative results of authoritarian modernisation in the two countries is that Atatürk was a 'dictator', whereas the Shah's inclinations were 'despotic' (pp. 19, 29, 59, 84, 111, 160, 191). Atatürk sought legitimation for his actions upon legal bases; therefore he removed the army from political involvements. The Turkish regime worked hard 'to provide itself with a solid civilian base' (p. 191). In contrast; Reza Shah maintained many features typical to military rule. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of the republican regime was mediated by the 'People's Party' in Turkey. Having imitated their Turkish equivalent, Iranian experiments to build a ruling national political party (*Iran-e Now* and *Taraqqi*) did not last long (p. 84). As a consequence, Atatürk channelled the support of the intelligentsia into the People's Party, whereas Reza Shah's administration remained as personal rule.

The Turkish Republic had enjoyed some other advantages too such as 'skills and pride inherited' from the Ottoman state, which the Ottoman modernisation reforms initiated a century earlier, and the relative unity of the regime and society (p. 84). Moreover, 'the committed and united

intelligentsia and the army' strongly favoured the Turkish leader, whereas Iran lacked such a modernist bureaucratic class (p. 59). Having co-opted the religious scholars (*ulama*) into the state bureaucracy in similar fashion to Ottoman rule, Atatürk found it possible to establish the primacy of the state over religious institutions and networks (p. 102). In contrast, Reza Shah had to deal with the clerics (mullahs) who have always possessed a considerable role in Iranian politics (p. 45). As Atabaki elaborates, Atatürk's charismatic traits, such as 'resourcefulness, careful exploration of alternatives, and keen sense of timing', were complementary factors in his accomplishments. Reza Shah, on the other hand, failed to present a strong personality to impress his public (p. 61). Some foreign diplomats even suspected that the Shah was suffering from a sort of 'mental malaise' (p. 81).

In the field of cultural reforms, the study focuses on the two most visible ones: Westernisation of dress codes and the purification of vernacular languages. According to Chehabi, the common motivating factor behind the cultural reforms was Atatürk and Reza Shah's concern about state building and their countries' standing in the international community (p. 209). Like Atatürk, the Shah revealed his motive on one occasion: 'All I am trying to do is for us to look like the Europeans so they would not laugh at us' (p. 34). In fact, state-sponsored language reforms to purify Turkish and Persian were crucial for nation building. The Turkish success relied on the clarity of the country's objectives. Turkey was experiencing a dramatic transformation from a multilingual empire to a monolingual nation-state. In this respect, they aimed at getting rid of the Ottoman past and achieving certain minimum standards of Western civilisation so as to remain on a par with the West. Reza Shah and Iranian intelligentsia, however, could never simplify their country's problems like this (p. 257).

*Men of Order* could be improved if it devoted greater study to the differences between Turkey and Iran's political cultures, and how the religious branches affected their authoritarian modernisation. However, the historical findings and conclusions still both challenge and provide an important corrective to the positions of those arguing for a "monolithic Islam" and sustaining a totalising discourse about the Middle East. It is no exaggeration to say that *Men of Order* can be seen as a landmark of historically grounded, contextually rich, evidentially impressive comparative research in Middle Eastern studies.

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**Anne-Marie Brady**, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, 286pp., \$65.00 hbk.; \$24.95 pbk.).

Much has been written about the foreign missionaries, business people, social reformers, revolutionaries and adventurers who have lived in China as private citizens over the past century. We know of their lives through numerous memoirs, biographies and scholarly monographs. Anne-Marie Brady's path-breaking book reverses the lens: she explores official Chinese attitudes towards and treatment of non-governmental visitors from abroad. Beginning her story in the 1920s, Brady's study is limited to the Chinese Communist Party, initially as contender for power and eventually as governing party. This is an inside story, enriched by the extensive use of *neibu* (classified) manuals and related materials about China's *waishi* (management of foreigners) system. Brady also interviewed both *waishi* officials and their wards. Further, she consulted the rich correspondence files of such foreign friends of China as Maud Russell, a former YMCA official who was dismissed for her leftist sympathies.

