Jeffrey K. McDonough

Professor of Philosophy


G.W. Leibniz, Unicum Opticae, Catoptricae et Dioptricae Principium,
Acta Eruditorum, Leipzig 1682

Peer-Reviewed Articles

Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Later Years,” The Philosophical Review (125:1) 2016: 1-34.  PDF
This essay offers an account of the relationship between extended Leibnizian bodies and unextended Leibnizian monads, an account that shows why Leibniz was right to see intimate, explanatory connections between his studies in physics and his mature metaphysics. The first section sets the stage by introducing a case study from Leibniz’s technical work on the strength of extended, rigid beams. The second section draws on that case study to introduce a model for understanding Leibniz’s views on the relationship between derivative and primitive forces. The third section draws on Leibniz’s understanding of the relationship between derivative and primitive forces in order to shed light in turn on his understanding of the relationship between the extended, material bodies and unextended, immaterial monads. The fourth section responds to a likely objection by arguing that Leibniz’s monads may, in a perfectly reasonable sense, be spatially located.

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists,” Ergo (2:15) 2015: 367-392. Link
In a stimulating recent paper, “Violations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in Leibniz and Spinoza),” Michael Della Rocca argues that rationalists face a daunting dilemma: either abandon the Principle of Sufficient Reason or embrace a radical, Parmenidian-style monism. The present paper argues that neither historical nor contemporary rationalists need be afraid of Della Rocca’s dilemma. The second section reconstructs Della Rocca’s argument in five steps. The third section argues that Leibniz’s treatment of relations undermines one of those steps in particular and thus provides him—as well as contemporary rationalists—with a way out. The fourth section argues that a similar way out is available to Spinoza, and that it’s a better way out than either of the two options Della Rocca offers on Spinoza’s behalf. The essay concludes with an historically-minded suggestion for those eager to revitalize the once-again popular notion of grounding.

"Leibniz's Conciliatory Account of Substance," Philosophers' Imprint, (13:6) 2013: 1-23. Link
This essay offers an alternative account of Leibniz’s views on substance and fundamental ontology.  The proposal is driven by three main ideas.  First, that Leibniz’s treatment should be understood against the backdrop of a traditional dispute over the paradigmatic nature substance as well as his own overarching conciliatory ambitions.  Second, that Leibniz’s metaphysics is intended to support his conciliatory view that both traditional views of substance are tenable in at least their positive and philosophical respects.  Third, that the relationship between immaterial substances, corporeal substances, and ordinary bodies in Leibniz’s metaphysics is best understood as one of “material” constitution.  The interpretation as a whole thus suggests that Leibniz needn’t be read as offering either an exclusive defense of corporeal substance realism, nor of immaterial substance idealism, nor as being deeply torn (at a time or over time) between two such views.  He may instead be seen as offering a carefully presented, consistent, and sophisticated conciliatory account of substance.

"Leibniz and the Puzzle of Incompossibility: The Packing Strategy," The Philosophical Review (119:2) 2010: 135-163. Winner of the 2008 Leibniz Society Essay Competition PDF
Confronting the threat of a Spinozistic necessitarianism, Leibniz insists that not all possible substances are compossible – that they can’t all be instantiated together – and thus that not all possible worlds are compossible – that they can’t all be instantiated together. While it is easy to appreciate Leibniz’s reasons for embracing this view, it has proven difficult to see how his doctrine of incompossibility might be reconciled with the broader commitments of his larger philosophical system. This essay develops, in four sections, a novel solution to the “puzzle of incompossibility.” The first section frames the difficulty more carefully and briefly argues that the two dominant strategies developed by Leibniz’s commentators fail to solve it fully insofar as they require simply abandoning one or another of its motivating commitments. The second and third sections show how Leibniz’s guiding analogy of a geometrical packing or tiling problem may be applied to solve the puzzle of incompossibility in the context of finite and infinite worlds composed of extended corporeal substances. Finally, the fourth section shows how the strategy of Leibniz’s packing analogy might be applied even in the context of a thoroughly idealist metaphysics in which the only true substances are non-extended, mind-like “monads.” The essay concludes by drawing some connections between Leibniz’s thinking about the puzzle of incompossibility and the development of his views concerning the status of corporeal substances and extended bodies.

