Does Europe Need a Common Foreign and Security Policy?
The Politics of Necessity, Viability and Adequacy
by Stefan A. Schirm

Abstract

CFSP’s performance is widely regarded as weak. Why did Europe’s stance in world politics not improve with the Treaty of Maastricht? The article analyses the present policy approach and the institutionalist and military-strategic reform proposals. It is argued that policy and proposals suffer from drawbacks leading to an uncomprehensive formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both do not provide CFSP with a necessary strategy but instead largely duplicate existing organizations. Furthermore, they propose concepts that are not viable because member states do not agree on a common defense policy. In addition, they fail to offer answers adequate to today’s challenges, which are not primarily military in nature. Instead, a socioeconomic security policy appears to be a more realistic option. It is necessary because no other organization provides it sufficiently; it is viable because member states could agree on it; and it is adequate because the stabilization of countries in Eastern Europe is best achieved by social and economic policy—and not by military deterrence.
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The author is indebted to Laurent Goetschel, Jeff Kopstein, Andrew Moravcsik, Carolyn Rhodes, Elmar Rieger, and to the participants of the CES European Integration Study Group and of the ECSA Workshop for comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.
I. Introduction

With the Treaty of Maastricht the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign relations was upgraded and defined as one of the three pillars of the European Union. In addition to the economic policy-areas administered by the Commission in Brussels and the agreements on Justice/Internal Affairs, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became an integral part of the European Union.

The 1991 decision to establish the CFSP can be explained by five factors: (1) With the end of cold war-bipolarity, longstanding security structures vanished and supposedly left a policy vacuum which had to be filled with a new European approach. (2) The Europeanization of Western Europe’s security policy also seemed necessary because of the selective withdrawal of the United States from the European theater. (3) With the deepening of economic integration, EU’s international role as an economic giant but political "dwarf" in foreign policy and security matters became more accentuated. (4) In addition to these apparent policy requirements EPC’s vague legal status and the weakness of its formal institutional framework led to the demand for a stronger juridical basis and clearer definition of its purpose. (5) Spill-over effects from economic to political integration occurred as the dynamics of the single market-project stimulated political cooperation. These overlapping and mutually reinforcing reasons for creating a CFSP seemed to augur well for its future development.

Five years after Maastricht, however, CFSP’s performance is rather disappointing: EU’s role as an international actor in the foreign policy and security field was not strengthened and the Yugoslav-case demonstrates, that decisive conflict-resolution activities have not been achieved by CFSP.

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1 These factors reflect various theoretical approaches like functionalism, neorealism, intergovernmentalism and new institutionalism. As this paper does not claim to make a contribution to the theoretical debate, a further elaboration of theories is not undertaken (see note 3). On the grounds for CFSP see Reinhardt Rummel, West European Cooperation in Foreign and Security Policy, in: Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Sciences, No. 531, January 1994, pp. 112-123; Roger Morgan, The Prospects for Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, in: Armaud Clèse et al. (Ed.), The International System After the Collapse of the East-West-Order, (Dordrecht/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) pp. 413-423.
One of the main lessons from CFSP's performance is that it often duplicates functions better accomplished by NATO, the United States, United Nations, or even the CSCE. This applies not only to the Yugoslavia case, but also to other important challenges to European security, such as the incorporation of the former east bloc into a common security framework, orchestrated by NATO's "Partnership for Peace". Thus, the question arises as to whether an EU-policy in the security-field is necessary, given the performance of older organizations and the sustained presence of the US. Even if an EU-specific foreign policy proves to be meaningful, is the present CFSP form and implementation the adequate response to such contemporary challenges as the stabilization of eastern European countries? These questions are not only important for evaluating the CFSP and its prospects for becoming a policy-shaping mechanism. They are also at the core of the reform debate at the intergovernmental conference (IGC) which began in Spring 1996.

In light of the widely acknowledged weakness2 of CFSP in its three years of existence, this paper tries to answer the basic question, whether the EU needs a CFSP, and if so, which kind of strategy and institutional features should it adopt to meet foreign policy and security problems at the end of the 20th century.3 It is assumed here, that the shaping of any policy has to start with an assessment of the actual policy-needs and of the strategies adequate to meet these challenges and viable to be agreed upon by the EU-members.

In a first step (1) the analytical framework is laid out. The following chapter (2) assesses the character and scope of CFSP. What is the CFSP,


what are its purposes, and how does it work? Then (3) a short history of CFSP activities is given and the reasons for its weakness are analysed. Where has it acted, and why did it not improve EU’s international stance substantially? The fourth part (4) discusses the institutionalist and the military-strategic proposals for reshaping of CFSP. The core argument of this paper is, that the present policy-approach and reform-proposals are important but remain deficient, because they neglect the diversity of national interests and the existing security institutions and because they fail to focus on two essential questions: What are the real foreign and security challenges for Europe today, and, which could be the viable and appropriate strategies to address them? In the fifth part (5) an answer to these questions is provided. It is argued that a civil socio-economic CFSP is the appropriate and viable policy, because of the predominantly non-military nature of today’s challenges, because of member state’s opposition to common defense, and because military security is already provided by other organizations. The sixth section concludes the paper with the basic arguments for a more realistic CFSP.

II. Analytical Framework: Necessity, Viability and Adequacy

The successful development and implementation of any intergovernmental political cooperation depends on the extent to which it is necessary because other policy instruments do not perform sufficiently, viable to be agreed upon by member states and adequate vis a vis the challenges it is supposed to meet. The following framework serves as analytical tool to answer three questions: (1) why has CFSP not strengthened EU’s role as a foreign and security policy actor?, (2) does the EU need a Common Foreign and Security Policy at all?, and (3) if it does so, which kind of approach would be necessary, viable and adequate? It is assumed here that any policy has to fulfill certain criteria if it is to become a policy-shaping mechanism. The following concept is indeed basic in nature and might seem self-evident. But considering the often normative, descriptive or vague character of the CFSP-debate, even evident analytical tools can provide cognitive progress. Presuming that actors in international relations are rational in promoting
their interests, the following three concepts can contribute towards an analysis of policy-performance and policy-prospects of CFSP.

