

# LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN COMMUNIST STATES

*Edited by*

**Raymond Taras**

Boston

UNWIN HYMAN

London Sydney Wellington

© 1989 by Unwin Hyman  
 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction  
 without permission. All rights reserved.

**Unwin Hyman, Inc.**  
 8 Winchester Place, Winchester, Mass. 01890, USA

Published by the Academic Division of  
**Unwin Hyman Ltd**  
 15/17 Broadwick Street, London W1V 1FP, UK

Allen & Unwin (Australia) Ltd,  
 8 Napier Street, North Sydney, NSW 2060, Australia

Allen & Unwin (New Zealand) Ltd in association with the  
 Port Nicholson Press Ltd,  
 Compusales Building, 75 Ghuznee Street, Wellington 1, New Zealand

First published in 1989.

Chapter 3, "Institutions, Factions, Conservatism, and Leadership Change  
 in China: The Case of Hu Yaobang," is published by permission of  
 Transaction Publishers from *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. VIII,  
 No. 1. Copyright © 1988 by the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies.

---

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Leadership change in Communist states / edited by Raymond Taras.

p. cm.  
 Bibliography: p.  
 Includes index.

Contents: Political competition in Communist elites / Raymond  
 Taras—From Brezhnev to Gorbachev / George W. Breslauer—  
 Institutions, factions, conservatism and leadership change in China  
 / David Bachman—Origins of leadership change in the Socialist  
 Republic of Vietnam / Douglas Pike—Leadership changes,  
 factionalism, and organizational politics in Cuba since 1960 / Jorge  
 I Domínguez—Factional activity in East European Communist parties  
 / Raymond Taras—Conclusion / Alfred G. Meyer.

ISBN 0-04-445277-2

1. Heads of state—Communist countries—Succession. 2. Elite  
 (Social sciences)—Communist countries. 3. Communist countries—  
 Politics and government. I. Taras, Ray, 1946—  
 JC474.L3535 1989 89-5477  
 305.5'2'091717—dc 19 CIP

---

**British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data**

Taras, Ray  
 Leadership change in communist states.  
 I. Communist countries. Politics  
 I. Title  
 320.9171'7  
 ISBN 0-04-445277-2

---

Typeset in 10 on 12 point Bembo by Nene Phototypesetters Ltd  
 and printed in Great Britain by Billing and Sons Ltd, London and Worcester

## Contents

Contributors	page	vii
Preface		ix
1 <i>Political Competition and Communist Leadership: A Historiographical Introduction</i>		1
RAYMOND TARAS		
2 <i>From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Ends and Means of Soviet Leadership Selection</i>		24
GEORGE W. BRESLAUER		
3 <i>Institutions, Factions, Conservatism, and Leadership Change in China: The Case of Hu Yaobang</i>		73
DAVID BACHMAN		
4 <i>Origins of Leadership Change in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam</i>		107
DOUGLAS PIKE		
5 <i>Leadership Changes, Factionalism, and Organizational Politics in Cuba since 1960</i>		129
JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ		
6 <i>Factional Activity in Eastern European Communist Parties: Crisis Management and Leadership Change</i>		156
RAYMOND TARAS		
7 <i>Conclusion: Problem Solving and Power Struggles</i>		188
ALFRED G. MEYER		
Index		201

*Leadership Changes, Factionalism,  
and Organizational Politics  
in Cuba since 1960<sup>1</sup>*

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ

Factionalism in political parties is a slightly pejorative term for what is typically a normal struggle over power, influence, and policy. That its connotation is somewhat negative reflects in part the willingness of scholars to accept a party's hopes for itself—coherence in ideology, programs, structure, and loyalties—as if they were fact. But the connotation also reflects a common view that factions deal in the politics of personal rivalries and individual or small group claims for status and position, with less regard for the making of policy or for representing broadly based interests.

Although much about factionalism can be self-serving and unseemly, factions in Communist party politics may not always be “bad.” Factions in single-party regimes may help to approximate the more open competition among contrasting ideas that exists in polyarchies without risking loss of control by the dominant party. Disputes arising from organizational politics can perform these services as well. Such a limited competition among factions and among agencies may provide useful criticism about malperforming office holders or about current policies, may generate alternative policy recommendations, and may help the top leaders to drop ineffective lower-level leaders or counterproductive policies. These changes may be adopted gradually and incrementally. In contrast, the absence of competition may deprive the top leaders of such options and may permit wrongheaded policies to be adopted and implemented. When changes are made, they tend to be drastic and sudden. In addition, the absence of factional and organizational struggles may channel the normal struggle over power, policy, and status into less formal cliques that may fail to provide the personnel

and policy debate advantages of factionalism and organizational politics.

With regard to the 1960s, I will argue that factionalism in the Cuban Communist party and organizational politics in the Cuban bureaucracy, though they seemed divisive and fruitless at the time, in the long run helped the top leaders—including Fidel Castro—to remain aware of alternative courses of action, which were eventually adopted. In contrast, the absence of meaningful factionalism in the 1980s, along with the effort to limit the scope of organizational politics, limited political cooperation and competition to the sphere of mutual protection cliques and enabled Fidel Castro to adopt policies that have already been counterproductive for the regime's own goals.

#### TYPES OF ELITE CONFLICTS

Factions are self-conscious personal groupings of politicians and bureaucrats who either belong to or formally defer to the same political party. They are not confined to any one bureaucracy or region in the country; instead, they can be drawn from wide social and political circles. They acknowledge one or more leaders of their group. And they struggle continuously with other similar groupings of the same party over officeholding and influence. Otherwise, factional systems may differ along several dimensions. Some parties legalize the existence of factions, whereas other parties seek to prohibit factions. Some factions struggle over policy, but some do not. Some factions are exclusive—that is, one must belong to one faction and to no other; other factions are not exclusive.

The existence of factions presupposes that a political party has a well-defined organizational life. Where that is not generally the case, as in the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, factions exist mainly in the organizational arena of the U.S. Congress and state legislatures and within the party that controls the executive branch.

Factions are not unique to communist parties. Japan's Liberal Democratic party (LDP) has long had a well-developed system of factions. One reason for the existence of these factions has to do with the origin of the party. The LDP was formed in 1955 by a merger of two then existing conservative parties (Liberals and

Democrats), each of which had been formed by a series of shifting coalitions of various conservative groupings that emerged after World War II. The personal ties among politicians drawn from the earlier political formations continued into the LDP. Japan's electoral law and its multimember electoral district system accommodated well this pattern of factionalism and, in the long run, helped it to endure. Factional competition is very vigorous over officeholding but tends to avoid disputes over ideology and policy. These disputes emerge in other policy settings and among the various political parties (Tsurutani 1977: chap. 4).

