

Chapter 3. The Development and Principles of the Strategic Theories

Engels indicated, “The thought process began when the history began. The advancement of thought process is the reflection of the consistency of the abstract and theoretical form of the historical development.” (1¹) It is absolutely necessary and significant to study in depth the strategies by studying the beginning of the history in order to understand the thought process of strategic theories, to search for the path of changes of strategic theories, and to understand the trend of its development and the principles of its development.

Section 1. The Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories

The ancient Chinese strategic theories were great, profound, and have a long history. They guided the thousands of years of military applications and were further expanded and enriched from practical applications. The historical Chinese strategic theories included two big dimensions, the ancient and modern strategic theories. The two are closely intertwined as a whole. They are the basics for the modern Chinese strategic theories; they have also greatly impacted the development of world strategic theories.

Subsection One, The Birth and Development of Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories

The ancient Chinese strategic theories went through several big developmental steps, the slow developmental phase, formal establishment phase, expansion and fulfillment phase, and the integration of the Chinese and western theories phase.

The slow developmental phase – This phase was from ancient past to late Western Zhou Dynasty. In the Sun Bin’s Military Strategy, (See King Wei.) it had recorded the “Shen-nong’s battle ax flint,” some scholars dated it back to about 7000 years ago. The earliest battle in Chinese history that we talked about is the Battle of Ban Chuan between the Yellow Emperor and Emperor Yen and the Zhu-lu battle between Yellow Emperor and Chi Yu. After defeating these two enemies, the three big tribes were incorporated into the main body of China (Hua-xia Tribe). Thereafter, there were “fifty two battles to win over the populace” (2) and he successfully unified a definite region. In ruling the various tribes, Yellow Emperor established right and left guardians to supervise various tribes. “If there were people who did not follow his edicts, the Yellow Emperor would conquer them and annihilate them.” (3), etc. It already displayed the ability to control the entire region. From the old war fares of the Xia, Shang, Western Zhou dynasties, in order to gain victories, people then used “the will of god” and “protect the people” as campaign slogans to gain

¹ Marx and Engels Selected Work, Vol. 2, page 122

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the support of the publics. Under these slogans, people use strategies to win victories, such as the defeat of Xia by Shang dynasty; King Wu's victory over King Zhou; they all used strategies, such as using political mobilization, hiding and preserving their forces, gaining cooperation from other countries, annihilating the supporters of the enemies, using the spies, grasping the timely moment and attacking the core of the enemies.

In the military books (*Jun Zhi*) and (*Jun Zheng*) which were produced about the Western Zhou era they discussed many tactics "when just and proper, one should reach the goals", "if you see a possibility, you advance, but withdraw if you encounter difficulty ahead," and "the earlier people will win the heart of the people, the latter people will wait for the moment of weakness," and "the jewel is to take the advantage of the topography." These tactics were already equipped with the significance and functions of strategic guidance. However, it had not yet developed into systematic strategic theories.

Formal Establishment phase- This was the period of Chun-Qiu Warring States period, it was about 8th century B.C. to 3rd century B.C. with about five to six hundred years in between. During this period, reputed to be the first ever book on military strategies (*Sun Zi, The Art of War*) came to being, which symbolized the formal establishment of the Chinese ancient strategic theories. Thereafter, the six military books, (*Wu Zi Military Strategies*), (*Qi Sun Zi Military Strategies*), (*Si Bin Military Strategies*), (*Wei Liao Zi*), (*Shi Ma Fa*), (*Liu Tao*), etc., made the Chinese ancient strategic theories even better.

Many scholars not in the military field also actively discussed military strategies, which made the theories even more complete. The military scholars had a better understanding of the relationship between warfare and politics, warfare and economy, warfare and diplomacy; the principles of strategic guidance, how to manage the country and the military. They had contributed more systematic strategic theories and approaches to deal with these important issues. During this period the framework of the Chinese ancient strategic theories was established. The philosophical principles of ancient strategies emerged in a more systematic manner.

The Expansion and Fulfillment Phase –It is from the 3rd century B.C. to the mid-19th century. It was a long period in which the society was in a feudal system; the productivity and development were slow. The period was a non-firearms period. In the latter part, it entered into both non-firearms and a firearms period. Although it did not offer a systematic breakthrough in the area of strategic theories, it did expand and fulfill the practical substance of the content. In basic theories they did provide some creative interpretations on some military matters. They provided better understanding than the ancient people on, for example, protracted vs. speedy, direct vs. indirect, false vs. real, appearance vs. substance, attack vs. defense, honesty vs. deceit, They also provided better methods of using non-firearms and firearms in protecting the city and applied them in the theories of field battles; they also provided some new ideas to coastal defense. They elevated the qualities of strategic policies. For example, they unified the formation and implementation of national strategies; the application of cavalry battle command principles; the implementation and conclusion of national defense strategies against attacks, and the multi-dimensional strategic research and applications. These were better than our early ancestors were. They made the ancient Chinese strategic theories more systematic and complete. But some war guidance principles began to show clear backwardness in the Qing dynasty.

The integration of Chinese and Western Theories Phase - Due to the Opium War, many foreign countries invaded China, which fostered the integration of the western strategic theories and ancient Chinese strategic theories. It smashed the traditional strategic thinking and developed a new framework. It absorbed the western military thinking into the content, for example, it abolished the long held Qing dynasty fundamental but restrictive policies of “horse riding and shooting,” and proposed “to study the fine foreign techniques to defeat the foreigners.” The new perspective and policies in coastal defense strategies, protracted strategies, national defense developmental strategies, were quite different from the ancient strategies. The qualities had made great leap forward. But during this period, there is a tendency on total acceptance of the western military thinking and a willingness to ignore the good old military Chinese traditions.

There was also a tendency to stick to the old ways and refuse to accept the advanced military theories and technologies, which could have negatively impacted on the formation of the modern strategic development of China. Not until Mao Tse-dong, whom led the Chinese communists in the liberation war and the war against the foreign invaders, created the progressive proletariat military science, thus, the Chinese strategic theories had finally reached its new height.

Subsection Two. Major Content Of Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories

The main content of the ancient Chinese strategic theories could generally be divided into three parts: the early victory theory, total victory theory, and war victory theory.

The early victory means prior to the war, one has equipped itself with the conditions to win victory. This is more related to the strategic theory of preparing for war. Its content includes “knowing” and “accumulating into shape” two parts. The “knowing” talks about understanding of the war, which includes “early knowing” and “thorough knowing.” The “early knowing” is a matter of timing in “knowing.” “Thorough knowing” is to do with the space of “knowing.” These two are intertwined, they require the war decision-makers to be all knowing and knowing at all times, which it has to do with the vital problem, i.e., the victory of the war. They have to make good prediction and decide on correct war strategies. The “accumulating into shape” mainly talks about the preparation of military forces. It includes the preparation of politics, the economy, the commanders, rules and regulations, soldiers, arms and equipment, the nature, territory, and battlefields. The efforts will assure that there is a superior force against the enemy. The total victory theory is to talk about the strategic theory to win total war victory by using the most thorough efforts with minimum cost. It requires the decision-makers to form a total destructive dialectic relationship with the maximum effort to defeat the enemy but still minimizes the damage inflicted on both sides. The tactics are to combine attack with strategies, attack with diplomacy, attack with military and applied psychological warfare (by using literary offense and intimidation economic warfare, and allying other forces at war. The war victory theory is to win victory through warfare. It is the best part of the ancient Chinese strategic theory. It includes the rich dialectic content, which emphasizes that you ruled the enemy but not be ruled by them. So, there must be talk of kindness and treachery, distinguishing the advantages and disadvantages, knowing what is constant, what is change, good at being flexible and imperative, understanding what is true and false, knowing when to be regular and irregular, good at specializing or diversified, understanding

the protracted and speedy, understanding the straight and shift, and recognizing the need of attack and defense.

The early victory, total victory and war victory are an inter-related organic whole. From the operations, we can see that early victory is the basis and prerequisite of total victory and war victory; the total victory stands in between early victory and war victory. It is the most effective application of war preparation and it could provide the right condition for war victory. If the total victory failed, it could be relegated to war victory. If the war is won, it can turn around and become the chips of implementing total victory strategies. It can also increase the early victory power of the country and political group, which means, "defeat the enemies and getting stronger." (5) These three could become the methods and objectives, each side will accept the function of the other side and they interact in such a way to form the theoretical system of victory over enemies, getting stronger and final victory.

In recent years, the conflict between the ancient Chinese and western strategic theories created some new development. The modern people have included areas such as, the war problems, war guidance, strategic tactics, the science of troop management, the science of military philosophy, in their systematic discussions, which caused the formation of a new framework of strategic theories. It has also made some breakthrough in practical content, which made further development on the ancient Chinese strategic theories. For example, in the national defense concept, it has changed from the strong emphasis on fortified defense and neglecting the coastal defense to equal emphasis on both; in coastal defense strategy, it proposes the development of the navy, expanding deeper defense, forming a blue water navy, learning the good things from the foreigners. It also serves to develop further the ancient theory of making the country rich and cultivating a strong army. It not only emphasizes agriculture warfare but also commercial warfare. In the war guidance, it changed from the ancient way of valuing winning with quick battles and frowning on the protracted war to consider both ways according to the circumstances.

It brought the protracted war to a new height in the fight against the imperial forces. In troop management, it proposed a series of policies of troop formation and troop management, and training method, which could cope with the modern warfare. The traditional view to emphasize politics and belittle the importance of equipment also received serious impact. People gradually began to value the importance of weapon equipment and facilities in the strategic domain.

Looking at the major content of the ancient and modern Chinese strategic theories, it can be briefly said that, value the politics; be careful in war, use just army to win; use war to end war; combine the interests and mobilize; make the country rich and cultivate strong military; equal emphasis on fortified and coastal defense; stay in peace but be alert for troubles; try to win early victory; plan first before fighting; win total victory; to attack with strategies; attack with diplomacy; use both civilians and military personnel; avoid the frontal assault and attack where it is vulnerable; deploy troops for sudden attacks; eliminate enemies one by one; know how to use the circumstance and surrounding; attack when people are not ready; use the right moment for action; be flexible; use protracted or slow war based on the circumstances; know your enemies thoroughly; be changeable; achieve victory by better control; set the rules and regulations ahead of time; unify the military authority; strictly enforce the rules; emphasize the

characters of the people; be clear in applying award and punishment; motivate the senior and low level people equally; and make sure the weapons are good and the soldiers are able.

Subsection Three. The Major Traits Of The Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories

The ancient Chinese strategic theories possess the following main traits:

It was formed early. The ancient Chinese strategic theories were formed as early as at the end of Chun-qiu to the warring period, which was about the 7th century B.C. to the 3rd century B.C. The typical strategy books were represented by (Sun Zi, The Art of War.) During this long period and long after this period, the westerners did not have any book which specialized on strategic theories. Therefore, the ancient Chinese strategic theories were the leader in the world. But after the 16th century, the western military theories had made quicker development. For a long period, the Chinese had become stagnant in the systems of strategic theories and there was no new development.

Philosophical reasoning was emphasized. The ancient Chinese Strategic theories involved rich dialectic thoughts, which had strong philosophical traits and were measurable. They were rich in proverbial wisdom. The words were simple and meaning was profound. They could give people deep insights and broad association. They could be applied to military matters but they could also lend support to politics, economy, medicine, and sports. However, they are weak in operations. Though good at the holistic thinking, the ancient Chinese strategic theories value the wholeness and look things at full range and in long term, which demonstrated the holistic and systematic nature of the thinking. This approach was being compared to the western emphasis on quantitative analysis and verification; it is apparent that there are advantages as well as shortcomings on each side.

To reason from observing the nature. The ancient Chinese were good at reasoning from observing nature and these thought processes were applied to strategic theories and strategic policies. For example, from observing nature, they figured that a country should establish a centralized administrative organization. From the changes in nature, they also came to the realization of war guidance theories and strategic policies.

Section 2. The Changes of the World Strategic Theories

This section talks about the world, which refers to the other parts of the world and does not include China. The changes of the world strategic theories can be divided into three stages: the ancient, modern, and current stages.

