

Web Appendix

1. Variable descriptions

Table A1: Variable description

Variable	Values	Description
Preference variable I	1 definitely should be 2 probably should be 3 probably should not be 4 definitely should not be	Survey question: “On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibility to: Reduce income differences between the rich and poor?”
Preference variable II	1 agree strongly 2 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree 5 disagree strongly	Survey question: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.”
Job (In)security	As preference variable II	Survey question: “[...] show how much you agree or disagree that [the statement] applies to your [main] job. My job is secure.”
Partisan Affiliation	1 far right 2 right 3 centrist 4 left 5 far left 6 other	This variables codes an individual’s partisan affiliation, defined in a broad way (affiliation, vote in last election, vote intention in next election). See Table A5 below.
Spending for Health	As preference variable II	Survey question: “Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say “much more”, it might require a tax increase to pay for it.” Here: “More or less government spending for health.”
Spending for pensions	As preference variable II	As above, but here: “More or less government spending for old age pensions.”
Spending for unemployment benefits	As preference variable II	As above, but here: “More or less government spending for unemployment benefits.”

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Table A1: Variable description (continued)

Variable	Values	Description
Income	1 (lowest) – 9 (highest)	This variable measure household income in 9 quantiles. The quantiles were calculated by country-year on censored data (right-censored at 95 th percentile).
Age	18-97	Age in years
Gender	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for female, 0 otherwise
Student	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for student, 0 otherwise
Retired	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for retired, 0 otherwise
Unemployed	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for unemployed, 0 otherwise
Non- Employed	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for not employed (“housewife / -man, permanently disabled / sick, not in labor force / not working”), 0 otherwise
Self Employment	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for self employed, 0 otherwise
Public Employment	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for being in public employment, 0 otherwise
Union Member	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for union membership, 0 otherwise
Church attendance	0-5	Frequency of church attendance. 0 = no (Christian) religion; 1 = never; 2 = less frequently [than several times a year]; 3 = several times a year; 4 = once to three times a month; 5 = once a week.
Protestant	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for being catholic, 0 otherwise
Catholic	0 or 1	Dummy equals 1 for being protestant, 0 otherwise
Minority	0 or 1	Dummy variables for various ethnic or linguistic groups. Contact authors for details.
Country dummies	0 or 1	Dummy variables for each country.
Year dummies	0 or 1	Dummy variables for each year of field-work.

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Table A1: Variable description (continued)

Variable	Values	Description
Merged data:		
Skill Specificity	0 (low) to ca. 3.33 (right censored)	This variable measures an individual's skill specificity. Like in Iversen & Soskice (2001), it is calculated as: [(Share of ISCO-88 level 4 groups)/(share of labor force)] divided by ISCO level of skills (s1) or highest level of education (s2), respectively. The employed measure is an average of s1 and s2. We take the "share of labor force" from labor force surveys, as a grand mean over all country-years we have in the sample. The variable is right-censored approximately at its 95 th percentile. Individuals not employed have a 0 on this variable.
Occupational unemployment rates	0 to 20 (right censored)	This variable measures occupational unemployment rates at the most detailed level available. More concretely, we use the following data: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USA: 1985-2001 at ISCO88-2d (gendered) • Canada: 1987-2001 at ISCO88-1d (gendered) • UK: 1985-1990 at OPCS1980, 16 groups (gendered); 1990-91 at ISCO88-2d (gendered); 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Ireland: 1987-1991 at ISCO88-1d (gendered), 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Netherlands: missing • France: missing • Switzerland: 1991-95 at ISCO88-1d (gendered), 1996-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Spain: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Portugal: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Germany: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Austria: 1995-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Finland: 1997-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Sweden: 1998-99 at ISCO88-1d (gendered), 2000-01 at ISCO88-2d • Norway: 1996-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Denmark: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d • Australia: 1997-2001 at ISCO88-1d (gendered) • New Zealand: 1991-2001 at ISCO88-1d (gendered) <p>Individuals not employed have a 0 on this variable.</p> <p>Sources: National labor force surveys (USA, UK), EU labor force surveys, ILO</p>