Grounding her account, in part, in Lyman Van Slyke's classic 1967 study *Enemies and Friends* Brady conceives of the Chinese communists' posture towards foreigners as a kind of united front activity. Under various historical circumstances, 'foreign friends' have been useful allies in solidifying domestic support and eliciting respect from foreign governments. Prior to 1949, friends like the American journalist Edgar Snow were helpful in the fight for state power. In the 1950s and 1960s 'people's diplomacy' helped compensate for the PRC's paucity of official recognition. In the 1970s, it helped expand recognition, and in the subsequent reform period it has facilitated foreign support for China's drive towards modernisation. The Cultural Revolution of the mid 1960s through the mid 1970s marked a low-point in the number and importance of foreigners in China, but yielded some of the most interesting stories. Some foreigners, for instance, initially fought successfully for the equal right to participate in the new revolution, but ultimately served jail time as alleged spies and traitors.

*Making the Foreign Serve China* will be of interest to diplomatic historians as well as China scholars. When Brady writes that her topic 'does not fit easily within the realm of standard categorizations of foreign relations activities, which usually focus on state-to-state relations alone' (p. 2), she has entered the sub-sub-field of 'cultural relations' constructed by Akira Ariye, Frank Ninkovich and other diplomatic historians. Brady is persuasive in arguing that China's people's diplomacy is less unique than its creators purport, having its genesis in part in prior Soviet practice. It would be interesting, as well, to see a comparison with American practices of people's and cultural diplomacy.

Brady's account is most comprehensive for the pre-reform (i.e. pre-1979) period. She carries her story forward from there with the proliferation of *waishi* materials and personnel, the weakening of control in practice, and the declining importance of foreign revolutionary enthusiasts. Readers gain little insight, however, into the demographics, motivations or management of the tens of thousands of foreigners who have gone to China since the early 1980s to teach English (and other languages), engage in business, study and participate in a plethora of NGO activities. The treatment of foreign private institutions, not just individuals, is also light in Brady's account. She merely mentions in passing the formation in the 1980s of new bodies to manage relations with foreign NGOs (p. 200). Filling these two significant gaps—the new foreign friends and the institutional factor—would require substantial new research, which one hopes Brady or others will undertake.

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## FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

**William A. Callahan**, *Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2004 312pp., £16.00, pbk.).

In *Contingent States*, Callahan presents an innovative recount concerning Greater China, an increasingly hot topic for academics and policymakers alike. Callahan's theoretical starting point is a radical critical ethnographic approach, which treats culture as completely context-sensitive. In this view, national security, national culture and their norms change from being objects discovered as solutions to security problems, into problems themselves: essential discourses should be questioned and reinterpreted contingently.

Also departing from the typical approach to Greater China which geographically covers mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Chinese overseas, Callahan selects four spaces: the South China Sea, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The reason for his choice, Callahan contends, is because the Korean case supplies a very good

example in illuminating how 'Confucianism' can be employed and interpreted as a distinctive discourse within the special 'Greater Korean' context, while the other three cases present vexing sovereignty problems and might therefore yield interesting conceptual innovations, accordingly challenging the orthodox notions on sovereignty in IR.

The main body of this book comprises six chapters. Chapter 1 deconstructs the Euro-American discourse of 'Greater China' which frames China as either economic opportunity (Confucian capitalism) or danger (the China threat). Callahan argues that the logic of heterotopia as proposed by Foucault suggests that Greater China cannot be treated as a coherent tradition; rather, Chinese civilisation should be understood in its contingent relationship with the 'barbarian'. However, it would be helpful if, in addition to resorting to the allegorical Dao zhi story in Zhuangzhi to support his points, Callahan provided more arguments to support his claim that conventional notions of Greater China are problematic, while his notion of a contingent heterotopic China is more appropriate.

In Chapter 2 Callahan deftly maps out four historical trajectories in Chinese approaches to 'barbarians': nativism, conquest, conversion and diaspora, with each entailing a distinctive logic (discovery, entitlement, synthesis and flexibility). It concludes that none of the four narratives is truer or better than the others. Rather, all four are involved in the contingent relations that produce Greater China in its various forms. Further elaboration on the relationship between those four narratives would represent a compelling addition to Callahan's already significant contribution to this field of enquiry.

Chapter 3 demonstrates Callahan's impressive command of Chinese historical materials. By following the practice of irony politics, Callahan contends that the Chinese cartography and imperial Chinese rituals allow for shared sovereignty. In this way, Callahan successfully reframes the South China Sea problem as premodern and modern concepts of space, sovereignty and power. This line of argument further opens the possibility of resisting the modernity with another type of 'modernity'.