Party factions may be the last refuge of elements of polyarchy when the leaders of existing parties seek to curtail competition to achieve some other goal. This was part of the story of Japan's LDP, though the existence of other Japanese parties assured vigorous interparty competition. Colombia is a more noteworthy example of the contribution of factions to the preservation of elements of political competition. In 1957 Colombia's Liberal and Conservative parties signed a series of pacts (called the National Front agreements) to overthrow dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. In addition, the parties agreed to alternate the presidency between them, to share equally all lower-level offices, to require a two-thirds vote for the approval of laws in Congress, to exclude other parties from participating in elections for a period of 16 years, and generally to limit political competition in order to reduce the level of violence that gripped the country; a national plebiscite added these provisions to the Constitution.

Although factions had always existed in Colombia, the National Front breathed new life into them. Because competition between Liberals and Conservatives had been eliminated, the factions found new freedom to compete among themselves without threatening a party's fortunes. This feature also enabled Colombian factions to compete at times over policy as well as personnel. In addition, Colombia's electoral law both accommodated the existence of factions and facilitated their operation. The electoral law stipulated that each party could have several lists; that each list could have a formal faction label in the voting booth; that each faction could offer several lists under its label; that votes would be counted in order to allow each faction to transfer and cumulate votes from its weakest to its strongest lists; and that seats within each party could be allocated by proportional representation (Kline 1980).

Communist party factions are formally illegal, and thus they differ radically from those just described. Their illegality also means that they tend to be much less exclusive than the formally constituted Japanese LDP or Colombian National Front factions; communist party members may have good relations with more than one faction.

The very existence of factions is a variable, and especially so in communist party politics—that is, factions may appear or disappear as time passes. Some of the arguments among scholars about whether factions exist in a particular communist party and, if so, what they are, may miss the mark. Seemingly opposed scholarly arguments may be equally correct, though for different periods; factions that exist at one time may have disappeared later on (Hough and Fainsod 1979: chap. 14).

Factional politics should be distinguished from organizational politics—that is, the coalitions that may form in government on the basis of bureaucratic or occupational connections. Although these also feature conflict over personnel and officeholding, their defining characteristic is that they emerge out of the policy arena and that many disputes stem more from organizational roles than from the individual characteristics of power contenders. In other words, persons in roles X and Y are likely to compete with each other over the allocation of resources no matter who occupies those roles.

Leaders of factions are not necessarily or irrevocably linked to one organization; they may be generalists in their career patterns. Leaders in organizational politics are typically representing the interests of the organization they lead. Leaders of factions may hold enduring views on various issues as they shift from one organization to another. Leaders in organizational politics hold the views they do mainly because of their organizational roles. Factions may compete over issues that may or may not be related to the organizations in which their members work; organizational politics are more narrowly focused on issues that pertain to particular organizations.

Organizational politics often arise as competing coalitions within subsectors of a government—for example, among economic agencies over the allocation of resources for production. Factions, on the other hand, may more easily connect political leaders in disparate spheres, such as culture, the armed forces, or consumer goods industry. To compete in organizational politics, leaders

often seek out their counterparts in other organizations whose missions are complementary. To compete in factional politics, organizational complementarity may or may not be relevant depending on the circumstances. Factions, therefore, resemble a political party more than competitive organizational politics because factions address a wider array of personnel and policy issues.

In turn, both factional and organizational politics should be distinguished from the politics of cliques. These operate mainly within single organizations, where subordinates and superiors help and protect one another. Although cliques may have an impact on personnel and policy, they are much more limited in scope than is the case for factional and organizational politics.

Finally there are networks of friends. Individuals who met in school, during military service, or at some point in their professional development may have retained ties as they move along in their careers, and they may help each other to the extent possible. These friendship ties, however, need not be related to policy views and need not be connected to organizational roles. Because friendships may exist among persons working in quite different organizations, friendship networks also differ from cliques as defined earlier.

Friendship networks may matter greatly for individual career advancement and may serve as building blocks for cliques. Cliques and friendship networks, in turn, may be the building blocks for organizational politics and for factional politics. Nonetheless the impact of particular friendship networks, or of cliques, on national politics becomes evident only when one of its members becomes a high-level leader and brings those old-time friends and allies into powerful positions. In this chapter I will concentrate on the two clearest manifestations of organized political competition—factions and organizational politics—while remaining conscious of the enduring significance of the two less formal means of personal association.

#### *Can Some Good Come from Communist Party Factionalism?*

Other things being equal, factions are more likely to flourish when there is no towering figure dominating a communist party's politics, and they may be especially important during a political

succession. More generally the gradual institutionalization of communist party politics in Eastern Europe from the 1950s to the 1970s featured a shift from individual to collective leadership in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, and, upon Tito's death, later in Yugoslavia. Comparable processes occurred in China and Vietnam, especially after the deaths of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh (Barnett 1986: 37-65; Korbonski 1986; Rogers 1986).

To be sure, such transitions toward collective leadership are not irreversible, nor are they free from severe conflicts. Moreover even under collective leadership some individual leaders may become preeminent (for example, Deng Xiaoping in China from the late 1970s to the late 1980s). The key test of whether collective as opposed to individual leadership prevails is whether other members of the top leadership have their own independent sources of authority and have a capacity to slow down (as may have occurred with regard to aspects of political liberalization in China in 1985-87), block, or at times reverse the initiatives of the top leader. They often do this by building factional or organizational coalitions or both.

The outcomes of factional disputes have varied in the history of communist party politics. On balance, however, the strengthening of both factional and organizational leadership groupings in the Soviet Union and in much of Eastern Europe after the death of Stalin enhanced the personal safety of both leaders and ordinary citizens; facilitated the removal of incompetent, corrupt, or abusive personnel; and made it easier to cancel or to modify inappropriate policies and to experiment with new policies. Although some groupings no doubt existed under Stalin's rule, it was certainly much easier for them to function after his death.

