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Ties That Bind?
The Parapublic Underpinnings
of Franco-German Relations
as Construction of International Value

by

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Abstract

Beneath the relations among states, and distinct from the exchanges of an autonomous regional or global civil society, there is another set of international practices which is neither public nor private but parapublic. The Franco-German parapublic underpinnings consist of publicly funded youth and educational exchanges, some two thousand city and regional partnerships, a host of institutes and associations concerned with Franco-German matters, and various other parapublic elements. This institutional reality provides resources, socializes the participants of its programs, and generates social meaning. Simultaneously, parapublic activity faces severe limits. In this paper I clarify the concept of “parapublic underpinnings” of international relations and flesh out their characteristics for the relationship between France and Germany. I then evaluate the effects and limits of this type of activity, and relate this paper’s findings and arguments to recent research on transnationalism, Europeanization, and denationalization.
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The relationship between France and Germany consists of much more than the relations between two states. It also comprises connections among the French and the Germans. The governments of the neighboring states have promoted and facilitated these contacts, but they have evolved into something more. “Beyond public relations,” then German ambassador in Paris Axel Herbst insisted, “we have knitted a net of human ties through the multitude of Franco-German city partnerships. These ties are more than a mere addendum to the official relations; they give official relations, like the solid fundaments of a house, robustness and endurance.”1 Newspaper editor Günther Nonnenmacher holds that such partnerships, along with numerous other Franco-German exchanges and related practices, constitute the “weaving of a lining (Unterfutter) that has become increasingly sturdy (reißfest)” and that undergirds “the cooperation in the ‘big’ questions.”2 Similarly, Alfred Grosser, dean of Franco-German analysis, spoke as early as 1965 about “the human infrastructure of the present political relationship.”3 “This friendship,” Jacques Delors and Karl Lamers assert at the end of the century with a sense of achievement, “goes beyond the political power centers in government and administration. It blossoms among our contemporaries through youth exchanges, city partnerships, and through a certain awareness of a common destiny.”4

Franco-German reconciliation after World War II was crucial for European postwar politics–“the cornerstone of all subsequent history,” as American observer Julius Friend categorically formulates.5 Accordingly, scholars of various intellectual orientations have paid much attention to the political relations between France and Germany, as well as to Franco-German societal and economic affairs over the past half century.6

However, beneath the relations between the French and German states, and separate from French and German societal interaction, there is a Franco-German institutional reality that is neither strictly public nor properly private; it is “parapublic.” It underpins the intergovernmental relations between the two states. Parapublic underpinnings are reiterated interactions across borders by individuals or collective actors. Such interaction is not public-intergovernmental, because those involved in it do not relate to each other as representatives of their states or state-entities. Yet, these contacts are also not private, because the interaction is to a significant or decisive degree publicly funded, organized, or co-organized. This is not interpenetration among different autonomous societies. Para-

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1 Herbst 1978. All translations from French and German into English in this article are my own.
4 Delors and Lamers 1998. References to what I call parapublic underpinnings, in the Franco-German case, often come with terms such as the (social) glue, fabric, tissue, or cement of Franco-German relations. See, for example, Brigouleix 1987.
5 Friend 1991, XIX.
6 Work on Franco-German relations includes all aspects of Franco-German political bilateralism; a body of literature properly termed “France and Germany in Europe”; as well as studies on the history of Franco-German affairs and of common French and German history. Comprehensive standard works on post-War Franco-German affairs include Cole 2001; Friend 1991; Gordon 1995; Haglund 1991; Leimbacher 1992; Simonian 1985; Soutou 1996; Ziebura 1997. Works on “France and Germany in Europe” include Calleo 1993; Calleo and Staal 1998; CIRAC et al. 1995; Hendriks and Morgan 2001; Kolboom and Weisenfeld 1993; Mazucelli 1997; Picht and Wessels 1990; Webber 1999. For a study of Franco-German bilateralism within European multilateralism, see especially Lequesne 1990. For private Franco-German economic and societal interchange, see Boche 1993; Froment-Maurice 1997; Lasserre 1988; Leblond 1997; Puchala 1970; Trouille 1999. For a historical study of differences and rapprochement between the French and the German societies since 1880, see Kaelble 1991. Among the enormous amount of writing on the history of Franco-German affairs and common French and German history are Binoche 1996; Grosser 1986; Jurt 1993; Poidevin and Bariéty 1977; Werner 1983; Wilkens 1990. In addition to investigations of Franco-German relations themselves, there is a very broad range of comparative studies on all aspects of French and German histories, economies, political systems, political cultures and so forth.
public underpinnings are a distinct type of international activity. To the systematic exploration of this structural aspect of the European polity, and to its relevance for broader conceptual and theoretical concerns in political analysis, researchers have paid little attention.