In Chapter 4 Callahan shows how Confucianism can also be used to go beyond Sino-Korean relations to promote specific political projects in the Korean temporal and spatial terrains, such as patriarchy, reunification, peace and even democracy. In this sense, Callahan contends that whether Confucianism is a core value of Korean culture is not the key issue; the key problem is how Confucianism was used as a discourse in various ways to construct communities in South Korea.

In dealing with Hong Kong, Callahan first deconstructs the prevalent images of Hong Kong in the British and Chinese imaginaries. He then examines the competing notions of Chinese-ness in Beijing and

Hong Kong. Callahan shows how the 'one country, two systems' has resonance with the ancient Confucian concept 'harmony with difference', which further helps to explore the problems of Westphalia's 'one system, many states'.

Chapter 6 examines the interplay among identity, democracy and violence in cross-straits relations. Callahan strives to move beyond the mainstream unification/independence division in the studies of the Taiwan Strait issue by using concepts of both recognition and 'Confucian friendship', which he contends entertain the seeds of constructing a new type of cosmopolitics in Greater China. What is missing from Callahan's argument is that the sovereignty contention between Taiwan and Mainland China interrupts contacts between the two peoples so frequently that it thwarts the function of any 'Confucian friendship' logic across Taiwan Strait.

By revaluing the traditional Chinese vocabulary of civilisation, Confucianism, harmony and friendship beyond its imperial articulation, Callahan examines not only how people resist power but also how they build different identities and communities on different political terrains. The author's command of the original Chinese historical and contemporary materials is striking. *Contingent States* also offers a very good example concerning the questions of how to start dialogues between Western-generated international relations theory and non-Western experience. For those interested in Greater China, reading this book can help broaden visions, even though one might not agree with Callahan's critical approach to the relevant issues.

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**See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya (eds.), *Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, 264pp., £57.95, hbk.).**

The relative significance of individual elements of the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific security architecture and the contribution of particular security approaches to regional order have generated increasing interest over the past few years. In this context, it is to be welcomed that a group of scholars with particular expertise in the security policy of states in Northeast and Southeast Asia should address the evolution of security

principles and approaches as adopted by regional governments from the Cold War until now.

This book serves three purposes: (1) it analyses the importance of the key pillars of the evolving regional security architecture in Asia-Pacific; (2) it explores the function of different security approaches from the perspective of individual regional states; and (3) it examines the compatibility among the approaches to achieve national and regional security and their impact on regional order. The book is based on papers first presented at a conference organised by the Singapore-based Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in December 2002.

In the first of 12 chapters, Ralf Emmers surveys concepts such as collective defence, collective security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. He argues that cooperative security arrangements complement bilateral alliances. This is taken up in Chapter Two by William Tow, who advises the US and its allies to pursue 'convergent security' (understood as a mix of realist and liberal policy prescriptions) to deal with the contemporary security agenda. Ron Huisken is concerned with the task of allowing alliances to become part of a 'broader security regime focused on the distinctive contemporary challenges to security' (p. 38). Huisken is sceptical about the likelihood of this happening. He regards longer-term trends in Sino-US relations as pushing in the opposite direction. Yet he also believes that the war against terror is likely to reinforce and prolong a 'favourable shift in regional attitudes toward enriching multilateral security processes' (p.47).

Part II of *Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation* brings together nine country perspectives on security approaches. Tracing the evolution of China's conception of security and the development of Beijing's security approaches, Nan Li argues that, under Jiang Zemin, China has operationalised the idea of cooperative security in the 'new security concept', which stresses mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. However, he takes this to mean neither that China has abandoned the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy, nor that Beijing has been fully socialised into the norms of cooperative security. In contrast to China, Japan is pursuing what Yasuhiro Takeda calls Japan's 'compound approach to security cooperation'. This involves relying on the Japan-US bilateral alliance, UN collective security and cooperative security arrangements. Still, in Takeda's view, the Japan-US alliance is the 'foundation of the security policy of Japan' and the 'single most effective institution for regional peace and security' (p. 104). Shin-wha Lee examines the significance of individual elements of the regional security architecture in the context of inter-Korean conflict and growing Korean nationalism. He does not regard existing arrangements of cooperative security as playing a major role in addressing the North Korean problem, yet he also speaks of the need to recalibrate the ROK-US alliance. To him

the need for this arises in part from attenuating security concerns in relation to Russia and China as well as the fact that American policy has complicated Seoul's policy of engagement of the North.

