The Future of National Security:
A Report on Workshops in Four Cities in 2000
with annotations updating observations after 9/11/2001

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Overview

As part of the CNA Corporation’s project on the future of national security, the project director, H. H. Gaffney, assisted by a consultant as facilitator, conducted a series of workshops on the subject in the year 2000. The workshops were conducted in New York (May; in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations and Larry Korb, Director of Studies), San Francisco (October; with the Northern California Council on World Affairs and Jane Wales, President), Chicago (also October; with the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and John Rielly, President), and Atlanta (December; with the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and Linda Brady, Chair).

These discussions took place before the al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S. retaliation in Afghanistan. We have not had the opportunity to return to each of these groups to see how their views may have been changed by these events. For the record, though, we will speculate throughout this report on the changes in U.S. national security that these groups might have recommended, based on the discussions. Our post-9/11 comments and speculations are in bold text throughout the document. We have also italicized some particularly prescient observations.

The intent was to bring informed citizens together, to present them with a picture of the world, of current problems in U.S. forces, and of alternatives for the forces, and to let them express their views on each of these subjects. By design, few of the participants were defense experts. We based the materials presented at these workshops on the presentations and discussions we had with our Technical Advisory Committee, which is chaired by CNAC Board Member Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway.
Because we assembled these working groups in conjunction with established foreign affairs associations, we knew that we were interacting with citizens who were aware of international trends and issues. This was deliberate, for our effort was not one of "scientific polling," but rather of tapping these citizens for the feedback they could provide to our study on the future of U.S. national security. This study is an attempt to reconcile the evolution of U.S. military forces with the evolving world. We presented a summary of the study during the workshops in order to stimulate the discussions and to gain additional insights.

The workshops were all successful in that the participants were fully engaged and offered insights into the thinking of a wider public than we are usually exposed to here in Washington. The common theme we detected was a definite interest in the here-and-now: the connection of the U.S. military to foreign policy, and especially to global economics, in the present.

In the first place, we believe the concern of all the groups with the here-and-now, rather than some distant future, would have been reinforced by the real events in the world, in which U.S. forces are now operating in one of the most remote areas in the world—Afghanistan.

Their major concerns, e.g. the futures of Russia, China, and Middle East peace, were not those to which they would apply U.S. military force. There was a sense of malaise about the world and the ability of the United States to manage that world. None of the groups rose to a discussion of "the Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) or national missile defense (NMD). They wanted the budgets for national security increased, but for a wider spread of functions than just defense—they especially wanted diplomacy funded adequately. Thus, the "shaping" strategy reflected in U.S. National Security Strategy appealed to them more than the "preparing for the future" strategy for defense. They expressed concern about the efficiency of the Defense Department and whether it can adopt "best business practices." All agreed that strong civilian leadership is needed in the next stage to make the tough choices, to provide coherence, and to motivate the people of the Defense Department.
The advent of the Bush Administration, and of Secretary Rumsfeld and his colleagues in the Defense Department, has already provided both strong civilian leadership and the pursuit of “best business practices.” The new administration has been frustrated in its attempts to stand back from the world in order to engage in transformation of the forces. In response to 9/11, it has been forced to marry the resulting Global War on Terrorism with transformation. Since our participants evidenced a keen awareness of the threat of catastrophic terrorism, it would seem that 9/11 brought the new administration closer to their desired position of improving DoD for the here-and-now vice some more abstract future threat.

While we found a fair amount of consensus among the four workshops, there were some differences in emphasis. In New York, we detected a strong willingness to engage in humanitarian interventions. In San Francisco, the emphasis was on preserving and building the international institutions in which the U.S. participates, notably the UN. In Chicago, the participants complained strongly about the haphazard and reactive approach of the Clinton Administration. In Atlanta, the participants were concerned about domestic security and its vulnerabilities, especially in the cyber world, though they were unable to articulate the threat.

By way of a summary, we next enumerate our own “top ten list” of key conclusions we think we heard from the four workshops as a whole. These are ordered from generalities about the world down to the specifics of change in the U.S. Defense Department.
Top ten “cosmic conclusions” from the workshops

#1—The biggest hole in U.S. national security may be the lack of a global strategy to replace Cold War containment.

The U.S. lacks standards by which to judge what forces to keep and improve, how to relate them to foreign policy in their deployments and interactions with other countries, and the nature, tempo, and utility of its military interventions in the Globalization Era. References to “national interests” tend to be expansive rather than limited, and they do not exclude values and humanitarian impulses. Simply employing the adjective “selective” before some broad concept such as “engagement” isn’t enough. Whatever strategy emerges will emerge from a lengthy give-and-take in Washington and even between Washington and the public, based on a collective understanding of the Globalization Era and what it means to the future of our country’s well-being. The United States has had ten years of experience since the end of the Cold War, whose bookends may be Desert Storm and Kosovo, but our understanding of what all that experience means for U.S. security is still evolving.

After 9/11, our participants would realize that a global strategy has been thrust upon the United States: it is the global war on terror. The extension of this war to the “Axis of Evil” and its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) hangs in the balance as of mid-2002, but we cannot say that our participants would have supported preemptive attacks. The new global strategy of the U.S. also includes a new focus on our own homeland defense and a new sense that globalization itself is a positive force worth supporting, which our participants would agree with, we think.
#2—The connections between military security and economic stability need to be better understood.

Globalization strikes everyone as the dominant international trend and an overwhelmingly positive one. Nonetheless, international and internal tensions and conflicts persist. We don’t yet understand whether globalization ameliorates or exacerbates these tensions and conflicts, but in the era of global communications, we may be more aware of and sensitive to them. Military establishments—American and others—can’t exist simply to respond when conflicts, especially those that might threaten the course of globalization, break out between or within states. Rather, the military undergirds globalization by continuing to contribute to the regional stability needed for long-term and widespread economic advance.

The surprise of 9/11 was the revelation that one discontented group could take advantage of global connections—travel, visas, passports, the internet, bank transfers—to inflict serious harm to the U.S. The U.S. simply providing regional stability was not enough to stop them, and we think our participants would have been disappointed in this failure. Likewise, we believe their view would have shifted from globalization as a self-propelling force to globalization as an uneven and even reversible process that the U.S. needs to manage more proactively in order to reduce such seething discontent, that is, security would be very much to the fore in their minds now.

#3—There are no compelling threats or prospective peer competitors, but there is a vague feeling that the world in general is becoming more unstable due to civil strife.

Even if the participants had a sense that there were more instabilities in the world, they also conveyed a nearly equally strong sense that America is generally safe today from external threats. Moreover, there was no sense that “our own neighborhood” in the Western Hemisphere is becoming a scarier place. The danger that exists is really “outside, over there,” although there was a lingering undertone of fear about terrorists sneaking that danger across our borders.
Prophetically, we noted in our discussions the “lingering undertone of fear about terrorists sneaking a danger ‘out there’ across our borders.” On 9/11, the vague feelings took an awful material form. America was no longer safe from external threats. As such, definitions of national and individual security would have merged for our participants.

#4—There was a strong preference for a U.S. military strategy of “shaping the environment” versus “respond” and “prepare.”

It follows from #3 that preventive measures should be the main focus of our military’s interactions with the outside world, which in turn should take a back seat to our support for international organizations and vigorous diplomatic strategies. Our “shaping” activities should focus on the “big pieces,” meaning the more important countries. The combination of measures taken after World War II (e.g., Bretton Woods), the advent of nuclear weapons, and that the great East-West confrontation ended with a bang, not a whimper, has effectively taken great-power war off the table. This has been a huge achievement that must be maintained. Global economic prosperity both demands it and obviates it. The U.S. must never get bogged down in internal conflicts to the extent that it neglects its stable relationships with the more important countries of the world.

After 9/11, our participants would probably agree that U.S. relationships with both the advanced countries and those that are on the fringe, like Saudi Arabia, are even more important, but for a very specific purpose—to track down and suppress al Qaeda. We may well be bogged down now in Afghanistan, and could be in Iraq as well. “Stable relationships” may now relate more to this security effort than to more purely economic matters. But they would probably regard the turn to “unilateralism” by the new Administration as complicating this need.

#5—The public entertains no great over-the-horizon fears, but prefers a focus on today’s instabilities.

In addition to maintaining its alliance and other relations, the United States shouldn’t become the world’s sole policeman, but it needs to
do more for the cause of global stability. The U.S. military isn’t the lead player here, but its role is crucial because it appears that no other nation can mobilize and enable multinational responses as well as the United States does. Desert Storm was our initial great success in the 1990s. Bosnia/Kosovo may well end up being the model for the future—except no one has any idea where that next Bosnia or Kosovo may be. Our participants expressed unhappiness over the early lost opportunities and the NATO countries’ (including the United States’) indecisive approaches to the Balkans.