With its conceptual argument and empirical analysis, this paper particularly speaks to recent research on transnationalism, Europeanization, and denationalization. Regarding the new literature on transnationalism, its findings reveal a third type of international activity with characteristic types of effects and limits – one which properly belongs neither to the state world nor to the society world. In relation to the growing research on Europeanization, this paper draws attention to a kind of intra-European processes which are not linked to the EU frame of integration and which take place outside of it. Whereas parapublic processes make Europeans more European, the findings here do not suggest that such activity would imply a fundamental transformation of domestic political structures or pave the way toward an amalgamated European collective identity to replace individuals’ sense of national belonging. Finally, with respect to the contemporary work on societal globalization and denationalization, this paper documents a specific kind of particularly dense transborder interaction. These interactions, however, do not seem to eradicate the relevance of national borders for collective belonging, to lead to the contestation of the domestic French and German compacts, or to merge French and Germans into a regional civil society. Instead, this intensive transborder interchange seems to co-exist or even go hand in hand with domestic resilience.

The parapublic underpinnings of Franco-German relations consist of three main pillars: massive youth and educational exchanges, with the Franco-German Youth Office at their core, involving some five million participants; some two thousand “twinships” or “partnerships” between French and German cities and towns as well as other regional entities such as districts, régions, and Länder; and a host of institutes and associations in one way or another concerned with Franco-German matters and committed to Franco-German ends. Along with these three main staples, there are a variety of additional parapublic entities that include the Franco-German cultural TV channel ARTE and a multitude of prizes accorded for advancing or contributing to Franco-German affairs. This range of diverse parapublic underpinnings constitutes an important aspect of the institutional reality of Franco-German ties.

The public funding or organization of international parapublic activity typically comes with the institutionalization of social purpose. For example, the Franco-German cultural TV channel

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7 For a concept capturing a set of related domestic phenomena, (domestic) “parapublic institutions” that “bridge the gap between the public and private” while operating “largely outside of the limelight of public attention,” see Katzenstein 1987, 58-80. Quotes from 58 and 80.
8 Advocating a Deutschian-transactionist perspective, Hans Manfred Bock in particular laments the relative dearth of studies that explicitly connect empirical Franco-German research to general theoretical developments in political science. Bock 1989.
9 In private cross-border interaction (“transnationalism”), individuals or collective societal actors do not relate to one another as official representatives of their states or state-units, nor is their interaction substantially publicly funded or organized. In the Franco-German case, such private cross-border interaction includes the Franco-German chambers of commerce, the tourism between France and Germany, and other societal interaction between French and Germans. See, for example, Leblond 1997, 253; Puchala 1970; Stabreit 1997, 5.
10 ARTE abbreviates Association Relative à la Télévision Européene.
11 For a detailed late-1980s overview of much of what I subsume under “parapublic underpinnings,” see the almost 1,000-page edition on the “daily reality of Franco-German exchanges,” Oberlin 1988. For both an update and a complement, see the “roads to friendship – address book of Franco-German cooperation,” jointly edited by the French and German foreign ministries. Auswärtiges Amt and Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Paris 1996. For reviews of Franco-German cooperation at the time, including parapublic underpinnings, see the respective reports of the coordinators of Franco-German affairs at the two states’ foreign ministries, Barzel 1988; Hamon and Ahlers 1970; Lapié and Schmid 1973; Lenz and Wex 1983. For a historically informed overviews of several public and parapublic features of Franco-German relations, see Schmid 1988; Vaillant 1988.
ARTE presents world news and weather from a “Franco-German” perspective. Publicly funded or publicly organized youth activities across borders virtually always embody social meaning and purpose. Parapublic underpinnings of inter-state relations are normatively charged. Elements of systemic social structure, they institutionalize signification and purpose in the international realm. The parapublic underpinnings of the relations between France and Germany have helped to define a particular Franco-German meaning and social purpose. These parapublic underpinnings are part of a bilateral institutional order; and they are part of an evolving European regional polity.

