

# Informed Preferences? The Impact of Unions on Workers' Policy Views

**Sung Eun Kim** National University of Singapore  
**Yotam Margalit** Tel Aviv University

**Abstract:** *Despite declining memberships, labor unions still represent large shares of electorates worldwide. Yet their political clout remains contested. To what extent, and in what way, do unions shape workers' political preferences? We address these questions by combining unique survey data of American workers and a set of inferential strategies that exploit two sources of variation: the legal choice that workers face in joining or opting out of unions and the over-time reversal of a union's policy position. Focusing on the issue of trade, we offer evidence that unions influence their members' policy preferences in a significant and theoretically predictable manner. In contrast, we find that self-selection into membership accounts at most for a quarter of the observed "union effect." The study illuminates the impact of unions in cohering workers' voice and provides insight on the role of information provision in shaping how citizens form policy preferences.*

**Replication Materials:** The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FZI6NO>.

To what extent, and in what way, do labor unions shape workers' political preferences? The importance of unions is often attributed to their role in advancing the interests of workers, allowing them to overcome problems of collective action and to generate an effective "voice" (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Much has been made, therefore, of the decline in the power of unions in recent decades and the impact of this trend on the representation of the disadvantaged and less well off.

Yet despite a decrease in membership rates, union members still represent very sizable shares in the electorates of most advanced economies: a quarter of all workers in Britain, a third in Italy, and over half the workforce in countries such as Norway or Belgium. Even in the United States, a noted example of shrinking unionization rates, enlisted union members still account for about 11% of the workforce (almost 15 million workers), a conservative figure that excludes nonmembers covered by union

agreements, as well as family members whose livelihoods often depend on a unionized wage earner.<sup>1</sup> Clearly, few organizations have the reach and ongoing access to such a significant share of the electorate as labor unions do. A key question is whether and how this access translates into political influence.

The importance of this question has gained added impetus in recent years, as scholars have argued that the decline in union membership contributed to a host of regressive labor market outcomes, including weakening labor protections in the face of growing trade liberalization, erosion of the real minimum wage, and the overall rise in income inequality (Bartels 2009; Burgoon and Raess 2006; Hacker and Pierson 2011). One factor potentially contributing to these developments is the influence that unions exert on shaping the political views of their members. If unions are an institution that directly affects the policy preferences of a large swath of workers

---

Sung Eun Kim is an Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, AS1 #04-10 11 Arts Link, Singapore 117570 ([sungeunkim@nus.edu.sg](mailto:sungeunkim@nus.edu.sg)). Yotam Margalit is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel ([ymargalit@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:ymargalit@post.tau.ac.il)).

For valuable feedback and suggestions, we thank Michael Becher, Ruben Enikopolov, Giovanni Facchini, Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner, John Huber, Alex Kuo, and Neil Malhotra, as well as audiences at LSE, Oxford University, Nottingham University, IPEG Barcelona, and Stanford GSB. An earlier version of the article was presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Political Science Association and the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association. We also thank the Israel Science Foundation, grant no. 3131433 (Margalit) for support for this research. All errors remain our own.

<sup>1</sup>Data are from OECD and J. Visser, ICTWSS database, version 3.0 (<http://www.uva-aias.net/208>).

*American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 61, No. 3, July 2017, Pp. 728–743

©2016, Midwest Political Science Association

DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12280

(e.g., by providing policy-relevant information to its members), the decline in union density could help account for the relatively weak public opposition to a host of regressive policies advanced in recent years. Yet this potential explanation rests on the assumption that unions exert substantial influence on the political preferences of their members, a key assumption that is empirically unsubstantiated. As a recent study summarizing the state of the research on the topic concluded, "After 60 years of research on American unions, we still lack convincing evidence of whether or how union membership affects political attitudes" (Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014, 40).

This lacuna is due at least in part to empirical challenges that arise in evaluating the political influence of unions on their members. The first is an absence of appropriate data. Standard national surveys do not include sizable samples of both union members and nonmembers within the same industry, limiting researchers' ability to conduct comparisons with a meaningful control group. A second empirical challenge arises from the fact that even if one overcame this data availability issue and found that union members in a given industry hold policy positions that differ from those of their non-unionized counterparts, the interpretation would still be unclear. It may be that participation in the union itself causes workers to adopt certain positions (i.e., a treatment effect), but it is equally plausible that workers who choose to join a union differ from non-unionized workers in other characteristics that may also account for their divergent political preferences (i.e., a selection effect).

We address these empirical challenges by combining a unique original survey that includes large samples of American workers in a targeted set of industries together with a set of inferential strategies that allow us to test the relative strength of the competing explanations. Our analysis focuses on the policy views of workers regarding trade openness, one of the few salient political issues on which unions across different industries vary significantly in positions and strength of preferences. To explore the link between the unions' stance on trade and the preferences of their members, we generate a new metric of each union's policy position that is based on its official announcements and lobbying efforts on trade-related bills in the years preceding the study.

Our findings provide evidence that unions exert influence on their members in a clear and systematic manner. In contrast, our analysis suggests that self-selection into unions accounts, at most, for less than a quarter of the observed difference between union members and their non-unionized counterparts. More specifically, the analysis points to the important role of unions as information

providers, demonstrating a strong relationship between the intensity of unions' correspondence with their members, the degree of information that members possess about the issue at hand, and the degree of alignment between the unions and their members on the issue.

Exploiting differences across the United States in the legal choice that workers face in joining or opting out of unions (aka the Right to Work law), we show that preferences of union members and nonmembers are not consistent with the legal differences in selection mechanisms into unions. We estimate that union membership accounts for about a 41% increase above the baseline rate in workers' likelihood of opposing trade liberalization, an effect comparable to the effect associated with obtaining a college degree, one of the most studied and established predictors of trade policy preferences (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). In addition, we leverage the dramatic change in the United Auto Workers' (UAW) stance toward a free trade agreement with Korea and examine the impact of its reversal on the stance of its members. Using pre- and post-shift data, we show that members had indeed become more supportive of trade expansion following their union's change of position, whereas this change had no discernible effect on nonmembers employed in the same industry.