After 9/11, we believe our participants would be much more ready to focus on “today’s instabilities.” And they would see that the U.S. military establishment would have to take much of the lead, except that the police and financial agencies are also critical in mobilizing multinational responses. They would have had no idea Afghanistan would come after Bosnia and Kosovo, and so soon. In effect, we all would discover the fragility of globalization. Our participants would have approved the U.S. strengthening security ties with states that lie along the seam between the globalizing and non-globalizing areas of the world while reinforcing cooperation among our old allies.

#6—The world needs a new international security architecture that enables multinational responses for interventions in the internal conflicts in failing states, which are presently the main “war scourge” in the world.

The Clinton Administration made progress in crafting an international financial architecture, but almost none in generating a similar one in security affairs. Our participants were greatly wary of seeing the U.S. military get too deeply involved—unilaterally—in interventions in internal conflicts, but believed the U.S. could do a lot more to establish the international conditions for more efficient multinational responses to civil strife. In many ways, they saw this as the most challenging security task of the coming decade.

After 9/11, they would acknowledged that the “failing states” (e.g., Afghanistan) have jumped into the foreground as recognized breeding grounds for al Qaeda and other terrorists. They would agree that the U.S. should seek to eliminate the sanctuaries of terrorists in
places like Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The new international security architecture is more diffuse, and the lines between criminal activity and terrorism has been dramatically reduced. Our participants would agree that this requires new forms of cooperation both across national lines (e.g., law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies) and among law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community and the military within the U.S. government.

#7—The United Nations is an under-used asset that the United State should support more.

Participants in general were greatly embarrassed by our unwillingness to pay all our dues to the UN. They viewed our sometimes adversarial relationship with that body as reflecting a failure to sustain and further develop the institutions that might more efficiently enable broader multilateral responses to the humanitarian crises that accompany civil strife.

After 9/11, our participants would have been gratified by the support given to us by the NATO countries and Russia especially. They would probably acquiesce in the need to form coalitions of the willing rather than relying on existing forums like the UN and NATO. However, they would certainly be reluctant to support the Bush Administration’s growing unilateralism in its foreign policy, noting that in general it may be contributing to a rise of anti-Americanism around the world, which they would note only fuels a sense of growing distance between the U.S. and the other members of the UN. They would be conscientious participants in the ongoing debate (in mid-2002) about the potential U.S. invasion of Iraq.

1. The workshops were conducted before U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke gained agreement in the UN for a reduction in the U.S. share and the U.S. Congress in turn agreed to release funds to pay U.S. arrears.
#8—Several current Pentagon concerns (rogues, RMA, NMD) don’t translate well to public at large, but WMD is a real concern.²

When the Pentagon talks about other countries possessing “the bomb,” the public pays attention. If it were further explained that we’re really talking about North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, the public recognizes those countries as “the rogues,” and that they probably can be contained. The “revolution in military affairs” is too abstract to follow, and it wasn’t clear that any other country besides the United States is pursuing it. National Missile Defense (NMD) was a definite don’t-hold-your-breath-waiting-for-it target for skepticism. In fact, the participants never brought up NMD themselves. We would thus observe that a Defense Department that focuses mainly on these issues may become disconnected from the U.S. public, although it may well be the department’s responsibility to address those issues before it has signals from the public to do so.

After 9/11, our participants would be exceedingly worried about al Qaeda, and would fear that they could obtain WMD as well as committing other atrocious assaults. The Administration has labeled the three countries mentioned the “Axis of Evil,” all seeking WMD, but their connections to al Qaeda are not yet evident. In any case, our participants would now be more attuned to all of these Administration concerns, and might well be ready to support the Bush Administration’s initiatives to pursue more aggressive courses in each.

#9—Spend more on defense, but spend it on people and not necessarily operations or equipment.

When presented with a discrete question, participants wanted to increase defense spending—but when forced to choose between foreign aid, diplomacy and international organizations, and defense, defense was third. When the desire for more defense spending was disaggregated, participants wanted the additional funds focused on

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² RMA = Revolution in Military Affairs; NMD = National Missile Defense; WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction.
people. They felt the U.S. already did enough operations around the world, and saw no compelling reason to shortchange people in favor of technology, because the U.S. is obviously far ahead of the rest of the world.

Even before 9/11, the new Administration was putting people first. They increased pay and benefits. This has been about as strong a consensus, both in the military establishment and with our participants, as could be expected. Still, the Global War on Terrorism has forced the Administration to pursue expensive current operations as well, and thus they have not been able to increase the funds for acquisition of new equipment very much. They have substantially increased R&D funds, especially for missile defense. Our participants would have agreed, we think, in the need for the current operations, but would probably have supported the measured pace in missile defense R&D.

#10—The public is skeptical about defense management, fearing that is it clinging to old business practices that are increasingly out of sync with a New Economy.

Whatever transformations the military services have made since the end of the Cold War seem unconvincing to a public that's seen an enormous amount of socio-economic change over the past decade. And whatever transformations are planned for the future ought not to be just about buying new high-tech systems, but rather should include how the defense community organizes itself, treats its people, and interacts with the economic world. Complaints about “doing more with less” do not impress, as that’s the norm in the New Economy (i.e., realizing greater productivity). The public wants to support defense, but in turn it wants to see the kind of a good return on its investment that might follow from better business practices.

Before 9/11, the new Administration was greatly concerned with better business practices in defense, and this continues, even though they initially increased the defense budget by 10 percent, and followed it after 9/11 with another 14 percent increase. We believe our participants would have recognized the necessity for these increases while also supporting the continued search for efficiencies. The Administration has not cut forces, i.e., they are not trying to do more
with less. In the meantime, however, the bubble of telecoms investment in the U.S. economy has burst. At this point, it is not clear that defense is less well-managed or less innovative than the U.S. business community, but we are not sure that our participants would have shared this view.
Opening statements: The good, the bad, and the ugly of U.S. foreign policy

In the opening session, the participants introduced themselves by providing a bit of background information and their reason for participating in the group session. In the Atlanta, San Francisco, and Chicago groups, participants were asked to describe the best and worst of U.S. foreign policies in the last decade. In the New York workshop, each participant was asked to describe the foreign policy issue most neglected in the current presidential campaign. The answers of all four groups are aggregated here along the lines of the latter query.

We got a sense from our participants that there was nothing that could be seen as an American “victory” since Desert Storm. There were some things the U.S. did right (e.g., NAFTA), but many more that the U.S. did poorly (Balkans, interventions in failed states, Russia’s transition). So, despite the greatest economic expansion in our country’s history and the unprecedented if uneven advance in the global economy, the participants seemed uneasy about U.S. foreign policy and felt it lacked direction. In these workshops, we did not encounter glib bumper-sticker slogans, obvious villains, or clearly demarcated “lines in the sand.” The participants did not advocate parameters by which to judge whether an administration has gone too far, or has not done enough, or has not done it in time.

People’s can’t precisely define “international stability,” but they know it when they see it. “Instability” seems even harder to define, because its manifestations are diverse. The trend of international stability has been in the economic affairs of the prospering countries, while the trend in instabilities has been in failing states outside the economic sphere. These divergent trends have made it confusing for the U.S. government to state and prioritize definitive national interests, especially since those national interests were stated throughout the Cold War years in security-great power terms.
Unlike the great success of the American stock market over the 1990s, where people seemed content with accepting their good fortune with few questions asked, our workshop participants had a hard time accepting U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s, despite the lack of any significant “failures.” They reflected disappointment about Russia’s transition to democracy and markets, and about the lack of lasting peace in the Middle East. They regretted that Saddam Hussein was still in power and that the Balkans situation has dragged on so long and cost so many indigenous lives (not American lives, however). But in the end, it was hard for them to point to anything as America’s “fault,” because it’s hard to find any situation where the U.S. was really in control—that is, where the solution set was so obviously binary that just a concerted effort on our part would have turned that zero into a one (short of massive intervention, which no one wants). Our success always seems greater when the bad leader departs (e.g., Milosevic) rather than when he holds on (Saddam), but a leadership upgrade doesn’t necessarily equate to better times ahead (e.g., Russia), because the underlying conditions can’t be changed on command.

Our participants accepted all these frustrations and voiced many more. Thus they consistently enunciated their desire for a coherent national security strategy. Few seemed to believe that such a declaration would improve our ability to influence the outside world. Rather, most just seemed intent on improving the dialogue between the public and Washington. In short, they evinced no illusions that a grand strategy’s emergence would clear up the confusing state of the world today, but might have thought that it could improve our own internal debates about how to deal with it.

Two of the four workshops took place before the 2000 presidential debates. Many of the issues raised by our participants were not resolved in those debates, but remain to be addressed.

Now, after 9/11, al Qaeda has provided foreign policy focus, though perhaps not what our participants may have otherwise desired. Given the appalling attacks of 9/11, U.S. retaliation in Afghanistan with its demolition of the Taliban and dispersal of al Qaeda leadership might not otherwise be considered a foreign policy success, especially as we wait for the next incident. If we were to meet with them again, we
would probably ask them whether the single-minded focus on global terrorism and rogues was sufficient to constitute a foreign policy. Nonetheless, these are the focus now.
Session I: Interpreting the current international security environment

This session opened with a written exercise in which each participant completed eight statements about U.S. national security by choosing the word (from a pair expressing opposing sentiments) that best expressed their own opinion (e.g., the U.S. is safer/more at risk today than during the Cold War). The exercise provided only binary choices so as to force participants into making a stark choice indicative of their true beliefs.