Factions played a decisive role in the organization of power in the USSR in the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death, dramatically so when Nikita Khrushchev defeated his powerful opponents who had coalesced in what he called the "anti-party group." The members of this faction were drawn from many varied segments of the Soviet Communist party and government; its leaders actually met regularly to oppose Khrushchev and to plot his overthrow. This factional dispute focused on both officeholding and on key issues about the organization of state control over the economy (Barghoorn 1966: chap. 7; Hough and Fainsod 1979: 215-19).

Factionalism may have contributed to political paralysis in the Soviet Union by the late 1970s, however, in anticipation of Leonid Brezhnev's death, and in the early 1980s during the short-lived tenures of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Factionalism may also slow down or derail Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies launched in the late 1980s. On the other hand, such disputes were also the source of the criticism, analysis, and changes that made possible the Gorbachev reform effort in the first place (Colton 1986: chap. 3).

More complex is the case of the German Democratic Republic. The pattern of politics at the top has come to embody a wide array of factors, including factional and organizational conflicts as well as alternative claims based on professional expertise. To manage this growing complexity, Peter Ludz has argued, East German politics evolved toward a routinized "consultative authoritarianism" that permits regular exchanges among leaders of their assessments of policies and personnel and, as a result, permits changes in both in a timely fashion (Ludz 1972: 120-48). To be sure, consultative authoritarianism can easily become an enduring though somewhat enlarged oligarchy; the pattern of conflicts may be so restrained that innovations come all too slowly; and it can still be shaped by one top leader far more than by his associates. But compared with its predecessors, consultative authoritarianism is a preferable means to manage complex modern industrial societies; East Germany's economic performance in the 1970s and 1980s was one indication of the relative effectiveness of this approach.

There is an alternative path in the evolution of communist party politics. In the late 1920s Stalin manipulated and relied upon competing factions as effective checks and balances to safeguard his own power and eventually to destroy opposing factions. A similar path led the People's Republic of China to the Cultural Revolution. Factions and factional disputes had existed in the Chinese Communist party, becoming publicly evident in the 1950s. The Cultural Revolution can be interpreted as an attempt by Mao and his supporters to crush the power of competing factions, to enshrine Mao's "correct ideas" as the guide to policy, and to suppress criticisms of people and policies associated with Mao (Nathan 1977). The human and social costs that resulted from these years of upheaval make the politics of faction look good by comparison. And both the examples of Stalin and Mao reinforce the point that

stable factional politics flourish best in the absence of such a towering figure.

As expected from this analysis, factional politics intensified in China after Mao's death, highlighted by the dispute with and eventual defeat of the so-called Gang of Four by Deng Xiaoping and his allies. China may have begun a transition toward consultative authoritarianism in the 1980s. It is difficult to manage market socialism without permitting, and making good use of, the organized complexity of factional and organizational politics to generate criticism of personnel and policies and to foster innovation.

In short, although several benefits may be derived from factional politics, two important costs have also been noted. One is policy paralysis. The other is that one faction's leader turns to destroy his rivals without mercy. The latter happens most likely when a towering leader (Stalin, Mao, Castro) executes such policies. In the absence of such a leader, temporary policy paralysis remains the more routine cost of factional disputes. The gains in personal safety, personnel rotation, and policy choice that stem from factional disputes may outweigh the costs of potential paralysis in normal circumstances, but this can only be assessed case by case.

#### ELITE CONFLICT IN THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE 1960S

In the 1960s the Cuban Communist party exemplified several of the propositions sketched earlier. First, as was evident from the discussion about the origins of Japan's LDP or Colombia's National Front, party mergers or tight political pacts do not abolish all previous differences. Residual competition reemerges in the form of factions. Second, as was clear in the Colombian case, the abolition of interparty competition frees factions to compete vigorously with each other because they no longer fear the loss of the party's supremacy.

In summer 1961 the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) was founded to rule Cuba. This embryonic Communist party was put together from three preexisting organizations: the Twenty-six of July Movement, founded and led by Fidel Castro;

the Revolutionary Directorate, founded by and constituted mainly of university students; and the People's Socialist party (PSP), the prerevolutionary Communist party. Memberships were pooled; recruitment of new members proceeded slowly (Domínguez 1978: 210-18, 364-65).

In April 1961 the Cuban government defeated an invasion of Cuban exiles who had landed at the Bay of Pigs; the government used that opportunity to arrest tens of thousands of the domestic opposition. Moreover, from 1960 to 1962 the United States received about a quarter million Cubans emigrants disproportionately drawn from the ranks of managers, administrators, and professionals and from the religious and political opposition. The combined effect of military victory and the export of the opposition ended the most serious challenges to the regime, and it freed the constituents of the ORI to struggle over influence.

The ORI's national directorate (announced in early March 1962) was composed of ten members from the PSP, thirteen from the Twenty-six of July Movement, and two from the Revolutionary Directorate. Aníbal Escalante, from the PSP, had been serving as ORI organization secretary. Escalante gave preference in appointments to his old comrades from the PSP both to reward those faithful to him and because they were, in fact, the only ones who knew how to organize a party ready to rule over all. The Twenty-six of July Movement and the Revolutionary Directorate had more military than partisan experience.

Later in March 1962 Fidel Castro denounced Escalante and replaced him as organization secretary. In the revised six-man ORI Secretariat, only the fifth secretary came from the PSP. About half of the ORI's members were expelled. The results of this factional struggle changed the balance of power within the party and also led to changes in personnel and policy in other spheres. For example, the system of civilian political instructors in the armed forces, instituted by Escalante in 1961-62, was dropped; political power returned to high-ranking military officers. And the system of recruiting members into the party was changed to emphasize broader participation in the selection of party members and to build mass support for the party and the regime.

Castro had accused Escalante of "sectarianism" in favoring the old Communists at the expense of others. Escalante's faction was a self-conscious grouping around him; the Revolutionary

Directorate, led by Faure Chomón, and Castro's Twenty-six of July behaved as factions just as much. Faction members were not drawn only from one region or from one bureaucracy; they came from all over the country, and their members occupied posts throughout the regime's organizations. The old PSP leaders within the ORI kept in touch, exchanged ideas, and cooperated in the selection of policies and personnel. So did the members of the other founding factions of the ORI. Factions had been built on networks of friendship formed during prerevolutionary partisan, military, and other activities.

The old Communists were typically older than the members of the two other factions; they were more self-consciously Marxist-Leninist; most were civilians who had not participated in the armed struggle against Batista; they had long-standing ties with the Soviet Communist party; and they had a special importance within Cuba's labor movement. The two other factions had no contacts with the Soviets before 1959; their members were typically not Marxist-Leninists and were at times barely acquainted with this body of thought; and, though they were drawn from all walks of life, many of the leaders were middle-class professionals and, in the Directorate, most had been at the university (Gonzalez 1974: 96-103).