Table A2: Descriptive Statistic of Key Variables

	Redistributional Preference		Partisan Affiliation	Perceived Job Insecurity	Occupational Unemployment Rates	Skill Specificity (mean / median)
Range	1-5	1-4	1-5	1-5]0;20]]0;3.33]
	contra to pro		right to left	low to high	low to high	low to high
USA	2.84	2.37	3.07	2.17	3.36	1.37 / 1.13
Canada	3.11	2.47	3.16	2.49	4.73	1.18 / 1.11
United Kingdom	3.57	3.07	3.01	2.51	3.03	1.59 / 1.26
Ireland	3.73	3.27	3.23	2.31	4.94	1.51 / 1.38
Switzerland	3.36	2.88	3.10	2.44	2.00	1.38 / 1.34
Spain	3.92	3.38	3.26	2.51	5.60	1.62 / 1.66
Portugal	4.36	3.66	3.58	2.41	2.84	1.84 / 1.94
West Germany	3.41	2.88	3.38	2.18	3.69	1.68 / 1.80
East Germany	4.05	3.39	3.69	3.04	3.50	1.69 / 1.86
Austria	3.72	3.06	3.33	-	1.58	1.55 / 1.38
Finland	3.99	-	3.47	-	4.63	1.50 / 1.38
Sweden	3.67	3.11	3.43	-	4.03	1.49 / 1.23
Norway	3.57	3.20	2.93	2.23	2.13	1.37 / 1.18
Denmark	3.33	2.36	3.11	1.84	3.08	1.45 / 1.26
Australia	3.26	2.88	2.96		2.92	1.37 / 1.22
New Zealand	3.12	2.60	2.98	2.54	4.23	1.34 / 1.23

Note:
Last two columns refer to observations with reported occupational information only.

Figure A1: Redistributive Preferences (5 answer categories)





Figure A2: Redistributive Preferences (4 answer categories)



2. Country-years included in the micro-analyses

Table A3: Country-years included in the micro-level analyses

Country-years in Table 1 (five answer categories)

	1985	1987	1990	1992	1993	1996	1999	2000
USA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X+	X
Canada				X	X	X	X	X+
United Kingdom				X	X	X	X	X
Ireland					X	X		X+
Switzerland						X++		X
Spain					X+	X	X	X
Portugal							X	X
West Germany				X	X	X	X+	X
East Germany				X	X	X	X+	X
Austria							X+	X+
Finland								X
Sweden							X	X+
Norway						X	X	X
Denmark								X+
Australia							X	
New Zealand				X	X	X+	X	X+

Notes:
Columns refer to year of ISSP survey. In some country-years, survey was fielded one or even two years later (indicated by + and ++, respectively).
A bold X indicates that country-year drops from model 2 due to missing values.

Table A4: Country-years included in the micro-level analyses

Country-years in Table A8, model (1) and (4) (four answer categories)

	1985	1990	1991	1996	1998
USA	X	X	X	X	X
Canada				X	
United Kingdom			X	X	
Ireland			X	X	X
Switzerland				X++	X+
Spain				X	X
Portugal					X+
West Germany				X	X
East Germany				X	X
Austria					X+
Sweden					X
Norway				X	X
Denmark					X
Australia					X
New Zealand			X	X+	X

Notes:
Columns refer to year of ISSP survey. In some country-years, survey was fielded one or even two years later (indicated by + and ++, respectively).
A bold X indicates that country-year drops from model 4 due to missing values.

3. Party classification scheme

Table A5: Party classification scheme

COUNTRY	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “FAR LEFT” (LR=1)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “LEFT” (LR=2)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “CENTRIST” (LR=3)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “RIGHT” (LR=4)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “FAR RIGHT” (LR=5)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “OTHER” (LR=6)
Australia		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australian Labour Party • Greens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australian Democrats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Party • National (Country) Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One Nation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic Labour Party • Nuclear Disarmament Party
Austria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kommunistische Partei Oesterreichs (KPOE) • GA (left-wing Green Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sozialistische Partei Oesterreichs (SPOE) • Vereinte Gruene Oesterreichs (VGOE) • Alternative Liste Oesterreichs (ALOE) • Buergerinitiative Parlament (BIP) • Gruene (Greens) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oesterreichische Volkspartei (OEVV) • Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs (FPÖ) [1985-1990] • LIF (Liberal) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs (FPÖ) [1991-2000] 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VGOE (conservative Green Party)
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communist 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Democratic Party - NDP • Bloc Québécois - BQ • Green Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Party of Canada -LP • PC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reform Party of Canada - RPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Libertarian • Confederation of regions 	
Denmark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Socialist Peoples Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti - SF) • Leftwing Alliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiet - SD) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radical Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre - RV) • Centre Democratic (Centrum-Demokraterne - CD) • Christian People's Party (Kristeligt Folkeparti - KrF) • Freisinnige Demokratische Partei – FDP (Radical Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal (Venstre - V) • Conservative Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progressive (Fremskridtspartiet - FP) • Danish Peoples Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic Renewal