Necessity. When new international policy-instruments are created by a group of states - as in the case of CFSP - their performance will depend on the existence or non-existence of other policy-instruments run by the same actors and dealing with the same issues as the new approach. If other institutions and strategies do exist in the same policy field and if their performance is by and large seen as successful, then the motivation of the states who created the new approach to strengthen it, will be weak. This applies as long as the new mechanism does not provide any policy options and instruments (or access to them), which the older approaches can not deliver. Only if the new policy offers desired options to the states, which other international mechanisms and the states alone can not provide, does it become a necessary step, thus increasing its prospects to be endorsed and promoted by the respective member states.

Viability. Obviously an international policy approach depends on the political will of its member states to agree on its activities. The performance of an intergovernmental mechanism (like CFSP) depends on the national interests of its member states. Even though the respective treaty text or the particular interests of related bureaucracies might advocate specific goals, the actual performance will still reflect what is perceived by member states as lying in their interest. Therefore the viability of joint international policies rests on how far national interests of the members converge and on the policy goals pursued by them. This causal link is only modified if international cooperation is institutionalized through a supranational actor with relative autonomy from its creators (states). This applies to pillar one, but not to CFSP.

Adequacy. The success of international policy instruments depends also on whether they are appropriate for the challenges they are supposed to meet. If the strategy and the instruments applied do not address the respective problems in an adequate way, any policy will fail. In addition, the support of member states towards the international policy approach depends on whether the joint initiative is perceived as appropriate (and therefore promising) vis-à-vis the issues at stake. Therefore the conception of any policy
depends on an evaluation of the challenges it is to meet. Inadequate strategies will not motivate member states to support a joint intergovernmental approach. The adequacy of a policy does not only depend on appropriate strategies vis-à-vis the specific challenges, but also on an efficient institutionalization of operational procedures and capabilities to execute the respective measures.

Of course this sketch is an ideal-type concept, because it assumes rational analysis and action to the extent that

- national interests (of whatever nature) predominantly shape intergovernmental cooperation, that
- duplication of existing policy instruments lowers the chances for success of the new approach, and that
- strategies which do not meet their respective challenges, tend not to perform well.  

III. Character and Scope of CFSP (how does it work?)

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is an intergovernmental mechanism, thus shaped and controlled by the governments of the member states in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. The Commission, which is solely responsible in many economic policy areas (first pillar) has only the right to propose initiatives to the Council in CFSP matters. Decisions on CFSP have to be taken unanimously in the Council. Only operational implementation can be voted by majority, and only when the Council has unanimously so decided. This implies that national interests have to be coordinated on every issue and that every EU member has veto-power. As a result, only the lowest common policy denominator is often achieved, due to divergent national interests of the 15 member states. But compared to the previous European Political Cooperation, CFSP represents integrative

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4 History of international relations is crowded with examples of unnecessary, coincidental, and inadequate policies. But such explanatory factors do not provide an analytical framework, and - by and large - are also not conducive to most policy activities.
progress - if only in comparison with the low starting point. CFSP’s innovations compared to EPC include the incorporation of security as an issue area of common policy, the above-mentioned right of the Commission to initiate cooperation, and the possibility of majority-vote.

CFSP goals were formulated vaguely in the Treaty of Maastricht. Article J.1 states inter alia, that CFSP should "safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union"; "strengthen the security of the Union and of its member-states" and "develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights". With these programmatic aims the job description for CFSP is more than imprecise. At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty does not provide clear definitions of interests. Nor does it specify regulations about how and when to initiate which CFSP actions. Operational provisions are very general, stating for example that member states should inform each other on any foreign and security issue of common relevance and that a common position should be reached where appropriate (J.2.). Those member-states with a seat in the UN Security Council are requested to represent EU’s position.

Regarding the defense/military dimension of security policy, the Maastricht Treaty provides that the Western European Union (WEU) forms an integral part of the European Union, to which the execution of EU actions may be delegated. The Treaty (J.4.) expresses the aspiration for a European military policy by proclaiming "the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense". Furthermore, a proposal by France and Germany was included, stating that CFSP-decisions should not preclude any deeper cooperation between two or more member-states. Thus a common foreign and security policy inside the EU-member group but outside CFSP was made possible. The Eurocorps - in which the Franco-German brigade is now joined by detachments

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6 Title V, Article J.1.-J.11 of the Treaty on the European Union.

7 Thus it is the "ambition of Maastricht, to endow the Union with a foreign and security policy and with military might", Morgan p. 423.
from Belgium, Spain and Luxemburg - is the most prominent example of a
closer security cooperation of EU members outside CFSP - besides NATO,
which includes 11 of the 15 EU-members.8

IV. CFSP Performance and the Reasons for its Weakness

CFSP has officially existed since the Maastricht Treaty went into force in
November 1993. But activities undertaken since the agreement on the
treaty in 1991 were shaped in light of the new regulations. However, apart
from a dramatic increase in the number of meetings and declarations, no
substantial improvement of the impact of EU's foreign and security policy
has occurred. EU's role as an international actor in foreign and security po-
licy matters continues to be that of a "dwarf"; national foreign and security
policies remain the dominant feature; and the EU has not developed into a
leading player in traditional "high politics".9  The following activities took
place under CFSP auspices:

- Creation of a Stability Pact to promote a negotiated settlement of mi-
  norities- and border-disputes among eastern European countries.
- Support of the Gaza-Jericho-Agreement by providing development
  aid for infrastructural projects.
- Monitoring the elections in Russia and South Africa.
- Humanitarian aid to Bosnia and administration of the city of Mostar.
- Continuous attempts to reach a negotiated peace in Bosnia.
- Agreements among EU-members on restrictions for weapon exports
  and promotion of the prolongation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
  Treaty.

Besides the Stability-Pact and the engagement in the Bosnian peace-pro-
cess, the EU-activities were of a microscopic relevance and did not require
the CFSP-framework to take place. Regarding the two major activities, the

8 11 of the 15 member states of the EU are members of NATO: Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal,
Spain, Austria, Sweden, Ireland and Finland are EU-members, but not NATO-
members. On NATO and European security see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The
9 See Burghardt, 1994a
CFSP-balance is disappointing because they produced no visible results, and also raised doubts about the necessity of a CFSP to promote such initiatives. The Balladur-project of a Stability Pact vis à vis eastern Europe encountered eastern European countries (essentially the Visegrad Group), which were interested in discussing their future membership in the EU, but considered the minorities- and border-issues a bilateral affair not to be dealt with on a multilateral stage and as topics already settled by themselves in bilateral agreements. But economic assistance and diplomatic pressures via the carrot of "future membership" did lead to communiqués on common positions in the issues at stake. In the end, the round-table discussions produced friendly declarations. In 1995 the Stability Pact was handed over to the OSCE (the former CSCE), which has offered an institutional framework for such issues since the 1970s. This showed, that the CFSP was largely duplicating an already existing mechanism.