The events of March 1962 were the first of several factional disputes seeking to right perceived wrongs. Most dramatic was the accusation made in 1964 by Chomón, from the Revolutionary Directorate, that PSP member Marcos Rodríguez had worked for the Batista government's secret police, aiding its repression of the Directorate. Many other PSP members were tainted with this charge; Joaquín Ordoqui, a National Directorate member from the old PSP, was removed from office and arrested. Marcos Rodríguez was shot (Halperin 1972).

These were struggles for power and for personal influence. Many people suffered, at times needlessly, from these battles. And yet from the perspective of the consolidation of the regime and its improved capacity to govern, there were also benefits from these disputes. The "new Communists" came to realize the importance of organizational skills—which Escalante had used so effectively—to wield power and to promote people and policies. Changes made in the party's organization and procedures strengthened its capacity to govern. Many specific policies adopted in response to these disputes were quite sensible from the regime's perspective. The

factional disputes of the early 1960s also enhanced the regime's political coherence. A clear and necessary policy was adopted that those who had worked for Batista's forces in the 1950s could not be part of the new order, even if they had belonged to the PSP. (The PSP was part of Batista's coalition in the late 1930s and early 1940s—it named two ministers to Batista's cabinet—but it formally broke with him in the 1950s, though some PSP members retained ties to the Batista regime.) Moreover the two instances (1962, 1964) when factional disputes became public helped the regime to air criticisms as a means to change personnel and policies.

The utility of public disputes was evident also in the parallel evolution of organizational politics (Domínguez 1978: 383-91; Mesa-Lago 1971: part II; Ritter 1974).<sup>2</sup> Beginning in 1962, two debates surfaced in Cuba over economic policy. One focused on whether to give priority to the sugar industry or to the development of other branches of manufacturing as the means to develop Cuba's economy. The second debate focused on the extent of centralization required to formulate and implement economic policy. Two types of resources were used in this struggle: the building of coalitions among organizations with compatible interests, and the search for support from the towering leader—Fidel Castro.

Ernesto Guevara, minister of industries, was the chief spokesman for two views: Cuba had to industrialize out of dependency on sugar production; moreover centralized budgetary controls were the best way to manage the economy. Guevara argued that all aspects of the processing of sugar should be under his ministry; he also wanted his ministry to retain control over the foreign distribution of the goods that its units produced. If his views were adopted, his ministry's power would grow.

Not surprisingly, Guevara was opposed by the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA), headed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, which raised sugar cane and other agricultural products and which included aspects of sugar processing under its jurisdiction. Guevara was also opposed by the Foreign Trade Ministry, headed by Alberto Mora, which argued that the decline in sugar production hurt Cuba's exports (about four fifths of Cuban exports were sugar cane by-products) and which did not want to surrender its foreign trade monopoly. The Foreign Trade Ministry also required flexibility for its own work, and that was more consistent with granting

economic autonomy to its various enterprises than having them centrally controlled through the budget.

Other agencies joined sides consistent with their organizational interests. For example, the Ministry of Finance ran the central budget; it became Guevara's chief ally. The National Bank of Cuba would have an enhanced role through a system of enterprise autonomy that required the use of some market means; when Guevara attacked the bank precisely for these reasons, the bank's president, Marcelo Fernández, joined the anti-Guevara coalition. The bank, moreover, was the strategic agency for this coalition because both the Foreign Trade Ministry and the INRA relied on bank loans for their work (the ministry, for international operations; the INRA, for credit to private farmers). The INRA, the Foreign Trade Ministry, and the National Bank shared organizational interest, means of communication, and joint policies.

These debates were useful. Before taking power few of the would-be leaders of government or party had thought much about how to organize and run the Cuban economy. The debate brought out a wide array of issues that needed some decision. The anti-Guevara coalition scored an early victory when it persuaded Fidel Castro to abandon the policy of accelerated industrialization and to shift to an economic strategy that emphasized Cuba's comparative advantage in sugar production. There are problems with the latter approach, but in the context of Cuba in the early 1960s it was a sound decision.

Consistent with the analytical approach sketched earlier, the organizational debate was focused on issues that stemmed from the nature of each organization and its interests. Leaders played their organizational roles, but they were not proxies for factional disputes. In the anti-Guevara coalition, for example, Rodríguez was from the PSP, Mora from the Revolutionary Directorate, and Fernández from the Twenty-six of July Movement. Organizational politics therefore identifies a dimension of conflict different from factional struggle. The joint and cross-cutting existence of factional and organizational politics aired diverse views on issues and prevented a single cleavage from dominating elite politics and—not unlike in some polyarchies—contributed to political stability. Note also that although the issues in organizational politics were certainly important, their scope was less far reaching than that covered by the factional disputes.

### *Toward Intolerance of Organized Competition*

Beneficial as factional and organizational disputes had been, they created an image of disarray and pettiness. By the mid-1960s Fidel Castro moved to curtail such competition. His answer to the factional and organizational politics debates was eclectic. As is typical for Communist parties, formal factions were declared illegal. Castro also continued to support the emphasis on sugar production, but he increasingly relied on central controls at the expense of enterprise economic autonomy. From 1964 to 1967 Guevara's Ministry of Industries was divided into five parts; Guevara would become the Cuban revolution's hero but not its manager. The Finance Ministry was also disbanded and its functions were transferred to the National Bank. But the anti-Guevara coalition leaders fared only marginally better. Foreign Trade Minister Mora was dismissed; Bank President Fernández replaced him. INRA President Rodríguez lost that job to Fidel Castro himself; Rodríguez became a minister without portfolio, and his influence declined during the remainder of the 1960s.

Moreover, through unrelated events the Revolutionary Directorate virtually disappeared as a viable faction. Foreign Trade Minister Mora had been a directorate member. Rolando Cubelas, once a prominent leader of the directorate and of the regime, was arrested in 1966 for trying to assassinate Fidel Castro (U.S. Senate 1975: 86-90, 176; *Granma* 1966, March 1: 1; March 5: 5; March 9: 5, 7, 8; March 10: 6; March 11: 3).