Table A5: Party classification scheme (continued)

COUNTRY	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “FAR LEFT” (LR=1)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “LEFT” (LR=2)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “CENTRIST” (LR=3)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “RIGHT” (LR=4)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “FAR RIGHT” (LR=5)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “OTHER” (LR=6)
Finland		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social Democratic Party • Left Alliance • Green League 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centre Party of Finland • Swedish Peoples Party • National Coalition party • Christian League • Reform Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • True Finns 		
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parti Communiste Francais - PCF (French Communist Party) • Far left 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parti Socialiste - PS (Socialist Party) • Green Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Union pour la Démocratie Francaise - UDF (Union for French Democracy/Liberal Parties) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rassemblement pour la République - RPR (Rally for the Republic/Conservative) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Front National - FN (National Front) 	
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PDS • Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) • [Buendinis 90 /] Die Gruenen • Alternative Liste 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU / CSU) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NPD • Republikaner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SEW • DSU
Ireland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workers Party • Democratic Left • Sinn Fein 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour • Green Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fianna Fail • Fine Gael 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progressive Party 		

Table A5: Party classification scheme (continued)

COUNTRY	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "FAR LEFT" (LR=1)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "LEFT" (LR=2)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "CENTRIST" (LR=3)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "RIGHT" (LR=4)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "FAR RIGHT" (LR=5)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "OTHER" (LR=6)
Italy <1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rifondazione Comunista – RC • Partito Radicale - PR (Radical Party) • PCI • DP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liste Verde • Partito Socialista Italiano - PSI (Socialist Party) • Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano - PSDI (Italian Democratic Socialist Party) • Partito Democratico della Sinistra - PDS (Democratic Party of the Left) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democrazia Cristiana - DC (Christian Democrats) • Partito Repubblicano Italiano - PRI (Republican Party) • Partito Liberale Italiano - PLI (Liberal Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leghe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movimento Sociale Italiano - MSI (Italian Social Movement) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La Rete
Italy > 1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rif. comunista (bertinotti) • Nuovi Communisti Italia (Cossuta) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • feder. verdi (ripa di meana) • Verdi (Ripa di Mena) • Socialisti Italiani (Boselli Intini) • Partito Democratico della Sinistra - PDS (d'Alema) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ccd-cdu (casini-buttiglione) • Centro Cristiano Democratico (Casino) • lista dini • Rinnovamento Italiano (Dini) • popolari-svp-pri-ud (prodi) • Partito Popolare Italiano - PPI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alleanza Nazionale (Fini) • Forza Italia (Berlusconi) • Lega Nord (Bossi) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movimento Sociale (fiamma tricolore) • movimento sociale tricolore (rauti) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lista pannella-sgarbi • Patto Segni • UDR (Cossiga) • Lista Pannella Riformatori

Table A5: Party classification scheme (continued)

COUNTRY	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "FAR LEFT" (LR=1)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "LEFT" (LR=2)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "CENTRIST" (LR=3)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "RIGHT" (LR=4)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "FAR RIGHT" (LR=5)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "OTHER" (LR=6)
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Groen Links - GL (Green Left Party) • Socialist Party - SP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partij van de Arbeid - PvdA (Labour Party) • Democraten '66 - D66 (Democrats '66) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Christian Democratic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie - VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy; Liberal Party) • Calvinist State Party - SGP • Calvinist Political Alliance - GPV • Calvinist Political Federation - RPF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centrum Democrats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Union 55 Plus • General Union of the Netherlands
New Zealand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Labour 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alliance • Labour Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Zealand First • Social Credit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Party • ACT • Christian Coalition • United 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Green • Democrats • Social Democrats • Liberal Party
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Red Electoral Alliance (Roed Valgallianse) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) • Labour Party (Det norske Arbeiderparti) Social Democrats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal Party (Venstre) • Centre Party (Senterpartiet) • Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conservative Party (Hoyre) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) 	

Table A5: Party classification scheme (continued)