Subsection 1. The Ancient World Strategic Theories

The world strategic theories experienced a long period, which started from the 8th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D. It passed two historical periods, the slavery society and feudal society. The ancient western society, which used the slavery system, was keen on expanding their territories, robbing the wealthy, and increasing their range of control. They frequently invaded and robbed the wealth of other countries. The ancient western strategic theories originated from the Mediterranean coastal areas where politics, economy and culture were far better developed, through their frequent warfare. The early trait of the world ancient strategic theories is the combination of the military science and historical studies. There are many strategic thoughts buried in the voluminous military and historical books. For example, in the 5th century B.C. the Greek historian Herodotus (about 484 B.C. to about 430 or 420 B.C.) wrote the book on the “Persian Wars, Thucydides (about 460 B.C. and 396 B.C.) wrote the book on (Polynesian Wars), the historian of Athens Xenophon (about 431 B.C. to 352 B.C.) wrote a book on “Anabasis”, “**The Long Conquering**(phonetic)?”, the Roman commander and military expert Caesar (about 100 B.C. to 44 B.C.) wrote books on Gallic War and Civil War, etc. In the first century A.D., Frontinus (about 35 A.D. to 103A.D) edited the “Strategy,” which broke the traditional historical mode of writing. It demonstrated the shift from the traditional military history to military theories. In 4 centuries A.D., ancient Roman military expert, **Sugativus**(phonetic) (the date of birth and death were not clear) discussed military affairs in a book, which ended the mixing of the ancient Greek and Roman military strategic writings with the discussion of history. **Sugativus** (phonetic) became well known in Europe for his being the only writing on the theories of military affairs prior to the Renaissance period.

From the above books, it appears that the military specialists of the ancient Greek and Roman periods, had already paid attention to the true nature of the war, the relationship between war and economy, and troop management. They also valued the importance of applying strategies in the war. The ancient Greek historian Xenophon was the one who first brought out the concept of “The way of commanders and soldiers. (Phonetic)” It was close to the original meaning of “strategies.” The ancient Roman commander and politician Julius Caesar believed that, in the war, the strategies were more important than the weapons; in order to win victory at war, it was needed to defeat the enemies through the combined use of politics, diplomacy and military. At the same time, it is essential to be careful in using the military. He emphasized that the use of military should be used through active political campaigns, with firm grasping of the enemies’ situations, the awareness of advantageous circumstances of the topography and other relevant conditions. The latter Roman military expert Sugativus (phonetic) discussed the specific subject on the issues of military guidance in his book “Discussing Military Affairs (phonetic)” The commanders should have full grasp of the knowledge about their own and their enemies’ affairs, decide on the correct direction of the war, attack when the timing was right, with strong emphasis on the importance of the suddenness of the war, prepare a strong reserve, and use a quick offensive, etc. Due to the conditions of the time and restrictive nature of the strategic environment, the military theorists of the “slavery period did not have deep understanding of the military science and

they were in a budding stage.”(5) Fatalism and Idealism in those days were also quite rampant.

From the 5th century, Europe went into the Middle Ages for 1000 years, which was the period of feudalism. The development of European military theories was greatly hampered due to the problems of grabbing others’ territories, the restrictions of Christianity and the philosophy of theologians. Engels said, “The military development of the entire Middle Ages were like other sciences, there was no accomplishment what so ever.”(6) However, due to the development of productivity, the advancement of military technologies, and the practical experiences gained during many wars, there developed strategic thoughts, which were typical of the feudalism era. The most typical work of the early Middle Ages was the work on “Strategies” by the Byzantium emperor Maurius (539-620). In the late Middle Ages there was an Italian philosopher and military theorist, Machiavelli (1469-1527) on “The Art of War” and the “Supremacy.” The book by Maurius, “Strategicon,” was one of the textbooks used in training high level military commanders. The word “Strategicon” actually became the origin of the word used as strategy. The latter part of the Middle Ages, the Western military strategic thoughts were revived due to the impact of the Renaissance. The most typical military theorist of this ear was Machiavelli, who was touted by Engels as “The first mentionable modern military writer.” (7) He believed that politics and war had a very close relationship. They have mutually coordinated and supported each other, so they are required to become one. The military is the major branch of a nation, if the head of the nation does not have his own troop, he would not be able to hold on to his power. He promoted the idea of using militia rather than mercenaries. His influence to the world was immense and the westerners regarded him as the father of modern strategies.

Compared to the ancient Chinese military books, which emphasized abstract generalization and were rich with philosophical reasoning traits, the ancient western theories appeared to be confusing and not systematic. Because the western military specialists often paid more attention to the realistic matter, they tried to apply their great military talents in the real battles, thus, even with thousands of years of ancient war history, there was no specific strategic theories in writing with complete meaning on strategies. As indicated by John Collins (phonetic), “There were very few creative military experts, who had written books on military strategies prior to the 19th century. These historians were to write long after the fact. So even they wrote lengthy works on organizations, weapons, wars, battles, and fighting tactics, they only wrote some tidbits on strategic matters. ” (8)

Subsection 2. The World Modern Strategic Theories

This period of the world modern strategic theories covered the historical period from the Capitalistic Revolution of the 17th century to the end of World War II. The Capitalistic Revolution of England in 1640 suggested the end of the European Middle Ages and the beginning of the western Capitalistic society. The rise of the capitalistic society and the fall of the feudal society changed the distribution of world power. The development of production methods, the improvement of science and technologies, transportation, and communication, all had increased the connections between different parts of the world. The formation of modern nationalism gradually pushed the traditional monarch’s interests and

religious moral principles off the world stage. During the development of Capitalism, all kinds of hegemonies, colonialism, and superpower political theories also came into being. The western capitalistic countries, which led industrialization, relied on the superiority of their agricultural culture; they started to seriously expand their power with blood and fire. Under the attacks of Capitalism, areas such as the American continent, African continent, Asian continent, western Pacific islands and the Oceania became the commercial markets and the sources of materials for the world of Capitalistic countries. During this period, there was frequent fighting over the years because of the conflicting needs amongst the capitalistic countries, the imperial powers and their colonies, the capitalists and proletariats, which led to the two unparalleled and fierce World Wars. The modern western strategic theories were born during these continuous wars and conflicts.

After the 18th century, the first group of capitalistic military thinkers appeared. The famous representatives are: Piro (phonetic) of Prussia (1757-1808, his representative book “The Essence of New Fighting Method”(phonetic), Suvalov (phonetic) of Russia (1730-1800) his representative book “The science of winning”(phonetic) etc. They objected to the ignorance and neglect in their understanding of war issues and studied the general rules of war. Piro (phonetic) was the first one who had clearly distinguished and defined the strategies and tactics. He pointed out, “The strategy is related to the military actions, which was beyond the sight and battle field of gun fires, while the tactic is to do with the military actions within the sight and battle field of gun fires mentioned above.” (9) Tactic is mere supplement to strategy and belongs to part of the strategy. Piro(phonetic) even distinguished the strategy into political and military strategy: the political strategy is focused on the diplomatic relationships between countries and on the establishment of allies; the military strategy is the study of war issues; compared to military strategy, the “political strategy is at the highest level”. Suvalov (phonetic) made specific in-depth discussions on strategic offenses and troop concentrations in his book. He advocated speedy maneuvers, concentration of main forces, attack when enemies were not prepared, fierce attacks, and establishing and deploying the reserve units. In terms of the relationship between men and weapons, he put the men first and considered them as the major factor in the winning or losing in the fighting. These thoughts broke the reserved and stagnant atmosphere of the military theories of the Middle Ages.

The Napoleon wars about the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century greatly promoted the development of the western military strategic theories. From the perspective of the history of military strategic thoughts, the Napoleon war had the significance of a milestone. It established a strong foundation of the system of the western capitalistic military theories, which included the strategic thinking. Napoleon had created; a whole set of strategic guidance principles and fighting methods in leading the French capitalistic military to fight against the European feudal system. He had, therefore, created many miracles in the history of the capitalistic military. In strategic guidance, he abolished the then popular passive cordon strategy and emphasized the positive offenses with initiatives. He emphasized that the objective of the offense was to annihilate the enemy troops; it was not just to occupy the enemy territories, cities, and strategic locations. He emphasized concentrating superior forces in establishing the offensive military groups and the direction of the offenses, he also emphasized the fast maneuvering, establishing and

maintaining strong reserve units. Engels commented, "Napoleon's immortal accomplishment lied in his discovery of the only method of correctly using a large armed group of people in his strategy and tactic. This deployment of a large armed group of people could only be possible in a revolution." (10) But, just like what Collins said, "Strangely, though reputed to be one of the greatest strategists in history, Napoleon Bonaparte(1769-1821), if strictly speaking, could not be considered as a pioneer of strategic theories."Therefore, people in the world came to appraise his strategic contributions through the eyes of other people. The two most important persons were Anthony Henry Romney (phonetic) (1779-1869) and Karl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831). (11)

Romney's (phonetic) "The Concept of the Art of War"(phonetic) was the first western book on the war and strategic theories. He indicated that the science of strategy is a major component of the art of war. "It was the art of war which proceeded on a map, it is the art of war on the entire theater of war." (12) He believed that offense is better than defense, the only way to defeat the enemy is to fight and not to threaten the enemy's route of maneuvers. In order to defeat the enemy, one should adopt a very strong strategy and pour the largest forces at the most decisive point. To defeat the enemy with a superior force was the fundamental content of the four strategic principles. He criticized the French Marshal Saks' (phonetic) viewpoint that war is a shadowy science, which has no rules. He indicated, "There are indeed principles in the strategy," and made some valuable explorations. Engels praised Romney (phonetic) as "the best writer" to describe the wars of Napoleon and considered him as the "most recognized authority" on military strategic theories." (13)

Clausewitz's book (The Theory of War) (phonetic) was the bible of the capitalists' military strategic theories. The book had thoroughly discussed in depth the true nature of war, the rules of war, the principles of war and the philosophy of war. He made many brilliant interpretations, it was considered as the "Bible" of the western science of strategy. Even now, it still has a large influence on the current military of capitalistic countries. Clausewitz believed that war came from politics, and politics was the mother of war. He got high praise from Lenin on his famous judgment that, "War was merely a continuation through a different means of politics." Lenin believed that "Marx's doctrine looked at this principle and fairly accepted it as the theoretical foundation in studying every war." (14) Clausewitz emphasized "The attempts to annihilate the enemy troops and maintain one's own troops are mutually assisting each other, because they have mutual impact. It is the same idea which is supported by both sides."(15) He proposed, "The most important but simple principle in the strategy is to concentrate the armed forces." The two fighting methods of offense and defense are mutually related, impacted, and transferable. The defense cannot be just a pure defense, "It is a shield, which is formed by clever offenses." (16) Clausewitz offered his own interpretation on the distinction of strategy and tactic." He believed that the strategy is "For the purpose of obtaining the objectives of war that it uses fighting."(17) He classified the elements of strategy into spiritual, material, mathematical, geographical, and statistical elements. He also emphasized that in the strategic theories, principles, and methods, one should take all the special characteristics of the time period into consideration.

Clusewitz's military strategic thoughts reflected the progressive trend and innovative spirit during the rise of capitalism. His discussions made creative explorations into the

relationships of war and politics, material elements and spiritual elements, annihilate the enemies and preserve oneself, and the offense and defense.