As Cuba entered the late 1960s, Fidel Castro had asserted his power over factions and over organizational politics. He handled the organizational dispute by allocating rewards and punishments to all sides rather than by simply siding with one group against the other. Along with the formal prohibition of factionalism within the party, the clear message was to avoid the organized conflicts that had been such an important—and useful—part of the first decade of revolutionary rule.

As Castro narrowed the scope of permissible debate, he also embarked on a policy course that would prove destructive of the regime's objectives. Castro came to emphasize moral over material incentives to motivate workers; when that proved insufficient, the government relied on military means to organize the economy and especially the sugar harvest. A strong believer that money itself is a

source of corruption, Castro authorized policies to discontinue financial cost accounting and audits and the keeping of financial statistics as well as the formulation of a central budget. Cuba had never developed a medium-term or a long-term plan; now even annual plans fell by the wayside. The Cuban regime committed itself to support revolutionary movements overseas, especially in Africa and Latin America; most visibly Guevara led expeditions to the Congo and to Bolivia. And Cuba also began first to differ with and then to criticize Soviet and Eastern European policies toward Cuba and other matters.

Former PSP members were appalled by these policies toward labor and toward the Soviets and their allies. Led again by Aníbal Escalante, they began to discuss what could be done among themselves and also with Soviet, East German, and Czech government and party officials. In late January 1968 Fidel Castro and his brother, Armed Forces Minister General Raúl Castro, announced the discovery of what they called the "microfaction." Microfaction members were found in the party, the armed forces, the Interior Ministry, the labor federation, some state enterprises, and intellectual circles, illustrating the faction's broad scope and the wide-ranging organizational affiliations of its members. Some microfaction members were dismissed from the party's Central Committee and others from the party itself. Accused of crimes of opinion and association, 43 of them were arrested; at a subsequent trial 35 were convicted and imprisoned (*Granma* 1968, January 28: 1-2; January 29: 2-3; January 30: 2-3; February 1: 2; February 2: 3).

Noteworthy was the role of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia as a possible counterweight to the influence of the Castro brothers. The external actors had become a part of Cuba's domestic politics and had been caught red-handed. Never before had their interference been so public and one-sided, and never again would it be so. The Soviets and the Eastern Europeans may have learned from the crisis of 1968 to deal with Cuba more effectively by exercising influence discreetly through organizational politics rather than by backing one faction. Factional politics can threaten the power of top incumbents; organizational politics can be presented in a more "technical" manner that need not frighten those at the top of the regime.

The response of the Castro brothers to the microfaction shows a resemblance to that of Mao on the eve of the Cultural Revolution.

It was not the absence or the weakness of factions that worried each leader but the power of factions they did not control. In China as in Cuba the top leader launched an assault on his enemies that sought to enshrine only one correct view of policy and that required personal loyalty to the top leader. In China as in Cuba profound social dislocations followed. In Cuba these resulted from the combination of the social policies of the "revolutionary offensive" (launched in 1968) as well as from the emphasis on producing 10 million tons of milled sugar in 1970 (twice the historical average). Fidel Castro would brook no opposition—and he crushed what there was.

And yet in the perspective of history, the microfaction triumphed. By the early 1970s, having witnessed the collapse of the Cuban economy in the late 1960s and the growing resistance of ordinary workers to the regime's policies toward labor, the Cuban government and party rediscovered the value and ideological correctness of material incentives for labor. The Cuban Communist party held its first congress at last in 1975 and approved Cuba's first five-year plan. Budgets, financial accounting, and other means of orthodox central planning were reintroduced. And beginning in 1968, when Fidel Castro was coerced into giving in to Soviet preferences and endorsed the Soviet intervention of Czechoslovakia, Cuban-Soviet relations improved and became quite strong. The microfaction got no credit for these policy changes. Its members were discredited and some remained in jail when the policies they once advocated were adopted by the same Fidel Castro who once denounced them.

Castro's political style in the 1970s resembled his management of the organizational debate of the mid-1960s. He adopted many of the policies of the people whom he dismissed from office. The severity of the steps taken against microfaction members, however, strongly discouraged factional activity thereafter. Members of the PSP who remained in the high circles of government and party eschewed overt factional behavior thereafter, making it easier for members of other factions to do the same.

ELITE CONFLICT IN THE  
CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY  
SINCE 1970

The effectiveness of many policies adopted by the Cuban regime in the first half of the 1970s—to promote growth in the economy,

education, and public health and to project political and military power overseas—owed much to the lessons learned during the factional and organizational debates of the 1960s, even if many of the participants in those debates had paid dearly for the expression of their views and for their association with other like-minded people.

There were two results: leadership learning and leadership stability. The leaders who had been victorious in the 1960s implemented in the 1970s many of the policies of those whom they had vanquished. But the victorious leaders prudently avoided participating in the kinds of debates that would get them in trouble. And so a stable oligarchy came to rule.<sup>3</sup> Of the eleven members of the founding Political Bureau and Secretariat in 1965, only one (Dorticós) had died and only one other (Chomón, the last remainder from the Directorate) had been demoted 20 years later. All of the vice presidents of the Council of State in 1985 had been members of the party's National Directorate at its establishment in 1962 and of the Political Bureau since 1965. Of the fourteen members of the Political Bureau in 1985, nine had been members of either the Political Bureau or the Secretariat since 1965; four others had been ministers of government as early as 1959–60; and only one (Jorge Risquet) had been added to the top leadership as recently as the late 1960s.

Stability of leadership was evident as well at lower levels. Cabinet membership turnover became remarkably regular. Between one and three posts changed per year—never over one sixth of the Cabinet (Dominguez 1978: Table 6.8). Of the 90 members of the Central Committee formed in 1965 who were still alive in 1975, only 14 percent were dropped when the First Party Congress elected a new Central Committee in 1975. And only 21 percent of the 108 full members of the 1975 Central Committee still alive were dropped when the Second Party Congress met in 1980. The distribution of Central Committee members across occupations also became quite stable between the First and Second Party Congresses (Dominguez 1982: Table 1.1).

To curtail potential divisiveness, succession in the case of Fidel's death had long been formalized. In January 1959, within days of victory, Fidel named his brother Raúl as successor in case of his death (Thomas 1971: 1087). Dynastic communism was secure from factional and organizational challenges. Factions that might chal-

lenge Raúl's claim to rule had been crushed. As armed forces minister General Raúl Castro organized and led Cuba's best working institution, victorious in Angola and Ethiopia. As second secretary of the party, and first vice president of the Councils of State and Government, Raúl Castro was often credited with improving the workings of these entities. He would have little opposition to claim the right to rule upon his brother's death.