Then, following a mini-brief by Project Director Henry Gaffney on U.S. national interests and global trends in international security, we facilitated roughly 30 minutes of discussion on the subject. The session ended with another written polling exercise in which we asked participants to rank 11 national security issue-areas in terms of perceived importance.

Exercise 1: The world, the United States, and the U.S. military

Participants were asked to choose the word or phrase that best completed the sentence. The majority selections are presented below, in descending order of majority (expressed as percentage of all votes cast):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Atlanta</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World today more unstable than during Cold War</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have more respect for military now than in Cold War</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US military is weaker today than during Cold War</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military service worse choice now for young people</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US has more security commitments than in Cold War</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US today is safer than during Cold War</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US should spend more on defense in coming years</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US should intervene less in conflicts overseas</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Highlighted cells represent minority views.
Analysis of data

Overall impressions

The statements receiving the strongest levels of support (i.e., roughly two-thirds or higher) create a cumulative sense of a U.S. military that—while respected—may be out of sync with the world at large.

In the first place, their voting shows a strong perception that the world is more unstable than in the Cold War. Then the votes convey that—despite the fact that the United States outspends any other country or group of countries in the world by a huge margin—they perceive that U.S. military forces are weaker now than a decade ago. How might they be “weaker?” Our participants saw the military as less prepared for the tasks at hand today than it was at the end of the Cold War, suggesting a lack of adaptation on the military’s part to a changed international security environment—a theme we heard repeatedly in the discussion, even from those who believed that the military was currently engaged in a lot of extraneous missions (e.g., the presumption that they were somehow engaged in nation-building).

One also needs to factor in the participants’ sense that the military is somehow “broken within.” Despite very high approval rates (73 percent expressed more respect today for the military than they had during the Cold War), there was likewise a strong perception that life in the military is a fairly bad deal (68 percent saying the military is now a worse choice for young people today than during the Cold War). And so, when the participants declared themselves ready for more defense spending (62 percent), they wanted to spend it on people and not operations, as we will discuss later.

The statements receiving the lowest levels of majority support underlie the participants’ sense of unease regarding a lack of vision in U.S. foreign policy. We think their perception of “more security commitments” (67 percent) was based less on the facts (i.e., actual number of operations across the 1990s) than on a feeling of rudderlessness—of having no clear way to gauge the world’s crises so as to determine which truly merit U.S. concern and response. So participants believed that operations stemmed from a sense of burden, not a fear-threat
reaction. In the end, more felt the U.S. is safer from the outside world today than it was during the Cold War (64 percent). Even so, the majority sensed that America needs to be more selective in its overseas interventions.

Add these statements up, and you have a citizenry unsure of America’s role in the world. They see lots of instabilities and they’re not sure which ones they should worry about. They feel safer in the world, and yet they feel somewhat overextended militarily. But what’s the fear lurking behind this sense of over-reach? It’s not an external threat, but rather a sense that the U.S. is to some extent burning up its military “stock” without a clear sense as to when or how much to use it.

At the core of the concerns expressed in this vote, we sensed the following questions:

- How much is America really responsible for in this new era?
- How much military effort should America expend against that responsibility? And for how long?
- In short, what is the strategy here? How does the U.S. know whether it has gotten too deeply involved in a situation that might not otherwise merit its concern?

All of that changed with the attack on the U.S. homeland. The participants would not feel safer now, and a vague sense of “instabilities” has been replaced by the uncertainty of when the next terrorist attack may occur. Since 9/11, the U.S. has intervened in Afghanistan and Pakistan, inserted Special Forces trainers on the ground in the Philippines, Georgia, and Yemen, and established “temporary” bases in two former Soviet republics. We have no doubt the participants would have applauded the intervention in Afghanistan. In short, 9/11 has thrust the U.S. into a number of unexpected security situations around the world, but all so far tied to the Global War on Terrorism. We expect our participants would readily accept this narrow definition of U.S. “responsibility.” But we expect they would not applaud preemptive action by the U.S. in Iraq, unless a strong case is made linking Iraq to the sort of dangers we experienced with 9/11.
Differences among groups

While the overall picture that emerged from the exercise is of a somewhat stressed U.S. military faced with an unstable world in which it is overcommitted at the same time that its military resources are in decline, there were some significant differences among the workshops. The participants were split on how to deal with this new combination of an unstable world and a safe America. A majority of New York participants thought that the U.S. should do more foreign interventions in order to preserve international stability, while the Chicago and Atlanta groups strongly believed that such commitments should be decreased. The San Francisco group was split down the middle.

There was more agreement on the role of the U.S. military in the new century. Three of the four groups agreed that the post-Cold War cuts in military budgets had excessively weakened our armed forces and argued that the U.S. should therefore spend more on defense. Only in Atlanta were there mixed views on these questions.

Each of the groups had a different take on the position of the United States in the current world. In many ways, the San Francisco group was the most optimistic. This was the only group in which a majority saw the world as more stable now than during the Cold War. The group also felt quite strongly that the U.S. was safer now than it used to be, despite (or perhaps because of) its extensive commitments abroad. In line with this relatively rosy picture of the world, this group was the only one that was split on whether the U.S. should spend more on defense.

The New York group was most likely to go against the majority opinion in the pre-discussion exercise. The participants saw a dangerous world that needed the stabilizing presence of the U.S. and its military. This was the only group that felt that the U.S. is less safe now than it was during the Cold War. Combining this perception with their sense that the world today is more unstable, New Yorkers were the only group to argue for an increase in U.S. intervention overseas. They were willing to fund this intervention by spending more on defense.
The Chicago group saw an increase in U.S. security over the last decade combined with a decrease in the stability of the world. This strong desire to preserve the safety of the U.S., combined with a sense that the U.S. military had become weaker over time and a perceived lack of focus in American foreign policy, led Chicago participants to strongly endorse an increase in defense funding while unanimously calling for a decrease in American commitments abroad.

The Atlanta group’s views were roughly similar to those of the Chicago group, but with some key differences. The Atlanta participants also believed that U.S. security had increased as world stability had decreased. While they agreed with Chicago that the U.S. should decrease its foreign commitments, they were more ambivalent about the state of the U.S. military and thus not as eager to increase spending on defense.

Overall, the New York and San Francisco groups can be characterized as being relatively willing to project U.S. power abroad both to protect U.S. interests and for humanitarian and peacekeeping reasons. The Chicago and Atlanta groups, on the other hand, wanted to limit U.S. power to defending the homeland and U.S. economic interests abroad, with little interest in humanitarian operations.

Our participants would now recognize that a “safe America” is now in question. The Bush Administration is indeed spending more on defense. “Humanitarian operations” per se have not taken place, but, at least in Afghanistan, may have become an element of the Global War on Terrorism, and we think the San Franciscans at least would support any such attempt to offset the terrorists.

**Mini-briefing 1: Relating U.S. forces to U.S. national security interests**

In the first mini-briefing, we presented a global view of U.S. national security interests (not including economic interests). These included both positive and negative interests.

- Positive interests are defending the homeland, maintaining alliances, pursuing peace in the Middle East, ensuring the flow
of Gulf oil, and bringing Russia and China into the world community.

- Negative interests include having no peer competitor and no opposing blocs, containing and deterring the rogues, keeping out drugs, preventing proliferation, and having no holocausts in the Balkans.

- Altogether, they amount to broad interests all over the world, not necessarily in any order of priority.

We noted, from personal observation, that U.S. decision-makers are pragmatic and adaptive and thus try to solve situations rather than debate the national interests—the articulation of interest comes later in the explanations to Congress and the public. We also noted in general how U.S. forces serve these interests, in deterrence and diplomacy, presence, and operations in harm’s way.

We then presented the central national security problems we foresaw for the near future, for instance, the evolution of the situations in Russia, China, Colombia, and Iraq. We noted that the number of places in which the U.S. might have to fight an opponent in the foreseeable future was small, possibly only Iraq and Korea, but not counting peacekeeping operations, for which we have learned not to intervene until some kind of agreement has been reached.

**After 9/11, Russia and China are not as central as “national security” problems (and Russia, or at least Putin, has joined the West—9/11 reinforced his inclinations in this direction), though concern about the security of nuclear weapons and material in Russia continues, and the situation over Taiwan remains tense. Colombia and Iraq remain central problems for the U.S. But we never envisaged that the U.S. would be fighting in Afghanistan, nor would any of our participants have suggested as much. Whether the U.S. must now engage in “nation-building” in Afghanistan remains open; the Administration would prefer that other countries take the burden.**

We concluded this first mini-briefing by noting that the shape and size of U.S. defense efforts seemed to be determined by domestic factors more than by international threats. The domestic factors included U.S. politics, U.S. federal budget politics, the Service insti-
tutions and continuity, the U.S. impulse to keep pushing technology ahead, and public respect for the defense institution.