COUNTRY	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "FAR LEFT" (LR=1)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "LEFT" (LR=2)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "CENTRIST" (LR=3)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "RIGHT" (LR=4)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "FAR RIGHT" (LR=5)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO "OTHER" (LR=6)
Portugal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UDP - Uniao Democrática Popular (Popular Democratic Union) • PSR (Revolutionary Socialist Party) • Bloco de Esquerda (Left Block) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDU / PCP - Coligacao Democrática Unitária (United Democratic Coalition) / Partido Comunista Portugues (Portuguese Communist Party) • MRPP (Revolutionary Movement of Portuguese Proletariat) • PS (Socialist Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PPD, renamed PSD - Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party), Partido Social Democráta (Social Democratic Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDS, 1995 renamed PP - Partido do Centro Democrático Social (Centre Social Democrats), Partido Popular (Popular Party) 		
Spain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Herri Batasuna - HB - Nationalists from Basque • Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya - ERC (Catalan Republican Left) • Izquierda Unida - IU (United Left) • BNG (Nationalists from Galicia) • Left national parties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol - PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) • Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity) - EA-EUE - Nationalists from Basque • Communist Party • Regional Party of Left • Ecologist Party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centró Democrático y Social - CDS (Centre Democrats) • Convergència i Unió - CiU (Convergence and Union) • PNV (Nationalists from Basque) • Regional Party of Center • White 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partido Aragon´s Regionalista - PAR (Aragonese Regionalist Party/Nationalists from Aragon) • Partidu Andalucista - PA (Andalusian Party/Nationalists from Andalusia) • Partido Popular - PP (Popular Party) • CC (Nationalists from Canaries) • UV (Regionalists from Valencia) • Right national parties 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IC-(E)V • Independent Liberal Group

Table A5: Party classification scheme (continued)

COUNTRY	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “FAR LEFT” (LR=1)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “LEFT” (LR=2)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “CENTRIST” (LR=3)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “RIGHT” (LR=4)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “FAR RIGHT” (LR=5)	PARTY(S) ASSIGNED TO “OTHER” (LR=6)
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vp - Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MP - Miljöpartiet de Gröna (Green Ecology Party) • S (Social Democrats) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CP - Centerpartiet (Centre Party) • FP - Folkepartiet Liberalerna (Liberal Peoples Party) • KdS - Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet (Christian Democratic Community Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M (Conservative) 		
Switzerland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partei der Arbeit - PDA (Labour Party) • Progressive Organisationen - PÖCH (Progressive Organisations of Switzerland) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sozialdemokratische Partei - SP (Social Democrats) • Grüene Partei (Ecologists) • GB (Green Alliance) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evangelische Volkspartei - EVP (Protestant Peoples Party) • Landesring der Unabhængigen - LdU (Independents Party) • Christlich demokratische Volkspartei - CVP (Christian Democratic Peoples Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schweizerische Volkspartei - SVP (Swiss Peoples Party) • Liberale Partei - LIB (Liberal Conservatives) • LPS (Liberal Party) • Christlich-soziale Partei (Conservative Christian Social Party) • Freisinnige-demokratische Partei – FDP (Radical Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schweizer Demokraten - SD (Swiss Democrats) • Freiheitspartei der Schweiz - FPS (Freedom Party) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nationale Organisationen - NA (National action) • Freie Liste - FL (Free List) • LEGA

Table A5: Party classification scheme (continued)

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United Kingdom		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Labour 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social Democratic Party (SDP) Liberal Alliance Alliance (Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance) Liberal Democrats, SLD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conservative 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plaid Cymru Scottish Nationalists Green Party
USA		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong Democrat Not (very) strong democrat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Independent (near democrat) Independent (near republican) Independent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong republican Not (very) strong republican 		

4. Additional results

Table A6: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function of income and risk variables


“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.”						
Variable	Simulated change	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Agree strongly
Unemployment	Employed -> Unemployed	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	0.13
Skill Specificity	Min -> Max	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.09
	p20 -> p80	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.03
Occupational Unemployment Risk	Min -> Max	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.09
	p20 -> p80	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.03
Income	Min -> Max	0.04	0.11	0.08	0.00	-0.23
	p20 -> p80	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.01	-0.15

Notes:

Simulations based on model (1) in Table 1. First difference sometimes do not sum to zero due to rounding errors. “Min -> Max” refers to simulated changes from a variable’s minimum to its maximum values. “p20 -> p80” denotes changes from a variable’s 20th to its 80th percentile.