The economic and social crisis of 1979–80 did not drastically change these leadership patterns. At that time the Cuban economy slowed, common crime increased, and a social and political crisis unfolded. The crisis culminated in the emigration of over 125,000 Cubans from Mariel harbor to the United States. Although these events led to several important leadership changes, they were limited in number and scope and were understandable in terms of organizational criteria: those who did not perform well were dismissed. The Mariel crisis passed, and after 1982 the Cuban economy recovered. The Reagan administration's hostility served also to promote leadership unity; it was as if the new external competition required that internal differences be put aside.

In addition, the factional disputes of the 1960s had faded. There is little evidence that they matter nearly as much in the 1970s and the 1980s. Nonetheless an implicit pact kept the old PSP's share of the Central Committee fairly constant: it was 23 percent in 1965 and 21 percent in 1975. In 1980 the old PSP accounted for 15 percent of the new full members and for 23 percent of the new alternate members of the Central Committee, or about 19 percent of all new members. Although the factional politics of the 1960s no longer dominated politics, the historical shares of membership have been maintained partly not to give offense and partly to make amends to those who had suffered, at times unjustly, from factional disputes in the 1960s.

No new factions have emerged. Though some have speculated that there may be a "Fidelista" and a "Raulista" faction, linked to Fidel and Raúl Castro, there is no empirical evidence of the existence of either faction. To be sure, there are networks of friendship that may attach some individuals more to one than to the other Castro, but it has not yet been possible to show that this affects the wider scope of politics.

Similarly the "export" of retired military officers to other parts

of the government and party has not created either a Raulista or a military faction, nor has it been an independent factor to enhance the clout of the armed forces. Instead, the new civilian leaders of the various agencies behave according to their new roles. The main significance of this export of retired military personnel has been to diffuse military styles of work and organization throughout the government and party (Domínguez 1978: chap. 9).

Differences occasionally arise between officials that are better explained as differences in their temperaments than as the result of either factional or organizational disputes. At the July 1980 plenary meeting of the National Assembly, for example, a new traffic code was approved (*Granma* 1980, July 4: 3). One issue in dispute was a proposal by the assembly's Committee on Internal Order that cargo trucks be used to transport people for recreational purposes on weekends or on vacation. Interior Minister Ramiro Valdés urged the assembly to approve the committee's proposal, leaving it to the Interior Ministry to issue regulations to address the problems identified with the proposal during the debate. Party Secretary Jesús Montané reminded Valdés that the Interior Ministry could issue no regulations unless authorized to do so by law. At stake was not a factional or an organizational dispute but the long-standing habit of Minister Valdés to act as he deemed best.

Another issue in dispute with regard to the traffic code was the severity of sanctions against those driving under the influence of alcohol. Some, including Party Secretary Montané, wanted a tougher bill. Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez argued, instead: "We must bear in mind our country's specific conditions, not to establish a penalty that does not elicit compliance from our society." Once again, this was not a factional or organizational dispute but a difference of opinion between someone who thought that the government had the authority it needed and a long-standing pragmatist who thought that the right to legitimate rule had to be sustained continuously.

Nonetheless these two cases illustrate the organizational context increasingly evident in Cuban politics. Much of what is debated addresses the powers and jurisdiction of government agencies even when the motivation of participants in the debate may not stem directly from organizational factors. As a result, this stable oligarchy learned also to consult more widely with middle-level leaders representing specific organizational interests. In turn this per-

mitted the evolution of organizational politics but without endangering the tenure of those at the very top.

For example, at the July 1983 plenary meeting of the National Assembly, the minister of higher education moved successfully to amend the bill on the organization of the public health sector in order to guarantee that all medical schools and other upper-level training centers for health specialists remained under the jurisdiction of his ministry. Just as interestingly, President Castro chided the Public Health Ministry for not having been aggressive enough in obtaining necessary resources for its own facilities. Castro compared the success of the Ministry of Education in getting the necessary textbooks for students in primary schools with the lack of success of the Ministry of Public Health in getting the necessary textbooks for the students in the schools for which it was responsible in budget terms (*Granma* 1983, July 14: 4). Organizational politics was a fact of life. It worked so that the stability of the regime, and of all key leaders, was not threatened. Indeed, Castro seemed to say, success at it was a sign of revolutionary virtue.

### *The Crisis of the Late 1980s*

This sea of political calm was overtaken by the leadership storms of the late 1980s. Fidel Castro's discussions of Cuba's troubles, begun in late 1984, were received with surprise. Had the Cuban economy not registered that year a very good growth record? Had Cuban arms not prevailed so thoroughly in the Horn of Africa's wars that the size of that troop deployment could be reduced at last? There is no evidence that Castro's decisions since late 1984 about people and policies respond to factional or organizational disputes. They respond to his notions of what Cuba should be like and of what its citizens and leaders should do.

In the aftermath of the Second Party Congress in 1980, three people seemed well positioned to succeed Raúl Castro—that is, the second succession within the regime and possibly the first outside the Castro family. These were the party's secretary for ideology, Antonio Pérez Herrero, who had helped to build the party in the late 1970s; Humberto Pérez, president of the Central Planning Board and architect of the economic strategy that had kept Cuba's growth path on course; and Ramiro Valdés, interior minister, who had helped to consolidate the regime in the 1960s and who assumed

that post again in late 1979. In 1985 all three were removed from these posts and from their posts in the party's Political Bureau and Secretariat.

They were dismissed in part for mistakes they no doubt committed, in part because they pursued policies that Fidel Castro opposed, though he had once authorized them, and in part because they became scapegoats for failing policies for which Fidel Castro personally and other leaders still in power were responsible. It was also rumored that Valdés had become corrupt and had abused power. Pérez Herrero was dismissed for unspecified "deficiencies and repeated errors" (*Granma* 1985, February 1: 1). It was Humberto Pérez's dismissal, however, that turned out to be decisive.

For organizational politics to succeed, it must be possible for leaders and agencies to mobilize their own resources and also to establish links with other leaders and agencies both bilaterally and as organizational teams. In the 1960s the National Bank was a strategically located agency around which INRA and the Foreign Trade Ministry could coalesce. In the 1970s and 1980s with the implementation of more orthodox forms of central planning, the Central Planning Board became the strategic organization for coalition building.