Several authors deal with the perspectives of Southeast Asian states. Rizal Sukma argues that Indonesia has long preferred cooperative security systems to those of collective defence to ensure national and regional security in Southeast Asia. J. N. Mak elaborates on how ASEAN in particular has played an important role in safeguarding Malaysia from potential external interference in its domestic affairs and possible intraregional conflict. Mak also details the extensive defence cooperation between Malaysia on the one hand and the United States and Australia on the other. Examining Philippine policy, Renato Cruz de Castro argues that Manila's recent strengthening of defence and security cooperation with the United States has taken place in the context of Philippine disillusionment with cooperative security arrangements, particularly the ASEAN Regional Forum. Discussing Singapore, Chin Kin Wah maintains that the city-state also continues to regard the US as crucial to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, with the San Francisco Treaty system serving the purpose of a reassurance mechanism. He also suggests the ASEAN Regional Forum is important for Singapore in terms of its possible function of moderating competition among the major powers and its potential as a multilateral framework for counterterrorism. Chulacheeb Chinwanno reviews the development of Bangkok's defence ties with Washington and its de facto alliance with China at the time of Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia. He argues that since the 1960s Thailand has also been a staunch advocate of cooperative security as a supplementary approach to security as well as an active participant in UN peacekeeping operations.

Finally, Satu Limaye details US security policy towards the Asia-Pacific under George W. Bush. He notes that Bush initially set out to revitalise relations with 'allies and friends', but argues that the global war on terror has delayed the implementation of changes to US military and defence policies towards Asia. Limaye also shows that, despite widespread perceptions and rhetoric to the contrary, the US under Bush has in fact been committed to regional multilateral approaches in Asia-Pacific. In his view, the US is likely to judge regional cooperative security arrangements on the basis of their contribution to the global war on terror, while maintaining its alliances and forward-based forces.

*Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation* is informative, effective and useful. Moreover, several chapters also focus on the significance of the Five Power Defence Arrangements, which is often ignored. However, although the introduction also mentions the IISS Asia Security Conference (or 'Shangri-la dialogue'), none of the other chapters offer a preliminary assessment of this addition to the regional security

architecture. Nevertheless, it is clear from this volume that key regional states continue to see their security and defence relationship with Washington as crucial. Also, there is no inherent incompatibility between bilateralism and multilateralism in their respective pursuit of national and regional security.

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**Fotios Moustakis**, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 2003, 210pp., £20.00, pbk. £65.00 hbk.).

The literature on Greek–Turkish relations is heavily biased towards the analysis of bilateral relations from a policy-oriented perspective, mostly discounting any theory-informed approach to the role of international security institutions on the two states’ conflict. Therefore, a work—especially of book-length—claiming the application of a theoretical framework on the eastern Mediterranean, the Greek–Turkish conflict and NATO would have been a welcome contribution. Unfortunately, Moustakis’ book fails on both theoretical and empirical grounds to make a worthwhile contribution to the study of the Greek–Turkish dispute or the role of security institutions in interstate conflicts.

The first surprise for the reader leafing through this book is the fact that although it was first published in September 2003 both its primary and secondary bibliographical sources end at 1999. Unfortunately the inevitable result is that the tectonic developments in Greek–Turkish relations since 1999, especially in the aftermath of the EU summit in Helsinki in December of that year, and their consequences for the states’ relationship with NATO are not discussed. A misleading picture of the state of Greek–Turkish affairs is therefore presented.

The first three chapters of Moustakis’ book are devoted to the importance of south-eastern Europe for Western interests, to Greek and Turkish security challenges, as well as to Greek–NATO and Turkish–NATO relationships during the Cold War and post-Cold War period. In these chapters Moustakis succeeds in providing the reader with a balanced account of how Greek–Turkish foreign and security policies were formulated before and after the Cold War as well as how Greek–Turkish bilateral relations influenced the effectiveness of NATO.

In the fourth chapter the author applies the theoretical framework of the 'pluralistic security community' (PSC), originally developed by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, to the eastern Mediterranean. By exploring the reasons behind the lack of solidarity, stability unity and cooperation between the two southern NATO members, Moustakis argues that a hybrid region has developed. One may not doubt the conclusions drawn from the application of the PSC to the southern flank of NATO. However, the ability of this particular theoretical application to make interesting, productive and—importantly—theoretically informed arguments is highly doubtful.