A new “domestic factor” has been added: homeland security, with a big new budget and a new department. This development recasts the traditional arms-vs.-butter debate into a triangular discussion among domestic priorities (e.g., Social Security), domestic defense (now to be more focused with the Department of Homeland Security) and international security, suggesting a potential downstream budgeting squeeze on DoD, especially as the federal deficit grows.

Exercise 2: ranking U.S. national security issue-areas

Data summary

Participants were asked to rank the following eleven issue areas in terms of their perceived importance to U.S. national security. Composite rankings are as follows, in descending order.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Atlanta</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WMD proliferation</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain alliances</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East peace</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contain rogues</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland defense/Terrorism</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMD</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent genocide</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human assist</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat drug trafficking</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Highlighted cells represent rankings significantly different from the average. Drug trafficking was not included as one of the choices in New York.

Analysis of data

In the first voting exercise, there was a general sense of unease about America’s military “fit” with the world outside, but in this one, partic-

3. The final column represents the mean of the four averages obtained from the workshops.
Participants were far less able to express ambivalence, for here we forced them to rank whatever fears they may have about the outside world in the order in which they would like the Pentagon to tackle them. Looking at the list above, it's fair to say that even if the participants saw a world of “new” dangers, they generated a rather “classic” list of tasks from top to bottom. That is, very familiar ones head the list while the old “lesser includeds” remain included but less important.

Note that homeland defense/terrorism were halfway down the list. After 9/11, they would undoubtedly be at the top of the list. And it would probably now be coupled with the WMD threat. Middle East peace would probably rise to just under those issues, while China and Russia would move toward the bottom of the list.

Weapons of mass destruction continued to top the agenda everywhere except Chicago, where this topic was seen as of only mid-level importance. The Chicago group, on the other hand, almost unanimously saw the preservation of alliances as the key problem facing the U.S., while the other three groups placed this issue at the midpoint of their concerns. The past and potential future peer competitors (Russia and China) were next in importance in all four cities. The New York group’s relatively low interest in Middle East peace was probably more a function of timing: the workshop took place in June 2000, before the October 2000 surge in violence that was undoubtedly on people’s minds in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco. Other problems, including NMD, the drug war, and the containment of rogue states, were all seen as of much less concern than they appear to be in Washington. The groups did not see humanitarian assistance and the prevention of genocide as top problems.

What do these results mean? If the participants were expressing in the previous vote a sense of the U.S. military’s mismatch with the changed international security environment, one would have expected to see the so-called new security issues top the list of tasks above. But in fact, they do not. In fact, none of them make the upper-half cut-off (roughly 5.0 or less). So if the U.S. faces a more unstable world full of rogues, terrorists, missile proliferators, failed states, “ethnic cleansing,” and drug kingpins, then why shouldn’t any of them merit higher priority than the classic tasks of dealing with Russia, China, and our
alliances, and bringing peace to the Middle East? Even if the perception is that the U.S. military has somehow failed to adapt itself to changed times, why would it not still be robust enough to back the diplomacy that handles these classic tasks of maintaining stability?

The one exception to this pattern would seem to be “WMD proliferation,” which, depending on one’s sense of history, is either “old school” or “new security.” The issue of “Who’s got the bomb?” was always central to the Cold War’s unfolding. Just ask anyone who lived through the Cuban missile crisis, Mao’s “paper tiger” harangues, and the U.S.-Soviet and even U.S.-Europe wrangling over deployment of missiles in Western Europe or missiles in Russia solely threatening Europe. But our participants were expressing some new level of concern about India-Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq, and terrorist groups. If there is one post-Cold War fear that seems to have broken into the top ranks, it’s definitely WMD proliferation.

If that’s the case, then how does America deal with its emerging vulnerability to these threats? If fear of the bomb really ranks number one, then why do the rogues, terrorists, and national missile defense remain buried in the middle of pack? One answer may be that our participants didn’t view the WMD proliferation issue as a direct threat to the U.S., outside of delivery by terrorists (a point often raised in discussion). If so, then the military’s role is somewhat limited: the U.S. works on the source countries (relations with Russia, China, our allies), it tries to stabilize the Mideast (source of almost all anti-American terrorism), and then it leaves the Justice Department and the FBI to secure the American homeland against terrorists.

To sum up, while our participants were well versed in the terminology of “new security” issues and appreciated the impact that such issues have had on the world at large (seen as more unstable with time), the post-Cold War environment has not dramatically altered their sense of the key tasks at hand. In short, U.S. security policy should continue to focus on issues involving the important countries of the world first and foremost, and not get bogged down in smaller tasks (e.g., intervening in failed states, coping with narcotics, responding with disaster relief).
As the italicized passages show, the undertone of concern with the terrorists was there even before 9/11. But no one anticipated the form the threat would take. At this point in time (mid-2002), the concern with the classic issues of national security would be in the background.

Discussion: U.S. national security interests

The overriding theme we heard from all four workshops was the “need for the U.S. to do more out in the world,” although each city had very different ways of expressing what that “more” might be. In San Francisco, the “more” was more often focused on the less developed regions of the world. In New York, the focus was more on the larger countries such as Russia and China. In Chicago, it was on the economic globalization and how instabilities in the Southern Hemisphere threatened the planet’s expanding circle of prosperity. *And in Atlanta, it was on the dangers to the security of America and its allies posed by new technologies such as cyberterrorism and biological and chemical warfare.* But all wanted the same thing: more multilateralism, more cooperation with other states, and more U.S. leadership in international fora such as the United Nations.

But the “more” wasn’t just more interventions and better policies. All four workshops consistently called for a guiding foreign policy vision that better related the political-military universe to that of the economic one. Almost everyone could agree that Bill Clinton was one of America’s greatest trade/economic presidents, but likewise one of its worst diplomacy/security presidents. Within the space of a single paragraph they epitomized what they both loved and hated about the post-Cold War era: what they loved is that economics no longer seems hostage to security fears, but what they hated is that the U.S. has lost a clear sense of priorities in its foreign policy.

The Cold War used to offer a comforting simplicity: the U.S. kept the peace with the Soviets and that allowed economic life (at least in the Free World) to advance. But we have no doubt that, when push came to shove, our participants would choose national security over economic gain—though this could also have been because our workshops were addressing the national security mission. In the
Globalization Era, economics is obviously king, with security fears largely relegated to those backward areas where the locals insist on fighting over bits of land and scarce resources. Hence, there aren’t any situations where “push comes to shove” anymore and the threat to some larger strategic vision kicks in. Lacking the fear of escalation, the U.S. finds itself asking a series of “how much” questions: How much should the U.S. care about this situation? How much can the situation disturb the global economy? How much does it challenge our values? How much effort should the U.S. muster, and for how long, to cope with it?

9/11 seems to have clarified a lot of these post-Cold War questions for the U.S. The threat has been brought to the U.S. homeland, and a larger strategic vision has been found: defeat the global al Qaeda terrorist threat. It was clear that the first place to attack was in Afghanistan. But the al Qaeda threat is “a wraith,” as Secretary Rumsfeld described it—hard to track down, and we don’t know where it will strike next, or where we might have to retaliate next. It has become clear that the U.S. Government’s task is back to providing physical security, both for the homeland and overseas. Questions of the global economy seem to have been put on the Administration’s back-burner for a while, except as al Qaeda might disrupt it. At the moment, al Qaeda is equated with global terrorism in general, given its loosely connected nature, but we cannot assume that its demise will end terrorism that spills over borders.

These aren’t questions we’re used to asking as a society, for the old Cold War logic of containment provided us, in many instances, with a packaged response that preempted most such deliberations. Moreover, armed with a seemingly clear overarching strategy, presidents were given a long leash regarding the maneuvering and threatening of military power. This was especially so since, as the 1950s wore on, the U.S. realized the Soviets weren’t going to attack us or our allies directly. The leash got tightened as losses in Vietnam mounted. Later, the goals in Desert Storm were limited as well. In contrast, we sensed from our participants that security in the Globalization Era seems to be defined as the U.S. as the global “policeman” trudging off to yet another “domestic disturbance” that seems only remotely connected to our national security interests.4
The remote connection is no more, and the U.S. is not just a global policeman, but is defending itself. The notion of the pure “away game” military intervention is unlikely ever to return. From now on, any U.S. combat intervention in the Middle East or other Muslim areas will be accompanied by heightened security concerns at home.

So what really counted today as a national interest for our participants? They had no stomach for any “holy wars,” in which the U.S. would impose its cultural values on others. However, they were sensitive to the notion that whenever a state flouted international norms, our global “neighborhood” lost something of value—namely, the predictability that stems from rules. Rules allow people the opportunity to engage in the global economic scene. America benefits most from that, and hence has a strong interest in keeping it fair and operating over the widest expanse possible.