The board allocated resources. It could choose to favor some projects and neglect others. That, however, was not an effective way to build a coalition. More frequently the board preferred not to choose. When a ministry pressured on behalf of organizational changes, the board often yielded on an ad hoc basis. That enhanced the board's power because it had to approve every exception to established policy. So too with the budget, which typically reflected an aggregation of organizational demands as opposed to systematic choices among them. As a result, according to Fidel Castro's report to the Third Party Congress, "rather than regulating spending [the budget] promoted it" (Castro 1986: 31, 35). An attack on the Central Planning Board's president was therefore an assault on the very process of organizational accommodation. In late 1984 President Castro took away the authority of the Planning Board's president; six months later Humberto Pérez lost the board's presidency.

Humberto Pérez had symbolized Cuba's gradual evolution toward the use of more market means under central planning. There had been a leadership consensus on this economic strategy since the

early 1970s. Although these views were not under attack by any faction, Pérez's dismissal eliminated from the regime's top ranks an articulate defender of this approach to socialism. President Castro's attack on the use of such limited market means came soon enough after Pérez's fall; there is no evidence that the Political Bureau resisted this dramatic policy change.

On the twenty-fifth anniversary of victory at the Bay of Pigs (April 19, 1986), Fidel Castro complained that "some people have confused freelancing with capitalism." Indeed, "some of our enterprise heads have also become capitalist-like entrepreneurs." He went on: "The first thing a socialist, a revolutionary, a common cadre, must ask himself is not if his firm is making more money but how the country makes more" (*Granma Weekly Review* 1986, April 27: 9). He lashed out at the threat posed by the possibility of adopting market socialism. At a meeting at the Interior Ministry he asked rhetorically whether the Cuban people's heroism at home and abroad was based on money. "No," he said, "not based on money. It is based on concepts, on ideas, on principles, on certain moral values that people treasure not only more than money, more than vile money, more even than life itself." Indeed, if one relies "only and exclusively on material incentives," then, he said, "one builds capitalism" (*Granma* 1986, June 15: 3). "What concerned us most," he said, "was the increase in the ambition for money, the spirit of profit that was invading the working class" (*Granma Weekly Review* 1986, July 6: 2).

These views are quite different from those being articulated by Communist party leaders in the Soviet Union, China, and much of Eastern Europe. Fidel Castro was not just seeking to root out those who were corrupt or who abused power; he was challenging the ideological basis for the use of market means within a centrally planned economy.

Adding these moral standards to performance criteria to judge those in office has made it easier to institute wholesale changes in the top leadership. At the 1986 Third Party Congress four members were dropped from the party's Political Bureau; 37 percent of the full members of the Central Committee and 47 percent of the alternate members were also dropped. These dismissals affected virtually all organizations and sectors of economy, society, and politics. No factional or organizational pattern emerges from these dismissals. The main explanation for the scope of the changes is the

assertion of Fidel Castro's power in a manner not seen since the end of the 1960s.

Within sectors, however, there are differences that can be explained with reference to organizational politics. When a leader stumbles, so does the organization headed by that leader. For example, fewer officers from the Army and the Air Force were dropped from membership in the Central Committee in 1986 than were officers from the Navy and the Interior Ministry. All four Navy full or alternate members of the Central Committee were dismissed in 1986, including Aldo Santamaría, who had headed the Revolutionary Navy since the regime's foundation. The Navy's representation was reduced to a Central Committee alternate. Along with Ramiro Valdés's dismissal from the Political Bureau and as interior minister, over two thirds of the Interior Ministry's representatives on the Central Committee were dismissed. Though new Interior Ministry officers joined the Central Committee, the ministry's net share fell by 38 percent from the Second to the Third Party Congress.

Similarly, the dismissal of Pérez Herrero as party secretary for ideology led to the dismissal of the head of party propaganda and of the director of radio and television. The dismissal of Humberto Pérez as Planning Board president is connected to the dismissals of the president of the State Committee for Finance and of the minister for light industry. José Ramírez, founder and leader of the National Association of Small Peasants for a quarter century and, along with Humberto Pérez, an architect of the "free peasant market" (authorized in 1980, banned in 1986), was also replaced (allegedly because of illness) in 1987.

In short, organizational politics has existed in contemporary Cuba. Thanks especially to the strategic location and the behavioral style of the Central Planning Board, the allocation of resources could be modified through coalition building. Leaders and agencies cooperate with one another, formally and informally, when their missions are complementary and oppose one another when they are not. Organizational leaders reward their friends and punish their enemies. When a high leader is toppled, his deputies fall as well. But the scope of this type of organizational politics is narrower than was the scope of factional politics. Nor does the organizational politics of the 1980s shape politics inside the Political Bureau in a manner akin to the "great debate" of the mid-1960s. And when

Fidel Castro dismissed Humberto Pérez and weakened the Central Planning Board's powers, he constrained organizational politics to enable himself to institute sweeping economic and social changes.

Informal cliques have continued to operate, however, at most levels of party and government, but they stop well short of the debates over personnel and policy that are typical of factional and organizational politics. The following extended anecdote illustrates the operation of cliques for the protection of intermediate and lower-level elites. In September 1984 Silvia Spence was dismissed from her job as chief accountant for the José Mercerón cement factory in Santiago province on the grounds of indiscipline. She had pointed out several irregularities in the management of the plant; management accused her of undermining its authority. Spence appealed the decision.

Although she received the support of party officials at the plant and at the level of the municipality, Mercerón's management was part of a clique with party officials at the level of the province and with officials at higher echelons of the Ministry of Construction, which supervised the Mercerón. At a key moment Construction Minister José López Moreno ruled in favor of Mercerón's management (the typical pattern of response to Spence's appeal was, however, to give no answer until she forced one). In July 1986 the party's National Auditing Commission at last ruled in Spence's favor, but the Construction Ministry delayed in carrying out the party commission's order (though it never formally defied it). Not until September 1986 did the Construction Ministry audit the Mercerón plant and not until November 1986 was Spence given her job back. Shortly thereafter Mercerón's Director was replaced and was also placed on probation from party membership for one year (*Granma* 1986, December 25: 2; December 26: 2-3).