Moustakis' arguments here could in fact address the reasons that account for NATO's inability to facilitate positive identification between Greece and Turkey, as well as NATO's limitations as an international institution. Such arguments could have been made had the author applied other theoretical approaches, stemming from contemporary theoretical debate, such as rational institutionalism and/or constructivism. The most influential work to date on this issue, namely Ronald Krebs's article on ' "Perverse Institutionalism": NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict' (*International Organization*, 53, no. 2, Spring 1999) should have been taken into account.

The fifth chapter examines NATO's potentially positive role in eliminating the possibility of an intra-alliance conflict. This chapter could have made a contribution had it been based on the application of a more fruitful theoretical framework and had the author been up to date on developments since early 2000 regarding confidence-building enterprises. Unfortunately the author, mainly due to his dependency on primary and secondary sources up to 1999, appears unaware of the evolution and the particular characteristics of the aforementioned measures. The inescapable problem is that Moustakis presents for consideration by the parties involved a long list of measures, some of which have already been discussed and adopted by Greece and Turkey, others of which have been rejected. The reasons for adoption and rejection, naturally, remain unexplored to the interested reader.

As for NATO's positive role in the Greek–Turkish conflict, the author's efforts should focus on the examination of the reasons behind NATO's failed attempts to propose certain confidence-building measures to Greece and Turkey. Such a 'lessons-learned' approach would have undoubtedly been rather fruitful for developing a well-elaborated thesis that could account for the particular limits in NATO's role to eliminate the possibility of an intra-alliance conflict. One should also have in mind that NATO's role in its two members' conflict has so far been limited to conflict prevention and conflict management, and has in no case addressed the resolution of the conflict.

Overall, Moustakis could have produced a theory-informed and

policy-relevant work. To do so, his analysis would need to be based on the application of a more state-of-the-art theoretical approach to the Greek–Turkish relationship and NATO, and it would have taken into account developments in Greek–Turkish relations since the critical year of 1999.

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**Alexander Moens**, *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy, and Loyalty* (London: Ashgate Press, 2004, 236pp., £35.00, hbk.).

President George W. Bush is undoubtedly one of the most controversial presidents in modern American history. His political agenda is ambitious, and includes a determination to effect drastic change in American domestic and foreign policy. As a result, he has become one of the most divisive political figures in the modern era. For these reasons alone, understanding the values, beliefs and goals that underpin President Bush's actions is a task of the utmost importance.

Few dedicated attempts have been made to analyse the psychological foundations of the Bush administration's foreign policy seriously. Too many books have been either rabidly critical of President Bush and his foreign policy, or apologist works extolling the virtue of each and every one of Bush's decisions.

Alexander Moen's work *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy and Loyalty* is neither, and therefore a welcome addition to the literature on the 43rd president. Moen's work is based on the premise that 'the policy is the person' (p. 2). The book is an attempt to explain President Bush's foreign policy decision-making with reference to 'the person, character and the style' of President Bush himself (p. 2). Moen's principal argument therefore is that the best route to understanding George W. Bush is to understand his *values*.

Much of the book is dedicated to a narrative account of the major political events in the life of George W. Bush. Interspersed with this narrative is analysis that relates various political decisions back to the values that underpin Bush's political strategies and tactics. Moen's fundamental assessment of President Bush is that his values are those of

a 'compassionate conservative'. Moen describes the values included under this umbrella term as 'personal responsibility and traditional family, faith based communities helping the needy, and the quest to rebuild an American society and culture that respects faith and favours life' (p. 2).

Moen believes these values provide the best angle to understanding the foreign policy of George W. Bush. Without a doubt, a focus on these particular values also provides significant explanatory power in reference to Bush's domestic policy, which is somewhat odd given the title of the book (there is a substantial portion dedicated to Bush's domestic policy agenda). In sections describing Bush's tax cuts, 'no child left behind' plan and various 'faith-based initiatives', Moen's focus on Bush's personal values provides some valuable insights.