We pause here to reflect that the business of America has always been American business. If the end of the Cold War has meant that security in international affairs has been reduced to concerns with “disturbances” and “rule breaking” that disrupt business, then so be it. The trick then becomes adjusting to the “threat” of “instability” without turning that concept into an everywhere, all-the-time bogeyman. That’s where we sensed from the participants that the foreign policy strategy was lacking. The U.S. had downgraded from the old Soviet threat involving the end of life as we know it to a new inchoate threat of instability that threatens us—by and large—with just scary pictures on the news and lower returns on our overseas mutual funds.

These were anti-prophetic words that are now turned on their heads: we have rediscovered the world and now understand that there is still plenty of pain in the system to generate real threats to U.S. national security. For now the focus is al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, but even if we eliminate both, plenty of pain and anger will remain that is amplified by globalization. To assume all that anger or other agitation

4. It is well to recall that the U.S. has actually “trudged off” to only four such situations in the 1990s—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, while containing Iraq. It may be that the prolongation of the U.S. involvement in these situations, in contrast to quick-in and quick-out of Grenada and Panama in the 1980s, lends a sense to the public of “more” interventions.
goes away just because we remove the most prominent current representations is to engage in a form of illusory “decapitation.”

We’ve gone from a world in which the survival of the Free World took precedence to one in which a former president can be perceived as a master of economic diplomacy and a bumbler in security affairs and the two judgments seem oddly unconnected.

We would not want to say now that the situation has been reversed.

Our participants struggled when it came to enunciating any sense of what America’s current and future national security interests should be. They knew they were against “instability,” and they knew they wanted the global economy to advance. They knew that America had to do more about situations, at least to exercise leadership in organizing international responses, but they had the impression that the U.S. was getting involved militarily too frequently without clear purpose—and hence, with no clear limits. They knew that somehow security and the global economy intersect, and that the military has a key role in enabling that intersection. They couldn’t define that management role, but they wished someone would.

Our participants spoke the language of “new security” (e.g., terrorism, civil strife, humanitarian disasters) with plenty of passion, but displayed an unwillingness to displace traditional military missions with such things as “nation-building” and “global policing.” In short, they wanted “new security” issues to remain “lesser includeds,” the only problem being that today no one is able to define the “greater included.”

It remains problematic today whether al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein are the “greater includeds.” Nonetheless, the U.S. has a management role, and it is not for internal conflicts with a humanitarian stake. We believe that our participants would have a clear sense of mission today, but we also believe that they would stress more international cooperation in pursuing that mission than the Bush Administration has.
Session II: U.S. military strategy and planning

This session opened with a written exercise in which each participant decided which shares of four U.S. notional budgets (security, international affairs, defense, and military) should be increased, decreased, or kept the same in the future. Each budget consisted of only three shares, so in each instance participants had to decide which share would be increased, which decreased, and which would stay the same. No current estimates of actual shares were provided; we simply wanted to capture each participant’s sense of budgetary priorities.

Then, following another mini-brief by Dr. Gaffney on U.S. military planning, operational, and budgetary issues, we facilitated about 30 minutes of discussion on the subject. The session ended with another written polling exercise in which we asked participants to rank various aspects of U.S. military strategy in order of perceived importance (e.g., Shaping vs. Responding vs. Preparing).

Exercise 3: Establishing U.S. budgetary priorities

Data summary

The results of the third exercise are presented in the following table. The “overall winner” in each instance received the highest cumulative vote total across all four workshops.
Analysis of data

In this exercise, we forced participants to show favoritism for one definition of security over another and, by doing so, we uncovered and then tried to dissect their senses of unease regarding the U.S. military’s “fit” with an outside world that seems to have undergone so much change in the last decade (though not necessarily in terms of security and conflict, where most of the fears they raised involved only potential situations, not current ones).

In the first question (international security budget), participants were encouraged to rank their fears in terms of proximity (Is the danger within? At the door? Over there?). The results may seem somewhat surprising, given the prominence accorded WMD proliferation and its potential linkages to terrorism against the U.S. (something raised often in discussion). In sum, our participants felt safest within our own borders, reasonably secure at our borders, but saw that most insecurity was abroad. In their minds, then, the danger was primarily “over there” in terms of the
additional resources they might want to direct toward security. They did not, however, express views that danger abroad would threaten the United States. Rather, we sensed they saw the overseas situations as deplorable in themselves.

**This has all changed. They would perceive a huge threat to the U.S. homeland now. But that threat has to be countered overseas as well as at home. We would guess that our participants would not see the new threat as a reason to retreat from the world, but would reinforce their desire to be active overseas.**

The strong overall support for increasing international security budgets was driven by the sizeable majorities advocating that position in New York and Atlanta. The two groups disagreed on where this increase should come from. New Yorkers sought to cut domestic security, and Atlantans wanted to cut border security. Chicago participants agreed with New Yorkers that domestic security budgets need to be decreased, but were ambivalent as to whether the money should be transferred to international security or border security. The San Francisco participants were ambivalent about what to do with the security budgets, although they had a weak preference toward spending more on border security.

**Now there is a new homeland security budget, funded at $38 billion for FY03, to cover both internal defense and border controls.**

Turning next to the “international affairs budget,” we then asked participants to re-distribute the pie between the State Department and UN (diplomacy and international organizations), the U.S. Agency for International Development (foreign aid), and the Pentagon (defense). If the danger is mostly “over there,” then who should the U.S. send most often to deal with it? Here our participants voiced an overall preference for diplomats, a sense that our foreign aid effort is roughly appropriate, and—when forced to make a choice between competing tools—no clear desire to use the military more. A majority of participants in Atlanta, New York, and San Francisco supported an increase in funding for diplomacy and international organizations, largely at the expense of defense budgets. Chicago participants, on the other hand, felt strongly that defense budgets needed to be increased, although they were not sure at whose expense. Participants
in all four cities largely felt that foreign aid funding was already at about the right levels. So again, even if “new security” issues dominate the post-Cold War international security environment, our participants expressed a desire for the military to stick with what it knows best (the classic tasks involving Russia and China, our allies, and Middle East stability), and leave the resolution of the new sources of instability largely to the diplomats and international organizations.

We believe they would now agree with the Bush Administration’s proposed increase in the foreign assistance budget, especially if it provides for the stabilization of Afghanistan. But they would not believe that diplomats and international organizations alone could carry the new load. With the announcement on the proposed creation of the Department of Homeland Security, we would expect many participants to advocate a rethinking of both the structure and the role of both Defense and the intelligence community (CIA in particular). In short, they would expect significant structural changes in order to provide better U.S. security across the board.

Stepping down next into the Pentagon’s budget, we looked to see how our participants’ fears about the outside world translated into budgetary priorities for the services. When forced to choose, our participants saw a decrease for the Army, standing pat for the Air Force, and an increase for naval forces. But there were significant differences among the four groups. Atlanta, Chicago, and New York wanted to increase funding for the Navy, the first two at the expense of the Army and the latter at the expense of the Air Force. San Franciscans were evenly split among the services, with most of them simply believing that all three services should be cut. If “new security” issues loomed large in their perceptions of the outside world, our participants showed a general reticence to commit U.S. forces against them. They displayed a preference for having the service most identified with containing crises “over there” handle these issues rather than getting heavily involved.

They would probably not disagree with the general increases for all services that have been funded for FY2002 and proposed for FY2003. 9/11, the subsequent campaign in Afghanistan, and a prospective campaign in Iraq would not seem to favor one service over another.
Finally, we went down even further into the notional military budget we presented to see how participants would prefer to re-direct money between personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement/ R&D. In short, do they prefer to spend money on people, doing things overseas, or high-tech equipment? Here the answers were fairly stark: all four groups wanted to spend more on people, with all groups except Atlanta taking the funding out of equipment and not operations. When push came to shove, our participants chose not to diminish our military interactions with the outside world in order to fix what they perceived to be a poor working environment for today’s military personnel. If the world were more unstable, then, it was not unstable for them in a way best met by higher investments in new technology and equipment.

When we added up all these answers, we were left with the question, “Does this mean the U.S. military is somehow losing its connectivity to the existing international security ‘market’?” Our participants saw a more unstable world, but when forced to choose, picked diplomats and the UN over the application of U.S. military power to attempt resolution. They preferred naval forces, which some might regard as the most offshore of the military forces, and indicated they would spend the next dollar on people, not more operations or new equipment.

The Bush Administration came to office resolved to take care of people as a first priority, but also to effect “transformation” of the forces for an uncertain future. There were some indications that they wanted to do this in part by cutting back on overseas commitments (though saving the costs of those commitments—$3-4 billion a year—would not have financed the transformation). They now are confronted with funding both current operations and transformation. We believe our participants would have generally said, “Take care of the here-and-now, and transform more gradually than you had hoped. in ways that directly support current operations versus some abstract future scenario.