"Leibniz's Optics and Contingency in Nature," Perspectives on Science (18:4) 2010: 432-455. PDF
It has been tempting to suppose that the central theses of Leibniz's mature understanding of the laws of nature are forged in the domain of physics and opportunistically carried over to the domain of optics. This essay argues that that tempting story gets things essentially the wrong way around. Each of its three main sections accordingly takes up one of the defining features of Leibniz’s mature understanding of the laws of nature and argues that it is best understood as arising from his increasingly sophisticated attempts to show that the laws of optics can be thought of as selecting one uniquely determined actual path from an infinite family of possible paths. Collectively the three sections aim to show that the crucial nexus of views at the heart of Leibniz’s mature philosophical understanding of the laws of nature has its most intelligible roots in his optical derivations, which appear to have paved the way – both historically and conceptually – for the philosophical significance he assigns to his discoveries in the domain of physics. Optics the horse, as it were, physics the cart.

"Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Laws of Optics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (78:3) 2009: 505-544. PDF
This essay examines one of the cornerstones of Leibniz’s defense of teleology within the order of nature, namely, his derivation of the two central laws of geometrical optics from his “Most Determined Path Principle” or “MDPP”. The first section places the MDPP in its historical context, and argues that it allows Leibniz to bring to the fore philosophical issues concerning the legitimacy of teleological explanations by addressing two technical objections raised by Cartesians to non-mechanistic derivations of the laws of optics. The second section argues that, by drawing on laws such as the MDPP, Leibniz is able to introduce a thin notion of teleology that gives him the resources to respond to the most pressing charges of his day by showing how teleology within the order of nature may be stripped of problematic Scholastic commitments, fitted to accepted explanatory structures, and successfully applied to a wide and promising range of natural phenomena. Finally, the third section argues that contemporary philosophers have been overly hasty in their dismissal of Leibniz’s account of natural teleology, and indeed that their own generally thin conceptions of teleology have left them with few well-motivated resources for resisting Leibniz’s elegant position.

"Berkeley, Human Agency and Divine Concurrentism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, (46:4) 2008: 567-590. Winner of the 2007 Colin and Alisa Turbayne International Berkeley Essay Prize PDF
Berkeley ’s commentators have been highly critical of his account of human agency. In this essay I argue that there is a rather straightforward reading of his view that is historically sensitive, philosophically well-motivated, and fits squarely with his texts. The paper falls into four main sections. The first section briefly revisits three options concerning the relationship between human and divine agency available to theistically minded philosophers in the medieval and early modern eras. The second argues that of those three views only the position of concurrentism is consistent with Berkeley’s texts. The third section explores Berkeley’s reasons for adopting concurrentism, especially as opposed to occasionalism, by highlighting three motivating considerations drawn from his larger philosophical system. Finally the fourth section attempts to flesh out Berkeley’s understanding of human activity by looking at how we might understand his claim that we move our legs ourselves in light of his commitments to idealism and concurrentism.

"Leibniz's Two Realms Revisited," Nôus, (42:4) 2008: 673-696 PDF
In his attempt to reconcile piety and the new science, teleology and mechanism, final causation and efficient causation, Leibniz often speaks of there being two realms – a “kingdom of power or efficient causes” and “a kingdom of wisdom or final causes.” In this essay, I explore Leibniz’s attempt to apply this doctrine to the natural world. The essay falls into four main parts. The first part looks to Leibniz’s much neglected work in optics for the roots of his view that the world can be seen as being governed by two complete sets of equipotent laws. The second offers an account of how this picture of lawful over-determination is to be reconciled with Leibniz’s mature metaphysics. The third addresses a line of objection proposed by David Hirschmann to the effect that Leibniz’s two realms doctrine as applied to the physical world undermines his stated commitment to an efficient, broadly mechanical, account of the natural world. Finally the fourth part suggests that Leibniz’s thinking about the harmony of final and efficient causes in connection with corporeal nature may help to shed light on his understanding of the teleological unfolding of monads as well.