The table shows the simulation results for the variables of interest in model (1) in Table 1. The Min -> Max simulations reported in the last column are displayed in Figure 3.

Figure A3: Relationship between insecurity and risk exposure



Note: Shown are mean values of the risk exposure variables for each answer category to the statement "my job is secure"

This figure complements the discussion on the relationship between income and risk exposure. It shows the mean value of both objective risk exposure measures – skill specificity and occupational unemployment rates – for each answer category on the ‘my-job-is-secure’ question. Clearly, individuals exposed to more risks in the labor market feel their jobs to be more insecure.

Table A7: Determinants of Partisan Preferences (four answer categories)

	(1)	(2)
	Right-Left Partisan Affiliation (ordered logit, 4 categories)	Left Partisan Affiliation (logit)
Pro Redistribution (four categories)	0.585*** [0.010]	0.574*** [0.012]
Country Dummies	yes	yes
Year Dummies	yes	yes
Constant		-2.620*** [0.171]
Observations	45498	45498
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.08
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-54287.02	-29050.95
Wald χ^2 (degrees of freedom)	4658.47 (25)	3300.55 (25)

Notes:

(Ordered) logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights).

Robust standard errors in brackets.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

See appendix for details on variable descriptions.

Based on ISSP data for USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, West Germany, East Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand.

This table parallels Table 3. It shows the results from regressing partisan preferences on our redistributive preference variable with four answer categories (as opposed to five answer categories).

5. Alternative Explanations

An alternative explanation of individual redistributive preferences builds directly on the insurance logic of redistributive policies, but argues that religion functions as a substitute for insurance (Scheve and Stasavage 2005). In this spiritual view, those who believe in God experience less psychic distress from unemployment and other adverse life events, and (assuming that income and psychic benefits are non-separable) this implies that they will demand less insurance. Scheve and Stasavage present empirical support for these propositions at the individual- as well as at the country-level.

A related argument is that the support for redistribution is undermined by the presence of cross-cutting cleavages such as religion or race. In Roemer's (1997; 2001) model, people have intrinsic preferences on some ascriptive dimension such as race or religion, in addition to preferences over redistribution. When the former becomes politically salient, rightist parties can appeal to poor religious or racist voters, and the leftist party is forced to respond by attracting higher income anti-clerical or anti-racist voters. As this "exchange" of voters takes place, the two constituencies begin to resemble one another in terms of income. The original pro-welfare coalition is torn asunder by appeals to commonalities on another, non-economic, dimension. Since some have argued that the traditional economic left-right has declined in importance in electoral politics (Inglehart 1987, 1990; Kitschelt 1994), it is of considerable importance for the politics of redistribution to know the extent to which objective economic conditions, and preferences for redistribution, matter for people's party choice.

We test whether our results are robust with respect to the inclusion of variables suggested by these alternative accounts of the genesis of redistributive preferences. In terms of *religiosity*, we control for both church attendance, and religious denomination (Protestant or

Catholic). The operationalization of these variables follows Scheve and Stasavage (2005). The next three tables display the results when controlling for the religious argument put forward by Scheve and Stasavage (2005). Tables A8 and A9 report models with the religious variables, including and excluding our risk exposure measures. Table A10 uses one basic specification for different dependent variables capturing redistributive preferences. These dependent variables were suggested in Iversen and Soskice (2001) and are also employed in Scheve and Stasavage (2005). Amongst these is a variable that aggregates the answers to the three different survey questions into factor scores based on a principal components analysis. These questions ask about preferences for government spending on unemployment benefits, health, and old age pension. They tap the insurance aspect of redistribution more closely than the redistributive questions employed in this paper. The specification in Table A10 reports our standard model extended by the religious factors suggested by Scheve and Stasavage (2005).

While church attendance is usually a statistically significant determinant for preferences over redistribution as insurance, its estimated coefficient always drops in size and significance once risk exposure variables are added to the equation. More often than not, this drop is so sharp that it is difficult to argue that religious variables are important determinants of preferences over redistribution. Figures A4 and A5, showing the substantive effect of the church attendance variable, support this conclusion since these simulated effects are rather small (especially when controlling for risk exposure).