Specifically, parapublic underpinnings have at least three kinds of partially overlapping effects. First, they provide resources, as is the case here, for Franco-German undertakings most broadly conceived. They thereby instigate effort and direct energy. Second, they cultivate and socialize their participants. They thus produce and reproduce a certain kind of personnel who will later staff public offices. These people will practice and represent interstate relations. Third, they generate and perpetuate social meaning and purpose, that is, they construct international value. They help to shape normalities, define legitimate ends, and contribute to the formation of the rudiments of international collective identity. They help to make some parts of the world hang together.

At the same time, the parapublic underpinnings of the Franco-German relationship analyzed in this paper face severe limits. To begin with, their impact is very indirect. Effects do not emerge mechanically and are not altogether assured. Second, they have not brought about a cross-border Franco-German public sphere. Third, they have done little to tear down the “cultural wall” that often separates the French and Germans, and which makes the French and German domestic social compacts in many respects deeply dissimilar. Finally, they have had very little effect on how the French and Germans think of themselves as social collectivities and of their roles in the world.

“Actors create structures which take on a life of their own and in turn shape subsequent action,” political scientist Martha Finnemore stresses.12 Individuals, groups, or governmental entities have differed from one another in their specific reasons for instituting Franco-German parapublic entities. But they shared at least one of two motives: either they wanted to contribute to the reconciliation between French and Germans, and France and Germany; or, later, they endeavored to secure Franco-German connectedness or friendship.

For some fifteen years immediately following the end of World War II, the idea of reconciliation, the Versöhnungsgedanke, lay at the heart of the initiation and the subsequent growth of parapublic Franco-German interaction. After centuries of war between French and German political entities, and after some eighty years of “hereditary enmity” between France and Germany between 1871 and 1945, the various components of parapublic institutionalization aimed at bringing the French and Germans closer together, outside of purely public administrative and political work. The Elysée Treaty of January 1963 concluded and “crowned” this reconciliation phase, now commonly dated 1945-1963.13

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12 Finnemore 1996, 30. See also Pierson forthcoming, especially chapters 4 and 5.
13 As French Foreign Minister at the time, Treaty co-signatory Couve de Murville explicated. de Murville 1988, 174. The treaty is commonly referred to as “Elysée Treaty” because it was signed in the salon Murat of the Elysée Palace, the seat of the French president in Paris. Its full official names are Traité entre la République fédérale d’Allemagne et la République française sur la coopération germano-française and Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik über die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit. The full Treaty text is reprinted, for example, in Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 136-145 and Méraudier 1993b, 85-89. President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer honor this reconciliation motive in their brief “Common Declaration,” with which they introduce the Elysée Treaty. There they stress their “conviction” that the reconciliation between the French and German peoples that “ends a centuries old rivalry constitutes a historic event that fundamentally redefines the relationship between the two peoples with one another.” Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 136-137.
At the same time the Elysée Treaty also opened and decisively shaped a historical con-
juncture in which observers from within and outside the two countries came to commonly consider
France and Germany “partners and friends” – as a multitude of terms such as “couple,” “tandem,”
and “pair” suggest. In the course of the 1960s France and Germany broadened and strengthened
the net of their parapublic ties. Publicly funded or co-organized youth, student, and other types of
cross-Rhinish exchanges expanded drastically. The number of town partnerships rose sharply. Other
parapublic elements were extended, and yet others added. The leading motive behind strengthening
this parapublic web at that time was to cement Franco-German connectedness and friendship – to
safeguard reconciliation and to develop proximity.