Nevertheless, it is unclear how these personal values translate into foreign policy decisions. One major test of Moen's 'values-based' foreign policy framework is the decision to go to war preventively against Iraq. Moen's explanation of the Iraq decision is that it was based on a 'nexus' of three threats: the threat of further terrorist attack combined with 'the most deadly weapons' and supplied by 'the most hostile rogue state' (p. 163). However, Moen's description of the decision-making process leads one to wonder how 'loyalty', 'strategy' or 'values' really affected what was probably the most momentous decision of Bush's presidency. One would have hoped that, given his thesis, Moen might have made a stronger effort to connect them. Rather, it seems as if what spurred the Iraq decision was indeed a 'nexus of threat', spurred more by Bush's sense of the world as a dangerous place than his personal values of personal responsibility and faith-based initiatives.

One example that does suit Moen's 'values-framework' is the administration's vision of a 'Middle-East transformation'. Moen compares this ambitious policy programme to community faith-based initiatives as both use 'revolutionary means to establish old truths of individual responsibility, freedom, security and prosperity' (p. 172). However, if Bush's Middle-East programme was based on fundamental personal values, it is necessary to show that those were in place, or translated into concrete policies *before* 9/11. In order to do this, Moen is forced to rely on one of Bush's pre-election comments indicating that 'world peace' was an important goal (p. 173). This is not particularly convincing, and a more complete explanation would focus on the Middle-East transformation as *intrinsically connected* to the 'threat nexus' that led to action in Iraq.

It is undeniable that Moen has a deep and nuanced sense of Bush's character and foreign policy. The depth of his research on President Bush is impressive. However, the book would have been well served by a deeper engagement with theoretical issues that bear on Moen's work.

There is almost no attempt to make use of the wide body of research on belief systems, worldviews, character, leadership and values. Without a thorough discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of his 'values' argument, Moen misses an excellent opportunity to place the Bush presidency in historical perspective.

Moen's book will find a ready audience with those who are interested in foreign policy analysis and decision-making. Additionally, those interested in better understanding President George W. Bush, and the values and beliefs that inform his foreign policy decisions, should certainly read it. It is not perfectly objective, but few books that deal with such a controversial subject could be. There are times when Moen seems to gloss over some of Bush's more heavily criticised decisions in favour of policy triumphs. Ultimately, it is a somewhat flawed though significant attempt to seriously analyse the impact of beliefs and values on presidential decision-making. Its focus on one of the most controversial and important presidents in recent history only makes it that much more valuable.

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## INTEGRATION AND TRANSITION

**Derek Beach**, *The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 304pp., £18.99, pbk.).

*The Dynamics of European Integration* is an ambitious attempt to explain the role of three institutional actors—namely the European Commission, the European Parliament and the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers—in intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union (EU) from the mid 1980s until the present. Current research on the influence of these actors comes to contradicting conclusions. Liberal intergovernmentalists stress that the EU institutions have only a marginal role in intergovernmental bargaining, whereas supranationalists maintain that these institutions fulfil an important function in helping member states achieve efficient outcomes in complex negotiations.

Derek Beach brings some subtlety into this debate with the development of what he calls a 'leadership model' of intergovernmental negotiations, based on rational choice institutionalism and negotiation theory. He argues that the influence of EU institutions in intergovernmental negotiations depends on a series of conditions, namely their leadership resources, the negotiating context and their choice of leadership strategies. Each of these broad variables is a composite of several factors. Leadership resources refer to material leadership resources, the comparative informational advantages of the institutional actors and their reputation. The negotiation context is defined by the position of the institution within the institutional framework of the EU, the nature of the issues under negotiations, the number of issues and parties, and the distribution and intensity of governmental preferences. Finally, leadership strategies can either be agenda-shaping or brokerage. Taking all these factors into consideration, Beach tries to explain how and when European institutions influence the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations. His basic claim is that the negotiation context and the leadership strategies employed by EU institutions condition whether or not they can translate their leadership resources into influence over outcomes.

Beach tests his theoretical framework in an empirical study that covers twenty years of recent history of the process of European integration. In particular, he analyses the last Intergovernmental Conferences that resulted in the Single European Act (1985), the Treaty of Maastricht (1991), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1996-97), the Treaty of Nice (2000) and the Constitutional Treaty (2003-04). In addition, Beach adds the negotiations preceding the most recent enlargement of the EU as a sixth case study. In each case study, he makes an exhaustive and rigorous analysis of the role of the institutions, considering in detail how European institutions use the resources available to them, how the negotiation context can influence the bargaining dynamics and, finally, whether European institutions chose the appropriate leadership strategies in the negotiations. In doing so, he gives several examples that well illustrate the significant role played by the institutions at several stages in the process of European integration. However, the institutions did not always have equal influence. The European Parliament, for example, was a marginal player most of the time, while the Commission's influence was high in the negotiations preceding the Single European Act and on Economic and Monetary Union, but minor in the negotiations preceding the Treaty of Nice.