The performance of the EU in the peace-negotiations in the former Yugoslavia was disappointing because no breakthrough success was achieved even though the EU tried hard. Numerous peace-agreements were negotiated, in part agreed upon, and then broken by one of the warring parties. But the main reason for disappointment was that the decisive and visible steps towards a peaceful settlement were undertaken by others: The United Nations provided the peacekeeping forces, NATO executed military monitoring and air-strikes, and the United States promoted the peace-agreement of Dayton (Ohio) in 1995. In order to implement the Dayton provisions, an international force (IFOR) was created by NATO. EU's activities can be considered as a contribution towards the Dayton agreement, but were not sufficient to reach a "European" settlement.

Assessing the performance of CFSP towards third countries, it is just as important to look at the instances where it did act, as those where it did not. Examples are the conflicts in Rwanda, where France intervened milit-

11 On the reasons for EU’s weak performance in the Yugoslavia-case Rummel states, that "it was first of all the lack of preventive diplomacy that reduced the influence of the Community, not the lack of economic or military leverage", Rummel, 1994, p. 122.
tarly alone; the Iraq embargo, where different implementation was the rule; the ban on nuclear testing, where French national interests prevailed; and—most importantly—the policy vis-à-vis Russia. Embedding Russia in an international security framework was not orchestrated by CFSP, but by NATO's "Partnership for Peace." Whether PFP proves to be successful or not, it was not a CFSP action. And the economic stabilization of Russia was largely organized and paid for unilaterally by Germany due to its more imminent interest in Russia's continuing willingness to cooperate with the West and in preventing a definitive collapse of Russia's market reforms.

Stating that CFSP's and EPC's performance was disappointing, one has to acknowledge, that this is only true in light of the expectations created by the far reaching treaty-declarations and political rhetoric of European politicians. Considering EU's missing experience in handling military conflicts like Yugoslavia, it can be argued, that "... the Community has been doing rather well in this test," Compared with the historical pattern of national diplomacy, the coordination of policies of the EU-members achieved by EPC and CFSP represent a significant alteration of the traditional way of foreign policy conduct. As Christopher Hill has pointed out, EPC/CFSP is mainly perceived as weak and unsatisfying because of the "capability-expectations gap" between real resources/political will and "talked up" expectations.

While showing weakness in its policy towards EU-external problems, CFSP provisions can be thought of as a success regarding EU-internal cohesion. Given the significant differences in foreign policy attitudes between, say, France and Germany on Yugoslavia, it is surprising how few conflicts emerged between EU-members. Thus CFSP seems to accomplish the important task of promoting EU-internal concertation and

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12 On the "Partnership for Peace" see Nick Williams, Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?, in: Survival, 38 (Spring 1996) 1, pp. 98-110.
coordination on an intergovernmental level. This became especially important since the single market and the Maastricht Treaty deepened economic integration and thus magnified the potential economic costs of a spill-over of tensions over foreign and security issues into the economic realm.

The reasons for CFSP's weakness regarding its external activities can be traced back to three factors:

1. First, there is an apparent divergence of national interests of the main EU-players towards a common foreign and security policy and towards the issues at stake. Largely for historical reasons, Germany is reluctant to pursue national interests alone and to develop an autonomous security policy. Germany is therefore the strongest advocate of a community-approach towards CFSP and is willing to transfer sovereignty, as it is anyway uneasy to act independently in the international arena. France and Great Britain, on the other hand, show little willingness to give up any control over foreign and security matters. National controlled capabilities are perceived as sufficient, and NATO is considered the maximum of international coordination seen as compatible with the wish to preserve national autonomy. This is true especially in the case of the United Kingdom, while France would make small concessions towards a strengthening of supranational EU-power if this would imply further control over Germany and a fostering of Europe's autonomy vis à vis the US. Even though most member states agree that they would gain international power by unifying their foreign policies, there is a "lack of political will to act decisively as a Union."16 Besides the "Big Three" the other member states play only a minor role in shaping a foreign and security policy: some seem unable to cooperate in CFSP matters (Greece), others follow the "Big Ones" (like the Benelux following France or Britain), some play a sound but weak coope-

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rative role (Spain), and many would adhere to most proposals as long as they get enough side-payments from the core group.

(2) Besides the lack of political will, there is a lack of strategic clarity. CFSP is missing any definition of common interests, of precise goals, and operational provisions to achieve them. CFSP lacks a vision of European foreign and security interests which could prevail over specific national attitudes. Apparently, important member states like the UK and France do not see the necessity of common strategies beyond national level approaches and NATO. In the traditional conception of security as military defense no threats have been identified by these countries, which could be met more effectively by EU-actions then with national policy, NATO etc. Given the virtual absence of the classical security threat - military attack - it becomes more necessary (and difficult) to define clearly what the EU considers a foreign and security policy challenge. Such a definition requires a clear concept of the character of the EU itself: Does it want to be a world power like the US? Would it make sense to become a super-power? Is it feasible to become such a world power? Or is it more realistic and viable to think of the EU as an "ever closer union" of states running an organization (with common bodies) in order to foster economic development, security and political stability of its member nations?

(3) The third problem is institutional weakness. Obviously decision-making by unanimity does not provide flexibility and the ability for rapid reaction. Multiple veto-points facilitate the mobilization of blocking coalitions by a minority. In addition, institutional weakness exists regarding the fragmented representation of CFSP in the international theatre, insufficient analyses capacity, and unclear funding for joint actions. The Yugoslavia case also showed that mediation-power in military conflicts is best underlined by an own military capacity of the mediator: Agreements which are not enforceable can easily be broken. Thus the loose incorporation of WEU into CFSP seemed to be insufficient. In general, institutional rules can not only provide operational efficiency but also shape the expectations and attitudes of member states. Therefore a weak and unprecise institutionalization of CFSP undermines the adhesion of EU-members to common attitudes and rules.
V. Are the Institutionalist and Military-Strategic Proposals for CFSP-Reform Adequate?