The article contributes to the research on the political impact of unions, currently the only organized interest group representing the interests of the low skilled (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Beyond the well-researched traditional routes of influence, such as lobbying and investments in political action committees (PACs) (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011; Masters and Delaney 2005), we show that unions are also able to influence the views of their membership in a meaningful and theoretically predictable way. The study also speaks to the broader literature on organized interests (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Gais and Walker 1991; Kollman 1998). In a major recent study of such organizations, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012) note that one of the prominent routes by which advocacies pursue their objectives is by dissemination of information to members of the organization and to the public, with the aim of communicating to public officials their favored political stance. Yet as the authors acknowledge, systematic data on such activities are lacking, a deficiency that limits our understanding of how organized interest groups use information dissemination as a mechanism of influence. This study provides new insight on how one prominent type of organized interest fills this function, and highlights the substantial heterogeneity across unions (i.e., within the same type of interest group) in both the mode of operation and its degree of influence.

Finally, our analysis also adds to the work on the sources of voter preferences. In particular, a prominent strand in the political economy literature attributes the positions that individuals take on various policies (e.g., trade, immigration, taxation) to their expectations regarding the likely impact of the policy on their own well-being (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Yet, most studies typically just assume this link between perceived self-interest and policy preferences, without explaining how those interests are crystallized by voters. By providing substantial new evidence on the role and impact of unions as information providers, the article illuminates one important mechanism that helps substantiate this key assumption.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the main insights from the literature and draws a set of expectations about the influence of unions on their members. The third section describes our data and empirical approach. The fourth and fifth sections present the findings and a set of robustness tests. The final section discusses the broader implications of the findings for research on preference formation and the evolving role of unions.

## **Preference Formation, Information, and the Impact of Unions**

One prominent strand in the political economy literature on policy preferences focuses on voters' self-interested considerations. This line of explanation suggests that people's attitudes on a policy are largely determined by the utility they expect to derive from it (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Critiques of the interest-based approach center not only on the empirical support (or lack thereof) for some of its predictions, but also on the mechanism underlying its core logic. In particular, some question the basic, often implicit, assumption that individuals understand how their personal well-being is influenced by government policy (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). The notion that voters can tease out the implications of a complex policy, which at times is a matter of debate even among the experts, seems questionable, particularly given the wealth of evidence demonstrating citizens' lack of knowledge or grasp of very basic political and economic facts (Campbell et al. 1960; Ferejohn 1990).

One response to this critique focuses on voter learning. Such learning could presumably occur in several ways, without requiring the (probably heroic) assumption that voters actively seek out and process policy-relevant

information. For example, individuals may draw on their everyday experiences to form policy opinions that largely accord with their interests. Indeed, some studies show that voters update their political preferences leftwards—even if only temporarily—in response to the experience of various hardships such as loss of employment or of health care (Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger 2013; Margalit 2013). Another source of learning is exposure to information or cues. According to this view, citizens acquire pertinent knowledge about the rationale and preferences of friends, coworkers, or other groups that they believe to share interests with them, and subsequently infer how a policy is likely to affect their own interests (Lupia 1994).

It is within this strand of arguments that the importance of labor unions is often stressed. Unions have close access to their members via regular meetings, direct mailings, or mobilization drives, and thus could regularly communicate with their members on the political issues of the day. If members consider the union as a custodian of their interests and a reliable source of information, these communications can potentially influence and sway the political views of the members (Iversen and Soskice 2015). Unions can also encourage their members to invest more effort in acquiring policy-relevant information (Ahlquist and Levi 2013).

Indeed, in their mammoth study of political advocacy organizations, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012, 400) note that an important route by which such organizations pursue their interests is through “disseminating information to the public or to the organization's members . . . in order to highlight issues, to shape opinions, or to generate communication to public officials in support of favored political positions.” Yet as this and related studies on advocacies indicate (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; Gais and Walker 1991; Kollman 1998), there is little systematic data on the frequency or scope of information dissemination efforts, let alone on their actual impact. Perhaps due to this lack of data, the bulk of work on the political impact of unions has focused on other routes of influence, such as campaigns to increase voter turnout, mobilization of members to engage in PAC contributions, and lobbying activities aimed at affecting pro-union legislation (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011; Leighley and Nagler 2007; Masters and Delaney 1987).

In the context of trade policy, the domain of influence on which we focus in this article, prior studies find that union membership is, on average, associated with lower support for free trade (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Discussing this finding, scholars surmise that it may be the outcome of unions' ongoing communications on the matter with their membership (e.g., Mansfield and Mutz 2009, 431, 436). Yet again, other

than conjecture, little evidence exists to back up this contention.

Cognizant of this deficiency, Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi (2014) provide what is perhaps the most careful and nuanced new set of insights on the matter. Focusing on a case study of a dockworkers' union, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), and using a survey of workers in three U.S. localities, the authors employ a matching procedure to get an estimate of the "union effect" on workers' attitudes. Overall, they find that members of the ILWU were more willing than nonmembers to support a protectionist stance on trade, even though trade openness was highly beneficial to their own employment. The authors propose that this seemingly puzzling result is evidence that the union was able to influence its members to oppose a policy that was injurious to the broader class of workers. The study combines survey data and a rich historical account of the ILWU's position on trade policy over a period of six decades. Yet as the authors recognize, it remains an open question whether the findings regarding this case can be generalized to explain the impact of unions on workers' policy preferences in the broader economy.

To address this question, one must not only investigate the impact of unions on a broader set of sectors, but also explore the mechanism underlying the influence of unions. If unions clarify the interests and shape the preferences of their members, systematic evidence should show that members (a) are aware of the information provided by their unions, (b) correctly interpret the union's stance on the matter, and (c) are more likely to adopt the position touted by the unions. While these outcomes are at least plausible *ex ante*, convincing empirical research on all three questions is lacking. In the next sections, we aim to provide new insights that address each of these contentions in turn.

