Elijah Chudnoff

 

Chudnoff@fas.harvard.edu

 

Department of Philosophy

Harvard University

209A Emerson Hall

25 Quincy St., Harvard Yard 

 

 

Education

 

2001 – Present                  Harvard University, Ph.D. in Philosophy, Expected June 2008

 

1997 – 2001                      University of Florida, B.A. in Philosophy with Honors

 

Areas of Specialization

 

Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

 

Areas of Competence

 

Early Modern Philosophy, History of Analytic Philosophy, Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mathematics

 

Dissertation

 

A Study of Rational Intuition

Committee: Jim Pryor, Alison Simmons, Susanna Siegel, Ned Hall

 

I defend the rationalist view that our knowledge of abstract objects such as numbers, shapes, and universals derives from rational intuition. Rational intuitions are similar to sensory perceptions: in both you learn by having experiences of some subject matter. The difference is that in a rational intuition you do not learn about concrete items by having sensory experiences of them; rather you learn about abstract objects by having intellectual experiences of their natures, or essences. I explain how it is possible for experiences to reveal the natures of abstract objects, give an account of what it is like to have such experiences, and argue for the view that experiences with this phenomenology justify belief.  


Awards

 

Whiting Dissertation Completion Fellowship (2007 – 2008)

Harvard University Certificate of Distinction in Teaching (2003 – 2004)

Mary S. Vanderbilt Scholarship Fund (2001)

Graduate Student Fellowship, Harvard University (2001 – 2007)

University Scholars Research Award, University of Florida (2000 – 2001)

Robert Long Essay Scholarship, Math Department, University of Florida (2000)

Undergraduate Essay Prize, Florida Philosophical Association (2000)

Presentations

 

Conferences

 

Cartesian and Leibnizian Rationalism

            Florida Philosophical Association                                                              Fall 2007


The Phenonomenology of Rational Intuition

Florida Philosophical Association                                                              Fall 2006

 

Facts, Evidence, and Epistemic Justification

Southeastern Graduate Philosophy Conference                                         Spring 2006

 

On Kim's Troubles with Functionalism

             Florida Philosophical Association                                                             Fall 2000

 

Harvard Workshop on Metaphysics and Epistemology

 

How to Be a Rationalist                                                                                           Fall 2007

Why Rational Intuition Justifies Belief                                                                    Spring 2007

The Metaphysics of Intuition                                                                                   Fall 2006

Epistemic Internalism                                                                                               Spring 2006

Knowing and Having Evidence                                                                               Fall 2005

Ideas and Intuitions: Locke vs. Leibniz                                                                   Spring 2005

Justification and Inference                                                                                        Fall 2004

Frege's Analysis of Arithmetic                                                                                Spring 2004

 

Pedagogical Publication


A Guide to Philosophical Writing
                Published by the Harvard Center for Expository Writing                           Fall 2007

Teaching

 

Undergraduate Seminars (fully responsible for designing and running course)

 

Consciousness                                                                                                            Spring 2007

A Priori Knowledge                                                                                                    Fall 2006

Kripke's Naming and Necessity                                                                                  Spring 2005

                        Spring 2004

Meaning and Rule-Following                                                                                      Spring 2006

Memory                                                                                                                        Fall 2005

 

Lecture Courses (responsible for weekly sections and grading) 

 

Epistemology                                                                                                               Spring 2007

                         Fall 2005

Carnap and Quine                                                                                                        Fall 2006

Frege, Russell, and Early Wittgenstein                                                                         Fall 2004

Introduction to Early Modern Philosophy                                                                    Spring 2003

Deductive Logic                                                                                                           Fall 2003


Dissertation Abstract

    Some of our knowledge is about abstract objects such as numbers, shapes, and universals. Many philosophers agree that this knowledge does not derive from sensory perception. They disagree, however, about where it does come from. I defend the rationalist view that our knowledge of abstract matters derives from rational intuition.

    Rational intuitions are similar to sensory perceptions in that both are ways of gaining knowledge from experiences of a subject matter. Rational intuitions are different from sensory perceptions, however, because they do not depend on sensory experiences of a concrete environment. Instead they depend on intellectual experiences that reveal the natures of abstract objects.

    In my dissertation I develop a theory of rational intuition that answers basic questions about its phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics.

    Rational intuitions are conscious episodes. That means there is something it feels like to have one. A phenomenology of rational intuition should explain what it is like to have a rational intuition. Though rational intuitions are often described as spontaneous inclinations to make judgments, I argue that they are not spontaneous, because they are based on intellectual experiences of their subject matter, which endow rational intuitions with a rich phenomenology. I argue, moreover, that intellectual experiences must be phenomenally rich enough to admit of felt differences in their clarity, distinctness, systematicity, and depth. I develop an account of the phenomenology of rational intuition that illuminates these phenomenal variations between intuitions.

    An epistemology of rational intuition should explain why rational intuitions justify belief. I defend the view that rational intuitions justify belief in virtue of their phenomenology: they justify belief because in having an intuition it feels like truths about abstract matters are revealed by intellectual experiences of their natures. I make clear why this view is prima facie plausible and defend it against a number of worries. I also show that it has many explanatory advantages over its competitors. For example, it can explain how it is possible to learn by intuition truths that are not already implied by your understanding or grasp of concepts. This shows why rational intuition is a genuine source of new knowledge. The view I defend can also exploit the resources of the phenomenology of intuition to explain how intuition can be corrected and developed; for, on my view, differences in their felt clarity, distinctness, systematicity, and depth can make epistemic differences between rational intuitions.

    The two main problems for the metaphysics of rational intuition are to explain how it is possible to have experiences that reveal natures and to explain how these experiences can ground knowledge. I argue that intellectual experiences of natures are constituted by simpler experiences, like conscious thoughts and imaginings. For example, imagining a range of example triangles can, in the right circumstances, constitute an experience making you aware of what it is for a figure to be a triangle. I defend this view by exploring the more general phenomenon of constituted experience, and by working through many examples of intellectual experiences being constituted by complexes of other experiences. I use the view that intellectual experiences are constituted experiences to defuse the worry that we cannot know about abstract objects because they are not in space and time and do not enter into causal relations.