Proposals addressing these weaknesses in the academic and the policy-making realm focus mainly on two - partly overlapping - lines of argument which are labeled here as the institutionalists and the military-strategic approach to improve CFSP.

The institutionalist approach refers to the above mentioned deficits of CFSP. Reform proposals range from the - still intergovernmental - introduction of majority vote procedures, creation of a planning capacity and unified external representation, to a - supranational - institutionalization of a communitarian body for CFSP purposes to which member state sovereignty is partly transferred. Both directions point to the advantages of majority-vote procedures. But advocates of majority-vote also have to acknowledge, that a continuous overruling of certain member-states or groups of them would lead to a de-europeanization of CFSP. It would split the EU into a majority-group which would be interested in CFSP, and a minority whose integration into the development of the EU would loosen up. A CFSP encompassing all EU-members only works if consensus is the rule and not the exception. But since a CFSP depending on all member states will not work due to divergent national interests and uncooperative states like Greece, a core-group CFSP seems the only viable option. This refers to proposals of "multiple speed" or 'concentric circles', where a "core group" around France and Germany would undertake activities, that other member states could not prevent by veto, but would also not be forced to endorse. A core-group lead is de facto already happening, as the franco-german axis shapes most of EU's activities.

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17 The negotiation of side-payments for every decision on CFSP-matters would turn CFSP into a Bazaar.


of such an approach would foster a more active and efficient CFSP but would put into question the overall European character of CFSP.

The creation of additional policy-planning and analysis capacities located or in the Commission or in the Council (General Secretariat) is a precondition for any kind of more visible CFSP and is widely agreed upon. This is the reform step most likely to be undertaken in course of the Intergovernmental Conference which started in March 1996.20 Unified external representation is also a basic requirement to act internationally, as third countries need an "address" to communicate with. Proposals for a supranational CFSP representation with relative autonomy from member state influence seem utopian in light of the strong nationalist stance taken by Britain and others. An intergovernmentally monitored "foreign minister" with the right to act autonomously on previously defined strategical lines appears to be more viable. Thus a common representation as well as planning capacity and majority/core-vote require a precise definition of the contents of politics, of common European interests and strategies - neither of which are addressed by the institutional approach.

The institutional debate with the most fundamental implications concerns the incorporation of the WEU in the EU (and its relationship to NATO). According to the Maastricht Treaty the WEU is an integral part of the development of the EU and can be asked to carry out EU-actions. Further specifications on how this might proceed have not been agreed upon. Proposals range from the full merger of both organizations to the transfer of all CFSP activities to a "New Western European Union"21.

Summing up, the problem with the institutionalist proposals is (1) that they only partially offer realistic steps, and (2) that they do not address the contents of politics. (1) Only the creation of an "Think Tank" and a selective fostering of majority-vote appears to offer implementable improvements. A transfer of CFSP to WEU, new institutions or a

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20 The French and German foreign ministers also agreed on the fostering of majority-vote procedures, see Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 29, 1996, p. 1, 10.

supranationalization of CFSP can not be considered viable because of the opposition of e.g. Britain, and because of divergent national interests in foreign and security issues. In addition, more institutions in the foreign and security field would duplicate the existing organizations, thus leading to bureaucratization and a "proliferation of institutions". (2) Institutional efficiency is necessary but not sufficient for an improvement of any policy - it can not substitute for common interests and strong political will which have to form the content of politics.

Political interests are at the core of the second approach to improve CFSP, the military-strategic. This line of reasoning calls for military capabilities for the EU and starts from three assumptions. First, it is assumed that powerful diplomacy needs military capacity as a tool for threat and implementation. Second, it is perceived that the US is pulling out of the European theater by reducing its military presence. Third, it is argued that any relevant security policy has to include military means in order to play the most important game of world politics - the game of "high politics". It is argued on these reasons, that CFSP has to be strengthened by a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and by a European military capacity to be build up in the framework of the WEU. Legally the military-strategic argument draws on the provision in the Maastricht Treaty on a common defense policy.

The military-strategic argument offers an interesting complement to the debate, but it too has drawbacks. Since it suggests that Europe needs a military organization beyond NATO it assumes that NATO for some reasons can not provide for sufficient security. This seems uncomprehensi-

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22 Jopp, 1995, p. 136
ble in light of NATO’s recent “excellent health”\textsuperscript{25} and its activities in Yugoslavia (1995-) and towards eastern Europe including Russia. The question remains unanswered, what an EU-NATO could have accomplished that NATO could not.\textsuperscript{26} The main difference between a NATO-like WEU and NATO itself would be the exclusion of the United States and thus an enhanced autonomy of the EU-countries vis à vis the US. This is indeed a reason sometimes offered, because of the assumption that the interests of the US and Europe grew more divergent after the end of the Cold War. Washington seems to be less concerned with European security and more with domestic, particularly economic issues. Underlining this observation, President Clinton has actively promoted the build-up of an ESDI and advocated a stronger European engagement in the continent’s security - inside the transatlantic partnership (NATO).

The relevant question for Europe is, whether to pursue security policy inside of a framework which counts on the US as a member or through an institutional splitting. Creating an European NATO through an upgrading of WEU would doubtless imply further autonomy for the EU. At the same time, it would increase the probability of transatlantic tensions because it offers the possibility for a security policy without and against US interests. Political conflicts with the US belong to the worst security

\textsuperscript{25} Philip Zelikow, The Masque of Institutions, in: Survival, 38 (Spring 1996) 1, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{26} It is sometimes argued that an EU-NATO would have strengthened EU’s stance in Yugoslavia because of the reluctant attitude of the US towards military involvement of NATO in the early years of the conflict. Taking the divergent positions of EU-members towards military action and towards the Yugoslavia-policy (towards Serbs, Croats and Bosnians) into account, the assumption of a potential common military EU-action seems questionable. If European states would have agreed on an action, they could have done so at any time as the US did not force them not to do so - it only did not want to participate itself in 1991-1995. The other questionable assumption of the military-approach in the Yugoslavia-case is, that military action would have been the appropriate step for conflict resolution. Just as plausible is the point that the economic sanctions on Serbia were decisive for the withdrawal of the Serbian support to the Bosnian Serbs which in turn was decisive for their adherence to the Dayton agreement. That is not to say that actions like the air-strikes did not contribute to a settlement. But air-strikes could have been undertaken at any time by those EU-members willing to do so. A NATO decision was not a necessary precondition. WEU - in its present form - could have provided a multilateral political legitimation.
scenarios one can think of for Western Europe. Comparing the potential gains in autonomy with the potential increase in tensions, the EU has to make a very careful choice, as its most important international partnership in economic, diplomatic, cultural and military aspects might be damaged. The dangers of an institutional split are magnified by the inability – and the unwillingness - of the EU to achieve the leadership-capacity which the US offers, as Europe is not going to become a unified state like the US. The EU will thus - for the foreseeable future - not be able to substitute for the US in military and security affairs.27