Beach's book has many merits. In particular, the empirical research constitutes an enormous and admirable work. Despite the fact that these negotiations are secret, Beach manages to provide very rich and detailed information on many aspects of the negotiations. As a result, the volume

presents interesting insights about negotiation processes in the EU. By reading the empirical chapters, the reader also learns a lot about the role of the institutions in the process of European integration. At the most general level, the book provides exhaustive information about the last twenty years of history of the EU, which will help our understanding of some of the problems of current importance such as the difficulties of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty.

Yet, there are also some weaknesses worth mentioning. Most importantly, although well elaborated, the theoretical argument suffers from the fact that so many different factors are seen as interacting in conditioning the influence of the EU institutions. Not only is there an abundance of factors included in the framework, but Beach does not even try to weigh the relative importance of these different factors. As a result, it is difficult to make predictions about what exactly should be observed in the case studies, and—more importantly still—which facts would falsify Beach's argument. Given the large number of factors that according to Beach's model determine the degree of influence, nearly all outcomes seem consistent with the theoretical argument. As such, the case studies convincingly show that sometimes the EU institutions matter and that their influence varies over time, but the why of this variation remains far less clear. Finally, the inclusion of the negotiations concerning the most recent enlargement of the EU as a case study appears slightly awkward given that all five other cases deal with treaty negotiations.

Despite these minor criticisms, I wholeheartedly recommend this volume to all students and scholars who are interested in the history-making intergovernmental bargains of the EU and in European integration in general.

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## INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

**William K. Tabb**, *Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 528pp., \$48.00, hbk.; \$20.50, pbk.).

**Eric Helleiner & Andreas Pickel (eds.),** *Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2005, 271pp., £29.95, hbk.; £11.95, pbk.)

Public discourses around the world are full of passionate debates on the contemporary processes of globalisation. While some, for example Joseph Stiglitz, are concerned with 'globalization and its discontent' others, like Jagdish Bhagwati, Dani Rodrick or Caf Dowlah feverishly defend its *raison d'être*, question the mantras of globalisation in the context of the nations in search of prosperity, or critique the dictums that create 'backwaters of global prosperity'. The two books under review add further difficulties to the puzzle, albeit from sharply opposed stances. While Tabb shows in *Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization* how the processes of globalisation, especially the multilateral institutions of economic governance and transnational corporations, integrate national economies while simultaneously undermining sovereignties of nation-states, Helleiner and Pickel assert in *Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World* that 'the reports of the death of economic nationalism are greatly exaggerated' (p. 234), even in the midst of rapidly globalising economies, societies and cultures.

In his voluminous treatise, Tabb employs several conflicting approaches—from Gramscian and materialist understandings of International Political Economy (IPE) to classical institutionalism—to examine global economic and financial rule making and their enforcement mechanisms. There is a distinct focus on multilateral economic institutions, which Tabb calls GSEGIS, an awkward acronym for 'global state economic governance institutions' and transnational corporations (TNCs). He sees GSEGIS as an 'organized form of a nascent international state', which, in their bid to provide 'international collective goods' (p. 5), both supplement and supersede governments, and take on 'qualities of stateness', overriding to some extent the sovereignty of national economies. At the same time, thanks to processes of globalisation, MNCs have emerged as 'the only citizens with full rights of mobility and political representation' (p. 43) in the global economy, as they, with the staunch support of host countries, impose preferred regulations of international business—the contemporary version of '*lex mercatoria*' (merchant's law)—across the world.

Tabb argues that the whole gamut of hegemonic practices of the GSEGIS—that thrive on neoliberal dictums of the 'iatronic medicine' prescribed by the so-called Washington Consensus (p. 187), and the 'universalization of capitalist social relations' (p. 47) that encompasses the policy arenas as wide as market access, aid, environment and

labour rights—revolve around the supreme hegemonic power: the United States. He admits that the US, ‘the casual hegemon’ (p. 18), often ‘dresses its own interests as the general interest’, but he hastens to add that the US ‘exerts its power not at all differently than many other governments would if they were in a hegemonic position’ (p. 2).