"Leibniz: Creation and Conservation and Concurrence," Leibniz Review, (17) 2007: 31-60. Winner of the 2007 Leibniz Society Essay Competition
In this paper, I argue – contrary to current consensus – that the hoary theological doctrine of divine concurrence poses no deep threat to Leibniz’s views on theodicy and creaturely activity even as they have been traditionally understood. The paper itself falls into four main sections. The first revisits Leibniz’s views on creation, paying special attention to his twin aims of showing that God is neither morally nor physically responsible for the initial imperfections of the world, as well as to the thesis that through creation God brings into existence genuine secondary causal agents. The second turns to Leibniz’s understanding of the doctrine of divine conservation, focusing on the compatibility between God’s immediate per se conservation of creatures and the possibility of change within the order of nature. The third takes up Leibniz’s views on concurrentism directly, with special care being given to the question of how God and creatures might be thought to act together in bringing about creaturely effects, and how God’s role in bringing about those effects within the order of nature is to be reconciled with the demands of Leibnizian theodicy. Finally, the fourth section looks at worries arising from the bridging principle that conservation is a continued, or continuous, creation. What emerges from the discussion is, I hope, a clearer picture of Leibniz’s views on the nature of monadic causation, his understanding of the relationship between divine and creaturely activity, and his position with respect to later medieval and early modern debates over secondary causation.

“A Rosa multiflora by Any Other Name: Taxonomic Incommensurability and Scientific Kinds,” Synthese (136) 2003: 337-358. PDF
This paper attempts to explore, criticize and develop Thomas Kuhn’s most mature – and surprisingly neglected – view of incommensurability. More specifically, it focuses on (1) undermining an influential picture of scientific kinds that lies at the heart of Kuhn’s understanding of taxonomic incommensurability; (2) sketching an alternative picture of scientific kinds that takes advantage of Kuhn’s partially developed theory of disciplinary matrices; and (3) using these two results to motivate revisions to Kuhn’s theory of taxonomic incompatibility, as well as, to the purported bridge between taxonomic incompatibility and some of the traditional problems associated with incommensurability.

“Hume’s Account of Memory,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy (10:1) 2002: 71-87.
This essay attempts to provide a sympathetic reading of Hume’s often tangled discussion of memory in the Treatise. It divides into three main sections. The first section isolates three puzzles in Hume’s account of memory. The second section attempts to show how those puzzles arise as a result of Hume’s understandable failure to recognize a necessary connection between memory and causation. Finally, the third section looks at how the reading of Hume’s account of memory offered in the first two sections fits into the larger context of his work by considering the roles he assigns to memory in his famous account of personal identity.

“Defending the Refutation of Idealism,” Southwestern Philosophy Review (17:1) 2000: 35-44. Winner of the 2000 Southwestern Philosophical Society Essay Prize PDF
In his Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Paul Guyer offers an influential reading of Kant’s famous “Refutation of Idealism.” Guyer’s reading has been widely praised as Kantian exegesis but less favorably received as an anti-skeptical line of argument worthy of contemporary interest. In this paper, I focus on defending the general thrust of Guyer’s reading as a response to Cartesian skepticism. The paper falls into two sections. The first section constructs Guyer’s central argument in three steps and gives it a quasi-formal presentation. That presentation reveals the principal obstacle to the argument’s being convincing to a contemporary audience, namely, its apparent reliance on Kant’s prohibition against psychological laws governing mental states. The second section constructs a lemma in defense of Guyer’s general line of attack. In effect, it suggests that that line does not depend on a metaphysical ban on psychological laws, but only on the modest premise that according to the Cartesian’s concept of knowledge such laws cannot justify claims about the temporal order of the self.