Mini-briefing 2: U.S. military planning and strategy

In the second mini-briefing, we reviewed the current threats considered by the Defense Department. These included the abstract two
major theater wars, (usually attached to the two rogues, Iraq and North Korea); small-scale contingencies and peacekeeping; attacks with weapons of mass destruction, including those mounted on ballistic missiles; and attacks by terrorists or the rogues on the U.S. homeland. We noted that these hardly equalled the old Soviet threat.

We noted that, paradoxically, the problems that the Defense Department is struggling with internally are hard to match to these threats. These internal problems include the recruitment, quality of life, medical care, and retention of military personnel, applying a revolution in business affairs to the management of defense, the choice between maintaining the force structure and embracing something called “the revolution in military affairs,” and the mix of people, munitions, platforms, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance.

We noted that U.S. forces are currently stretched three ways in their day-to-day operations: maintaining high readiness, including exercising, in preparation for the two major theater wars; being engaged forward in as many places and with as many other countries as possible; and carrying out national missions as they may pop up. We noted that these national missions can be seen as intruding on the other two, as far as the services and commanders are concerned. We noted that defense programs are also stretched three ways: keeping as much force structure as possible, with its associated manpower requirements; operating and exercising as much as possible; and modernizing and recapitalizing equipment.

Putting the two sets of stretches together yielded the stretches represented by the then Defense Department strategy: “shape, respond (to contingencies), and prepare (for the future).” We noted that the forces could not continue to do everything, especially considering that the defense budget was unlikely to increase much; service shares were unlikely to change; the major overseas deployments were likely to continue; and the operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and over Iraq were likely to continue. Hard choices would have to be made.

With the new Administration, the strategy has been changed—to ready combat capability present in four areas (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Europe), and the capability to take on two major theater conflicts, but in only one of those to win decisively.
by taking the capital and changing the leadership. 9/11 has not changed this strategy. Increases in the defense budget have relieved something of the hardness of choices, but transformation for the future may still be underfunded.

Exercise 4: Determining U.S. military priorities

Data summary

Participants were asked to rank issue areas within military strategy categories. The results were as follows, with a 1 representing the highest issue.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Atlanta</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<td><strong>Shape</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shaping</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Note: Highlighted cells represent rankings significantly different from the average. The final column represents the mean of the four averages obtained from the workshops.
Analysis of data

In this exercise, we sought to force participants to draw some clear lines between their perceptions of the outside world and their sense of the military’s utility in dealing with that outside world. In the first instance, we asked them to rank the three main tenets of the Clinton Administration’s National Military Strategy:

- Constant but low-key interaction with the outside world (“shaping”)
- Periodic and combative interaction with the outside world (“responding” to crises)
- Remaining more aloof from the outside world in order to prepare for future dangers (“preparing” for the future).

In keeping with their previously stated lack of interest in buying new equipment, “preparing” finished last in this ranking. In short, our participants wanted no withdrawal from the outside world, and no great focus on distant peer competitors.

Rather, it was the “shaping” function that received by far the most support among the participants. But remembering the preference for focusing on great power relationships, military alliances, and Mideast peace, this definition of “shaping” carried an air of “behind the scenes” effort. The U.S. military isn’t in the lead here, but rather works quietly with other militaries, leaving the more political issues to the diplomats.

“Shaping” won nearly unanimous support as the top priority in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco, but was seen in New York as less important than “responding.” These rankings reflect the first three groups' preferences for taking preventive diplomatic action to minimize the need for more forceful U.S. action and the perception in New York that more intervention is needed to make the world more stable.

Looking at the world to be “shaped,” one could argue that the resulting ranking of regions has changed little from preferences in the

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5. The final column represents the mean of the four averages obtained from the workshops.
Cold War: Europe and Russia remain the focus, followed by the Middle East and Asia. So basically this looks like the old containment strategy focus on Europe and Japan, with the addition of the Middle East and its oil. Atlanta and Chicago were in complete agreement on this ranking. New Yorkers assigned a somewhat lower priority to the Middle East, perhaps because the New York meeting took place before the collapse of the Middle East peace process. San Franciscans, perhaps reflecting their city's geographic position, ranked East Asia ahead of the Middle East and Europe. All four groups agreed to rank Latin America and Africa at the bottom. These were the same regions that received the least amount of attention in the Cold War. Again, if “new security” issues are emerging, they did not dent our participants’ sense of where America’s national security interests fall in terms of geography.

We would probably discover now that the focus among our participants on “the seam of the world” running from Israel through Pakistan would be much more intense, with Russia and China receding as prime security issues, and Europe not being regarded as a security problem at all (except for the rounding up of al Qaeda operatives).

Looking at the “responding” category, we likewise see a fairly conventional ranking of concerns and agreement among all four workshops. Classic wars between states and terrorism received priority (at 2.5 and 2.6, respectively) while the “new security” issues of rogues, ethnic conflicts, and humanitarian assistance ranked lower. The fact than none of the situations received a clear majority of votes (i.e., an average ranking well below 2.5 out of 5) demonstrates the participants’ lack of focus on any one particular threat—thus the preference for “shaping” in general.

Finally, looking at the “preparing” category, we saw the concern over WMD proliferation reflected in the prominence accorded to “nuclear/missile wars.” However, given the relative lack of support for National Missile Defense expressed in the second exercise (as well as the dead-last ranking of “space conflicts” in this vote), one doesn’t get the sense that this concern was self-motivated. That is, our participants worried about this sort of conflict in general, but perhaps not so much in reference to homeland defense issues. Beyond this selection, there was disagreement on other areas of top concern. New
Yorkers saw major land wars as just as serious a threat as nuclear war, while San Franciscans saw them as less of a threat than cyberterrorism. Chicagoans, possibly under the influence of the USS Cole bombing on the day of the seminar, placed land wars behind maritime conflicts in importance, and Atlantans placed them behind both cyberterrorism and maritime conflicts. All four groups agreed that conflict in space had the lowest priority. The relatively high overall ranking assigned to cyberspace conflict is surprising, again raising the issue of a possible disconnect between the U.S. military and the current international security “market.”

No one could have predicted back in 2000 that the U.S. would be fighting a war in Afghanistan, from the air and on the land. Nor did they foresee a preemptive attack on Iraq, despite their fears of WMD proliferation. In sum, their concerns about WMD were more generalized: that is, they worried about countries or actors acquiring and using them and by doing so, establishing dangerous precedents.

**Discussion: U.S. military strategy and planning**

Most of our participants were clear in stating that the “new security” issues should take a back seat to traditional military missions that focus on maintaining global peace (i.e., preventing a great-power war). But they also indicated that the U.S. military hadn’t adjusted to the end of the Cold War and remained trapped in “old think.” We were a little baffled: if “new security” isn’t the “new think” and traditional military missions aren’t to be discarded, then how can the military be off course in preserving what it has cherished while evolving the forces in only small increments?

Some of the answer seemed to lie in the way in which the participants expressed their sense of what U.S. military priorities should be (exercise 4 above)—namely, their strong focus on the “shaping” role the military could play. That is exactly the area in which most participants felt the military not only needed to do more, but needed to rethink

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6. The Atlanta participants were an exception in this regard.
(or maybe just expand?) its approaches—both within the institution itself and in its dealing with the outside, or non-military, world.

Moreover, when delineating the regions on which to focus this “shaping” activity, our participants’ choices neatly mirrored America’s global economic interests (e.g., first Europe, then Asia and the Mideast, then Latin America, and finally Africa) rather than any pattern that might be loosely construed as focused on “new security.” This pattern of responses suggests that the U.S. public might want U.S. policymakers to draw firmer connections between military power and the global economy. The military contributes to the continued functioning of the global economy, not so much by responding to crises or preparing to fight wars as by conducting the peacetime operations that increase and buttress the sense of predictability among our traditional military allies in Europe plus Japan and the newly emergent “prodigals” (e.g., Russia, China, and India).

While the U.S. military discusses “asymmetrical threats” and “transnational actors,” what we heard from our participants is that the area to which the Pentagon should most attend in the Globalization Era is its peacetime diplomatic role. In short, most participants thought that the leadership role the U.S. military could best play in the global economy was as organizer and leader of multinational responses to regional and subnational instabilities—less by providing lots of troops than in enabling other states to, in effect, police their own. So rather than seeing the U.S. military play “policeman of the world,” they’d by and large like to see it play a larger role in mobilizing the peacekeeping contributions of other nations.

That doesn’t mean ceding all control—especially those roles that best employ our substantial technological edge—but rather outsourcing the more personnel-intensive aspects of military interventions to either allies or private-sector substitutes. But most of all, it means building up local institutional capacity for regional and subnational peacekeeping over time. In short, it’s not being a global policeman

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7. We think the public is only vaguely aware of how much the U.S. engages in military-to-military contacts around the world. It’s a quiet story of success.
that the participants saw as undesirable, but rather the U.S. being the (only) global policeman. Americans want to do their share to manage instabilities, but they also want to see a better world result from their efforts—a return on the investment.