Of course, security policy also has to take into account the unlikely case of the US pulling out of Europe. In this unlikely scenario a stronger European defense policy would become more necessary and more attractive to EU-members. But even in this case, it is difficult to find reasons for the establishment of a new organization duplicating existing ones. Instead, a Europeanized NATO would provide the necessary organizing structure for defense and keep the transatlantic partnership involved in European security. In order to allow European states to act inside NATO but without the participation of the US the mentioned strengthening of the "European Pillar" of NATO is necessary. The US does support this step (see below).

The military-strategic line of thought sometimes draws on the argument, that the EU can not continue to undertake only the "easy parts" of security, leaving the more "difficult" military portions involving casualties and heavy expenditure to the US. This argument does not accord with the facts. In 1992 the EU core countries France, Germany and Great Britain spent on average 3.3% of their GNP on defense, while the US spent 5.3% (Japan: 1%).28 Considering, that the three European countries are mid-range powers and do not intend to perform a global security role like the US does, they actually devoted a relatively large share of their domestic product to defense - 62% of the GNP-portion the "Superpower" USA

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27 "Europeans, in turn, should do all they can to ensure that the Americans remain involved - while preparing for the inevitable occasions when US commitment will not be as strong as Europe would like" states Philip H. Gordon, Recasting the Atlantic Alliance, in: Survival, 38 (Spring 1996) 1, p. 51.

spent. Proposals for a European military capacity should also take into account that Europe does possess extensive military capacity when adding national forces. The latter include the large and modern French, German, and British armies, navies and air forces, as well as Britain's and France's nuclear weapons. These military forces (except for Germany's) have been participating regularly in out of area deployments such as the Gulf War II, Rwanda, Somalia, Yugoslavia etc. The detachment suffering most casualties in the former Yugoslavia years were French troops, and not US forces. Considering the strong military capacities of European countries and existing multilateral organizations, the demands for a new European defense capability do not convince. Pursuing European security inside a Europe-nized NATO does not preclude EU-members from taking action without the US and keeps America involved in a transatlantic security framework.

The rapprochement of France towards NATO in December 1995 shows that even the country traditionally most preoccupied with keeping distance from Washington has acknowledged the importance of NATO and thus of the US for European security. Maintaining NATO as the focal instrument of European security would prevent the risk of transatlantic tensions, as it forces the participating countries to achieve agreements and act jointly in order to operate. Institutional frameworks can not substitute for convergent national interests. But NATO should also not be underestimated as it shapes member-state expectations and policies that reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Claims for the necessity of an EU military organization on the grounds of NATO's "paralysis" 1991-1994 and EU's performance in Ex-Yugoslavia do not seem convincing: What is often perceived as European "weakness" in the Yugoslavia case did in fact reflect member state preferences. If EU countries had wished to intervene militarily they could have done so with combined national forces, under the existing political framework of WEU. A new institutional structure - an "EU-NATO" - would not have changed national attitudes opposed to European military intervention.

While the military-strategic approach is problematic if it only duplicates NATO by creating an identic organization reserved for EU-member states, it would make a qualitative difference if it would contribute to a more unified definition of interests, common positions, and policy than NATO does. Thinking along these lines, the military-strategic approach does offer a possible content to CFSP in the sense that it provides a way to define interests and implementation left open in the Maastricht Treaty. Specific European security interests and capabilities in the military realm could be defined and incorporated in a modified NATO doctrine in cooperation with the US. Such a Europeanization of NATO not only avoids institutional splitting and duplication but also seems viable because the US supports ESDI and wants to reduce its engagement via a transfer of responsibility (and expenditure) to European NATO-members.

Both the institutionalist and the military-strategic proposals for a reform of CFSP neglect the fundamental differences in attitudes among EU members regarding (1) specific security challenges and (2) the willingness to transfer any control of their foreign and security policy to a common body. As mentioned earlier, only Germany would consider such a "pooling of sovereignty"30 in CFSP matters. The specific interests also make it difficult to conceive a communitarian CFSP/ESDI as a realistic option. Germany is mainly concerned with eastern Europe, France is preoccupied with northern Africa and its former colonial territories, and Britain wavers between a global military vision of its former great power status and a position of an observer, mildly interested in the balance of power on "the continent". In any case, there is no consensus for a subordination of rational defense policies and capabilities under a common EU-policy.31

While the institutional approach seems insufficient because it neglects the content of policy (interests, challenges), the military-strategic seems to be unconvincing when merely directed at new organizational features (EU-NATO) and unrealistic when discussing a unified communitarian CFSP and


ESDI. The next chapter discusses the question, whether the military dimension constitutes an adequate answer to today's challenges in the foreign and security policy area to Western Europe. This is particularly necessary because both lines of reform proposals - the institutionalist and the military-strategic - neglect fundamental questions: What are the challenges that CFSP is actually supposed to meet? What are the strategies adequate to meet them? What strategies are viable to be agreed upon by the EU-members?