## Data and Empirical Strategy

Our analysis uses novel survey data of more than 4,000 American workers employed in a set of selected industries. The survey design followed a customized two-stage sampling approach. First, a set of 12 key industries was identified based on several criteria reflecting variation in their exposure to the impacts of globalization (e.g., factor intensity, value added per worker, trade balance, and exposure to offshoring activity).<sup>2</sup> Then, from each of those targeted industries, sizable samples of currently

employed workers were recruited by YouGov/Polimetrix to participate in an online survey fielded between July 2010 and February 2011.<sup>3</sup> To gain greater variation in the industries' exposure to international commerce, the survey included firms in both manufacturing and services that differ along pertinent dimensions such as size, trade balance, and value added per worker. (See Table A1 in the supporting information for the list of selected industries, their key characteristics, and the respective sample sizes).

We use a series of questions that could potentially tap into different aspects of workers' views on trade policy. Our analysis relies on responses to all three questions.

We would like to learn about your views on trade with other countries—by trade we mean American businesses and individuals buying goods from other countries or selling goods to other countries.


- Overall, do you think trade with other countries should be expanded, reduced, or kept at its current level?
- Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for you and your family?
- Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for the U.S. as a whole?

To explore the link between union membership and views on trade, the survey also contains questions regarding the intensity of communication initiated by the union on trade policy, as well as a question pertaining to the degree of information that the members possess about their union's position on the issue (see the supporting information for exact question wording).

In order to examine the correspondence between how members assess the stance of their union and its actual position, we generated a new measure of each union's "revealed preference" with respect to trade policy. We did so using information on each union's official announcements and lobbying activity on all relevant trade-related legislation advanced in the 2 years prior to our study. We code the union's stance on a bill on a 7-point scale and aggregate the codings from all bills to place the unions along a trade protectionist-liberalizer continuum. In total, we coded the activities of 15 labor unions that represent 75% of the unionized survey respondents who provided information on their affiliated unions. (See the

<sup>2</sup>Industries are classified at the three-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level.

<sup>3</sup>The data were collected as part of the Harvard Globalization Survey in which Margalit was a co-principal investigator (PI). See Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit (2015) for a more detailed description of the survey. We thank the other PIs for generously allowing us to use the data for this study.

**FIGURE 1 Trade Policy Views of Union Members vs. Nonmembers, by Industry**

supporting information for a detailed description of the trade bills and the coding scheme.)

Our measure, unsurprisingly, indicates that unions operating in the import competing sectors—fabricated metal, transportation equipment, and chemical manufacturing—exhibit the most protectionist stance. We also find that the least protectionist unions operate in the export-oriented sector, food manufacturing, and the nontradable service sectors (see Table A4 in the supporting information for the score of every union on the trade protectionism scale). To compare the views of union members and nonmembers who share similar employment interests, we also generate an average protectionism score for each industry. Since an industry has members in multiple unions, we average the protectionism score of each union and weight it by the proportion the union represents among all workers in the industry.

## Results

### Do Union Members Have Different Policy Preferences?

We begin by presenting an unconditional comparison of union members' trade policy preferences and those of nonmembers working in the same industry. The panels in Figure 1 present a comparison of the share of respondents in each group who (a) support reducing trade levels, (b) have a negative perception of trade's impact on self, and (c) have a negative perception of trade's impact on the United States as a whole.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>The binary measure uses the bottom two categories on the 5-point scale to classify the opposition to trade.

The graphs show that union members' policy preferences are different from those of nonmembers, but the impact of union membership is not uniform across industries. In the manufacturing industries, union members tend to hold more negative attitudes toward free trade than nonmembers. Yet, the difference in view associated with union membership is not homogeneous across the service industries. While union members employed in building construction are more opposed to trade expansion than nonmembers, the opposite pattern is registered in nursing and residential care, as well as in the ambulatory health care industries, where unionized workers are less protectionist. Finally, we find little difference between the preferences of union members and nonmembers in both the telecommunication and education sectors.

To get a better sense of the overall “union effect” across all industries, while taking account of the main potential confounders, we conduct a nearest-neighbor matching exercise. We match each union member with a non-unionized worker who is employed in the same industry and sector (private vs. public) and is also of the same gender, ethnicity, marital status, and education level as the union member.<sup>5</sup> After the requirement for exact matching on these criteria is fulfilled, the matching algorithm is instructed to seek the closest observation in terms of income level and age.<sup>6</sup> With the matched data, we estimate a probit regression model calculating

<sup>5</sup>Education level is measured as a binary indicator of completing a 4-year college degree.

<sup>6</sup>We do not match on the respondent's party identification, which could be influenced by union membership.

**FIGURE 2 Issues Unions Discuss Most Frequently**



Note: The unionized respondents were asked to list up to three issues that their union discussed most frequently in its communications to the respondent. We reclassified open-ended responses to eight categories presented in the figure, leaving out some answers that appear only rarely in the responses.

the average treatment effect of union membership on all three dependent variables.

The results indicate that the average union effect is indeed considerable: Union members are about 5 percentage points more likely to support reduction in levels of trade than similar workers from the same industry who do not belong to a union and about 5 percentage points more likely to perceive that trade is adversely affecting them personally. The largest effect is registered with regard to the view that trade is harming the United States as a whole, where the estimated union effect is an increase of 8 percentage points. Even taking account of the uncertainty in the estimates, the union effect is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 95% level for all three of the dependent variables (see Figure A3 in the supporting information for the full results).


The question, of course, is what accounts for this union effect and its variation across industries. Does it reflect a selection or treatment effect? The next sections

present empirical tests that evaluate the relative validity of these two lines of explanation.

### Unions as Information Providers

To evaluate the validity of the information provision mechanism, we begin by using descriptive data to examine the basic expectation that unions do indeed communicate with their members on trade issues. We then explore the extent to which members are familiar with their union's stance on the issues.