However, once in place, these parapublic underpinnings have developed lives of their own. Recurrent and evolving processes of interaction, these practices were emancipated from the
continued fostering of their founders and from their original reasons and driving motives. Their con-
tinued practice not only expresses, but also creates and reproduces signification and institutionalized
purpose. As these practices adapt over time, typically incrementally, the social meaning and purpose
which they embody becomes autonomous. The Franco-German parapublic underpinnings have be-
come an independent structural element of the European polity.

With reconciliation achieved, the heroic Versöhnungs-motive that initially propelled the insti-
tution of many Franco-German parapublic underpinnings has faded. And in spite of the many ups
and downs in Franco-German relations that followed the Elysée Treaty, many analysts and policy-
makers have considered France and Germany to be tightly linked with a supposedly “special” or
“singular” relationship during the second half of the twentieth century. But the apparent achievement
of the objectives that propelled their initial institution has not eliminated the various Franco-German
parapublic elements. Although their original mission has apparently been completed, they linger and
evolve. These parapublic underpinnings have outlasted the original motives for their establishment;
they have taken on a life of their own; and, in multiple ways, they continue to contribute resources,
persons, and social meaning and purpose to Franco-German relations. They construct international
value.

In sum, this paper advances three arguments. First, parapublic underpinnings, neither public-
intergovernmental nor private-societal, are a distinct category of international activity. This set of
practices is neither interaction among states or governments, nor does it truly belong to a regional or
global civil society of autonomous private actors, individual or collective. These practices underpin
relations among specific states. They complement social structures that characterize international
systems or, as in this case, regional subsystems. Second, French and German parapublic underpin-
nings consist of three pillars and assorted additional parapublic elements. Together they undergird
the “special” relationship between France and Germany in the second half of the twentieth century.
Third, parapublic underpinnings construct and perpetuate value. They engender and sustain meaning
and social purpose. They are not neutral. They are not value-free.

In this article I analyze parapublic underpinnings as constituents of an international institu-
tional structure, flesh out their characteristics for the relationship between France and Germany, and
discuss their effects and limits. The subsequent three sections order and empirically substantiate the

14 The Elysée Treaty lubricated the expansion of the Franco-German parapublic web, although the Treaty itself
largely concerns the public relations between the French and German states. Only Section C of the Treaty’s
second main part directly refers to what I term parapublic underpinnings. This section defines Franco-German
cooperation in the areas of education and youth affairs; it posits that France and Germany will aim at im-
proving the study of the respective other language and that Franco-German scientific exchanges will be intensi-
fied; and it announces the creation of a Franco-German youth organization in order to “strengthen the existing
ties between young French and Germans and to increase their mutual understanding.” Dokumente, Docu-
ments, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 142-143. On this legal base, the French and
German foreign ministers founded the Franco-German Youth Office in July of the same year.
three main pillars of the Franco-German parapublic underpinnings in turn. Section Four reviews some of the additional Franco-German parapublic components. Section Five discusses the effects that these parapublic underpinnings exert and examines their limits and unfulfilled ambitions. Section six connects this paper’s conceptual argument and empirical findings to the research on transnationalism, Europeanization, and denationalization.15

Greatest Mass Migration Ever: Youth Exchanges

“To give viable content” to the Franco-German friendship “shall particularly be the task of youth,” Charles de Gaulle announced in his speech to German youth in Ludwigsburg on 9 September 1962.16 From the early 1960s on, France and Germany have organized youth exchanges on an unprecedented scale. The Franco-German Youth Office (OFAJ / DFJW) occupies the central position within the parapublicly organized exchanges between France and Germany. It is complemented by other programs organizing or facilitating exchanges among young people, students, apprentices, and others. “The Franco-German Youth Office has developed the most intensive exchange among young people that has ever existed between two countries. Between 1963 and 1997 more than five million young people participated in more than 150,000 programs”17 – “the greatest mass migration of people of all time.”18 Massive exchanges of young people constitute the first pillar of the parapublic underpinnings of Franco-German relations.