VI. What are the Challenges and the Adequate Strategies?
Towards a Socio-Economic Approach to Security

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, several grounds were relevant for the creation of CFSP. In light of the political developments and the analyses outlined so far, these reasons have to be reconsidered. Five years after Maastricht, some do not seem as convincing as they might have in 1991. The presence of the United States in Europe is still the most important security anchor for the continent, as shown in the Yugoslavia-case and in the NATO-initiatives towards eastern Europe and Russia. The US did not leave the European theater but continued to provide security. The argument that the end of the cold war left a security vacuum might have accorded with the reality of 1991 but has been invalidated by NATO's performance since then. Institutional weaknesses of EPC must be acknowledged, but member states were not willing to overcome them in the regulations for CFSP as discussed earlier. Finally, the argument has to be considered, that the EU as an economic giant can not continue to be a foreign and security policy-"dwarf". The logic of this reasoning was never very compelling as it just suggests an automatic link between economic resources and military/security power. Why does an important economic actor have to be at the same time an important foreign and security policy actor? Unless there are challenges which can not be met with existing policy-instruments, there seems to be no convincing reason for a CFSP. So, does Europe need a CFSP at all?

Yes, it does. Europe needs a Common Foreign and Security Policy, but not necessarily the one established with the Maastricht Treaty and
discussed in the institutionalist and military-strategic proposals for a reform. An appraisal of the foreign policy and security problems Europe faces today, reveals challenges which can not sufficiently be met by existing or proposed policy instruments. The following are considered immediate or potential threats to EU's core interests of economic development, democracy, the rule of law, peace and regional stability:

- The countries directly located at the eastern border of the EU suffer under political and economic instability, which might result in the upsurge of new nationalism and in internal conflicts. These could spill-over to the EU in form of illegal migration, the break-down of trade, the loss of investment etc.

- Russia presents an unconsolidated state in political and economic terms. Economic hardship and political unrest could lead to a weakening of democratic development and market reforms. Nationalists could - if they seize power - feel tempted to recur to old imperial attitudes in order to distract attention from socio-economic hardships. As a consequence, EU's economic interests might be harmed and even a renewed military threat could become possible.

- The countries in northern Africa face severe domestic cleavages due to socio-economic disparities and Islamic fundamentalism.

- Due to political instability, poverty and a weak enforcement of law in many neighbouring countries Europe already faces an increase in migration and a spread of organized crime directed towards the EU.

- Chaos and impoverishment in "Third World"-countries pose additional security challenges, such as destruction of the environment, economic crises, domestic and regional conflicts damaging EU's economic interests, illegal migration etc.

Last, but definitely not least:

- After the unifying force of the cold war disappeared and due to growing domestic economic problems, the member-states of the EU face an increased possibility for tensions among them. As resources grow scarce, distributional disputes might increase within and among the EU-states. A more egoistic pursuit of national interests might damage European integration. EU-internal divergencies will probably become more accentuated with the upcoming enlargement to the east.
The common characteristic of all of these challenges is, that they can not be addressed by military means. To put it clearly: Of course they might develop into conflicts which would make it appropriate for the EU or NATO to intervene militarily. But until then, it is in the interest of Western European countries to prevent a militarization of the above mentioned security problems. Insofar as preventive security policy involves "cold" military action such as surveillance, peacekeeping and deterrence; NATO, the United Nations, and the WEU offer a widely experienced and ready to deploy arsenal of policy-instruments.

Europe, however, does not face any threat of military attack as it did during the Cold War. For this reason, military organizations do not provide sufficient answers to today's security challenges. The present security landscape requires a reorientation of security policy away from traditional military concerns and towards a focus on non-military problems and the means to handle them. A report by DG 1A and the University of Munich states: "Rather than relying primarily on defence and deterrence, European security now requires a multifaceted approach in which a variety of instruments are used together to reduce the risks of instability and insecurity on Europe's frontiers and in its neighbouring states".32 Borrowing from US policy in dealing with illegal migration, crime and a socio-economically unstable neighbour by erecting physical walls and a special police force (border control) vis-à-vis Mexico does not offer an efficient model. By creating NAFTA, the US acknowledged that economic policy might be the better security policy.33

32 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *CEPS and the Future of the European Union*, Interim Report, Research Group on European Affairs (University of Munich) and Planning Staff of the European Commission (DG1A), Munich/Brussels, July 1995, p. 8. The report continues stating: "For security policy to be successful, it needs to be well resourced, swift and flexible. In current circumstances, it is more likely to be about the "soft security" provided by instruments such as human rights monitoring, trade policy, economic and technical assistance than about the "hard security" provided by military defence." 33 On the foreign policy and security grounds for NAFTA see Stefan A. Schirm, *Macht und Wandel: Die Beziehungen der USA zu Mexico und Brasilien. Außenpolitik, Wirtschaft und Sicherheit*, (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1994), pp. 103-120 and Paul Krugman, The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA. It's Foreign Policy, Stupid, in: *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (November-December 1993) 5, pp. 13-19.
What Europe needs is a foreign and security policy by civil means to address non-military challenges and to prevent the escalation of tensions into military relevant conflicts. For the stabilization of the countries of eastern Europe or northern Africa, additional military capability would be inadequate and enhanced institutional efficiency would be insufficient. Political, economic, and social stability requires foremost economic development and the legal as well as political institutions to satisfy the needs of the population in these countries.\textsuperscript{34} In order to stabilize eastern Europe CFSP has to contribute towards fostering participative political systems, economic development perceived as providing equal opportunities, and the rule of law. For these purposes the European Union is prepared, as it acts on the same lines internally and because it possesses a fourty-year experience in mediating and integrating economic and social policies.\textsuperscript{35}

Promoting international relations along an economic logic lies in the very nature of the European Union. This is best exemplified by its leading role in the world political economy, its abilities to shape global politics e.g. in the Uruguay-Round of GATT, in North-South-relations and in monetary policy. With the end of the Cold War the essence of international relations revolves more around technological, developmental, trade- and currency-related issues, therefore magnifying Europes specific role. As EU's international "power" is of an economic nature, as the real security challenges have socio-economic grounds, and as EU-members do not agree on a merged and common military security policy, a socio-economic approach to CFSP provides the appropriate concept.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{35} The experiences made in these respects with underdeveloped regions and former instability of political systems in member states like Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy provide a useful know-how. EC's structural- and cohesion-funds are examples of policy tools in social and economic stabilization.

\textsuperscript{36} Roger Morgan takes a pragmatic view: "If, then, the "high road" to world power status for Europe - the road of politico-military "high politics" along which the proposed CFSP points - is strewn with obstacles of varying shapes and sizes, the EC's leaders might be well advised to take another look at the "low road", that of commercial and
Europe can thus focus on its specific strength as a civil power in order to promote a "stability transfer" as a preventive security policy. The EU has unique experience with the management of divergent interests in a situation of mutual interdependence. It has large economic resources and a huge potential for the diffusion of politico-economic expertise - whether in the technological area or in intergovernmental policy-making. Mobilizing its abilities for peaceful change through the deepening of international ties leads to a non-military security strategy for the prevention of conflicts. Obviously such a mechanism must complement conventional-military security; it cannot substitute for it. The question is one of emphasis.