Our first analysis examines the issues that unions discuss most prominently in their communications with their members. As part of the survey, union members were asked to list up to three issues that were most frequently addressed in their union's communications. The answers to this open-ended question, presented in Figure 2, indicate that in some industries, a considerable share of members describe trade as one of the three most discussed issues by the union: 58% of the respondents

**FIGURE 3 Union Communications on Trade and Members' Knowledge**

belonging to the United Auto Workers and 25% from the International Association of Machinists. In sharp contrast, none from two of the least protectionist unions—the American Federation of Teachers and the Service Employees International Union—listed trade as a frequently discussed issue.

Next, we explore the degree to which workers are familiar with their union's policy stance on trade. The panels in Figure 3 present the share of members who (a) answered that they had received at least three communications from their union in the past year on the issue of trade; (b) are either somewhat or very familiar with the union's position on trade; and (c) think that their union advocates reducing trade. The unions are sorted along the vertical axis by their protectionism score. The left panel indicates that members of more protectionist unions typically received more communication from their organization on trade-related issues. Those members also tend to express greater familiarity with their union's stance on the issue of trade (center panel) and to describe their union as protectionist (right panel). In the case of the more protectionist unions such as the UAW or the United Steelworkers, over 70% of the members correctly note that their union supports reduction of trade levels. Notably, the picture is almost reversed among the American Federation of Teachers, the least protectionist union in our sample.<sup>7</sup> These findings are clearly consistent with the notion that unions serve as information providers on the issue of trade policy.

<sup>7</sup>To be sure, these graphs alone do not prove a causal relation. In particular, given that union communications are self-reported, one cannot rule out the possibility that the recollection of communications is endogenous to respondents' prior position on trade.


### Do Members Internalize Information from the Union?

To assess whether communication from unions affects the preferences of workers on a given policy, we examine the alignment between the stance of the union and its members' attitudes toward trade openness. The upper panels in Figure 4 compare the stance of each union with the views of its members, presenting in each subgraph the responses to one of the three dependent variable questions. The graphs show quite vividly that members' own attitudes on the issue of trade are positively associated with the protectionism score of their union. Put simply, in the more protectionist unions, the members also tend to hold more protectionist views.

This finding, however, is subject to an obvious concern about endogeneity and potential spuriousness: The association might simply be driven by another factor that shapes both the unions' stance as well as that of its members. For example, workers and unions in import competing sectors might be more protectionist than others simply because of the adverse consequences that exposure to foreign competition poses to them. As a first way of dealing with this possibility, we compare the trade preferences of union members with those of non-union workers *employed in the same industry*. If the association is driven by some industry-level characteristic, we should observe the same pattern within an industry among both union and non-union members. Yet empirically, that does not appear to be the case.

The lower panels in Figure 4 present the share of union members and nonmembers who hold negative views toward international trade, plotting them against

**FIGURE 4 Alignment between Union's Stance and Workers' Policy Preferences across Unions**



the industry's protectionism score. The graphs highlight that the average protectionism score of unions in each industry is positively correlated with union members' trade preferences, but not with those of nonmembers. This suggests that workers from the same industry not only differ in their views on trade as a function of whether or not they belong to a union, but also that the differences reveal a distinct pattern: Members hold views that correspond to those of the union, whereas nonmembers do not. This striking pattern also finds support when tested formally (see the supporting information).

### Treatment versus Selection

The results presented so far are consistent with the notion that, among other functions, unions are information providers that exert effective influence on their members' policy preferences. Yet, as noted above, these findings may also reflect a self-selection process. To ad-

dress this possibility, this section presents inferential tests designed to help tease out between the competing explanations.

### Cross-State Legal Differences and the Union Effect

To examine whether self-selection accounts for the union effect detected in the analyses above, we leverage state-level differences in their Right to Work (RTW) laws, statutes that govern the extent to which employment in a workplace can be conditional on the worker becoming a union member. The RTW law, a provision included in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, allows individual states to prohibit union "security agreements." This means that in states that adopt the RTW provision, labor unions cannot legally require workers to pay union dues.<sup>8</sup> The implication is that union membership in RTW states depends

<sup>8</sup>In some states, there is an exemption to government employees, who can be required to pay union dues.



much more on individual workers' own discretion and is less a function of an institutional requirement to become members.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, union membership rates are systematically much higher in non-RTW states, even within the same industry. For example, workers in educational services are more than twice as likely to be union members in non-RTW states (48% vs. 23%), or almost three times as likely in building construction (20% vs. 7%). Even in sectors with lower unionization rates, the relative difference is mostly as large, if not greater (see Figure A2 in the supporting information for different unionization rates in RTW and non-RTW states across industries). This difference in the regulation of union membership across states allows us to test the self-selection explanation in the following manner: If self-selection accounts for members' preferences, we should observe that the effect of union membership is larger in those states in which membership is more likely to arise from a worker's own volition.

To test this proposition, we estimate the following binary probit model:

$$\text{Probit}(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Union}_i + \beta_2 \text{RTW}_i + \beta_3 \text{Union} \\ \times \text{RTW}_i + \gamma \text{Industry}_i + \theta \text{Controls}_i + \epsilon_i,$$

where  $Y_i$  is a binary measure of respondents' attitudes toward international trade. *Union* is a binary indicator for an individual  $i$ 's union membership, and *RTW* is a binary variable taking the value 1 if  $i$  resides in the RTW states at the time of the survey. The key parameter of interest is the coefficient  $\beta_3$  on the interaction term *Union*  $\times$  *RTW*. A finding that the interaction term is sizable and significant would point strongly toward a selection-based explanation, as it would indicate that the union effect is less pronounced when workers are "pushed" into their union membership status. The model also includes fixed effects for *Industry* as well as *Controls*, a vector of individual characteristics (income, gender, race, age, education, and marital status).<sup>10</sup> In the last column of each set of specifications, we include the full set of control variables interacted with *RTW* to account for the possibility that individual characteristics may also have varying effects under the different legal settings. The analysis focuses on private sector workers because unions in the public sector are only covered by RTW statutes in some of the states. Thus, for testing the selection hypothesis, restricting the analysis to private sector workers is more appropriate.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup>For an overview of the Right to Work law, see Collins (2012).