“Rough Drafts without Tears: A Guide to a Manageable Procedure for Improving Student Writing,” Teaching Philosophy (23:2) 2000: 127-137. PDF
This teaching paper sketches a procedure that I have used in introductory courses to improve student writing by having students comment upon one another’s work. It contains two sections and an appendix. The first section looks briefly at the most traditional procedure for requiring rough drafts in order to highlight some of the difficulties which used to lead me – and no doubt others - away from requiring rough drafts from introductory students. Section 2 falls into three subsections. Part (A) outlines the proposed alternative strategy as I have used it in my own courses, and also suggests some ways in which it might be modified to better fit the needs of particular instructors. Part (B) discusses advantages of the alternative strategy over the more traditional approach to rough drafts. Part (C) then considers and responds to three major concerns raised with regards to the alternative strategy. An example handout is included as an appendix.

Invited Articles and Entries

"Leibniz on Monadic Teleology and Optimal Form,"Studia Leibnitiana Sonderhaft, Leibniz and Experience, ed. Arnauld Pelletier, 2016. PDF
This essay attempts to bring out the hidden coherence in Leibniz’s account of monadic teleology by drawing on the notion of an optimal form. The first section introduces Leibniz’s understanding of an optimal form through his work on the technical problem of determining the shape of catenaries, that is, the shape of freely hanging cords suspended at two ends.  The second section argues that Leibniz’s notion of an optimal form provides him with a surprisingly elegant model of how monads might be subject to two kinds of teleology at the same time.  The third section considers various ways in which monads may nonetheless pursue courses of action that are sub-optimal and takes up a famous objection raised by Pierre Bayle.  Finally, the fourth section argues that Leibniz’s notion of an optimal form provides him with a rather ingenious account of the role of reason in the teleological unfolding of rational monads.  The essay concludes with some brief remarks concerning the recently much debated question of whether Leibniz was or was not a systematic philosopher.

“Leibniz’s Formal Theory of Contingency Developed,” Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress X vorträge, eds. Ute Beckmann, et. al, (New York: Georg Olms Verlag), 2016: vol. 1, pp. 451-466. (with Zeynep Soysal)


This essay develops our meta-logical interpretation of Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency by taking up two additional issues not fully addressed in our earlier efforts. The first issue concerns the relationship between Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency and his views on species and essentialism. The second issue concerns the relationship between Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency and the modal status of the actual world.

“Berkeley on Ordinary Objects,” The Continuum Companion to Berkeley, eds. Bertil Belfrage and Dick Brook (New York: Continuum Press) (approx. 5,000 words), forthcoming. PDF
Berkeley famously maintains that spirits and ideas exhaust the fundamental ontology of the world. How then do ordinary objects – tables and chairs, cats and dogs – fit into Berkeley’s metaphysics? Section 1 of this essay presents the core of Berkeley’s account of ordinary objects as well as a longstanding objection to that account, namely that he must deny the commonsense conviction that ordinary objects persist even when not perceived by us. Sections 2 through 4 consider three lines of response to the problem of the persistence of ordinary objects that have been attributed to Berkeley by his commentators. Finally, section 5 suggests that those three lines of response might perhaps best be seen as complementary – rather than rival – threads in Berkeley’s considered understanding of things such as birds and bees, mountains and lakes.

“Leibniz’s Optics,” The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, ed. Maria Rosa Antognazza, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (approx. 5,000 words), forthcoming. PDF
Although often overlooked today, optics thrived in the early modern era as a science of first rank, engaging many of the best minds of the period and producing some of its most dramatic scientific results. The present essay attempts to shed light on Leibniz’s efforts to contribute to the development of early modern optics by focusing on his derivations of the laws of reflection and refraction. The first three sections accordingly examine Leibniz’s attempts to derive the central laws of geometrical optics in works drawn from his early, middle, and later optical studies. The fourth section briefly sketches Leibniz’s efforts to extend the sophisticated techniques found in his optical writings to related problems in natural philosophy. Connections to more familiar themes from Leibniz’s philosophy are drawn along the way.

Monad,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, forthcoming (with Jen Nguyen).