This example shows that the lines separating party, management, and administration are quite blurred. The Construction Ministry's administrative personnel did not exercise genuine supervision over the plant; instead they shielded management. The party is not always a unified entity; in this case the two lowest levels of the party sided with Spence whereas the party at the provincial level was one of the best allies for Mercerón's management. The Mercerón plant was big enough that it dealt often at the provincial or higher levels rather than at the municipal level. The line between party and administration is, of course, also blurred. Construction

Minister López Moreno was also a member of the Central Committee. And yet the party remained an effective, though slow, independent avenue for redress of grievances. The National Auditing Commission turned out to be the key actor in the end.

This clique behavior, however, cannot be considered either factional or organizational politics in the sense that these terms have been used. This clique is a mutual protection association within one ministry. It does not intend to affect the allocation of resources beyond its own narrow circle. Conversely, such cliques are clearly quite common means for the defense of the shared interests of party, administrative, and managerial elites and become more important as teams of officials rise through the ranks.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The development of factional and organizational politics in Cuba has much in common with the experiences of other countries. As with Japan's LDP and Colombia's National Front parties, factions appeared in the Communist party of Cuba as the less formal continuation of the units that had joined to form the party. Factionalism could flourish in the Cuban Communist party, as in Colombia's National Front parties, in part because they could compete without fearing that the party would lose its supremacy. Moreover as it is with other Communist parties, so it is in Cuba: factionalism is formally forbidden, though it was quite common throughout the 1960s.

The need to decide about the organization of the economy, moreover, early on led various ministers to debate the role of their respective agencies in the making of policy. The Cuban economy's growing complexity in the 1970s facilitated the evolution of organizational politics as the regime gradually became a consultative oligarchy.

Conflicts that stemmed from both factional and organizational factors proved valuable to Cuba in the 1960s, just as they had been in other Communist regimes. These disputes aired policy choices, criticized current personnel and policy performance, and provided a means for learning. Because the cleavages in factional and in organizational politics were cross-cutting, no overarching single rift developed. Moreover from the perspective of regime learning,

it almost did not matter which grouping prevailed. As was most dramatic in the case of the microfaction, but also in part with regard to the "great debate" over economic policy and organization in the 1960s, the winners often adopted the policies of the losers (though without giving them credit).

However, the factional politics of the 1960s died with that decade, and no comparable factions have emerged. Though organizational politics have, of course, survived, Castro's strike against the powers of the Central Planning Board and its president in 1984-85 sharply weakened this potential source of resistance. The constraints that factional politics or more strongly articulated organizational politics might have posed to Castro's sweeping reassertion of power in the late 1980s are absent. Although cliques continue to exist, they lack the power typical of factions and organizational politics. Friendship networks endure as well (Raúl Castro, for example, employed Humberto Pérez as his personal economic adviser both before and after Pérez's tenure as central planner), but they have undetermined macropolitical effects. And having learned a lesson the hard way in 1968, the Soviet Union has not since intervened in Cuba's domestic affairs. Fidel Castro alone took the fateful steps that have launched Cuba's "rectification" campaign, a "strategic counteroffensive," as Castro has called it, to ward off the specter of capitalism that has been haunting Cuba.

At the end of the 1960s Castro, not unlike Mao, had defeated the factional opposition and imposed his own policy views—at costs so disastrous that social, economic, and foreign policies had to be changed. In the late 1980s because Castro lacked domestic opponents, he could launch his new policies without warning or leadership resistance. The early results are not reassuring from the regime's own perspective. The economy has slowed each year since 1984 while public dissent has been increasing. For the first time according to official Cuban statistics, the economy went into a recession in 1987 (Banco Nacional de Cuba 1988: 2). In mid-1987 Brigade General Rafael del Pino became the first Cuban general to defect to the United States. And Luis Orlando Domínguez, former member of Castro's personal staff and former president of the Communist Youth Union, became the second member of the Central Committee ever to be arrested on the charge of corruption.

Factionalism is likely to emerge during a succession episode, and personal cliques and friendship networks may become more im-

portant then, but that remains remote in time. Though Castro has been reported ill at various moments, he seems generally robust and in good health for a man born in 1926. From the perspective of this essay, however, the reappearance of factional and organizational politics, then or sooner, would be salutary. Far from signaling a weakness within the regime, this would indicate a shift toward more normal Communist party politics. Cuba's politics, economy, and society are too complex to be run as Castro has at times wished. The reemergence of a consultative oligarchy, where other leaders make important decisions and consult and compete among themselves and with others, would be constructive—even to serve the regime's own values.

## NOTES

- 1 The first version of this chapter was delivered at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Palmer House, September 3–6, 1987. Copyright by the American Political Science Association. General research on Cuba funded by the Ford Foundation.
- 2 There are differences in interpretation between this discussion and that in Domínguez (1978: 383–91). Key texts of these debates can be found in Silverman (1971).
- 3 From my biographical files.

## REFERENCES

- Banco Nacional de Cuba (1988, January). *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation of Cuba during 1987–1988*. Havana.
- Barghoorn, Frederick (1966). *Politics in the USSR*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Barnett, A. Doak (1986). "Ten Years after Mao." *Foreign Affairs*, 65(1).
- Castro, Fidel (1986, February). "Main Report: III Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba." Havana.
- Colton, Timothy J. (1986). *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union* (rev. ed.). New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Domínguez, Jorge I. (1978). *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- (1982). "Revolutionary Politics: The New Demands for Orderliness." In Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *Cuba: Internal and International Affairs*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

- Gonzalez, Edward (1974). *Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Halperin, Maurice (1972). *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hough, Jerry, and Merle Fainsod (1979). *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kline, Harvey F. (1980). "The National Front: Historical Perspective and Overview." In R. Albert Berry, Ronald Hellman, and Mauricio Solaún, eds., *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Korbonski, Andrzej (1986). "Leadership Succession and Political Change in Eastern Europe." *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 9(1–2).
- Ludz, Peter (1972). *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, ed. (1971). *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Nathan, Andrew J. (1977). "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics." In Stephen Schmidt, James Scott, Carl Landé, and Laura Guasti, eds., *Friends, Followers, and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ritter, Archibald (1974). *The Economic Development of Revolutionary Cuba: Strategy and Performance*. New York: Praeger.
- Rogers, Robert (1986). "Policy Differences within the Hanoi Leadership." *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 9(1–2).
- Silverman, Bertram, ed. (1971). *Man and Socialism in Cuba*. New York: Atheneum.
- Thomas, Hugh (1971). *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Tsurutani, Taketsugu (1977). *Political Change in Japan*. New York: David McKay.
- U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1975). "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders." *An Interim Report*, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.