<sup>10</sup>See the supporting information for complete details on the coding of each variable.

<sup>11</sup>Nonetheless, the findings are unchanged when we also include the public sector workers in the analysis (see Table A8).

We expect unions to affect the policy preferences of their members when they actively disseminate policy-related information to their membership. Thus, to provide an effective test of this claim, we conduct a split-sample analysis in which we estimate the model separately for industries in which the average protectionism score is high (i.e., above median) and low.<sup>12</sup>

We present the estimation results with all three dependent variables in Table 1. For each dependent variable, we begin by including only a set of basic covariates. The coefficient on *Union Member* is positive and statistically significant in the industry groups represented by the protectionist unions (top panel), yet it is not significant in the less protectionist industries (lower panel). This result, which holds across all the model specifications, suggests that the effect of union membership is conditional on the firmness of the union's stance on the policy issue in question, perhaps because those unions communicate their stance on the issue more intensely to their membership.

Yet as explained above, the key coefficient of interest is the interaction term *Union Member*  $\times$  *RTW*. Notably, this interaction term is not statistically significant in any of the specifications in the protectionist industries: This is the case when we include only the basic set of covariates, when we control also for respondents' partisan affiliation, and when we interact *RTW* with all other covariates. Moreover, the substantive effect of the interaction term is either very close to zero or small and slightly *negative*, a finding that is inconsistent with the selection mechanism being prominent. In the less protectionist industries, the finding is similar. The interaction coefficient is either substantively close to zero or negatively signed.

We subject the results to a series of robustness tests. First, we reestimate the models using the preprocessed data from the matching analysis. Second, we estimate the models with sampling weights. Our main analysis uses unweighted data because we do not seek to estimate the effect for the U.S. population as whole, but as robustness we check whether the results are affected by the use of weights. Third, we examine whether the exclusion of the public sector workers from the sample makes a difference as opposed to including all workers in the analysis. And lastly, we reestimate the models while excluding managers and supervisors, since they cannot join the unions by law. The estimated results presented in Tables A6–A9 in the supporting information show that the findings hold against this variety of robustness tests.

<sup>12</sup>None of the unions in the sample are actively advancing a pro-trade stance. The difference is thus between unions strongly opposed to trade-liberalizing bills and unions that are not strongly opposed.

**TABLE 1 Effect of Union Membership on Attitudes toward Trade**

	Trade Levels				Trade on Self				Trade on U.S.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<b>Strongly Protectionist Unions</b>												
Union Member	0.097* (0.038)	0.088* (0.043)	0.089* (0.043)	0.090* (0.044)	0.063+ (0.034)	0.074+ (0.039)	0.075+ (0.039)	0.085* (0.040)	0.127** (0.037)	0.137** (0.042)	0.140** (0.043)	0.140** (0.043)
RTW	0.024 (0.024)	0.020 (0.026)	0.025 (0.026)	-0.077 (0.175)	-0.001 (0.021)	0.003 (0.022)	0.009 (0.022)	0.264 (0.172)	0.014 (0.022)	0.017 (0.024)	0.025 (0.024)	0.041 (0.172)
RTW * Union Member		0.040 (0.085)	0.025 (0.084)	0.026 (0.087)		-0.040 (0.062)	-0.059 (0.058)	-0.077 (0.054)		-0.035 (0.066)	-0.054 (0.062)	-0.052 (0.064)
Party ID Control	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Full Interactions	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1614	1614	1588	1588	1614	1614	1588	1588	1614	1614	1588	1588
<b>Not Strongly Protectionist Unions</b>												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Union Member	-0.011 (0.052)	-0.014 (0.054)	-0.020 (0.054)	-0.029 (0.054)	-0.018 (0.041)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.013 (0.044)	-0.021 (0.043)	-0.031 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.046)	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.041 (0.045)
RTW	0.008 (0.022)	0.008 (0.023)	0.006 (0.023)	0.137 (0.176)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.000 (0.019)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.122 (0.118)	-0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.043 (0.148)
RTW * Union Member		0.046 (0.188)	0.041 (0.183)	0.056 (0.183)						-0.066 (0.133)	-0.057 (0.141)	-0.064 (0.133)
Party ID Control	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Full Interactions	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1810	1810	1778	1778	1810	1805	1773	1773	1810	1810	1778	1778

Note: Marginal effects are presented, with standard errors in parentheses. All models include fixed effects for *Industry* as well as *Controls* (income, gender, race, age, education, and marital status). Full interactions include the demographic controls interacted with *RTW*.  
 +p < .10, \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01.

Another plausible alternative explanation for these findings could be a strategic allocation of effort that unions exert in informing their members. Unions may employ greater communication effort in non-RTW states, where members are less likely *ex ante* to share the political views of the unions. Such strategic effort could then explain the lack of difference in members' attitudes across states with different RTW status. Yet, our data suggest this explanation is highly unlikely given that in both types of states, we observe very similar levels of union communication efforts. In RTW states, 22% of members received multiple trade policy-related communications from their union in the previous year, a figure almost identical to the corresponding share of members in the non-RTW states (21%). This pattern also holds true for other measures of union communication.

To assess the substantive effect of union membership on trade attitudes, we estimate the probability that a worker with characteristics of the sample median supports a reduction in trade levels.<sup>13</sup> A nonmember with such characteristics is, on average, 19% likely to support a more protectionist measure, but union membership increases this probability by 8 percentage points to over 27%. This represents a 39% increase over the baseline level. We also examine the effect of union membership in the less protectionist group of industries.<sup>14</sup> In this case, union membership increases the predicted probability of supporting trade reduction by less than 1 percentage point on average, and the point estimate is not statistically significant.