This article provides a brief overview of Leibniz’s understanding of monads for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It explains their metaphysical role, their intrinsic nature, and their tri-part division into bare monads, sensitive monads, and minds.

Freedom and the Ability to Sin,” Logoi, 2016. PDF

A short piece for Logoi on Saint Anselm of Canterbury and his understanding of the relationship between freedom and sin.

Descartes' "Dioptrics" and "Optics" The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon, ed. Larry Nolan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), (approx. 5,000 words total), 2016. PDF
Descartes’ work on optics spanned his entire career and represents a fascinating area of inquiry from both the perspectives of the history of science and his systematic natural philosophy. The first of these entries offers a brief account of Descartes' seminal work in optics, the Dioptrique, often translated as the Optics or, more literally, as the Dioptrics. The second entry overview of Descartes’ understanding of light, his derivations of the two central laws of geometrical optics, and a sampling of the optical phenomena he sought to explain.

"The Heyday of Teleology and Early Modern Philosophy" in Early Modern Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. John Carriero, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (35) 2011: 179-204. PDF
This paper argues that the standard reckoning of early modern proponents and opponents of traditional teleology tracks something deep and important in the period’s shifting attitudes towards teleology and teleological explanations. The first main section identifies two central commitments of ancient and medieval views on teleology. The second section argues that mainstream later medieval and early modern philosophers opposed the teleology of their predecessors by denying the explanatory parity of teleological and efficient causal explanations. The third section argues that Spinoza’s rejection of traditional teleology is rooted in his rejection of the ancient and medieval view that objective goodness is explanatory. Finally, the last main section argues that Leibniz’s claim to being a champion of traditional teleology rests securely on his attempt to defend both the traditional theses of explanatory parity and of explanatory goodness.

“Leibniz's Philosophy of Physics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition) revised 2014, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-physics/ (appx. 17,000 words)
This entry provides a broad overview of the central themes of Leibniz’s philosophy of physics, as well as an introduction to some of the principal arguments and argumentative strategies he used to defend his positions. It includes sections entitled, The Historical Development of Leibniz’s Physics, Leibniz on Matter, Leibniz’s Dynamics, Leibniz on the Laws of Motion, Leibniz on Space and Time. A bibliography arranged by topic is also included.

“Numbers, Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism,” Philosophical Perspectives (supplement to Nôus), Language, Mind and Ontology (12) 1998: 349-371 (with John Hawthorne) PDF
In this essay, we explore a fresh avenue into mind-body dualism by considering a seemingly distant question posed by Frege: "Why is it absurd to suppose that Julius Caesar is a number?". The essay falls into three main parts. In the first, through an exploration of Frege’s Julius Caesar problem, we attempt to expose two maxims applicable to the mind-body problem. In the second part, we draw on those maxims in arguing that “full blown dualism” is preferable to more modest, property-theoretic, versions. Finally, in the third part we close by suggesting that full blown dualism need not be spooky, resurrecting a broadly Lockean, rather than Cartesian, metaphysical picture.

Interview, Reviews and Commentaries

Interview & Discussion:

“Reply to ‘A Leibnizian Way out of the Rationalist’s Dilemma’ by Chloe Armstrong,’” an invited, two-part reply, for a featured discussion of my paper “Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists,” posted onThe Mod Squad: A Group Blog on Modern Philosophy, February 2016.


“Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant; Frege, Bees, Toasters and Julius Caesar,” an interview by Richard Marshall for 3:AM Magazine, September 19, 2014. (approx.. 5,600 words)


Published Reviews:

Review of “Steven Nadler, Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians,” The Philosophical Review, forthcoming. (with Colin Chamberlain) PDF

Review of Justin E. H. Smith, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life, Notre
Dame Philosophical Reviews, URL = http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/30317-divine-machines- leibniz-and-the-sciences-of-life-2/, 2012.