In many ways, then, what our participants were telling us was that when they looked around the world and saw lots of instability, their first thought wasn’t that the U.S. military should storm in and make things right, but rather that the key missing ingredient in most unstable situations was regional institutions armed with sufficient political coordination and military capabilities to keep the peace in the first place. What was so frustrating to them about Bosnia wasn’t that it happened, but that it took the European countries (we won’t say “Europeans,” because we’re not sure they exist as a single group) so long to respond. What remains so frustrating to them about central Africa and Sierra Leone was that no one was organized to respond. In contrast, most participants had a good feeling about East Timor because Australia led the actual intervention while the U.S. provided only some helicopters for logistic transport and some communications support.

That concept of improving regional capacities is the cornerstone concept that links together what at first seems like an incongruous series of statements:

- Our participants saw a more unstable world...
- And they believed the U.S. must do more to deal with global instability.
- They have great respect for the U.S. military as an institution...
- But they didn’t want it to be used as the global policeman.
- They wanted our military to focus on shaping the global security environment...
- But they want the focus to be peacetime operations, rather than being bogged down in endless crises.

In essence, they wanted the U.S. military to take a global leadership role, but they wanted that role to be defined more by our enabling
the actions of others than by our unilateral actions, more by institution-building than by nation-building, and more by outsourcing than by outmanning.

On reflection, after 9/11, the world in 2000 was a much softer world that our participants contemplated than it has become with the hard reality of a constant global terrorist threat by al Qaeda. Given the direct attack on the U.S. homeland on 9/11, and the need for the U.S. to retaliate fairly quickly, our participants would have applauded the Administration’s response, even if they might have been distressed earlier by the Administration’s desire to withdraw from peacekeeping and to pursue unilateralist policies. But they might have also pointed out that the continuing war on terrorism would require the close cooperation among nations and the institution-building that they felt desirable back in 2000. We believe they would stress the need to involve the UN as much as possible.
Session III: The future of U.S. national security

This session opened with a written exercise in which each participant nominated states, non-state actors, or issue-areas for six “best” awards (e.g., “Best New Villain”). This was the only written exercise that was open–ended.

Then, following the last mini-brief by Dr. Gaffney, on alternative U.S. military force structures, we facilitated about 30 minutes of discussion on the subject. This session did not include an “exit polling” exercise.

Exercise 5: Imagining the future of U.S. national security

Data summary

The participants were asked to nominate countries or non-state actors for a variety of “awards.” The results were as follows, with the number of votes noted in brackets:

- **Best New Villain**
  - a. China received the greatest number of votes [9].
  - b. Transnational actors and factors (mafia, disease, terrorism) received the next highest total [6].
  - c. Next were Iraq, Israel, and Colombia [3].
  - d. Next were Syria, France, Saudi Arabia, and “Koreas” [2].
  - e. A single vote each went to Algeria, central Africa, Egypt, India, Indonesia, OPEC, Pakistan, and South American dictatorships.

Obviously, terrorism, as represented by al Qaeda, would have leaped to the top if we were to poll them now. Iraq, Israel, and Colombia might have come in second. China might be placed last.
• **Best Actor in a Supporting Role**
  
  a. Runaway winner was United Kingdom [18].
  
  b. Turkey and Russia were second [4].
  
  c. Next most-mentioned was China [3].
  
  d. Followed by India, Mexico, Japan, and Germany [2].
  
  e. Those receiving one vote were Ireland, “private-sector IT,” and Vietnam.

  We suspect that this order would not have changed after 9/11. The strong support the U.S. received from Russia might have been something of a surprise.

• **Best New Ingenue (i.e., new star on the stage)**
  
  a. Taiwan was the top vote-getter [5].
  
  b. Next most-mentioned were Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, and Ukraine [3].
  
  c. Next were Iran, Georgia, Mexico, North Korea, and South Africa [2].
  
  d. Those receiving one vote were “Africa,” Chile, Egypt, Eritrea, Haiti, India, Kazakhstan, “minorities in the former Soviet Union,” Montenegro, Palestine, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone.

  If we were ourselves to insert a new “best new ingenue” now, it would probably be Pakistan under Musharraf, for the Pakistani turnaround on the Taliban and provision of bases proved to be key in the successful campaign in Afghanistan. However and ironically, Pakistan’s own instabilities have been revealed, and we fear that it could turn into a new Afghanistan.

• **Best Odd Couple (i.e., forming strange alliances)**
  
  a. Most-mentioned couplings were Russia-China [7 votes], Iran-Iraq [5], and Russia-France [2].

c. The states mentioned most as partners in the “Best Odd Couple” pairings were Russia [10]; Iran and Iraq [9]; China [8]; France [7]; India; and Colombia and Venezuela [2 each]

One very odd couple, simply never anticipated, would be the alliance between Uzbekistan and the United States that appeared in support of U.S. access to Afghanistan.

• Most Surprising Plot Twist in the future
  a. Mentioned most was Russia [8].
  b. Next most–mentioned were cyber/bio-chem terrorism [6], Iraq [4], and the India-Pakistan confrontation [3].
  c. The European Self-Defense Initiative (ESDI) got 2 votes.
  d. Single votes each went to a Brazil-Argentina war, Caspian oil, a break-up of China, Egyptian collapse, global warming, Japan, Libya, Mideast Nukes, pan European alliance, Panama Canal, North Korea, an anti-American free trade area in South America, Taiwan, and Venezuela.

But the biggest surprise was al Qaeda’s attack on the U.S., followed by our retaliation in Afghanistan.

Analysis of data

In this exercise, we asked participants to focus on the future and what fears they might have about its unfolding. Responses here were widely scattered, reflecting the participants’ sense that the U.S. lacked a coherent national security strategy. Of course, it’s tempting to turn that statement around and say that we received such scattered
responses to these questions precisely because we live in such confusing and unpredictable times—hence the U.S. government’s inability to generate and sustain a coherent strategic response to its environment.

Looking first at the Villain category, China received the most votes (9 of 41), as one might expect, given its near-constant identification by most political-military strategists as the most likely peer competitor, if there were to be any, of the U.S. in the coming decades. However, almost four-fifths of our participants did not buy into that; only in New York and Atlanta did China receive more than one vote. The next biggest concentration of votes (six) went to assorted transnational actors, but here we’re already down to one-out-of-seven responses. Again, no one really jumps out as a focus of U.S. fears about the future.

As noted above, the terrorists have jumped out as the focus.

Not surprisingly, the nod for Best Supporting Actor went to the United Kingdom, our long-time number-one ally. More interesting are the 10-percent shares for both Russia and China, suggesting some ambivalence about each country’s presumably “competitive” relationship with the U.S. or perhaps real doubt about the notion of the peer competitor itself, given America’s current position of strength in the global economy and in military forces.

The surprise here was the strong support from Russia, or at least from Putin himself.

The Ingenue category responses were fairly widespread in terms of geography, with most votes (13 of 40) going to Asia, followed by Europe and the former Soviet Union with 8, Latin America with 7, Africa with 5, and the Mideast with only 4. Given the recent events surrounding Indonesia and Taiwan, a heightened awareness of Asia seems natural, but overall, there was no clear focus of fears about the future.

We would call Pakistan the new ingenue.
The most interesting aspect of the Odd Couple vote was the number of times certain countries appeared, suggesting a real sense of uncertainty regarding our relations with them. For example, Russia and China are named in a combined total of 15 separate instances, suggesting that we’re not sure whether they’re going to be enemies (Villain), be friends (Supporting Actor), or join in competitive unions against the U.S. (Odd Couple). In general, this category seems full of countries with whom the U.S. has ambivalent or poor relationships, and it only makes sense that the U.S. would wonder about their yet-unknown intentions.

Perhaps the most intriguing new “odd couple” would be Pakistan and India. U.S. relations with India have gotten stronger and the U.S. now has something of a mediating role between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Whether our participants would see it that way, we don’t know, but we would put the question to them if we met them again.

Finally, in the category of Plot Twist, Russia led the way, followed by terrorism, Iraq, and the India-Pakistan threat of nuclear war. All of these are standard headlines of the past decade, suggesting that our participants expect more of the same. In that sense, while our participants may have had a hard time focusing their fears on any one state or collection of states (as in the Cold War), they had an easier time dismissing exotic “bolts from the blue,” preferring to stick with what was known in most instances.

The worst plot twist, and the most exotic bolt from the blue, did happen: the attack on 9/11. Note that our participants tended to put terrorism in second place in our surveys. None anticipated an attack on the U.S. homeland on such a scale.

In sum, it’s hard to look at this data and come away with a sense that Americans possess any concentrated fears about the outside world. The countries most mentioned (China, Russia) were cast in varying degrees of positive and negative lights, whereas the rogues (i.e., Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Libya) seem destined to remain lesser-includeds. If the world is a more dangerous and unstable place, then the collective fears of our participants seemed not to be easily aggregated at the level of nation-states.
That perspective seems largely justified by 9/11 and its aftermath. After all, al Qaeda is the classic non-state actor.