The substantive effect of union membership on the probability that one perceives a negative impact of trade on oneself and one's family is also considerable. A worker with characteristics of the sample median has a 16% likelihood of perceiving trade as harmful, but this estimate increases by over 7 percentage points among union members with similar characteristics, representing a 44% increase compared to the baseline estimate. This effect is comparable in size to that associated with education, a variable that is widely documented as an important determinant of trade preferences (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).

In sum, then, the results clearly go against the prediction that arises if self-selection accounts for the distinct

trade policy preferences of union members. Nonetheless, other unobservable factors can still account for some of the so-called union effect. We therefore follow the method pioneered by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and estimate a lower bound of the treatment, in the presence of other unobservables that influence the outcome of study. The results indicate that selection on unobservables can account, at most, for 24% of the estimated effect, implying that the union "treatment" accounts for the bulk of the observed change in the preferences of its members.<sup>15</sup>

### Members' Preferences When the Union Changes Position

If unions affect the policy positions of their members by providing policy-relevant information, then we would expect that following a change in the policy stance of a union, a corresponding change in the view of its members would also take place. In contrast, we would not expect this to occur if members join the union because of their affiliation with its (original) stance on trade. This section examines the effect of exactly such a type of reversal in a union's stance: the sudden and fairly dramatic shift in the UAW position toward a major trade liberalization deal.

For many years, the UAW, a union representing workers primarily in the auto industry, had been consistently and strongly opposed to the expansion of trade. It was also part of a vocal opposition to the signing of trade agreements with Colombia and with Korea, agreements that were debated exactly around the time of the survey. With respect to the latter agreement, the UAW's official statement from April 2010 summarized its position as follows:

The UAW strongly opposes the free-trade deal negotiated by President Bush with South Korea (KORUS FTA) in April 2007, and has reiterated that opposition to the Obama administration and to Congress. The poorly negotiated and misguided auto provisions of the KORUS FTA would further open the U.S. market to increased automotive imports from Korea.


The statement ended by calling the union members to "tell Congress that this free-trade deal would lead to a surge in automotive imports from South Korea,

<sup>13</sup>We estimate the predicted probability based on the second model and set *age* at its mean value and all other categorical variables at their median values, assuming a white male, married, with 4 years of college education. The industry is set to *transportation equipment industry* when estimating the model for the more protectionist group of industries.

<sup>14</sup>We estimate the probability setting the industry category to *ambulatory health care industry*.

<sup>15</sup>See the supporting information for a full description of the method and findings.

**FIGURE 5 Support for Reducing Trade by Union Membership before and after the UAW Shift**



Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

worsening our lopsided auto trade deficit and threatening the jobs of tens of thousands of American workers.”<sup>16</sup>

Yet, following intense lobbying and negotiations with the Obama administration, a set of changes advocated by the union was incorporated into the revised agreement. On December 6th of that same year, the union made a statement pronouncing that

The changes announced to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement today ... represent an important opportunity to break open the Korean market for U.S. businesses and workers and boost American manufacturing jobs, particularly in the automotive sector. ... We believe an agreement was achieved that will protect current American auto jobs, that will grow more American auto jobs ... and that has important enforcement mechanisms.<sup>17</sup>

How did this shift in the union's position influence the views of the autoworkers on trade? We examine the impact of the UAW's pro-trade message by focusing on our sample of auto industry workers. The survey includes 102 auto industry workers, a quarter of whom participated in the survey *after* the UAW announced its support for the free trade agreement. Using this sample, we

compare the views of union members with those of nonmembers before and after the UAW's endorsement of the free trade agreement. Figure 5 clearly demonstrates that union members working in the auto industry were more protectionist than nonmembers before the shift, yet the level of support for trade restrictions decreased substantially after the UAW endorsed the free trade agreement. Crucially, this change in attitudes toward trade liberalization is not observed among nonmembers also working in the auto industry.

This pattern is very much consistent with the information provision mechanism discussed herein, namely, that union members became more supportive of trade as they received a pro-trade message from the union. Yet at least in theory, this observed pattern could also be explained by reverse causality, namely, that a shift in members' trade preferences (following the renegotiation of the trade deal) was itself the trigger for the change in the union's public stance. Such an explanation, however, is highly implausible given the very complicated and technical nature of the changes made to the trade agreement. These included new provisions on the schedule of tariff reductions, changes to the list of safety regulations, incorporation of certain environmental standards, and the introduction of safeguard provisions pertaining to Korean exports.<sup>18</sup> Without the union communicating and clarifying the overall impact of these changes, the average worker may not even have been aware that such changes

<sup>16</sup>The full statement is available at <http://www.uaw.org/page/international-trade-and-investment-policy>.

<sup>17</sup>The full statement is available at <http://www.uaw.org/category/tags/korus>.

<sup>18</sup>See the supporting information for details on the revised agreement.

to the agreement were made, let alone comprehend how these complex technicalities would affect her well-being.

Qualitative evidence from the online discussion forum of the UAW workers further contradicts this possibility of reverse causality. Examining the entries regarding KORUS posted by workers on the union's Facebook page, we find that the discussion was overwhelmingly critical of the agreement, as well as of the change in the union's official stance. While not necessarily representative of the entire UAW membership's views, this evidence is inconsistent with the notion that the shift in the union's stance came as a result of strong rank-and-file support for the agreement.<sup>19</sup>

Another alternative explanation for the shift that occurred only in union members' preferences could be differences in news consumption: If union members follow the news more than nonmembers, perhaps the former became supportive of trade openness because of greater exposure to the media coverage of the agreement. While theoretically plausible, it should first be noted that the revised agreement was in fact criticized by key media outlets, some of which took a stance that directly contradicted the union's assessment of the deal.<sup>20</sup> Thus, it is unclear in what direction the effect of news consumption should shift one's attitudes toward trade. Notwithstanding, in the following estimation, we also control for respondents' level of news consumption along with other potential confounding factors to ensure that the differences between union members and nonmembers are not driven by other characteristics. We estimate the model as follows:

$$\text{Probit}(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Union}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post-Shift}_i + \beta_3 \text{Union} \\ \times \text{Post-Shift}_i + \theta \text{Controls}_i + \epsilon_i.$$