From the middle part of 19th century to the end of World War II, was the period that capitalism gained great development and entered into imperialism. During this period, many new military strategic theories and schools came to being, which were brought on by the deepening in industrialization following a series of breakthroughs and the need of carrying out wars. This brought unprecedented western countries' studies of military theories. The American, Alfred Thayers Mahan (1840-1914) promoted the "Naval Supremacy" and believed that "the naval supremacy, especially the right to control the main transportation lines, which are relevant to the national interests and trades, was the major factor in pure materialistic elements of making the nation strong and prosperous." (18) He advocated the building of a large navy and a net of naval bases to capture naval supremacy, by controlling the oceans, they could move on to realize the national strategic objectives. This proposal by Mahan impacted greatly to the building of navy and naval strategies by the British and the U.S. The German, Alfred Von Sullivann (phonetic) (1833-1913) proposed the idea of quick solution and annihilation strategy and believed that, "The war started in the Spring, should be concluded with total victory over the enemy by the Fall when leaves are falling." (19) He asserted that people should learn from Hannibal in his battle of the Cannae. By audacious flanking maneuvers and surrounding the enemies, it would bring the destruction of the main forces of the enemy. The strategic thinking of Sullivann (phonetic) had deeply branded the German strategic guidance during the two World Wars. The Italian, Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) proposed the theory of "the aerial supremacy". He believed that using the airplane as aerial weapons in fighting would thoroughly changed the face of war, which was a turning point of war history. To obtain the air supremacy is to inhibit the flying of the enemy but still can maintain one's own flying. It is absolutely necessary to build an air force, which parallel the army and navy. The destruction of the air force bases, the air force material reserves, and the centers of the air force industries, are much more effective than the aerial combats. Douhet's (phonetic) air supremacy theory was promoted in many nations in the building and using of an air force during the two World Wars. The British, Fuller (phonetic) (1878-1966) proposed "the theory of mechanized war" (phonetic), he believed that, after the appearance of tanks, it was a natural tendency for the army to become mechanized, war has become purely mechanized activities. He believed that victory in war "ninety nine per cent relies on the weapons," and "the strategy, command, bravery, disciplines, supply, organization, and all the elements of spiritual and physical prowess, will not be able to compete with the supremacy of weapons. These other factors are at the most good for 1 percent of the victory." (20)

Some held similar views as Fuller (phonetic) or the likes of the military theories by the German, Jacot (phonetic), who advocated "smaller" troops and the French, De Gaulle, who advocated a "professional" military. They all believed in using small but sharp professional troops, relying heavily on such new weapons as tanks and airplanes, to achieve victories in the wars. The German, Erich Rudderndolf (phonetic) advocated the theory of "An all out war," he believed the modern war was an "all out war" or "The war of a whole nation." The battlefield would involve the entire national territory. It was not only the troops that got involved in war; the people of the entire nation would join the war effort. He advocated sudden attack without declaring war, using blitzkrieg to achieve a quick end of the war. The

“all out war” reflected the desire for revenge and conquered the whole world by the Germans after World War I. It became the German Fascists’ theoretical basis of the “blitzkrieg” strategy. The strategic theories discussed above had made varying degrees of impact on the military strategies of the capitalistic countries, which fought in the two World Wars.

It could be said that during more than three hundred years of development, the western strategic theories had gradually molded into more complete systems of military theories. The science of strategy had thus become a relatively independent science of military affairs. Compared to the ancient strategic theories, the modern western strategic theories have their own characteristics. It is based on the materialistic foundation of the advancement of technologies of the industrialized era. It accepted the existence of “military science.” It paid great attention to exploring the rules of war and the rules of guidance of the wars in the early and middle part of the industrialized periods. It covered up the true nature of the war, especially the invasion wars, which were class based. It emphasized the use of military technologies and the improvement of military hardware. However, it often exaggerated the functions of weapons, especially those new weapons. It also emphasized the function of the spiritual element and people, but often unfairly exaggerated the functions of the individual top commander. It was aware of the influence of the nature and geography on war but to a certain degree, the tendency of “the theory of decision based on environment”(phonetic) emerged.

Subsection 3. The World’s Modern Strategic Theories

The world’s modern strategic theories refer to those of the period from the end of World War II to just before the end of the cold war. During this nearly half a century of cold war confrontation between the east and west, the societies also experienced a new technological revolution. The quick development of new technologies and wide application of these technologies in the military, which were well represented by the nuclear, microelectronics, and aerospace developments, promoted creative dimensions of war concepts, war models, and strategic theories.

The most profound impact on the military strategic theories after the World War II was nuclear strategic theory. After the emergence of nuclear weapons toward the end of the World War II, a great number of books related to nuclear strategies have been published. The early nuclear strategic theories talked about using nuclear weapons as a method of “deterrence.” Using the fear of mass destructive power of the nuclear weapons and the nuclear equipped countries’ monopoly on nuclear weapons, the threat of using these weapons could lead to the submission of the opponents. In the middle of the 1950s the American nuclear monopoly was broken. Moreover, the small equivalent tactical nuclear weapons were developed, thus emerged a new nuclear “actual combat” theory, replacing the nuclear “deterrence” theories. This theory believes that the use of strategic nuclear weapons can directly and quickly achieve the strategic objectives. It calls for nuclear war to replace the regular war and nuclear weapons to replace regular weapons. Dulles clearly indicated in his book “The development of American Foreign Policies”(phonetic), “The current fundamental policy is relying on a strong retaliatory power, using the weapons of our choice, and selecting the location of our choice for immediate retaliation.”(21) The Soviet Union also proposed the

“nuclear missiles theory,” which aimed at the objective of a “total victory through a nuclear war.” Sokolovsky edited “Military Strategies”(phonetic) and he believed “In the future world wars, from the standpoint of weapons, the first would be nuclear missiles.” The basics of implementing this kind of war by all branches of the military forces, the troop of strategic missiles and the nuclear submarines forces will be the first, large amount of nuclear missiles to be used. (22)

In late 1960s, the members of nuclear power nations gradually increased, which further developed the theory of nuclear threat. The American, Herman Kahn (phonetic) proposed “Gradual progression theory”(phonetic). He believed that when the nuclear forces of each nuclear opponent have reached the degree of “definite mutual destruction,” the reliance on nuclear weapons could not bring decisive victory. Any nuclear war could also bring devastating consequences to oneself. He advocated the avoidance of total nuclear war or even limited nuclear war. However, he advocated the maintenance of a strong second-strike capability. The British and French, etc. proposed the theory of the lowest limit of nuclear threat theory and advocated the use of limited nuclear retaliatory force to defeat the enemy’s objective of nuclear offense.

Related to the nuclear strategy, the regular strategic theory of the nuclear condition of World War II also came up with some new developments. These new developments appeared after the “actual combat” of the nuclear strategy got into the dead end alley. This theory advocates the use of nuclear forces as the “shield” and regular forces as the “sword” and readily preparing for the use of nuclear weapons and the defense against nuclear weapons in regular wars. The representative books on this are Robert Osgood’s “Limited War”, Henry Kissinger’s “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policies,” Maxwell Taylor’s “Uncertain Horn” (phonetic), and John Collins’ “Big Strategy”(phonetic), etc. The American strategic theorists generally called the regular combat under nuclear condition as “limited war.”

From 1960 on, the emergence of the new aerospace strategic theory, which advocates aerial supremacy and focusing on air and space control that were based on the development of aerospace technologies and military aircraft and spacecraft, have received great attention from countries all around the world. In the early 1960s’, the American President Kennedy declared, “The one who could control space would control the earth.” In March 1982 the American, Greywhelm (phonetic) and some others published a research report “High Frontier- New National Strategy”(phonetic) They believe that outer space is the future important battlefield. It will become the new strategic frontier. During this period, there were other strategic theories that drew people’s attention. One strategic theory was the alliance strategy using the confrontation of the east and west large military groups as the background. Another is the strategy of combined combat by various forces from multiple countries, which used military technological advancement as the background. In this, the fighting strategy is that the air and ground become one and the air and space become one. This regional war strategy and deterrent strategy were based on the background of international strategic structural changes. The modern military technological development, which resulted in new strategic theories, provided important conditions and momentum for new innovations in the military field.

Subsection 4. The Strategic Theories of Marxism

The strategic theories of Marxism: a new scientific system of strategic theory was created by Marx and Engels toward the end of 19th century. Marx and Engels used the scientific view of the world of dialectic materialism and historical materialism to comprehend and analyze war and strategic problems. They first established the scientific war view and strategic perspective in war history, and revealed the strategic guidance regulations and combat strategic guidance regulations in establishing the armed forces. They also illustrated epistemology and methodology, which could lead to correct understanding of war and strategic problems. The basic theoretical work and views of Marxism, which were related to war and strategic problems, were reflected in their works, (The Declaration of Communists), (The Defeat of the Troops of Piedmont), (The Report of the Communist Allies Central Committee to the Allies), (The German Farmers' Revolution), (In the year 1852 the Possibility and Outlook of the Holy Alliance's War Against the French), (The German Revolution and Counterrevolution), (The Siege of Saiwashitopor), (Revolutionary Spain), (The Now and Then of the Mountain Combat), (Persia and China), (The History of Rifles), (Attack), (Troops), (The Short Comments on War), (The Civil War of France), (Anti Dulin Discussion), (The Origin of the Family, Privatization, and Country) etc.(all phonetic). The most important Marxism theoretical viewpoints on strategic theories are:

The scientific discussions and the judgment on the origin and nature of war.

Marx and Engels indicated that the war of human society originated from the conflict of economic interests, which appeared toward the end of the primitive society. The violent relationship originated from an economic relationship and was the product of economy. In short, the economy was the materialistic basis of violence. In the class society, war was the tool, which directly served the politics, and the politics controlled the war. The nature of war depended on what impact it brought to the development of society. The war at different stages could change its nature due to the shift of political objectives. The war could be classified into progressive, revolutionary, liberation, defensive war and reactionary, counterrevolutionary, invasion, and offensive wars. (The defensive and offensive here was meant to be from the view of political significance.) The former should be supported and the latter should be opposed.

Related to the theories of the nature of the military and establishment of the armed forces.

Marx and Engels indicated that the military was gradually formed because of the appearance of classes in the nation. The military was the organized violence of the classes and was a special public right of a nation. The military with a different nature would have different duties in the society. The revolutionary military was the tool of those oppressed people against the oppressors. The reactionary military would oppress the people in a country and was the tool used to colonize, plunder, and fight for supremacy. The regular army of the capitalistic class should be abolished and the regular army of the proletariat should be established and maintained. The structural development of military organization and the productivity of the society and the social political system have very close relationships.

Related the theories of a people's war.

Marx and Engels based their beliefs on the principles of materialism, which believed the people were the creators of history, to review the war and fully affirmed the decisive function of people in the war. In the year 1849, Engels clearly proposed the concept of the "people's war." He also regarded this kind of people's war, which reflected the interests and desire of the war participants, as the true revolutionary war. Meanwhile, he emphasized that the people's war should be based on the full awakening of the people. The people's war should have a large regular army to be the main force of the entire armed forces. It should have a set of flexible combat methods, which could fully develop the power of all war participants.

Related to the strategic theories of positive defense.

Marx and Engels believed that the national war and national in-country revolution all have the element of defense from the political perspective. But the war on defense should not be mixed up with the military actions. The war on defense should not exclude offensive combat actions. If the enemy fired the first shot, the side, which was forced to react, had plenty of excuses and the right to take offensive combat actions to attack the opponents until their defeat. The most effective defense was still the active defense by engaging offensive actions. One should take the initiative as long as one could to influence the enemy movement and not be manipulated by them.

Related to the principles of troop concentration.

Marx and Engels emphasized that the fascinating part of strategy is troop concentration. The major objective of war is to defeat the enemy, so one should be good at troop concentration and thoroughly defeat the enemy. The action must be quick, that time is the essence of troop movement and time is victory.

Related to the influence on the modes of war due to the advancement of science and technologies.

Marx and Engels believed that the innovation on the modes and methodologies of combat had more to do with the inventions of better weapons and the improvement of the elements of soldiers and less to do with the creativeness or insights of those talented commanders. The advancement of science and technology promoted the changes of the modes and methodologies of wars. In relatively peaceful times, the improvement on the modes of war often lagged behind the progress of military technology. During a long period of peace, the improvement of weapons due to the advancement of industry could bring just as much backwardness to the methodology of war therefore it is essential to pay attention to the improvement of war methodologies.

Related to the creative nature of the war methodologies of the proletariat.

Marx and Engels emphasized that the new materialistic foundation of a society and a new political condition of a society produced new war methodologies. The modern war methodologies had made the liberation of the capitalistic class and the farmers as its premise. It is the military expression of liberation. The liberation of the proletariat had its own expression in military matters, and they would create their own special and new war methodologies.

The birth of the strategic theories of Marxism was one unprecedented great revolution in the developmental history of human military thinking. It was one part of the newly arrived concept form of the proletariats. It had fully realized the innovative spirit of the proletariats in their exploration of the mystery of war strategy. It is a sharp weapon to guide the proletariats in their victorious military struggles.

Lenin and Stalin, in their establishing and strengthening the first Soviet political power, countering foreign invasion, struggling to defend national security, had inherited and further developed the strategic theories of Marxism. In the important writings (Revolutionary Troop and Revolutionary Government), (The Lessons Learned on Moscow Uprising), (The Bankruptcy of the Second International), (Socialism and War), (The Military Outline of the Proletariat Revolution), (War and Revolution), etc. (phonetic), had analyzed in-depth the wars and strategic guidance regulations during the period of imperialism and proletariat revolution. It had become a major component of the strategic theories of Marxism.