Mini-briefing 3: Alternative forces

To set off discussions of the future of U.S. forces, we presented the participants of each of the workshops with three alternative U.S. force configurations. Given the huge investments represented by legacy forces, we noted that any of these alternatives would represent a change in emphasis only as the forces evolve over time.

- Alternative 1 we called “the stabilizing force.” We presented the slogans underlying it as: “We are the glue of globalization,” “the cop walking the beat,” and “Stability is a collective good—pay as you go.” It would involve daily operations and lots of military-to-military ties. It would mean keeping current forces and modernizing them only modestly.

- Alternative 2 was “the response force.” Its slogans were: “the inevitability of crushing the rogue,” “the SWAT team,” and “Prevent disruptions of stability.” It would strongly emphasize jointness and overwhelming force for contingencies. It would involve some trade-offs between force size and modernization.

- Alternative 3 was “the transformation force.” Its slogans were: “The world is OK; lay back for surprises” (the strategic pause), “The Maytag repairman,” and “Master nature’s chaos in order to be prepared for the unknown.” U.S. forces would be much less involved in stabilizing the world and responding to conflicts, and drastic reductions in force structure would permit the pursuit of the most advanced technologies.

We noted that these alternatives were not discrete. They would always overlap, especially in the near-term. For instance, the response force could be routinely deployed around the world, but would still have the most advanced modernization in the world even if it did not pursue the most advanced conceivable technology. One participant pointed out that there had to be a connection between the stabilizing force and the transformation force, i.e., that at the core of this Venn diagram, U.S. forces are always war-fighting forces.
We also showed the workshops a fourth alternative, which had two parts: shift $10-20 billion from the Defense Department either to “international stabilization,” i.e., to the State Department and civilian support of nation-building, or to U.S. homeland defense, for national missile defense, anti-terrorism, and the war on drugs.

**Discussion: The future of U.S. national security**

We did not try to make the participants choose among these alternatives. However, we saw from their responses in the exercises that they would have chosen the stabilizing force. They believed that U.S. forces should stay involved with the world, both with allies and in minor interventions. They were not turned on by “transformation.” Shaping for them wasn’t necessarily intervention. Rather, it was a mix of deterrence of war, especially through maintaining alliances and other institutions of peace, and of dealing with Russia and China, and containment and deterrence of rogues and terrorists. All of that implied forces in being, ready, and stationed abroad as they are now. They also wanted to provide adequate funding of the State Department and diplomacy, even at the cost of Defense Department funding.

An overwhelming impression we gained from the participants’ discussion about the future of national security was the relative lack of fear. This is in contrast to much of the discussion of defense that takes place around Washington, where globalizing trends are seen as more threatening than as inducements to maintaining peace. Of course, that’s the nature of the security business, and it’s hard to argue that such pessimism didn’t serve us well during the Cold War. But now in the Globalization Era, the question arises as to whether that professional pessimism serves to divide the military from the larger society. Absent the Soviet threat, the U.S. military turned to planning for the rather abstract concept of two nearly simultaneous major theater wars—which seems out of sync with how at least the sector of the public that we interviewed tends to view the world.

What we heard from the participants was that they saw themselves living in a here-and-now sort of world. They tended to discount long-term projections about “peer competitors.” We believe that was based
on their reasonably strong awareness of how the U.S. stacks up militarily vis-à-vis the rest of the world and a belief that the Cold War’s demise signalled the end of an era in international security. In short, they were more concerned about a growing mismatch between the nature of our military capabilities and the missions the U.S. is likely to be engaged in than about some distant, abstract future threat.

One might say that the defense community in Washington needs to think about abstract future threats because the average citizen tends to contemplate only the here and now. But what we heard from our participants was the view that, if the military were to discount the views of informed citizens, these citizens might in turn perceive the military as irrelevant to the dominant international trend of the era—that of rapid and tumultuous economic globalization. So when our participants pointed to “increased” global instability, they weren’t projecting some greater, over-the-horizon sort of threat, but were concerned with the need for America to get more involved in mitigating the negative outcomes of globalization. In short, we believe they weren’t interested in “skipping this era” and projecting to some distant, high-tech future threat—rather, they want a military that meets today’s challenges.

Thus, when they spoke of “transformations,” they were referring not so much to hardware and high-tech weaponry as to operational practices and institutional culture. Moreover, they did not view the current operational load as a hindrance to the transformation they might have had in mind, but rather as a driver. We didn’t detect support for the “strategic pause” argument for planning against distant threats. The participants did not themselves raise, or discuss, the topic of ballistic missile defense, for instance. They want a military that seems appropriate to the current strategic environment, one whose strategic goals seem better connected to the world they see emerging around them.

Along these lines, many participants were open to the notion of revamping the service structure of the Defense Department. We detected a sense of incredulity over the lack of institutional change within DoD in the decade following the Cold War’s end. The civilian sector’s manning requirements have been dramatically altered by the
technological and management developments of the last decade. thus, some participants had a hard time understanding why the services still needed so many people and why the parameters of service had changed so little. In sum, they saw an institution having difficulty adopting “new business practices,” and thus becoming out of step with the profound changes they have witnessed across the civilian sector and its workforce.

In summary, our participants expressed little fear about the future security environment and evinced more concern about today’s military establishment. They felt that, in a fiercely competitive global economy, the private sector is constantly asked to “do more with less,” and that the military’s reluctance to go down the same path seemed to be keeping it from finding better ways to attract and retain high-quality personnel and from transforming the forces in ways suitable to the world as these citizens saw it.

Upon reflection, nearly a year after 9/11, and as pursuit of al Qaeda drags on at a much lower level of visibility and success, we do not believe these views of the participants would have changed much.

- They would realize the need for more funds, organization, and activity in providing for homeland defense, but would still not give any strong priority to national missile defense, since the homeland defense threat comes from much smaller delivery vehicles.

- They would applaud the decision to provide more funds for foreign aid, especially to stabilize Afghanistan and other “ungovernable areas.”

- Similar to what current polls show, they would probably not be quite certain about the U.S. undertaking a preemptive attack on Iraq, especially in a go-it-alone mode.

- They would recognize the necessity and utility of the large increases in the U.S. defense budget.

- Their desire for a better run DoD would only be strengthened, and probably find its expression in the calls for transformation.
• They would have noted that the attacks of 9/11 did not cause as much damage to the U.S. economy and the global economy as initially feared, though they might have noted the straits that U.S. airlines are in, and they would probably worry about the growing federal budget deficit.

• They would be fully supportive of the global war on terrorism.
Closing statements: Advice to the new Secretary of Defense

To wrap up the workshops, we gave each participant an opportunity to make a closing statement in the form of impromptu advice offered to the individual “just nominated to be the next Secretary of Defense.”

The dominant theme here was one of impatience for substantive change and a strong desire for personal accountability. The desired Secretary of Defense would know that he or she is responsible not only for making things work in a day-to-day sense, but also for moving the organization as a whole down some well-considered path over time. Caretakers need not apply, or cheerleaders. “Doing more with less” can’t be the complaint, but rather must be the management vision—after all, that’s how U.S. business does it.

Interestingly enough, no one referenced external threats or long-term challenges as the problems for a new Secretary. Instead, the emphasis was on the need to establish a sense of urgency for internal change, and the courage and commitment to see such reform through to its end. The new Secretary of Defense must have the President’s support. He or she must set priorities. The participants all made it clear that he or she must take care of U.S. military personnel as the first priority. While concentrating on internal management of the department, he or she must nevertheless not be trapped by it, but seek outside advice.

We did not detect any broad strategic approach or approaches that the participants might want a new Secretary to take. On one hand, they recommended caution in taking on external adventures. At the other extreme, they didn’t want the persistence of Cold War thinking and they didn’t they push for a “revolution in military affairs,” unless it was a simple injunction to keep up with civilian technologies.
To the extent that they addressed external issues, they emphasized coalition-building and cooperation with both allies and potential competitors. The participants thought that the Defense Department would be unduly burdened in world affairs unless it spoke out strongly in support of adequate funding of the State Department. We did not stress the point in our presentations, and they hardly brought it up, but obliquely we sensed that they wanted to relate U.S. defense efforts to the global economy somehow. The connection remained unarticulated. The real danger to be faced may be that the Defense Department could remain an Old Economy institution in a New Economy world.

The new Administration, and particularly the strong leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld, would have pleased our participants. They would see that he was attempting to conduct the Defense Department’s business in a new and efficient way, and they would probably have recognized that strong leadership also involves innovation, so they would support transformation. They would be proud of the way the U.S. military rose to the occasion after 9/11. They would be pleased that taking care of our military people was the first priority. They would be less pleased with the unilateralist tendencies displayed by the Administration, and they would definitely want to see U.S. initiatives in the UN as more of a part of our overall strategy.