This specification is similar to the one estimated in the previous section, only here we include a *Post-Shift* indicator instead of a binary variable denoting an *RTW* state. The *Post-Shift* indicator variable takes the value 1 if individual *i* was interviewed after the UAW announced its support for the KORUS FTA and the value 0 if interviewed before. In some models, we also include separate indicators for Michigan and Ohio, the two states in which the auto industry is concentrated, as well as their interaction terms with a binary indicator for post-shift survey. The main interest in this analysis is the effect associated with *Union* membership and the interaction term

*Union × Post-Shift*. We expect union members interviewed before the change in the union's position to exhibit more intense protectionist attitudes than nonmembers because the former were exposed to the union's message opposing the free trade deal. In addition, we expect union members interviewed after the shift—and who presumably were exposed to the pro-trade message from the union—to be less protectionist.

The estimation results, presented in Table 2, are in line with these expectations: The coefficient on *Union Member* is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level or higher in all specifications estimating support for trade reduction. In addition, the coefficient on *Union Member × Post-Shift* is negative and highly significant in all models. This is also the case when we control for respondent's news consumption and ideological affinity. Given the fairly small sample size, the consistency of the finding, both unconditionally and when controlling for a host of confounding factors, is quite striking.

Turning to the right panel of the table, in which we analyze respondents' view of trade as harmful to themselves and their families, we find that union membership was again associated with a sizable and significant effect on the perception of trade as adversely affecting oneself. However, in this case, we observe a much weaker change following the union's U-turn in the pro-trade direction. Taken together, these results suggest that the union's change in position influenced the views of its members toward a more liberal stance, but this shift did not reverse the members' perception that trade had overall been harmful to them and their families.

## Moderators of the Union Effect

Having demonstrated that union membership exerts significant influence on members' views, we also explore whether the effect varies across different types of workers in theoretically predictable ways. First, we examine whether workers with opposed ideological convictions exhibit a lesser tendency to adopt the union's stance. Since we do not have information about workers' views on trade prior to joining the union, we use members' partisan stance instead, with the expectation that Republicans (who tend to be more pro-trade) would exhibit less openness to the union's protectionist message. In our model, we interact a 5-point measure of partisan preference with an indicator variable denoting union membership. The results provide qualified support for the hypothesis, indicating that indeed, the "union effect" on members' views tends to be weaker among Republicans (Table A13). The

<sup>19</sup>See the supporting information for full excerpts from the UAW's discussion forum on the KORUS agreement.

<sup>20</sup>For example, see the *New York Times* article "Few New Jobs Expected Soon from Free-Trade Agreement with South Korea" (December 7, 2010).

**TABLE 2 Change in the Union's Policy Position and Members' Preferences**

	Trade Level				Trade on Self			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Union Member	0.541** (0.120)	0.492** (0.141)	0.501** (0.143)	0.477** (0.156)	0.397** (0.140)	0.299+ (0.157)	0.415* (0.164)	0.375* (0.178)
Post-Shift	0.076 (0.130)	0.043 (0.138)	0.021 (0.139)	-0.005 (0.176)	-0.048 (0.123)	-0.070 (0.127)	-0.094 (0.127)	0.035 (0.166)
Post-Shift × Union Member	-0.453** (0.076)	-0.473** (0.075)	-0.478** (0.077)	-0.507** (0.072)	-0.074 (0.207)	-0.042 (0.230)	0.022 (0.253)	0.146 (0.325)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Consumption	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Party ID	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Auto States	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	100	97	96	96	100	97	96	96

*Note:* Marginal effects are presented, with standard errors in parentheses. Demographic Controls = income, gender, race, age, education, and marital status. News Consumption = A binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the respondent read a newspaper once a day or more. Auto States = Michigan, Post-Shift × Michigan, Ohio, Post-Shift × Ohio.

+p < .10, \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01.

interactions are always positively signed and in two of the outcomes significant at the 90% level.

Following Zaller (1992), we also test the prediction that unions' communication is more likely to influence the members who are less informed about economic matters. This is expected both because the union-provided content is likely to be newer for those individuals, and because it is likely to face less countervailing information. To test this prediction, we interact union membership with a measure of economic knowledge, based on whether the respondent had ever taken an economics class. Examining the results, we observe that among union members, having no prior economics education is indeed associated with a more protectionist view, as well as a more negative perception of trade's impact on the United States. However, the estimated effect is well below statistical significance, a result we obtain across all models (Table A14). In sum, we find very limited evidence that prior economic knowledge is a strong moderator of the union effect.<sup>21</sup>

Finally, we examine whether the characteristics of the unions themselves are associated with differences in the influence they exert on their members. Following Ahlquist and Levi (2013), we expect that the more economically successful unions will also be the most effective in swaying their members' views. Using a union's spending power (measured per capita in the previous year) as a proxy for its economic success, we interact this measure

with the union's stance on trade (i.e., the protectionism score). The results indicate that the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level with respect to the perceived impact of trade on self and on the United States (see Table A15). Thus, the findings are consistent with the argument that the more economically successful unions are more effective in influencing their members.

## Conclusion

Labor unions are conventionally seen as organizations fighting for better rights, wages, and benefits for workers. This study has shown that one route by which unions pursue their objectives is communication of policy-relevant information to their membership. The frequency and nature of the communications vary across unions, but those engaging in it more intensely are able to influence the members' attitudes toward the union-held position. Thus, it appears that unions are not merely a "voice" of workers' preferences, but also an effective institution that is able to systematically shape and cohere that voice toward a given policy objective.