Section 3. The Military Strategic Theories of Mao Ze-dong and The Military Strategic Theories of the New Period

The military strategic theory of Mao Ze-dong and its development in the new period possessed unique Chinese characteristics and style in its contemporary theories of military strategies. It focused on the embodiment of the Chinese Communists' control over the military strategic thinking of the entire war front and its superb art of strategic guidance. It stood as an independent brand in the developmental history of world military strategic theories.

Subsection 1. The Strategic Theories Of Mao Ze-dong.

The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were fermented and developed during the Chinese revolutionary wars and the defensive wars after the establishment of the country. During the period of 1920 to 1940, the Chinese Communists led the Chinese people in their struggles of national liberation and class liberation and fought hard during the wars of the people's revolution. It was rare to find in the history of the wars the kind of fighting such as the Chinese revolutionary wars, with the disparity of strengths, the ferocity of the enemies, the complications of the events, the cruelty of the fighting, and the large scale of the battles. Mao Ze-Dong led the Chinese Communists; they learned war from the wars they won; countless victories in superb battles by defeating larger enemy forces by a smaller force, in the process they cultivated a large group of outstanding military strategists. It could be said that Mao Ze-dong was the most outstanding representative of them all. He once said, "I lived my entire life fighting and fought for twenty two years. I started out by lacking determination to fight to becoming eager to fight. I started out from not knowing how to fight to becoming good at fighting." According to an incomplete statistical count, he directly participated and commanded more than 230 battles. After the establishment of the new China, Mao again led the military struggles in strengthening national defense, protecting national sovereignty and

security. He won victories time and time again in counterattack battles for the sake of self-defense, thus, established the reputations of the military and the country.

The strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were the practical applications and concrete expression of the military strategic theories of Marxism in the Chinese revolutionary wars. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin had clearly demonstrated and developed their regulations of war and war guidance during their times, based on the special traits of their time and implementation of their revolutions. They had formed and developed the military strategic guidance of the proletariat in their revolutionary wars. They had provided scientific methodologies to the Chinese Communists, which were represented by Mao Ze-dong, in exploring the regulations of Chinese revolution and forming military strategies, which were suitable for the Chinese revolutionary wars. The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were the pure adaptation of the military strategic theories of Marxism into a Chinese mode.

The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were deeply rooted in the fertile ground of a traditional Chinese strategic culture. It absorbed broadly the best part of thinking from superb ancient Chinese culture. China has five thousand years of military strategic cultural traditions, at the end of the Chun-qiu era, the Sun Zi's *The Art of War*, had reached the peak level of ancient military strategic theories. The outstanding military experts of generation after generation, have created model war examples, which contain endless supplies of the art of strategic planning. The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were the traditional Chinese military strategic culture, which was the most logical development and the newest accomplishment of the time.

The most important content of the military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong was the strategic views, the guidance principles of a people's wars, and the strategic thinking on active defense of Marxism.

Subsection one, Strategic Views Of Marxism.

Mao Ze-dong based on the reality of the Chinese revolutionary wars, scientifically answered the basic theoretical questions on strategy and molded the Marxism strategic views, which possessed Chinese characteristics. He provided scientific methodologies to the Chinese Communists, so they could understand strategic issues and developed military strategies which suited the realistic situations of Chinese revolutionary wars. Mao Ze-dong's Marxism strategic views contained the following major content:

Subsection A. The strategic problem is a study of the regulations of the entire situation.

Mao Ze-dong indicated, "The study of the war guidance regulations of the entire situation is the duty of the science of strategy." (24) It is the same as saying that the strategy guides the entire war efforts. Any characteristic on taking care of all dimensions and all stages, belongs to the entire war and is part of the strategic issues. For example, taking care of the relationships, such as, between us and the enemies, between each battle and each phase of war, between the fore and aft, between all kinds of battle activities, between the directions of the battles, between various branches of the military, between the modes of the battles, between the decisive factors for the entire situation, the development of current history to the ensuing history, etc." Mao Ze-dong's discussions on strategic issues revealed that the

objective foundation of the strategy is the war guidance regulations of the entire situation. Therefore, in order to study strategic issues, one should understand and master the war guidance regulations of the entire war effort. The war guidance regulations of the entire war effort had embodied the connection of the essence of all elements of the entire war efforts. The commander should know the entire war effort. He should know the entire war could decide and control the partial war effort. The success or failure of the war could be determined by whether attention was paid to the entire front. Not only the top commander has to know the strategic issues; the battle commanders and tactical commanders should have a certain degree of understanding of strategic issues. "Knowing the entire situation would facilitate the use of its parts. Because the parts constitute the whole."(25)

Subsection B. Politic is the soul of military strategy.

Mao Ze-dong said, "War is the extension of politics." From this point, war is politics. The war itself is the operation of political characters. From the old days, there was no war without "political characters."(26) The military strategy has impacted on the entire war; thus, it reflects the political characters of the war. It is directly controlled by the politics, which are related to the war. Those who decided on military strategists must know the military and must obey the politics.

First, the political aim of war is the basic foundation of military strategy. The military objective of war, basically, is to defeat the enemy for self- preservation. The political aim of the war is to open roads for the political development of the country, nation, or political group. That is, when political development reached a stage, and could not proceed as usual, the war will erupt in order to wipe away the obstacles of the political path. The military strategy includes the military aim of the war; it also includes the political aim of the war. The political aim is more fundamental. As early as the year of the Red Army, Mao Ze-dong indicated that the Chinese Red Army is the armed masses, which would carry out political responsibilities. About the fighting of the Red Army, they did not fight purely for the sake of fighting. They fought for the sake of propaganda to the masses, organized the masses, armed the masses, and helped the masses to establish revolutionary political power. The military path, which is military strategy, of the Red Army, must obey the political responsibilities of the Red Army. When Mao Ze-dong discussed the strategic guidance of the anti-Japanese war, he seriously indicated that the political aim of the anti-Japanese war was "to get rid of the Japanese Imperialism and build a free and equal New China." The war could not be concluded if this aim was never achieved. Even if there were compromises, the war would recur, because the great masses would not obey. They would continue to fight to fulfill the political aim of the war. The military strategy of the anti-Japanese war, must obey the political aim of thoroughly expelling the Japanese imperialists.

Second, the military strategy must have a whole set of political practices to match. The war is not just the competition of the military strength and strength of the materials, it is the competition of human will. Therefore, the military strategy must have a whole set of political practices to match, especially, the political mobilization and political outline of the war must be the soul of the military strategy. The Chinese revolutionary war could win victories over the enemies within and without the country border, the most fundamental reason was the reliance on the mobilization of millions of people. The most important point here is to execute political mobilization of the war, tell the troops and masses the political

aim of the war, and let them realize their fighting was for a just cause. Then let them understand the reason for fighting, and what is the relationship between them and the war.

Subsection C. In formulating strategy, one should focus on the specific trait and development of the war.

Mao Ze-Dong emphasized, “The war and war guidance regulations are all developmental.” The war has its specific traits due to the differences in time, location and nature. Therefore, “When we study the war guidance regulations of different historical periods, different nature, different location, and different nations, we should focus on its special traits and development. We object to the Mechanism on war issues. (27) For those who commanded the Chinese revolutionary war, they should recognize that this war had its own specific regulations compared to other wars and other revolutionary wars. If one did not recognize these specific regulations, one could not win victory. Therefore, the military strategy of the Chinese revolutionary war must be established on the basis of fully recognizing and mastering the specific regulations of the Chinese revolutionary war. To study the specific regulations of the war, one should analyze the fundamental elements and conditions of both sides. One should also contrast and synthesize these elements and conditions, in order to find out the connection of their true nature and the specific regulations of this war, and then using these as basis to formulate the military strategy of war guidance.” During the fighting period of the land revolution, Mao Ze-dong pointed out the basic trait of this war was that it occurred in a large semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, in which the political and economical development were greatly lacking balance. The enemy was large, the Red Army was small but was led by the Communists and it was a land revolution. This situation regulated the possible development and possible victory over its enemy of the Chinese revolutionary war, but it was impossible to achieve quick development as well as quick victory. This determined that the main modes of Chinese revolutionary war were the repetition of the “circle and annihilate” or counter “circle and annihilate.” Thus, the defense strategy became the most important and complex war problems of the Red Army.

Subsection D. Planning and implementing military strategy is the competition of the subjective guidance capabilities of both sides.

Mao Ze-dong pointed out; “ The war is a competition, by the commanders of both sides, in using the materialistic basis of their military forces, financial power, etc., as their turf, to grab the superiority, and the initiative of the subjective capability. The result of competition could be either win or lose. Aside from the competition of the objective materialistic conditions, the victor won by the correctness of subjective command and the loser was lost due to the error made in the subjective command.”(28) The planning and implementing military strategy is the competition of the subjective guidance capabilities of both sides. Under the conditions that the enemy was strong and us weak, the use of mobile and flexible planning and implementing military strategy could turn around the situations of the enemy and us, and became the key link to win the final victory. From the perspective of military command, to express subjective guidance capability is mainly taking good care of the problems of initiative, flexibility, planning, etc. in the war. The initiative of the war means the freedom of military operations. Whether taking initiative or being passive, the superiority and inferiority

of the fighting forces are the objective basis. But the superiority or inferiority of the fighting forces is not really the matter of initiative or passiveness. It has to wait for the struggles and experience the competition of subjective guidance capabilities, to see the real emergence of initiative or passiveness. This requires the implementation of a highly flexible strategic command, which is the issue of flexibility of the war. The only way to achieve the victory of war is to exercise a high level of flexibility on strategic command by timely changes of tactics and modes of fighting based on the conditions of the troops and terrain's; to change the superiority or inferiority status of both sides; and execute the initiative to be taken against the enemy. The flexibility is highly related to the planning. Mao Ze-dong indicated, "Everything needs preparation to succeed; without preparation could bring ruin." The war does not have absolute precision. It has relative precision to a certain degree. This gives war planning an objective basis. But, the war has precision, which is low level and temporary. Therefore, the war planning is impossible to be fixed without change and should be changed and improved as the war goes on.

Subsection Two. War Guidance Principles Of The Peoples' War.

Basically speaking, Mao Ze-dong's military strategies were the people's war strategies. In his illustration of the "Ten big military principles," he pointed out: "Our enemies were very familiar with our fighting methods but they still could not save themselves from defeat." "It was because our strategies and tactics were based on the people's war. Any troop which were anti-people could not use our strategies and tactics."(29) "Soldiers and people are the root of victory." The deepest root cause of war power is imbedded in the masses. The troops, which gained the whole-hearted support of the masses would never be defeated in the world. Our army was a new type of people's army, "which stood close together with the Chinese people. Their only objective was to serve the Chinese masses with all their heart and soul." Under this objective, the basic starting point for our army to set the military strategies was to implement the people's war, that is, to rely on the support of the masses and motivate people with fighting fervor to win the victory of revolutionary war.

Subsection A. To preserve oneself and defeat the enemy is the basic principle of military strategy.

Mao Ze-dong had indicated that the military objective of the war is to preserve oneself and defeat the enemy. The objective of the war is the nature and basic principles of the war, which is the foundation of any war actions. From technical actions on one end to the war actions on the other end, it is for the fulfillment of this nature of war. This is the essence of what Mao Ze-dong absorbed from the military thinking of the past and present, from the Chinese and otherwise, and was one of the basic conclusions that he acquired from the experiences of Chinese revolutionary wars. In his theory of preserve oneself and defeat the enemy, Mao Ze-dong revealed the basic regulations of the war, which greatly enhanced the Chinese revolutionary war commanders' awareness to thoroughly execute the war objective of preserve oneself and defeat the enemy. Thus, it had afforded them a highly mobile and flexible strategic guidance, which allowed them to obtain initiative at the battlefield even under adverse situations.

Subsection B. Attribute the building of bases and creating battlefields as the strategic responsibilities.

