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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Economics, B.A. Mathematics, Case Western Reserve University, with Honors, Magna Cum Laude, 2004

Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2004 to present
Thesis Title: "Essays in Experimental Economics"
Expected Completion Date: June 2010

References:

Professor Alvin E. Roth (Chair)
Harvard Business School
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Professor Max Bazerman
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Professor Sendhil Mullainathan
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Professor David Laibson
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617-496-3402, dlaibson@harvard.edu

Professor Muriel Niederle
Department of Economics
Stanford University
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics
Secondary fields: Development Economics

Teaching Experience:

2009	Ec 2040 Experimental Economics, Harvard University teaching fellow for Professor Alvin E. Roth
2006-07	Ec 1035 Policy Applications of Psychology and Economics, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Sendhil Mullainathan

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2001-2004	CWRU, Research Assistant to Professor Avi Dor
2000-2002	CWRU, Research Assistant to Professors Eric Bettinger and Robert Slonim

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2009	Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship
2006, 08	Paul Warburg Funds Research Award, Harvard University
2007	Harvard Program on Negotiation Grant for Research
2004-present	Wyss Fellowship, Harvard Business School

Research Papers:

“Intermediation Reduces Punishment and Reward” (Job Market Paper)

This paper investigates how punishment changes when a transgressor does not directly interact with the injured party. In a laboratory experiment, third party punishment for keeping money at the expense of a poorer player is shown to decrease when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. Follow-up treatments provide evidence that intermediation reduces punishment predominately because the selfish player does not directly interact with the poorer player when an intermediary is used. Additionally, the experiments are designed such that when the selfish player chooses to include the intermediary, the poorer player can only be made worse off. Thus many current theories of fairness would incorrectly predict intermediation increases punishment. The results support the hypothesis that judgments of fairness are consistent with current theories, but that judgments narrowly focus on direct interactions. Narrow judgment can have grim equilibrium consequences. When an intermediary is made available, punishment is almost entirely ineffective in moderating self-interest, and the poorest players are far worse off than when no intermediary is allowed. Primarily as a test of generalizability, this paper also investigates moral decision-making and indirectness in a charity-reward domain. Consistent with the laboratory results, a framed field experiment shows rewards of a charitable behavior (donating mosquito nets) to decrease when the saliency of an intermediary (a charity) is increased. Together, the results show that moral decision-making is not always well predicted by the *overall* fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that *follow directly* from an act. The implications of these results are that, allowing indirect actions may lead to increased anti-social behavior.

“The Schooling Decision: Family Preferences, Intergenerational Conflict, and Moral Hazard in the Brazilian *Favelas*” with Leonardo Bursztyn

This paper analyzes the schooling decisions of poor households with adolescent children in urban Brazil using a high-stakes framed field experiment. Parents in our study are currently being paid large monthly transfers by the local government conditional on their 13 to 15 year-old child attending school. We elicit parents' preferences between such conditional monthly payments and guaranteed, unconditional monthly payments of varying relative sizes. In the baseline treatment, we observe that an overwhelming majority of parents are willing to forego large, guaranteed sums to keep the current conditionality on their payments. Parents reveal much weaker preferences for the conditionality if their child is not informed that the conditionality has been dropped or if they are offered to receive cell-phone text messages every time their child misses school. We conclude that parent-child conflict plays a crucial role in schooling decisions with most parents being unable to control their children's school attendance behavior, in particular due to lack of observability of the children's actions. Further experimental treatments indicate that parental demand to control that behavior is not just to provide the child with skills but also substantially to keep her safe and off the streets.

Works in Progress:

“Incentives and Education” with Eric Bettinger and Bob Slonim

Academics and policy-makers are becoming increasingly interested in the possibility of providing performance incentives to students. In a series of field experiments with a firm that offers online classes to high school students ([MBD Alchemie](#)), we will analyze the possible benefits and dangers of introducing incentives into the classroom. We will test many incentive schemes designed to maximize benefits highlighted by economists while trying to minimize dangers known to psychologists.

“Psychological Factors in Loan Repayment: A Field Study in Mexico” with Daylian Cain and Rodrigo Canales

Working with a large micro-lending firm in Mexico, we are able to change the scripts used when communicating with clients. Linking this with real loan repayment data, we can see what effects very minimal psychological interventions can have in affecting important financial behavior.