To what extent do the findings speak to the influence of other organized interest groups on their members? In their most recent study of organized interests in the United States, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012, 406) show that unions are more likely than any other type of organized interest groups (e.g., trade associations, identity groups, corporations) to be engaged in multiple activities

<sup>21</sup>Employing education as an alternative measure to knowledge produces substantively similar results.

such as testifying to congressional committees, lobbying, filing an amicus brief, or making a PAC donation. Unions are also more likely to use their websites to promote discussion of public policy issues as well as to try to facilitate political action.<sup>22</sup> Even the average spent by unions on lobbying is relatively high, second only to occupational and trade/business associations (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 409). Thus, on average, unions are relatively more active than most organized interest groups, which suggests that their influence on their membership is probably also more significant than that of their counterparts.

Our findings also give rise to the question of whether trade is a representative issue for testing the unions' influence on their members. To address this point, consider the following: In the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), 45% of respondents asked about their views on trade policy said that they "haven't thought much about it." In contrast, 12% and 13% chose this answer when asked about national spending on defense and on social services, respectively.<sup>23</sup> Given that people's views tend to be more malleable on issues on which they possess weaker opinions, this evidence suggests that the effect we observe with respect to trade is likely to be closer to the upper bound of the influence organized interest groups are able to exert on their members. Affecting attitude change on issues on which people tend to have stronger prior views—social issues, moral values—is likely to be more difficult.

In prior research on public opinion, any consideration of a union effect on members' attitudes has almost exclusively relied on the inclusion of an indicator variable denoting whether or not the respondent belongs to a union. This approach assumes a homogeneous effect across unions. Yet our study, which utilizes information not only on membership but also on the specific unions to which the respondents belong, highlights the significant variation in the position that unions take on the same issue as well as in the intensity with which they correspond about it with their members. Thus, by estimating only the average union effect, as most prior research has done, scholars have underestimated the impact of the more active unions on the preferences of their members. This suggests that for addressing certain questions about the political consequences of unions, particularly in studies that seek to go beyond their overall effect on the

electorate, collecting information not just on membership but also on the specific union affiliation is pertinent.

In recent years, perhaps due to the declining rates of union membership, the focus in much of the research has shifted to exploring the influence of other institutions, such as the church or business lobbies, on various political and electoral outcomes (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Green 2007). Yet even today, few organizations have the broad reach and regular access to such sizable portions of the electorate as unions do. As the findings of this article indicate, a meaningful understanding of the forces shaping public preferences in today's political environment still requires taking account of labor unions' impact.

## References

- Ahlquist, John, Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi. 2014. "Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Workers' Attitudes toward International Trade, and the ILWU Puzzle." *International Organization* 68(1): 33–75.
- Ahlquist, John, and Margaret Levi. 2013. *In the Interests of Others: Leaders, Governance, and Political Activism in Membership Organizations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2005. "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities." *Journal of Public Economics* 89(5): 897–931.
- Altonji, Joseph G., Todd E. Elder, and Christopher R. Taber. 2005. "Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools." *Journal of Political Economy* 113(1): 151–84.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2009. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Beth L. Leech, and David C. Kimball. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Burgoon, Brian, and Damian Raess. 2006. "Dogs That Sometimes Bark: Globalization and Works Councils in Germany." *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 12(3): 287–309.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Collins, Benjamin. 2012. "Right to Work Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research." Congressional Report for Congress.
- Facchini, Giovanni, and Anna Maria Mayda. 2009. "Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants? Evidence across Countries." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 91(2): 295–314.
- Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda, and Prachi Mishra. 2011. "Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?" *Journal of International Economics* 85(1): 114–28.
- Ferejohn, John. 1990. "Information and the Electoral Process." In *Information and Democratic Processes*, ed. John Ferejohn

<sup>22</sup>For example, 72% of union websites try to advance political action (e.g., promote a certain action or provide a link to facilitate voter registration); the corresponding figures are 37% for identity groups, 33% for trade or business associations, and only 3% for corporations (see Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 403).

<sup>23</sup>See the supporting information for a more complete discussion of the ANES data.

- and James Kukli. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 3–19.
- Freeman, Richard B., and James L. Medoff. 1984. *What Do Unions Do?* New York: Basic Books.
- Gais, Thomas L., and Jack L. Walker Jr. 1991. "Pathways to Influence in American Politics." *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America* 103: 104–11.
- Green, John Clifford. 2007. *The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2011. *Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Hacker, Jacob S., Philipp Rehm, and Mark Schlesinger. 2013. "The Insecure American: Economic Experiences, Financial Worries, and Policy Attitudes." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(1): 23–49.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60(2): 469–98.
- Hainmueller, Jens, Michael J. Hiscox, and Yotam Margalit. 2015. "Do Concerns about Labour Market Competition Shape Attitudes toward Immigration? New Evidence from U.S. Workers." *Journal of International Economics* 97(1): 193–207.
- Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2015. "Information, Inequality, and Mass Polarization Ideology in Advanced Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(13): 1781–1813.
- Kollman, Ken. 1998. *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. 2007. "Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964–2004." *Journal of Politics* 69(2): 430–41.
- Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *American Political Science Review* 88(1): 63–76.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63(3): 425–57.
- Margalit, Yotam. 2013. "Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession." *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 80–103.
- Masters, Marick F., and John T. Delaney. 2005. "Organized Labor's Political Scorecard." *Journal of Labor Research* 26(3): 365–92.
- Masters, Marick F., and John Thomas Delaney. 1987. "Union Political Activities: A Review of the Empirical Literature." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 40(3): 336–53.
- Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393–1430.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133–45.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. *The Uneheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

- Survey Questions on Unions and Trade
- Description of Selected Industries
- Union Membership across Industries
- Matching Procedure and Diagnostics
- Calculation of the Union Protectionism Score
- Measuring Alignment between the Union's Stance and Workers' Policy Preferences
- Robustness Tests
- Moderators of the Union Effect
- Additional Information on the Analysis of Auto Sector Workers
- Unobservable Selection and Bounding of the Treatment Effect