According to the military strategies of Mao Ze-dong, the building of bases and creating battlefields were unitary. The building of bases resided in the building of battlefields. Early in the period at the Jing-Gan Mountain, Mao Ze-dong indicated that the border area of Hu Nan and Jiang Xi occupied by the workers and farmers, were based at Ning Gang as the center. These were not only the bases for advancing the revolution but also the important conditions for developing the Red Army and victories over the enemies. By concluding the experience of land revolution war, Mao Ze-dong indicated further, "The conditions of the people are the most vital condition of the Red Army. These are the conditions of the bases." If the bases had good people conditions, they were the most important conditions, which allowed the Red Army to hide their actions, tire out the enemies, force the enemies in making mistakes, and exercise initiative on the battlefields, which finally brought defeat to the enemy's "circle and annihilate" tactics. Mao Ze-dong indicated during the period of the Anti-Japanese war, the guerrilla bases were the strategic bases for the objectives of allowing the guerrilla troops to rely on them to implement their strategic responsibilities, achieve the preservation and development of themselves, and annihilate and expel the enemies. These strategic bases were the bases for fighting the guerrilla wars. They were also the battlefields for guerrilla to fight their battles. Mao Ze-dong used the "make eyes"(phonetic) of the Go game as an example to illustrate the opening of guerrilla war bases behind the enemy lines. He emphasized its strategic significance. When the liberation war was just getting underway, Mao Ze-dong had repeatedly instructed the commanders of all strategic areas that they should regard the mobilization of the masses to create battlefields as their strategic responsibilities. The "Create the Battlefields" that Mao Ze-dong emphasized, was not only about the preparation of war material conditions, such as selection of terrain, building the military position, etc. He was talking more about the preparation of the conditions of people and masses, which were required in the development of the revolutionary war. Therefore, the creation of the battlefields that Mao Ze-dong stressed had broad content and deep meaning. It included mobilizing and organizing the masses, establishing revolutionary political power, equipping the masses with arms, and proceeding with the broad and deep social revolution or reform, satisfying the political and economical need of the masses, and drawing the masses to the revolutionary war. This is building the bases and creating the battlefield. The bases are the strategic bases of the army, it is what we relied on to realize all the strategic responsibilities and the war objectives.

Subsection C. The mode of war should make timely changes according to the changes of the war.

The war situation is complex. The battles opened up in different directions. The superiority of the enemy and us could shift and turn, thus, there are needs for changes of the mode of war to adjust and compliment each other. But many modes of war cannot be equally regarded. One fighting mode should be the major mode, which could be supplemented by other modes. To select and change the major fighting mode according to the development of the war is a fundamental issue of strategic guidance. The big strategic changes of several of our battles in our military history used the changes of major mode of fighting as its

fundamental content. For example, during the era of the Red Army, the guerrilla warfare was changed to the campaign warfare. During the Korean War, the campaign warfare was shifted to the trench warfare. The objective basis for selecting and changing the major mode of war is the contrast of the forces of the enemy and us. For example, during the Anti-Japanese war, the enemy was strong and us weak, thus, the best way to achieve the military objective was adopting the guerrilla warfare. Only through the guerrilla warfare, would it reduce our own losses and achieve more victories. That would also reduce the territories occupied by the enemy and expand our bases. As the Anti-Japanese war progressed, the contrast of the forces on both sides changed, which prompted the gradual transition to a more advanced mode of fighting, which is the campaign warfare. From practical experiences, we learned that the timely changes of the major modes of war are sure ways to win victories.

Subsection D. Do not fight a war, when one is not ready and confident. Even if one is in the worst possible circumstance, the strategy should be well prepared.

The preparation of strategy is the action to prepare strategy before the war erupts or during the process of fighting. Its function, is to deal with a sudden war, and the second is that, during the fighting, it requires to pave the way for the strategy of the next stage. Mao Ze-dong emphasized vehemently that on the basis of scientific prediction of the war process, one should prepare the strategy well. In his final conclusion of the counter “circle and annihilate” fighting experience of the land revolutionary war, he pointed out that the victory achieved during the counter “circle and annihilate” fighting, and the extent of the completion of missions during the preparation phase, were closely related. Better preparation would achieve bigger victories. Therefore, in the selection of timing for preparation, we would rather be faulted for early preparation than being too late. Mao Ze-dong indicated in his book “Discussions on Protracted Warfare.”(phonetic) that “ ‘Everything could be a success if there is preparation. If not, it will bring failure.’ If there is no prior planning and estimation, one will not achieve victory in war.” Just before the victory over the Japanese, Mao Ze-dong reminded the entire Communist party and troops to be alert to the danger of civil war and prepare the strategies. For example, he ordered each strategic area, to organize the scattered guerrilla troops into regular field battle corps or regional militia, and change the guerrilla warfare to regular campaign warfare, etc. This whole set of policies assured the Communists and the troops to take the initiative during their fights against the Nationalists, who were attempting to grab the credit of the successes of the Anti-Japanese campaign, and during the ensuing war of liberation. After the eruption of the Korean War, Mao Ze-dong considered the situations of the American troops’ invasion, he timely turned the strategic center to the Northeast of China. He assembled crack troops to form the reserve units, which allowed the quick organization of two hundred fifty thousand advanced units into battles once we joined the war, and the grasping of initiatives on both the political and military fronts. Mao Ze-dong specifically emphasized that the preparation for war should be based on the most difficult and darkest situations. When the decision to join the Korean War was made, Mao Ze-dong pointed out that preparation should be made that the Americans would declare war against China. The preparation should be made that, at the least, the Americans would bombard the big cities and industrial bases with their air forces. They would also deploy the navy to attack the coastal areas. There were also need to prepare that the Chinese could not kill the American troops in large quantities inside Korea, so that the war became a stalemate, which

could bring ruin to the Chinese construction plans already underway. It could also bring resentment to China from the capitalistic nations and some other people. We should be prepared both from the materialistic and psychological sides to deal with the most difficult and darkest situations. In the National Assembly of 1955, Mao Ze-dong said, "If we think things over from the worst possible situations, we would never take a beating. No matter what kind of work, we should think from the worst possible situations and prepare for it." (30)

Subsection E. You fight yours and I will fight mine; if we can win then we fight, if we cannot win, we leave the scene.

In 1965, Mao Ze-dong simply generalized his principles of using the military as "You fight yours and I will fight mine; if we can win then we fight, if we cannot win, we leave the scene." (31) The deep significance of this experience is that in executing a people's war, we will not be ruled by the enemy and follow their will. We will take our own initiative and let the enemy be ruled by us and not use their advantages. When we are facing the attack of a strong enemy, if we do not have the confidence of winning, we should step back and maneuver to find and create opportunities in order to achieve final victory. This is "to control the enemy and not be controlled by the enemy." It is a flexible and mobile military strategy by taking initiative and by avoiding passivity. Mao Ze-dong pointed out in his (Chinese Revolutionary War And Its Strategic Issues.) that during the early stage of the counter "circle and annihilate" war efforts, the Red Army had the need to use the withdraw tactics, and move bases to the central area. That tactics allowed us to pick the military spots we liked and with good people's conditions, so that the enemy would be under our control; make more mistakes; which allowed us better chances to attack. During the Anti-Japanese war, Mao Ze-dong emphasized further that we should gradually achieve partial superiority and initiatives to gradually achieve more strategic superiority and initiatives. During the liberation war, Mao Ze-dong clearly proposed the battle concept, "You fight yours and I will fight mine." In April of 1947, Mao Ze-dong instructed the northern Chinese regions organizing the Jeng Tai Battle to thoroughly implement the war guidance on the policy of "You fight yours and I will fight mine. (Each fight his own.) That was the policy of each fight with total autonomy." (32) In July of the same year, Mao Ze-dong again instructed the Eastern China Field Battle Corps, "...should adopt the tactics of first fight the weaker enemy, and then fight the stronger enemy, you fight yours and we fight ours. (Each fight his own.) Fight with total autonomy and put the enemy in a passive mode."(33) "You fight yours and I will fight mine; if we can defeat the enemy, we continue to fight. If we cannot defeat the enemy, we leave the scene." These fully reflected the essence of our highly mobile and flexible war guidance.

Subsection F. Concentrate superior forces and individually destroy the enemies.

Generally speaking, Chinese revolutionary war was in a state that the enemy was stronger than us. From one after another partial creations of superior forces against the enemies and defeating them as the basic way, it changed the strategies from passive to mobile and from inferior forces to become superior forces. The key here is to implement the principles of concentrating the superior forces and individually destroying the enemies. Mao Ze-dong had indicated, "Concentrate the forces are necessary in all the campaign war, warfare of quick

decision, and war of annihilation. The concentration of forces is a priority and the most important.” “To win victory from the defense strategy, the basic step is the concentration of forces.”(34) When the enemy forces are superior, if our army wanted to win victory from the defense strategy, we should implement the principles of concentrating the forces and individually destroying the enemies’ forces. This principle requires that, when the enemies are making attacks from different directions, our army should pick the right moment to concentrate superior forces several times the size of enemy forces and circle and destroy one of the weaker enemy forces. We should not equally divide our forces to counter the attacks from several directions. That way, we could not defeat any single attack but would entrap us in a passive fighting mode. The superior aspect of this principle is; first, it could achieve total annihilation. The total annihilation is the most effective way to defeat the enemy and supply us, to crumble the moral of the enemies and raise our own morale. Second, it could be quickly resolved. Quick resolution allowed our military to expand the war results and avoid the reinforcement of enemy forces. It could be said that the concentration of forces and individually annihilating the enemies was a superior tradition, which was practiced early in the development of our military.

Subsection G. Destroying the enemy’s effective strength as the major objective, we do not care about the loss of one city or one piece of land.

One important question faced by the strategic guidance of the Chinese revolutionary war was how to recognize and administer the relationship between the land taken and destroying the enemy’s effective strength. When Mao Ze-dong was discussing the implementation of withdrawing tactics at the early stage of the counter “circle and annihilate,” he indicated that “About the issues of losing territory, often there is the following occurrence, that is, only by losing that you do not lose. This is the principle of “If we want to take, we should first give.”(35) Losing part of the territory of the bases and destroying what the masses possess at their homes, is a price to be paid for the destruction of the enemy’s effective strength. If what we lost is the land, but what we gained is victory, we could recover the lost land and expand our territory, this is a “money making business.” In the Liberation war, Mao Ze-dong clearly proposed that, “We have to regard the destruction of the enemy’s effective strength as the major objective. We do not regard holding the cities or taking the cities and land as our major objective.” This should be one of the strategic guidance principles that our military should follow. Only through heavy destruction of the effective strength of the enemy, could we acquire and hold the land. If we are unable to largely destroy the enemy’s effective strength, we will lose the land, which we acquired. Therefore, to grab and hold the land is the result of heavily destroying the enemy’s effective strength. This may require many repetitions and seesawing to finally take the land and hold it. The best thing about implementing this principle is that we would throw the baggage to the enemy, which would make their supply line long and their forces scattered. On the contrary, our army could fight the battle with light burden, concentrate our forces, advance and withdraw at will, and search for easy targets and destroy them.

Subsection H. Be careful with the initial battle and execute effective decisive campaign.

The initial battle and decisive campaign are important issues of strategic guidance. The initial battle could have large impact on the entire situations. Mao Ze-dong pointed out that from the side of implementation of defense strategy, in order to defeat the enemy attack, the first counterattack is crucial. “The result of the first battle, whether it is a win or loss, will have strong impact on the entire situation. In fact, it could even have an impact on the decisive battle.” (36) The initial battle has strategic significance. Therefore, the strategic director of the Chinese revolutionary war must thoroughly follow the principle of “Be careful on the initial battle.” First, it must be won. We should make sure those conditions, such as, enemy situations, the terrain, the masses, etc, are all advantageous to us and not to the enemy. We would act only when we have confidence to win. Otherwise, we would rather withdraw and wait for the next opportunity. Second, we should pay attention to the plans of the entire war. The plan for the initial battle should be the prelude of the plan for the entire war. If the initial battle has no advantage to the entire situation but could be harmful, even if it was a victory, it was actually a defeat. Therefore, before fighting the first war, one should think about how to fight the second, third, fourth, or even the decisive campaign. Third, we must take care of the next strategic phase. When the strategic director is planning the initial battle at the strategic planning phase, he should calculate the subsequent phases, at the least, he should calculate the next phase. When calculating the withdraw phase, one should calculate the counterattack phase. When calculating the counterattack phase, one should calculate the attack phase. When calculating the attack phase, one should calculate the withdraw phase. If no such calculation was made and one only restricted oneself to the advantageous or disadvantageous situations in front of oneself, it would be the sure way to bring defeat. The decisive campaign is the battle to exhaust and destroy the enemy and determine the win or loss. Thus, more care will be needed to make the selection. Mao Ze-dong emphasized, “We propose that the decisive campaign under all advantageous situations, no matter whether it is fighting big or small battles, we should not allow any negativism.” (37) But we firmly object to fight the decisive campaign, of which we lack confidence to win, especially we should avoid to fight the decisive campaign under disadvantageous conditions and have no confidence to win, during the defense strategic phase. Even if there is a fundamental shift of our and the enemy’s strengths, after we have moved into the strategic counterattack and attack phases, the principle of “Execute effective decisive campaign. Avoid the decisive campaign which is disadvantageous” still applies.