To some extent a socio-economic approach to foreign and security policy is already in place. But present activities are insufficient, only loosely coordinated and not incorporated into a structured and strategically directed CFSP-framework:

- Several activities of the Commission contribute towards a stabilization of other countries. The PHARE- and TACIS-programes provide technical assistance to eastern Europe; development aid (DG 8) is given to the "Third World"; the Lomé-agreements on trade benefit former French and British colonies; the energy-cooperation with eastern Europe includes improvement of safety-standards in nuclear power plants etc.

- At the intergovernmental level the most effective civil means is probably the carrot-strategy of offering full membership to the Visegrad-countries and thus supporting market reforms and democratic political procedures by the governments, and giving the population a perspective for what is largely perceived as a better future. The Euro-Agreements on trade provide economic opportunities and thus sup-

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38 Becher, p. 401.
port for stability in the associated countries. The "Stability Pact" of 1994 was a diplomatic attempt for preventive security policy as it envisaged the peaceful settlement of tensions before they developed into open conflicts.

To reach a comprehensive and powerful civil CFSP - adequate to the real challenges - a coordination of these activities and the development of new tools is as necessary as a clear definition of policy-objectives, strategies, and instruments. Therefore a socio-economic CFSP goes far beyond the present status-quo, but builds upon it. Defining CFSP as a strategy to improve European security by stabilizing certain countries through economic development and the strengthening of democratic institutions demands an improved analytical capacity in order to identify potential or actual sources for security challenges and in order to identify the adequate instruments to prevent escalation of tensions into conflicts. Defining security policy along these lines meets the non-military character of actual challenges and reflects the character of the EU itself: The EU represents a "trading model" that pursues stability and wealth through commerce and mutually beneficial international ties rather than through military domination.

In order to improve a civil approach for CFSP, the EU has to undergo several levels of definition. The first is the definition of interests following the above mentioned security scenario. A second step is the conceptualization of security policy as an instrument to meet actual challenges, that are not military in nature, and thus leaving military aspects to existing organizations. Thirdly, geographic priorities have to be set, acknowledging,

41 The director general of DG 1A mentions six "interests and priorities": consolidation of the EU following enlargement; integration of central and eastern European countries into the Union; developing an ESDI as the European pillar of a reinforced North Atlantic Alliance; promoting a stable immediate neighbourhood; maintaining close political and economic ties with the U.S. and Japan; safeguarding the security of energy supplies and raw materials, in: Günter Burghardt, The New Europe, Speech to the 16th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, 23 August 1994b.
that e.g. Rwanda, Somalia or Chechnya do not possess the same intrinsic relevance to the EU as e.g. the Visegrad countries. The fourth concerns the identification of policy instruments and the question, which of these tools are to remain at the national level, which should be handled at the intergovernmental EU-level, and which are best transferred to the EU-commission. As mentioned above, several instruments exist at the commission-level (first pillar). Thus the task is to reduce the fragmentation of instruments and to bring them together under a common strategy and implementation. Such a strategy must also specify in which cases which policies have to be applied and with which conditionality. Creating regulations for these specific questions, the EU can draw on its large experience, for example with the PHARE-program, and also on the know-how of other international organisations running a socio-economic strategies in stabilizing states, such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Taking the economic needs of neighbouring countries and EU's character as a 'Trading Model' into account, one of the most effective tools for a civil CFSP is commerce. Enlarged - and conditioned - trading opportunities can contribute to economic development and provide a precondition to stability. Equitable distribution of growth and political instability have to be dealt with by other means. As liberalized trade also benefits EU member countries (comparable to the accession of e.g. Portugal and Spain), a socio-economic CFSP is also more cost-efficient than military-institutional options. The build-up of an EU-NATO organization would imply heavy financial burdens without stimulating economic development inside EU.

But why should member states pursue a civil foreign and security policy through EU instead of approaching it on their own? One can think of several arguments. First of all, a common approach is more efficient than individual policies because it avoids duplication of activities, thus reducing financial costs and political costs (in form of contradicting or parallel national policies). Second, CFSP allows for a better domestic acceptance because it is usually difficult to gain short-term public support for long-term foreign and security measures. Arguing with external (European) commitments national governments can better justify long term policies which do
not show immediate returns. Third, a European approach provides the member states with a tool to block special interests of private business by defining certain economic policies as "European security issues". The same blocking mechanism can be thought of vis-à-vis the traditional defense establishment (military, industry, bureaucracies), whose special interests can better be blocked by defining "European security" as a strategy focusing on stabilization of neighbours instead of deterrence. Fourth, a common approach will be perceived by third countries as more powerful than national policy if it follows a clear strategy to which all important EU members agree, and if it possesses an effective operational institutionalization. Joint EU-actions leave third countries no alternative West European partners. An exploitation of divergencies between national policies in Europe by third countries becomes unviable.

Centralized coordination, planning and analyses, and flexible decision making for a civilian CFSP require some of the proposals made by the institutionalist arguments discussed above. A new CFSP-body with enhanced decision-making power and relative autonomy to act within a clearly established strategy is necessary. This strategy has to be decided upon in an intergovernmental way by the governments - everything else, for example a supranationalization, is not realistic, as a "common" foreign and security policy proved not to be agreeable upon. The socio-economic approach towards a civil CFSP takes into account the divergent national interests of EU-members in the military-defense area, by proposing a strategy which does not structurally interfere with these differences as does the military-strategic approach. Respecting national divergencies on the military-defense side and existing organizations also makes the socio-economic concept more realistic in terms of its chances for implementation than the proposals for a militarization of CFSP. Furthermore, it serves the "last but not least" security challenge mentioned above. It fosters EU-internal cohesion by providing a common

42 I would like to thank Andrew Moravcsik for suggesting this argument.
43 "Sometimes the language of politics can run ahead of the realities, and if the idea of a "Common Foreign and Security Policy" is taken too literally, the members of the European Community may well come to regret killing the dull but accurate title of "Political Co-operation"", Hill, p. 124.
European interest and strategy and does not rely on policy-realms in which differences remain fundamental, as in the area of traditional foreign and defense policy.