Of the numerous organizations that grew out of the processes instituted by the Elysée Treaty – including the Franco-German Brigade, ARTE, and the Franco-German University, to name but three – the Franco-German Youth Office bears the honorable superlative of being the first.19 Following the provisions of the Elysée Treaty, the two Foreign Ministers Maurice Couve de Murville and Gerhard Schröder signed the foundational act of the Franco-German Youth Office during the first Franco-German summit consultations in Bonn in July 1963.20

Concretizing the prior stipulations of the Franco-German Treaty, the German ministerial cabinet assigned a sum of twenty million deutsche marks per year to the work of the DFJW. As a participant in the first Franco-German consultations reported, French President de Gaulle was disappointed, because he had hoped that a higher amount would be contributed to the new organization’s work. Adenauer interjected that the German cabinet decision might also be interpreted as a requirement that France and Germany each contribute twenty million deutsche marks (then fifty million French francs) per year. With a focus on youth exchanges, conferences, and reciprocal language training, the DFJW / OFAJ began its work with a yearly grant of forty million deutsche marks in the summer of 1963, after initiating its work with corresponding offices in Bonn in July 1963 and Paris in October of the same year.21 In the first years after its founding, up to 300,000 young French and German people participated each year in activities sponsored by the OFAJ / DFJW.22

15 Aiming to capture content and meaning of social affairs, this article’s outlook is broadly in line with the social constructivist-institutionalist tradition of political analysis. Works outlining this general perspective on social phenomena include Jepperson 1991; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; March and Olsen 1984; March and Olsen 1989; Ruggie 1998a; Wendt 1995; Wendt 1999. For this perspective’s theoretical roots and philosophical underpinnings, see Berger and Luckmann 1966; Ruggie 1998c; Searle 1995.
16 de Gaulle 1970, 16.
17 Ecker-Ertle 1998, 125.
18 Oberlin 1988, 275.
22 Friend 1991, 42.
The history and achievements of the Franco-German Youth Office have generally been described as an unqualified success. Francis Bellanger, president of the OFAJ / DFJW, stresses the Youth Office’s emphasis on high quality linguistic and pedagogic programs. For more than thirty-five years, the Youth Office has organized and sponsored exchanges among schools and universities as well as among athletes, artisans, and unemployed young French and Germans. Sixty-nine percent of the participants have been high school students, 21 percent apprentices and young professionals, 8 percent university students, and 2 percent unemployed.

“The only programs pushed are those that can be undertaken with a partner institution,” Friend remarks after some three decades of OFAJ / DFJW work, stressing that “this is not bus tourism. The cultural events are among the most interesting: choral groups, joint theater groups, and artists’ workshops. Most of these get-togethers last two weeks. Intercultural acquaintance is supposed to quell prejudice and provide the basis for common identity.” The OFAJ / DFJW is based upon de Gaulle and Adenauer’s conviction that young people could contribute to generating lasting relations between the two countries. Around the core pillar of the Franco-German Youth Office grew a host of exchange programs of wide-ranging kinds. Many relate to the twinships between French and German towns, to be looked at below.

Much Franco-German educational interchange involves universities and other institutions of learning in the two countries. Exchange programs between French and German universities have steadily grown since the 1960s. By 1988, there were 150 integrated study programs between France and Germany and 124 partnerships between French and German universities.

During the forty-eighth Franco-German summit consultations in Frankfurt on 27-28 October 1986, France and Germany decided upon the foundation of a Deutsch-Französisches Hochschulkolleg / Collège Franco-Allemand pour l’Enseignement Supérieur (DFHK / CFAES). The Kolleg’s foundation was formalized with an exchange of notes between the French and German foreign ministers on 12 November 1987. It began its work at the end of January 1988. The DFHK / CFAS is designed to increase mobility among university students and professors between France and Germany, and to deepen the relations between French and German universities through the coordination of already existing programs and exchanges. Already by 1992, the Kolleg had helped to organize forty integrated study programs between French and German universities, offering slots for more than six hundred students across all disciplines and subjects.