Subsection Three, The Strategic Thought Of Active Defense.

Active defense is one of the basic military strategic principles of Mao Ze-dong, which reflects his military path of the thinking on the people’s war.

As early as the period of the revolutionary war, while he analyzed the rules of the Chinese revolutionary war, he indicated, “The enemy ruled our entire country, we had a very small army. The fate of our revolution would depend on whether we could beat the enemy’s tactic of “circle and annihilate.” On this point, “The initial and most critical problem was to preserve our forces and wait for opportunity to strike the enemy.” If the only emphasis was on offense and not defensive method, we were the “Number one fool.” As to the revolutionary war, the adaptation of defensive strategy was not only militarily necessary, it would also benefit the politics. “All defensive war on just cause, could have the functions of causing political dissension and division, it could also mobilize those backward people to

join the war effort.” The defensive strategy could reflect, to a certain degree, the just nature of the revolutionary war and caused the army to win sympathy from the masses. Therefore, “The defensive strategy became the most complex but important issue of the Red Army in their fight.” Whether the Red Army could correctly implement the defensive move became vital to its existence. The correct defense could only be active defense. Mao Ze-dong said, “The active defense could be named as offensive defense. It could also be called as decisive campaign defense. Passive defense could be called as ‘concentrated defense,’ or ‘pure defense.’ The passive defense is actually a false-defense. Only an active defense could be called real defense, which was a defense using both counterattack and attack.”(38) The war principle of the Red Army is to recognize active defense, and oppose passive defense. Mao Ze-dong’s thought of active defense had theoretically provided correct solutions to the military strategic problems of the Chinese revolutionary war. It paved the way for the Chinese revolutionary war from victory to victory.

In general, the active defensive strategy must well manage the three important relationships, i.e., defense and offense, inner line and outer line, protracted and quick solution, based on the development of the battle situations.

First is the issue of the relationship between the defense and offense. Mao Ze-dong indicated that, from the entire war process, the defense and offense are the phases of a completely different strategic nature. They could not be mixed together. Before a fundamental change of the situations, where the enemy was strong and us weak, the Chinese revolutionary war could only rely on defensive strategy. Only after we obtained superiority over enemy forces, the Chinese revolutionary war could move into offensive strategy. At that time, the defense became local. But, we could not totally split up the defense and offense. The general principle of the active defense is based on offense to reach its defensive goal. Mao Ze-dong’s creativity lied in his ability in combining the defense and offense from the dialectic relationship of the strategy and campaign battles and proposed a strategy, which would use offensive moves in the defensive strategy. The significance is that we should use the vulnerabilities of the overly extended enemy front, which required them to divide their forces to hold the strategic locations and communication lines, so that we could use highly mobile, flexible campaign war or guerrilla war to divide and destroy the effective strength of the enemy. At the same time, we avoided losing our strength in the trench warfare. The “To tempt the enemy so they would enter deeply” tactic used in the land revolution period, the behind the line guerrilla warfare during the anti-Japanese war period, and the campaign war with the sole objective of concentrating superior forces and destroying the enemy forces individually, had fully reflected the flexible handling of dialectic method on defense and offense.

The relationship between the inside and outside fronts is closely related to the defense and offense. Mao Ze-dong indicated during his land revolutionary war period, the fight bases of the Red Army was at their bases, which was the inside front fighting in the strategy. “But we could or even should change it on our campaign or battles.” We had implemented the “outside front fighting within the inside front fighting.” We had turned the big “circle and annihilate” tactic of the enemy and turned it around to become our small “circle and annihilate” tactic against our enemy. We had used the enemy’s tactic of dividing the

advances with combined attacks and turn this tactic around against the enemy. Thus, we were able to shift the strategic superiority of the enemy forces into situations that we were in a superior status during the campaign battles. During the anti-Japanese war, Mao Ze-dong further expanded this thought. He combined the inside front of the strategy and the outside front of the campaign battles and made it into the basic war guidance principles of strategy against the Japanese. He demanded the adoption of flexible campaign war, using several divisions against one division, several tens of thousands of people against ten thousand enemy, several troop advancement against one advancement, from the outside front of the battlefield to suddenly encircle one troop advancement and destroy it, which would force the enemy's strategic outside front of the campaign battle and offense becoming the strategic inside front and defense. Thus, our own inside front and defense of the fighting strategy could become the outside front and offense in the campaign battles.

In executing attack in the battles and outside front fighting, we demand speedy resolution. Therefore, in implementing active defense military strategy, we should use the dialectic recognition and management on the issues of the relationship between protracted or quick solution. The Chinese revolutionary war became protracted due to the fact that the enemy was strong and us weak. Therefore, insisting on protracted war is one of the most important directives of the strategic guidance. But the campaign battles should be just the opposite. It should not be protracted but should reach quick resolution, which was also due to the situations where the enemy was strong and us weak. We lacked weapons and ammunitions, the amount of troops were less than the enemy, if we did not grasp the opportunities and make quick battle solutions, it was very likely that we would be defeated by the enemy forces, which swarmed in from various directions. Therefore, our campaign battles should seek quick resolution. In order to achieve such, the basic conditions are to prepare thoroughly; do not miss good opportunities; concentrate superior forces; use encircle and flanking tactics; select well the military position and strike the enemy while they are in motion, or strike the enemy before they firmly establish good military position, which they occupy. If we have not solved these problems, it is impossible to achieve quick solution on campaign battles. In general, in order to thoroughly execute the military strategic concept of defense strategy, it would require, from the dialectic relationship of the strategy and campaign battles, to be aware and master the contrasting and compatible relationships of defense and offense, inside front and outside front, protracted and speedy resolution, and insist on combining the strategy of protracting defense inside front and the quick resolution of offense outside front of the campaign battles.

After the establishment of New China, the military struggles led by the leadership of the Communist Party, had shifted from taking the political power of the country to strengthening the political power and defending the national security. Thus, it had faced a bigger stage of military struggles. Mao Ze-dong's active defense strategic thoughts had newer development. In April of 1955, Mao Ze-dong indicated during a Central Secretariat Conference that the directive of China's defense strategy was active defense and we would not initiate a war. In March 1956 the Chinese Military Commission Broader Conference formally announced that the Chinese Socialism would adopt the military strategy of active defense. From then on, though the international strategic structure had gone through some changes, we had also gone through some large or minor adjustment in terms of the targets of war, the major direction of

the strategy, the mode of war, etc. However, despite these adjustments, the military strategy of active defense has been the basis of our military strategic concept.

Under the new environment of a newly established country, basic spirit of the active defense strategy was for the purpose of defending the country's sovereignty, security, and the territorial integrity; insisting on the ground of self-defense; and implementing the policy of taking action until we were attacked. The key points were: First, the military principle was that we would not fire the first shot. China will not invade another country. We would not initiate attack, even though we were under the threat of invasion or even the intimidation of the war. We would insist that if the conflict could be resolved through peaceful method, we would not resort to arms. This was determined by the nature of Chinese socialism. Second, militarily and politically, prevent or advance the war. Prior to the war, we should continue to strengthen the military forces; expand the international unified front of maintaining peace and oppose war and maintain the peaceful environment needed for socialism construction. We should use positive initiative in military preparation and political struggles to prevent war, it is an indispensable content of the active military defense strategy. Third, using active counterattack or offensive battle to achieve the objective of defense strategy. We have adopted a strategy to counter the action of the enemy. But if the enemy forced war upon us, we should be able to counterattack with vigor and stop the offense of the enemy at a prescribed location. By gradually taking away the enemy's strategic initiative, we will then turn the defense strategy into offensive strategy and thoroughly defeat the enemy's invasion. Under the active defensive strategy, China has agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; will not use nuclear weapons or use nuclear weapons to intimidate countries, which do not have nuclear weapons. That said, we would resolutely use nuclear counterattack to any enemy which attack us with nuclear weapons.

The active military defense strategic thought was given a richer content than during the period of revolutionary war. It fully reflected the objective requirement of the military struggles at an expanded international stage on safeguarding the national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity. It has become the basic foundation for the Chinese to proceed with their national defense and military constructions.

Subsection 2, Military Strategy Of The New Period.

After the 11th Three Central Conference (phonetic), China entered a new historical period. Our strategic guidance on military struggles also faced new historical conditions. First, due to the structural changes of the international politics and economy, the forces seeking world peace continued to increase. The danger of world war was curtailed and the regional wars became the major type of war. Thus, dealing with the possibility of the eruption of regional wars became the major subject of our military. Next, due to the progress of advanced technologies, such as communication technology, aerospace technology, nuclear technology, bioengineering technology, computer technology, etc., which caused the world military revolution to go into deeper development. The weapon and equipment systems developed, the military structure, the fighting methods, and even the style of war, went through tremendous changes. The war using advanced technologies became the future mode of war. Our military needs to be equipped with the capabilities to win these modern technological,

especially the advanced technological, warfare. For this purpose, our military has established the military strategic concept of the new period. This way we have control over the entire situation of military constructions and battle training and gone even deeper to refine the active defense strategy of our military.

Subsection One, Insists on the people's war under the conditions of modern warfare.

Compared to modern warfare, the past wars that our army fought, there were a lot of changes from the materials, technologies, tactics, and even to the mode of the entire war. The fighting methods that our army was familiar with are no longer suitable to the needs of modern warfare. But it does not mean that the people's war is passé. Using the people's war as the strategy for all out war is still the way to win victory in modern warfare by our army. Deng Xiao-ping said, "We will insist on our people's war. We are not going to invade other countries. If the enemy wants to invade us, our "united three"(phonetic) will make the enemy soak in the big ocean of the people's war." (39) Jiang Ze-ming also emphasized that we should never abandon the thought of a people's war. We will always insist on the people's war, which is a treasure of winning victories and defeating enemies. The people's war is not only a powerful weapon for us to win the future wars, but also a potent weapon to stop foreign invasions. A strong people's army plus large militia and reserve units, will make anybody think things over. To insist on the thought of the people's war, we need to be based on the new situations and study the new methods of organizing the people's war and new fighting methods. The strategy and tactics of the people's war should also make advancement. We should maintain good traditions but the concrete fighting methods must be created on the basis of the changes of historical conditions. According to the strategic thought of the people's war, we should combine the capable regular army and strong reserves of the national defense; adjust to the requirements of the traits of the future military struggles and develop the market economy of socialism; pay attention to the construction of the reserves of the national defense; raise the quality; improve the organizational system; improve the structure; raise the capability for speedy mobilization; and improve the levels of military training. This way, we can truly achieve the objective that if the army gets called they can respond quickly and fight.

Subsection Two. Insists on active defense strategy concept.

In 1982, Deng Xiao-ping again declared, "What kind of concept that we should adopt in the future for anti-invasion war? I support the concept of "active defense." (40) The active defense itself is not just a matter of defense. The defense includes offense." Jiang Ze-ming also pointed that continuing the execution of an active defense military strategy concept, not only is inheriting our army traditions, but also pertinent to the current level of the national and military situations of our country. That is, China still insists on the military status of self-defense; implements the principle of attack after we were attacked; and still uses active initiative on military readiness and political struggles to stop the war and maintain peace. If the war broke out, we will use active offensive moves to reach our goal of defense.

Subsection Three. Stand firm on winning the regional war under the conditions of modern technologies, especially the advanced technologies.