In terms of the role of *ethnicity*, we test whether individuals belonging to a minority have systematically different preferences. For the US, this variable codes Blacks, Hispanics, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian as minorities (1, zero otherwise). Note that for many other countries there is no information available on a respondent's minority status. For those few countries where this

information is available, we coded those respondents who can reasonably be classified as disadvantaged minorities as a one (1), and all others were coded as zero (0).

Models (3) in Table A8 and A9 show a large, statistically significant coefficient on the minority dummy. However, this result depends heavily on the inclusion of the US in the sample. This effect is usually not found in other countries. Coupled with the mixed results on religion and the positive results on income and risk exposure, it is safe to conclude that redistributive preferences are rationally formed and that redistribution is a major ingredient of politics.

Table A8: Determinants of Preferences for Redistribution (5 answer categories)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pro Redistribution (5 answer categories)				
Occupational unemployment rate ^a	0.020*** [0.003]	0.021*** [0.004]	0.026*** [0.006]	0.019*** [0.004]
Skill specificity ^b	0.130*** [0.018]	0.134*** [0.019]	0.082*** [0.028]	0.141*** [0.020]
Unemployed	0.568*** [0.055]	0.577*** [0.058]	0.522*** [0.085]	0.670*** [0.062]
Income ^c	-0.144*** [0.004]	-0.147*** [0.004]	-0.160*** [0.007]	-0.144*** [0.005]
Age	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.002* [0.001]
Gender (female)	0.167*** [0.020]	0.176*** [0.021]	0.124*** [0.032]	0.162*** [0.022]
Non-employed	0.288*** [0.042]	0.299*** [0.044]	0.205*** [0.063]	0.422*** [0.050]
Student	0.251*** [0.056]	0.249*** [0.059]	0.260*** [0.088]	0.401*** [0.063]
Retired	0.276*** [0.048]	0.285*** [0.050]	0.228*** [0.075]	0.389*** [0.055]
Self-employed	-0.342*** [0.034]	-0.359*** [0.036]	-0.383*** [0.055]	-0.206*** [0.038]
Church attendance ^d	-	-0.021*** [0.008]	-	-
Protestant	-	-0.135*** [0.028]	-	-
Catholic	-	0.092*** [0.033]	-	-
Minority	-	-	0.594*** [0.077]	-
Publicly employed	-	-	-	0.156*** [0.029]
Union membership	-	-	-	0.279*** [0.029]
Country Dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year Dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	48334	44576	19343	41712
Pseudo R ²	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.06
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-68252.9	-62882.7	-28589.7	-58339
Wald χ^2 (degrees of freedom)	7368.33 (36)	6997.58 (39)	2589.62 (23)	5452.19 (36)

Notes:

Ordered logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights).

Robust standard errors in brackets.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

See appendix for details on variable descriptions.

^a Right censored at 20% (ca. 95th percentile), at the most detailed occupational level. Zeros for people not in labor force.^b Right censored at 3.33 (ca. 95th percentile). Zeros for people not in labor force.^c In 9 (national) quantiles.^d Church attendance [0 (no (Christian) religion), 1 (never), ..., 5 (once a week)]. Results do not change if zeros (0) are changed to missing values.

Results for models (2) & (3) including the control variables 'publicly employed' and 'union membership' are basically the same.

Table A9: Determinants of Preferences for Redistribution (4 answer categories)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pro Redistribution (4 answer categories)				
Occupational unemployment rate ^a	0.025*** [0.004]	0.027*** [0.004]	0.047*** [0.008]	0.028*** [0.004]
Skill specificity ^b	0.130*** [0.025]	0.134*** [0.025]	0.044 [0.040]	0.140*** [0.028]
Unemployed	0.629*** [0.074]	0.629*** [0.078]	0.625*** [0.111]	0.776*** [0.083]
Income ^c	-0.152*** [0.006]	-0.156*** [0.006]	-0.149*** [0.009]	-0.151*** [0.006]
Age	0.002 [0.001]	0.002** [0.001]	0.001 [0.002]	0.003** [0.001]
Gender (female)	0.221*** [0.027]	0.227*** [0.028]	0.239*** [0.042]	0.220*** [0.030]
Non-employed	0.353*** [0.055]	0.358*** [0.056]	0.356*** [0.084]	0.509*** [0.065]
Student	0.201*** [0.074]	0.191** [0.077]	0.211* [0.120]	0.381*** [0.085]
Retired	0.295*** [0.063]	0.285*** [0.065]	0.352*** [0.098]	0.442*** [0.072]
Self-employed	-0.468*** [0.043]	-0.519*** [0.046]	-0.522*** [0.071]	-0.316*** [0.049]
Church attendance ^d	-	-0.009 [0.010]	-	-
Protestant	-	-0.086** [0.037]	-	-
Catholic	-	0.074* [0.043]	-	-
Minority	-	-	0.583*** [0.079]	-
Publicly employed	-	-	-	0.258*** [0.037]
Union membership	-	-	-	0.254*** [0.039]
Country Dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year Dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	27793	25773	10823	23615
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-33540.8	-31264.5	-13434.3	-27850.5
Wald χ^2 (degrees of freedom)	4956.6 (30)	4542.68 (33)	1906.22 (19)	3662.22 (30)