The author explores, in considerable detail, the underlying dynamics of the post-Second World War architecture of global economic governance—to show how the GSEGI s succeeded in establishing unrivalled mastery over the US in the global economy. This was achieved by keeping the worlds of finance, trade and investment away from the domain of the United Nations, and through the European nations’ acquiescence to US-led global rule making, as the control over the IMF was left to them while the US retained control over the World Bank. Tabb, however, does not fail to point out that the GSEGI s’ demand for open economies, deregulation and privatisation—that views states in Westphalian norms as autonomous, unitary actors—ignores ‘the power of capital to shape state identity, motivation, and activity’ (p. 31).

Tabb questions the global public goods paradigm of the IPE—which postulates that the GSEGI s are freely entered into out of a mutual need of member countries—by pointing out that many developing countries signed into this myth are hardly benefiting from the order. He also questions the premise of treating the market as a ‘constitutional order’ to construct an economic governance structure, instead of voters or their representatives, and suspects that a ‘more subtle objective’ of such a construct may be less aimed at freeing the market from political interventions, rather than insulating regulatory interventions of GSEGI s from domestic politics (p. 208).

Turning to the post-9/11 world, the author explains how the current Bush Administration’s ‘unilateralism and focus on military force’ brought to the surface ‘aspects of competitive jealousies born of unequal influence on the rules of the game’ (p. 10) internationally. He explains how it also gave birth to rising cynicism across the spectrum of realists, liberal institutionalists and also constructivists within the US along the dichotomous worldview of generosity vs. suspicion in respect of America’s ‘selfless’ provision of international public goods. The discussion on how 9/11 has changed the world, or the US and its hegemonic power, however, has not been explored adequately.

The major strength of the book is definitely its comprehensiveness—it provides a historical context and engaging arguments on the contemporary dilemmas of global economic governance, emphasising an ‘inclusive pattern of sustainable development’ and fundamental reforms of the multilateral institutions

involved in economic governance. It also offers a spirited critique of the 'Anglo-American hegemonic presumptions' in theorising of international relations with a call for a more pragmatic and 'revitalized mainline political economy' approach to better understand the underpinnings of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world.

Helleiner and Pickel's edited volume, on the other hand, attempts to 'recontextualize' economic nationalism in the context of a globalising world by challenging the conventional view of 'nationalism in general and economic nationalism in particular', and postulating that 'economic nationalism and neoliberalism are not 'necessarily opposites', as they are often portrayed to be (p. 1). Clearly drawing inspiration from classical nationalist writings, from Frederick List to Raul Prebisch, as well as recent contributions of Ernest Gellner and Kent Roberts Greenfeld, the volume challenges what is called the 'economistic view' of globalisation: one that postulates that the global economy has 'eclipsed national economies and is progressively undermining the relative significance of national states, societies and cultures' (pp.2-5). Even under the rule of global economy, the authors assert, 'states remain the central actors in political economies,' as 'economic globalization has been engineered by certain nation-states and continues to be shaped by them, and by the international organisations they dominate' (p. 7).

Although the major thrust of the study is to 'broaden the relationships between national identities and economic processes' (p. 1), the authors, however, refrain from developing a 'general theory of economic nationalism' because empirical relationships between particular national identities and economic processes, some exemplars of which were presented in the study, differed widely. The good thing about *Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World* is that it does not view economic nationalism as a variant of realism or protectionist ideology, but projects economic nationalism as something that can be associated with a diverse range of policies, including liberal ideologies. Moreover, the study focuses on the 'economic significance of deeper national identities, rather than the role of economic ideologies on nations', and by doing so makes a powerful argument to the effect that 'globalization and economic nationalism, far from being inherently opposed forces, can actually be mutually reinforcing' (p. 234).

Aside from a theoretical expedition to 'bring the nation back' (p. 221), perhaps the best part of the study is Part I of the book, which explores economic nationalism in the context of former Soviet bloc countries. How nationalism and national identities conditioned the content and direction of the economic policies in the region since 1991 should come as a significant addition to the exiting knowledge on

post-communist economic transformation. Part II examines the 'classic' economic nationalism of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—to show how nationalism served as the core of the economic decision-making in these countries, but whether outward strategies, that served as the cornerstone of spectacular growth of these countries, was preponderantly influenced by nationalistic policies alone is still the subject of open debate.

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