Under the new historical condition, we should more thoroughly understand the thought of a people's war and the concept of active defense military strategy. It is a reflection of the requirement of modern warfare. Deng Xiao-ping started to emphasize from the latter part of 1970s, that our military should seriously resolve the problems of our lacking the capability in directing modern warfare and the lack of capability in fighting a modern warfare, and work hard at raising the defensive fighting capability under modern conditions. Jiang Ze-ming made the point a step further, that is, according to the developmental changes of the international situation we should pointedly prepare to deal with the regional war under the conditions of modern technologies, especially the advanced technologies. We should strengthen our capacity in the defensive war and quick responding war under the conditions of modern technologies, especially the advanced technologies. For this purpose, our military constructions must implement changes from quantity pattern type to quality efficiency type and from people intensive type to technology intensive type. Through implementing the strategy of using technology to strengthen the military, we raise the volume of applying advanced technologies in the weapons and equipment; develop the military organizational structure which could meet the demand of modern warfare; cultivate large amount of high quality military personnel who are knowledgeable about the modern technologies and modern warfare; and establish one highly efficient, together, and of capable being a modern regular army.

Section 4. The World's New Military Revolution And The Trend Of The Development of Strategic Theories In The Present Age.

Subsection One: The World's new military revolution.

Toward the end of the 1970's, the leader of the Soviet military believed that the information technology based on computers as its core, which entered the military field and the appearance of precision guided weapons, were causing changes in the military and had led to a new technological revolution.

The Gulf War of 1991 showed the people in the world the miniature form of the first advanced technological warfare, which caused people to pay attention to the new development of the war and military. Many countries, especially the United States, which has faster development in information technology, started continuous and in-depth discussions on the military revolution. Many people believed this rising military revolution was the unavoidable result of the quick development of the advanced technology and its wide applications to the military field. The core of this military revolution is to utilize the superiority of information to combine closely the available technology, advanced war thoughts, and military organization and structure and fully develop the potential of available technology, which could cause the revolutionary advancement on the military capability. This military revolution will be the total reform of the military field. It is related to a series of important big changes to the military weapons and equipment, the theories of combat, organization and structure, etc. It also pushes the movement of changing from the industrial era to the information age in the military constructions and war methods.

The advanced technology, especially the development of information technology, not only was demonstrated in regional wars, such as the Gulf War and the War in Kosovo, but also brought great impact to the reforms of the war and military field. Many theories and concepts brought up in the American military's discussions on the military revolution have become more systematic and were incorporated into official policies in the 1990s and became the operational guidance in the command of the American troops' development. In April of 1996, the American Joint Chiefs of Staffs published the document (The combined concept of the year 2010)(phonetic), which outlined the entire design of the American military development blue print of the 21st century. It proposed that relying on the superiority of advanced technology, especially the information technology, to "establish a strong military, which could intimidate the enemy in peace time, and could win victory in war time, and to defeat the enemies in any conflict." In April 2000, the American Joint Chiefs of Staffs again declared (The combined concept of the year 2020)(phonetic), and also contemplated the concept and plan of the proposal of establishing a "military revolutionary troop," which could deal with the requirements of the information age. It proposed the use of the opportunity of having the superiority on information technology, quickly changed the theories of troop size, organization, and campaign battles, which could best utilize this technology. This happened so that it would compress the quality of the current military strength and bring quick transformation into a military, which has more advanced technology and stronger capability. The United States is trying hard to assure the leading role in the future world strategic structure through the earlier practice of military revolution than other nations and the maintenance of its leading military superiority.

Some major European countries followed the lead of the United States and also started to proceed with the research and practice of the military revolution. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, etc. have already adopted practical steps, which could meet the requirements of the military revolution; use the advanced weapons systems, which are led by information technology; and emphasized the use of "system assembly," to raise the total war capability. Countries such as Japan, India, Korea and other countries in the Asian-Pacific region are trying to speed up their military reforms and have made great efforts in developing and importing advanced technological weapons and also actively seeking new war theories and military organization and structure, which could adopt advanced technology weapons. They are aiming at matching the military constructions and development with the momentum of the military revolution and the progress of time. This new military revolution will no doubt bring new challenges and opportunities to the development of national defense and military constructions of many nations in the world. Those countries which have grasped the opportunities, will achieve great changes in the military capabilities and strategic initiatives. Those countries which failed to grasp the opportunities will quickly become backward and increase its disparity from the advanced level. The danger is easily discernible.

The major characteristics of the current new military revolution of the world compared with the other military revolutions are:

Basic Characteristics. The new military revolution will use the technological revolution of the information as its core and proceed with thorough reforms to the military of the industrialized era. The changes made by information technology to the military of the

industrialized era are reflected in the following four major areas: First, it has greatly enhanced the information superiority, which could be symbolized by “In charge of the battlefield sensitivity”(phonetic) The understanding of the battlefield made the war participants increase their totally, accurately, and timely understanding of the situations of the enemy and us, which created the needed conditions for exercise of precision fighting. Second, through the “system assembly” the dispersed weapons and force units could be combined into a whole unit, which could perform the total war capability to the maximum. Third, through the combined use of modern industrial technologies, which produced the precision guided weapons and long distance attack weapons, they could open the path for making smart military tools and enhance the war efficiency of the military. Fourth, it produces the numerical battle simulation and the computer assisted decision-making systems, which greatly enhance the war command effectiveness. The above changes have made fundamental impacts to the military development and future victories. The basic objective of the new military revolution is to establish a troop of information, which could adjust to the information society based on the foundations of the development of information technology, thus, implement the transformation of the military and of war from the industrialized era to the information age.

Characteristics of its entirety. Those quickly developed advanced technologies after the 1980s, such as information, bioengineering, air and space, new energy sources, new materials, and oceanic development, etc., have changed the face of war to a great extent and increased the warring capability of mankind. The new military revolution is the result of the wide application of advanced technologies mentioned above. It does not rely only on single or small amounts of technological development, but it does rely on the entire movement of many clusters of advanced technologies. Information technology is the one which tied all these advanced technologies into a whole. The information technology is the leading factor in the current development of the advanced technologies. It is the cord which tied all the advanced technologies together. This is the fundamental reason why the new military revolution must use the technological revolution of information as its core.

Deep and far characteristics. The new military revolution will touch upon the military establishment and war. It will bring deep and far impact in the military field and far surpass any military reforms and revolution of any historical period. Only the technological advancement will not bring military revolution. It will only become a military revolution with true significance by adopting the organization and structure and the war theory, which have been adjusted to the new technologies. In modern military history, the technological advancement in areas such as mechanized troops, air power, radio, communication, etc., could only bring revolutionary changes to the military capabilities after the use of the blitzkrieg concept by the Germans and their adoption of the troop organization and structure, which had adjusted to these changes. After the emergence of the aircraft carrier, its capabilities have been fully realized only after it has proposed a unique ocean war concept and totally abandoned the old mode of naval fighting structure. In fact, the nuclear revolution of the military field did not come about when the nuclear weapons were invented. It came to existence about fifteen to twenty years after the invention of nuclear weapons and the proposal of the concept of using nuclear power of the nuclear threat strategy and the integration of nuclear weapons into the military forces of the nation. Therefore, the new

military revolution is the total revolution of the military field. Its basic thought is to closely integrate the current advanced technologies, advanced war thoughts, and military organization and structure, and make revolutionary advancement on military capabilities.

Long term characteristics. The implementation of new military revolution is a long process. The American military experts believe that it will take many decades. At the present, many developing countries in the world are only at the beginning stage of this revolution. It will take them time to fully appreciate the new military revolution and decide on the correct orientation.

Subsection Two. Trend of the development of strategic theories.

The present age new military revolution of the world is the product of the information age. It is a great social phenomenon of the human society at the historical turning point. The new military revolution not only brought deep changes to the military strength and strategic methods, it also greatly expanded the people's strategic thoughts and vision. Under the push of a new military revolution, the present age development of the strategic theories displayed the following trends:

Subsection A. Develop strategic theories, which adapt to the requirements of the information age.

The development of strategic theories must fully reflect the requirements of the time and carry the clear traits of the time. In the recent years, following the human entry to the information age, many countries have treated the exploration and development of the information security strategic theories, which have adjusted to the requirements of the information age, as their hot topics of strategic research.

Following the development of the information technology, the degree of using information in the society is getting higher. Currently, in the developed countries, information has become important as strategic resources. The information industry has become the nations' key industry. The information network has become the important basic strategic facilities of a nation. The information security becomes the most important security factor. Under this circumstance, if a nation does not have information security, the discussions of the securities of politics, economy, military, science and technology, and culture, will be in vain. Through the destruction of a nation's network system and the computers' soft and hardware facilities, it is possible to bring severe impact to the proper operations of the entire nations' economic lifeline and military system. This kind of strategic destruction is definitely unmatched by any weapon systems of the past. In 1999, the 21st century's National Security Committee of the United States made an announcement in the (New Century National Security Report), and defined the weapon of information war as a weapon of mass destruction and made it compatible to other mass destruction weapons, such as, nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. After this, the United States' (National Security Report) of the year 2000, listed the protection of the security of important basic information facilities of the energy resources, bank and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water supply system, etc., as the national key interests. From a thorough awareness of the strategic importance of information,

the information security adopted a clearly targeted and operable strategic counter measures, which will become the definite choice of any nation which is entering an information society. For those countries who are behind in information technology, the first question they have to answer is, how to control others and not be controlled by the others in the process of speeding up the acquiring of information, and establish self-autonomy and self-defense capability of their information system in their strategic plan on information security.

Subsection B. Develop strategic theories, which could adjust to the changes of the international structure.

After the end of the cold war, the bipolar international structure was broken and has undergone continuous changes. All major countries in the world have eagerly adjusted their strategies and study the way to form new strategies, which can adjust to the changes of the international structure. The United States has tried hard to grasp the “period of strategic opportunity after the cold war.” It has pushed the military constructions and war strategy toward the changes on the global information control and global long distance precision strike, so that the United States can gain absolute control in the new international structure and establish the “new world order” under her leadership. Other countries also tried hard to adjust their strategies based on the reality of their own nations and develop non-symmetrical forces and non-symmetrical strategies. In doing so, they hope to further elevate their nations’ international standing under this new international structure; to strive for more say in international affairs; create and maintain international environments, which is beneficial to the national economic development, peace and stability.

In the exploration of strategic theory, which could meet the changes of international structure, the theory, which is prepared to deal with various threats of war, has received the most attention. During the cold war, theories of war and strategies of the majority of the countries, including the United States and Soviet Unions, were established on the basis of dealing with a World War. Following the changes of the international structure, many countries have entirely re-adjusted their military strategies of siege and defeat in regional conflicts and local wars; used the regular forces with advanced technologies to win victories at local wars as their major tactics; valued how to deal with uncertain and long term threats and challenges; and deal with small scale arms conflicts and suddenly emerging incidents.

Subsection C, Develop strategic theories, which adjust to the advancement of advanced technology.

First, Search and propose new strategic theory based on the development of advanced technology. The rapid development of advanced technology greatly strengthens the functions of the military forces, and severely changes the face of war. On one hand, it has led to the continuous emergence of new war tactics and modes; greatly enhanced the capability of long distance battles; elevated unprecedented precision of attacks; and multiple killing powers. On the other hand, it is equipped with strong capabilities of battle adjustment and control. It can flexibly select the kinds of targets based on needs and the range and implementation of striking methods. Even with continuous and wide applications, it would not be required to carry the burden of the “nuclear threat.” The results of the development of advanced

technology weapons and their wide applications at battles suggested that both the advanced technology weapons and the superiority of advanced technology possess the functions of strategic intimidation. It is a far superior method than the nuclear weapons when the intimidation turns towards real war. Amongst the new generation advanced technology weapons, those mid-distance precision attack weapons such as the cruise missile, which has high precision and can penetrate the defense, and ground to ground battle and tactical guided missiles, etc., all are equipped with the intimidation and real battle dual-functions. The “battle space sensitivity”(phonetic) of the information technology and information attack and defense capabilities, etc.. They are also equipped with dual capabilities of intimidation and real battle. The intimidation effect, which combined with the advanced technology weapons and the superiority of information, is quite different from the “regular intimidation” of the nuclear intimidation. This new theory of intimidation has increasingly been valued. Those countries with leading edge advanced technological development will have more “trump cards” in their hands and will have more flexibility in selecting the strategy and more strategic turn around spaces in future international struggles.