Review of “Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, (49:3) 2011: 380-381. PDF

Unpublished Commentaries:

Comments on Julia Jorati’s “How to be More Spontaneous: Leibniz on the Best Type of Agency” for Activity, Spontaneity, and Agency in Later Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy – An International Conference, University of Toronto, June 9-10, 2016. PDF

Comments on Robert Adams’s "Leibniz and Pantheism,” The Twelfth Annual NYU Conference on Issues in Modern Philosophy: God, NYU, New York, New York, November 2015. PDF

Comments on Msgr. Dr. Tomas Halik’s "Return of Religion as Opportunity: ‘Anatheism’ and Post-Modern Philosophy and Theology,” Colloquium event, Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study, November 2015. PDF

Comments on Adam Harmer’s ‘Leibniz Against the World Soul: Three Versions’,” Leibniz Society of North America Meeting, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, October 2015. PDF

Comments on Daniel Garber's "Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad,” presented at The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meeting, Washington D.C., December 2011. PDF

Comments on Daniel Garber's "Metaphysics and Theology: The Role of the Monadology in Leibniz's Essais de Théodicée," presented at Leibniz's Theodicy: Context and Content, Notre Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame University, September 2010. PDF

Summary of "Leibniz's Optics and Contingency in Nature," with reply to comments by Daniel Garber, presented at Nature and Purpose in Early Modern Philosophy, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University, August 2009. PDF

Comments on Roger Ariew’s “Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suarez," presented at Franscico Suarez, S.J.: Last Medieval or First Early Modern?, London, Ontario, University of Western Ontario, September 2008. PDF

Comments on Sukjae Lee's "Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits," presented at Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Baltimore, MD, December 2007. PDF

Comments on Andy Egan’s "Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties," presented at California State University Long Beach, CA 2003. PDF


“How the Soul Acts on the Body,” a translation of a G. W. Leibniz's Anima Quomodo Agat in Corpus, dated by the Akademie Editors to the beginning of 1677 to the beginning of 1678. The note is reprinted in G.W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1923-) volume VI.iv.B.257. PDF

“On Existence,” a translation of G. W. Leibniz's De Existentia, dated by the Akademie Editors to December 1676 (?). The note is reprinted in G.W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1923-) volume VI.iii.87. PDF

"An Early Passage on Refraction," a translation of a selection taken from Descartes’ early Cogitationes Privatae of 1619-1621. The Latin text appears in Oeuvres de Descartes, Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (eds.) 1904. Paris: J. Vrin., volume X, pages 242-3. PDF

“Texts Related to Leibniz’s Comments on his Discussion with Fardella,” a translation of three texts grouped by the Akademie Editors together with Leibniz’s famous notes on his discussion with Michel Angelo Fardella in 1690. The Latin texts appear as De Corpore et Substantia Vere Una, 329 2; Differentia Inter Constitutionem Lineae ex Punctis et Materiae ex Substantiis, 329 3; and Pars Toto Minor, 329 4; in G.W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1923-) 1672-4. PDF

"An Untitled Derivation of the Law of Refraction, December 1681," a translation of a note made by Leibniz, and dated "December 1681," transcribed by Ernst Gerland and published in his Leibnizens Nachgelassene Schriften Physikalischen, Mechanischen und Technischen Inhalts (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1906; reprinted Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan University Library, 2006), 73. PDF-text


“A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics,” a translation with notes of G. W. Leibniz’s “Unicum Opticae, Catoptricae, et Dioptricae Principium,” originally published in June 1682 in the Acta Eruditorum; reprinted in L. Dutens, ed., Opera Omnia (Geneva: Fratres De Tournes, 1768), volume III, 145-150. PDF-text


"A Conjecture Why It Seems That Anaxagoras Could Have Said That Snow Is Black, for Jacob Thomasius in a Letter Sent 16 February 1666,” a translation of G. W. Leibniz’s “Conjectura cur Anaxagoras nivem nigram dicere potuisse videatur, petenti Jac. Thomasio in scheda missa d. 16 Febr. 1666,” reprinted in Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923-; (Reihe) II, (Band) 1, 4-5. PDF

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© 2012 Jeffrey K. McDonough