Notes:

Ordered logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights).

Robust standard errors in brackets.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

See appendix for details on variable descriptions.

^a Right censored at 20% (ca. 95th percentile), at the most detailed occupational level. Zeros for people not in labor force.


^b Right censored at 3.33 (ca. 95th percentile). Zeros for people not in labor force.

^c In 9 (national) quantiles.

^d Church attendance [0 (no (Christian) religion), 1 (never), ..., 5 (once a week)]. Results do not change if zeros (0) are changed to missing values.


Results for models (2) & (3) including the control variables 'publicly employed' and 'union membership' are basically the same.

Figure A4: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function of church attendance (not controlling for risk exposure)



Note: Change in church attendance from min (0) to max (5) and p20 to p80. Simulations based on model (2) in Table A8.

Figure A5: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function of church attendance (controlling for risk exposure)



Note: Change in church attendance from min (0) to max (5) and p20 to p80. Simulations based on model (2) in Table A8.

Table A10: Religion and Preferences for Government Spending

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pro government spending for			
	Health	Pension	Unemployment Benefits	Factor Scores on (1) to (3) ^e
Range of dependent variable	1 to 5	1 to 5	1 to 5	-2.9 to 1.65
Estimation	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
RELIGION:				
Church attendance ^d	-0.073*** [0.018]	-0.086*** [0.019]	-0.037* [0.019]	-0.034*** [0.007]
Protestant	0.019 [0.060]	0.136** [0.062]	-0.131** [0.062]	0.015 [0.022]
Catholic	0.126* [0.072]	0.317*** [0.072]	0.017 [0.071]	0.083*** [0.025]
RISKS:				
Occupational unemployment rate ^a	0.015* [0.008]	0.017** [0.008]	0.031*** [0.009]	0.009*** [0.003]
Skill specificity ^b	0.115*** [0.043]	0.180*** [0.046]	0.117** [0.048]	0.067*** [0.017]
REALIZED RISK:				
Unemployed	0.531*** [0.130]	0.513*** [0.131]	1.367*** [0.134]	0.367*** [0.048]
CONTROLS:				
Income ^c	-0.095*** [0.009]	-0.132*** [0.010]	-0.138*** [0.010]	-0.056*** [0.004]
Age	0.002 [0.002]	0.009*** [0.002]	0.005** [0.002]	0.003*** [0.001]
Gender (female)	0.423*** [0.047]	0.219*** [0.047]	0.229*** [0.047]	0.131*** [0.017]
Non-employed	0.339*** [0.096]	0.389*** [0.099]	0.431*** [0.099]	0.176*** [0.035]
Student	-0.004 [0.141]	0.157 [0.163]	0.403*** [0.154]	0.100* [0.060]
Retired	0.301*** [0.109]	0.303*** [0.116]	0.277** [0.113]	0.150*** [0.041]
Self-employed	-0.133* [0.077]	-0.371*** [0.087]	-0.473*** [0.080]	-0.148*** [0.029]
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9369	9294	9276	9070
(Pseudo) R ²	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.23
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-10470.1	-10187.7	-11307.2	
Wald χ^2 (degrees of freedom)	1696.43 (21)	1160.4 (21)	1554.91 (21)	

Notes:

Ordered logit and OLS regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights).
(Robust) standard errors in brackets.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

^{a, b, c} See Table 1. See appendix for details on variable descriptions.

^d See Table A8.

^e Factor scores from principal factor analysis. Factor loadings are 0.63 (health), 0.64 (unemployment benefits); 0.71 (pension)
Based on ISSP 1996 for USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland, West Germany, East Germany, Norway, New Zealand.