Second, Based on the advanced technological development, nations enrich and expand the traditional strategic theories. In this respect, the most typical example is that some countries are expanding the theory of “air supremacy” to “space supremacy”. The American Air Force has been continuously changing their traditional aviation power to aerospace power. In recent years, they are developing the Air Force strategy for the next century, clearly proposed to move from aviation and space power to space and aviation power. (phonetic) and emphasized the increasing reliance and urgency of the military on space and demanded the attention to “use the strategic high ground for shooting energy”(phonetic) from space. The United States military is still planning to develop the space weapons and has also proposed the strategic theories of “space control” and “space supremacy.” While forming the new branch of the military, the Space Troop, the Russians clearly included the space war into the range of the modern war. They also clearly divided the space into two large war zones of space near the ground and moon space. (phonetic). All these suggested that the theory of space strategy would become an important direction of the future strategic development.

Section 5. Basic Regulations Of The Development Of Strategic Theories.

Looking back at the development and history of strategic theories, we can gain some understanding of the following regulations:

Subsection One. Strategic theories are developed due to the implementation and development of war, the war implementation is the source and development power of the strategic theories.

Strategic theory, basically, is the guidance regulation of the entire war, which is reflected in the people’s mind. In ancient times, we could not even talk about consciously controlling the war. Due to the development of war implementation, people gradually recognized that there was the existence of some regulations in the guidance and policies in the war and war preparation. Some factors have relatively stable and absolute connections to victory and defeat of the war. This way, the strategic consciousness and the early sprouting stage of the

theories of strategy started to emerge. The strategy as a specific research area and a subject of study gradually became independent. In China, the strategic thoughts started early (Book of History),(I Ching),(Book of Poetry) (phonetic),etc. There were many ingenious strategic thoughts in these wise old books. In the Chun-qiu and the Warring States period, the society went through rapid reforms; the wars occurred frequently; the war tactics and methods were continuously upgraded, and the strategic application became more self-aware and mature. It was based on the large amount of war implementation during this period, that many military books, which set the rules, emerged. Among them, especially (Sun Zhi's The Art of War) had revealed many basic regulations of the military activities from the strategic viewpoint, and had reached the zone, which was difficult to reach by the latter people. In Europe, famous wars, such as, the war of Greece and Persia (550 B.C.-449 B.C.), the Buno war(phonetic)(334 B.C.-323 B.C.), Julius Cesar's Gallic war, etc. also contributed greatly to the establishment and development of strategic theories. About the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, the French Revolution and Napoleon's war, had pushed forward the development of strategic theories. Romeny(phonetic) (The general discussions of the art of war.) and Clausewitz's (The Theory of war) were written based on the conclusion of these two wars and other capitalistic wars. The 20th century has been a turbulent century with frequent wars, which were rich in styles and forms. Almost at every big war, especially the typical war, it would be accompanied by one change and leap and bound advancement of strategic theory. Looking at the history, the war implementation was like a testing ground, which inspected the past strategic policies and strategic war theories. It was also like a barometer, which totally reflected the newest movement of military development in a very focused manner and just like the cultivation base, which continuously produced new embryos of strategic thoughts. Therefore, researching and developing strategic theories must pay attention to the war implementation, which included the past wars and modern wars. Only this way, it is possible to win the battle of tomorrow with accurate and potent strategic guidance and promote continuous development in the strategic theory.

Subsection Two. Strategic theories are developed through the historical progression of social reforms. The birth of new social relationships and the emergence of new social forces have great facilitating functions on the development of strategic theories.

War is a product of privatization. It is the highest form of struggle, which solves the conflicts amongst classes, nations, countries, and political groups. It is the continuation of politics through different means. Strategy is formed and developed through fierce struggles amongst different classes, and intense crashes amongst political powers. Historically, every political revolution had its unique presentation on military strategic thoughts and the force of a new class had important impact to strategic thoughts. Whenever new social relationships started to sprout, the force of a new class stepped on to the historical stage and the society underwent large reforms. It would bring prosperity, development, and great breakthrough to the strategic theories. For example, Chun-qiu Warring States era was the time that our country moved from the slavery system to the feudal system. At that time, the new born feudal class made bold military reforms and was creative in their realization of political demands, which quickly made Chinese ancient strategic theories prosperous and mature. The development of productivity relationship of the capitalistic class and the rise of the capitalistic class revolution broke the feudal system and the shackles of the religions and

theologies. It also broke through the depressed and fruitless situation of several hundred years in the middle centuries. The French revolution liberated the large amount of farmers from their reliance on feudal land. Thus it fostered the scarifying spirit of the masses to defend their fatherland, which made the creation of Napoleon's war system and strategic theory possible. From which came the strategy, which was based on the concentrated, massive, quick, fierce, and sudden attack and bold military initiative. Lenin indicated with great enthusiasm that the masses of the French revolution displayed great creative spirit; changed the entire strategic system; abolished the old rules of war; created new methods of war. The proletariats belonged to the class with the most advanced and rich with revolutionary and creative spirit in the history. Marx indicated, "The liberation of the proletariats will have their own chance of military performance." After the birth of Marxism, the strategic theory gained great development and thorough reforms, which fully illustrated this point. The scientific view of the world of Marxism is like sunlight, which lit up the territory of military science and established the military strategy theory on the scientific basis of historic materialism. It was because of this that it has become a true science. Marx's strategy, which was related to the people's war principles, active defense, and concentrated forces, etc. possessed a very special meaning in the history of strategic development. Mao Ze-dong's military thoughts, which related to his brilliant discussions of strategic issues and the ingenious and skillful application of strategies in the Chinese revolutionary war, became a brilliantly dazzling jewel in the field of strategic theories.

Subsection Three. The development of strategic theories was based on the premise of the productivity and the possibility of supplying war materials due to this productivity. The development of productivity, the great advancement of the science and technology in particular, is the propeller, which allowed the creativity of the strategic theories and made it advance by leaps and bounds.

Any war cannot depart from economic conditions. "The victory of violence is based on the production of weapons. The production of weapons is based on entire productivity. Thus, the materialistic resource of violence relies on 'economic power' and 'economic conditions'." The entire history of the development of strategic theories illustrated that the economy is the origin of the development of strategic thoughts. Engels said, "Nothing relies on the economic premise than the army and navy. Equipment, formation, organization, tactics and strategy, must first rely on the level of productivity and the conditions of transportation." In the agricultural and manual trade industry era, the war tactics were rather backward due to the individual labor as the trait of social productivity and low productivity level of social materialistic resources. The space of war was narrower, which restricted the time, space, and vision of the strategists. Thus, the connotation volume of the strategy in this period was smaller. In the big industrial era, the rapid development of social productivity truly made the human history becoming the world history, which brought big changes to the military. This way, the military strategists in the capitalistic countries had broken through the skylight of the military strategic thoughts. They tried hard to expand to overseas and to the wide-open space. Compared to the simplistic value on land by the feudal society, they placed more value on resources and markets. This gave the needs and materialistic protection to the development of capitalistic strategic theories. The emergence of the strategic thoughts, such as the "naval supremacy," "air supremacy," "mechanized war theory," and "all out war," etc.,

reflected the need to expand the capitals. They were also developed on the basis of modern science and technologies and the development of mechanized weapons and equipment, such as war ships, airplanes, tanks, etc. After World War II, nuclear technology became the major factor, which impacted the changes of the strategies in every country in the world and many nuclear strategic thoughts emerged. After the 1980s, the rapid and fierce development of advanced technology changed the face of the human social life, which included the military field. The characteristics of the advanced weapons, such as high concentration of science and technologies, heavy investment, and large consumption, had further intensified the military's reliance on the economy and science and technologies. The competition of the military increasingly became more of a competition of national power. Thus, to eagerly elevate the combined power of a nation has become the focus of many countries' strategic thoughts.

Subsection Four. The nature of the strategic theory is like the art of playing 'go' of the politics and military. The structure of political and military struggles deeply impacted on the development of strategic theories.

The strategic plan possesses the characteristics of opposition and playing 'go'. The method of opposition and the set up on the 'go' game will affect the birth and growth of strategic theories, contents, and methods. The ancient Chinese was geographically in relatively sealed situations. During its long history, various internal political forces or divisions of powers of the Chinese nationalities had many ups and downs; they fought to grapple the powers. The final conclusion was that they were trying to solve the problems of unification and consolidation of their political powers. On this land, there was constant 'together long enough, they split up; split up long enough, they get together'. This richness and changeable quality of the structure of the political and military struggles undoubtedly had contributed greatly to the formation and changes of the Chinese strategic theories. China had long brewed the intimidating strategy of 'victory without a fight,' the alliance strategy of 'to ally with forces, which oppose to our enemies,' the military strategy of 'regular or irregular, which generate strength,' and the strategic thought of 'secure the center and strengthen the border area.' Outside of China, after the capitalism had connected the world into one entity, the world structures, such as the Frankfort system, Versailles-Washington system, and Yalta system, etc., all had great impact on the development of strategic theories. Especially, starting in the 1940s, the world strategies, guided by the bipolar confrontation of the 'Yalta structure', had persisted for almost half a centuries. The 'deterrent strategy' and "surpass the deterrent theory" (phonetic) of the United States were deeply branded by this structure. Entering the 1990s, the bipolar structure broke up. The international strategies had generally moved toward the tendency of multipolar structures. But there was a big loss in the balance of international strategic powers, which was reflected in the military unilateralism (phonetic), the strategy of 'absolute superiority,' and the strategy of 'absolute security.'

Subsection Five. The strategic theories possess the continuity and inheritance of the historical and cultural traditions. Each nation's cultural traditions, especially those deeply ingrained in the national cultural psychology, will have deep and far influence on the developmental processes of strategic theories.

From the historical perspective, the development of strategic theories had experienced the processes from simple to scientific, from confusion to precision, from fragmentary to systematic, from generality to specific. But the strategic theories do not come from one source. The strategic theory of each nationality and country possesses unique characteristics from the very beginning due to the differences of cultural backgrounds, geographical environments, social systems, and historical traditions, etc. They will continue to remain different. The influence of each national culture on the strategic theory, Firstly, is represented on the orientation of the strategy. For example, China has 5000 years of uninterrupted history of civilization, which formed a very unique cultural heritage of the nation. The Confucianists advocated kindness and self-discipline. The Taoists advocated gentility and plain living. The Mohists advocated working hard and enduring hardship and honesty. The military specialists advocated grabbing power and developing strategies. The political strategists of the Warring States era advocated being careful about time and assessing the situations. The Legalists School advocated agriculture and war education.(phonetic). They all had made great impact to the development of Chinese strategic thoughts and strategic culture. The Chinese philosophy of honoring the sameness and valuing the oneness and the 2000 year history of a united nation with multi-nationalities, had made the concept of national unity deeply ingrained in the hearts of the people. The national unity occupied a very important position in Chinese strategic thoughts. Second, is illustrated on the methodology of strategic thoughts. The differences of the philosophical methods of the east and west were the important reasons why their strategic theories possess different characteristics. The premature and well-developed dialectic thought of China and the intellectual brilliance, which was unique in the Chinese culture, made the Chinese strategic theories rich with bright speculative and scheming colors. Mao Ze-dong's military thoughts naturally belonged to the treasure chest of Marxism. But from the brilliant discussions of his strategic issues in the Chinese revolutionary war, and his unprecedented strategic artistry, we could see the long and continuous traditions of our strategic culture.

Footnotes of Chapter 3

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3. The Historical Records. The original records of five emperors.
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6. Marx and Engels' " Military Literary Works", The 1st Volume, age 363.
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8. The American, **John Collins'** (phonetic) "Big Strategy", The Chinese People's Liberation Army Military Science Institute. Published in 1978, Page 5.

9. The Russian, **Milstein**(phonetic), etc. “The Discussion of Military Science Of The Capitalists.” Shanghai People’s Publishing Firm, Published in 1959, Page 31.
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24. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 695.
25. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 695.
26. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 307.
27. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 692 and 693.
28. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 2, Page 318.

29. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 4, Page 355.
30. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 6, Page 404.
31. "People's Daily", 1965 September 3rd.
32. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 4, Page 41.
33. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 4, Page 127.
34. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 1, Page 744 and 745.
35. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 1, Page 732.
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37. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 2, Page 336.
38. "Mao Ze-dong's Military Literary Works" Volume 1, Page 719.
39. "Deng Xiao-ping's "Discussions On National Defense and Military Constructions" Page 60.
40. "Deng Xiao-ping's "Discussions On National Defense and Military Constructions" Page 98.