Avoiding EU-internal tensions in foreign and security policy issues is an important task for CFSP, not only due to deeper economic integration but also because of the radical changes in the international system since 1989: With the demise of the Soviet Union the external impetus for integration ceased to exist. The disappearance of the "threat to unite against"44 increased the probability of national divergencies among EU-members. These could be prevented by internal concertation through a CFSP which aims at identifying common interests and means instead of duplicating existing organizations and playing with sovereignty-intense issues like military policy. To those preoccupied with a potential German "hegemony", leaving NATO as the only central defense institution represents a better means to embed Germany than would a purely European defense alliance. In addition, divergencies between European NATO members and the US inside NATO seem a much more tolerable problem, than tensions among European members of a purely European military organization.

Possible EU-internal functions of CFSP also lead to a reconsideration of the "dwarf"-argument, which holds that with the deepening of economic integration EU's international role as an "economic giant but political dwarf in foreign policy and security matters" became more accentuated and was perceived as less bearable.45 As argued above, there is no automatic need for a major economic actor to become a major military-security actor, if necessary security functions are accomplished by existing institutions. This is true for EU-external actions because of the existence of NATO, WEU, and national forces. But there is another argument for a link between the deepening of economic integration and the strengthening of foreign and security cooperation: The merger of economic policies with the single market and the monetary union ties the member countries closer to

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45 This argument was for example stated by the "CFSP-commissioner" Hans van den Broek, asking the IGC 1996 to define "if Europe's political influence in the world is to match its economic power", in: Agence Europe, No. 6342, 22 October 1994.
each other and thus makes them more dependent on smoothly functioning cooperative links. The EU became more vulnerable to disputes among members over different attitudes towards EU-external problems. Since the integrative costs of political tensions rise, it becomes more important to prevent negative spill-overs from other policy areas into the economic realm. Coordinating policy is the sovereignty-loaded and national interest-focused foreign and security field becomes more necessary.

Considering the growing awareness of divergent national interests regarding the monetary union and trade matters leads to a second potential internal function of CFSP. Besides preventing foreign and security policies from affecting the economic integration negatively, a closer CFSP-cooperation could stimulate a greater sense of political unity and could spill-over positively into other areas. This twofold internal function of CFSP - preventing costs of tensions and stimulating union - is best achieved if CFSP (1) concentrates on the definition of common interests and strategies, (2) operates where real challenges exist and new policy-instruments are needed, and (3) does not depend on sovereignty-transfer in the military-strategic field, which would increase the possibility for tensions and disputes.

A civilian CFSP is also more plausible than a military-strategic policy because it builds on the values and traditions of European integration in the last four decades. It follows the functionalist logic of much of EC/EU’s achievements as it is directed at issues that require improved political tools (stabilization of neighbours) and it follows the path of decade-long socio-economic integration in Western Europe. In contrast, attempts to form a political union encompassing defense have failed ever since the European Defense Community in the early fifties. Regarding its driving political values, European integration has been guided by the idea of achieving economic development and creating a "security community" through the deepening of international ties as well as the strengthening and the management of international interdependence. Projecting these concepts to neighbouring countries provides the values any political order needs to

46 Morgan, p. 418.
reach consensus - also a continent-wide European security order. Military capabilities and institutional duplication have not been part of the guiding concepts of European integration.

VII. Conclusion: Towards a Necessary, Viable and Adequate CFSP

Looking at the actual CFSP, the proposals for its reform, and its potential future activities, this paper focused on three questions. Which kind of CFSP is necessary considering existing institutions? Which concept is viable regarding member-state interests? Which form is adequate to meet actual security challenges? The argument developed here is that present policy and proposals do not fully satisfy the criteria of necessity, of viability and of adequacy. They are instead best met with a civil socio-economic approach to foreign and security policy which could build upon existing instruments, experience and consensus.

Necessity. Considering the strong performance of NATO in recent years, the continuing political leadership and military presence of the United States in Europe and the capabilities of other organizations like OSCE, UN, and WEU, a military-strategic approach towards CFSP seems superfluous. The main effect of an EU-NATO would be the exclusion of the US and thus a higher probability of transatlantic tensions potentially damaging European security instead of improving it. As institutions form members expectations and attitudes, a continuing effort to coordinate policies between the US and the EU inside a common institution provides a mechanism to handle tensions. In order to ensure that if the need arises, Europe could deploy troops available for activities without the US, strengthening the European pillar inside NATO makes more sense than a duplication of NATO.

Viability. As two of the three "big players" in the EU (Britain and France) and some "small players" are not willing to transfer sovereignty-rights in foreign and security policy - much less in military matters - to any kind of common European mechanism, a CFSP along traditional defense policy lines is not realistic. Therefore military-institutionalist proposals that envisage a community-approach towards a Europeanization of traditional
foreign and security policy are not viable. Instead a civil and socio-economic approach to CFSP is viable because it (1) reflects the character of the Union as an organization promoting stability and wealth through the management of interdependence, because it (2) affects policy-areas in which member states traditionally agree to pursue common activities, and because it (3) is already practiced in a fragmented way by the Commission and the Council.

Adequacy. To make sense, a Common Foreign and Security Policy has to be able to meet the actual security challenges Europe faces today. As these problems are not military in nature, an enhanced military capacity of the EU and an institutional deepening of traditional security means are not adequate. Instead a civil socio-economic approach would be the most effective policy to stabilize the neighbouring countries economically and politically, and thus to enhance EU's own security and promote its economic interests as well as democracy, the rule of law and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Operating along these lines, the European Union has the best chances to become a more important global player. It would concentrate on its strengths instead of duplicating existing and functioning organizations. Its members could agree on such policies but not on others. Most important, it would meet the challenges the post-cold war world faces instead of sticking to inadequate parameters and instruments. If the widespread observation proves to be true, that today's international system is shaped more by economic logic than by military capabilities, then a powerful international role is best attained by the economic means, experience and consensus represented by the European Union. When socio-economic and political instability is the main threat to security, the traditional notion of defense changes: Military power becomes an instrument of last resort and socio-economic policy becomes the first priority.
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