Among the many other instances of Franco-German parapublic ties that involve youth exchanges is the foundation of a joint Franco-German university in Saarbrücken instituted at the seventy-second Franco-German summit in Potsdam in December 1998. Organizations such as the

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23 Bellanger 1996, 47.
24 Leblond 1997, 245.
26 Morizet 1993, 119. As the French General Consul in Stuttgart, Hugues Goisbault puts it with respect to the standing of the DFJW/OFAJ as well as other Franco-German programs at the turn of the century: “The product is good, the wrapping needs a bit of updating.” Quoted in Fritz 1999.
27 Numbers from Morizet 1988, 199.
28 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 89.
29 For a reprint of the note, see Deutsch-Französisches Hochschulkolleg/College Franco-Allemand pour l’Enseignement Supérieur 1992, 7-9.
30 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 97.
32 Ibid., 5. See the same publication for a full list of all universities involved in programs and exchanges.
33 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 December 1998, 2.
Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft also organize exchange programs among French and German apprentices and young professionals.34

**Town, City, Regional Couplings: Jumelages, Partnerschaften**

“Twinships” or “partnerships” between French and German towns, cities, and regional entities are the second pillar of Franco-German parapublic underpinnings. Initially instituted only between French and German towns and cities (Städtepartnerschaften), these partnerships were later extended to include links between départements and Landkreise as well as between régions or départements and Länder. By the 1990s the total number of such jumelages or Partnerschaften had grown to more than two thousand.35

The idea of advancing Franco-German reconciliation with such twinships stems from the late 1940s.36 The first Franco-German jumelage / Städtepartnerschaft was formed in September 1950, when the mayors of Montbéliard and Ludwigsburg agreed upon “exchanges” between their towns. The association was given an official framework twelve years later, with the expressed goal that “this friendship between a French and a German city may contribute to deepening the good relations between France and Germany.”37 Immediately following the two pioneers were the towns of Celle and Meudon, and Karlsruhe and Nancy. At the time of the signing of the Elysée Treaty in January 1963, there were already some 120 twinships between French and German towns and cities;38 after its conclusion, the number of new town partnerships rose to between thirty and eighty new connections per year.39 By the Treaty’s tenth anniversary there were already six hundred. The year 1981 saw the celebration of the 1000th Franco-German town twinship.40 By the second half of the 1990s, the number had risen to some two thousand, now supplemented by associations between French and German regional entities.41

Typically, associated French and German twin- or partner-towns are of approximately the same size. Usually there are additional reference points, such as similar social or economic backgrounds, historical parallels or historical connections. The towns may also experience similar challenges, such as comparable economic and socio-economic difficulties – for example, a dependence on decaying industries, as is the case in several partnerships between towns in the German Ruhr and Saar areas and French Lorraine.

Sometimes shared memories have sparked a partnership. The twinship between the coal mining towns Herne and Henin-Liétard, for example, was instigated by the joint memory of a catastrophe in 1906, when in the French industrial town some thousand miners were buried. In spite of the tense relations between France and Germany at the time, the city of Herne did not hesitate to send rescuers and specialists, equipped with technical machinery that was not available in France at

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35 For a list of twinships between French and German cities, towns, districts, régions, and Länder, see Auswärtiges Amt and Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Paris 1996, 129-210.
37 Quoted in ibid.
38 Santini 1993, 334.
39 For an exact listing, see Engelhardt 1978, 105.
40 Ibid.
the time. The common memory ushered in a Städtepartnerschaft between the two industrial towns fifty years later.\textsuperscript{42}

Heidelberg and Montpellier are another example. Both are old university towns with prestigious medical schools. They are about the same size, with a reputation of being particularly attractive cities, and academia and tourism shape the atmospheres of daily life in both municipalities. In February 1957 a meeting took place between the medical students and professors of both cities, with the mayors of both towns receiving the groups.\textsuperscript{43} The municipalities of Heidelberg and Montpellier followed their universities and instituted a city twinship in 1961 that would yield particularly rich exchanges and the presence of the other culture in the daily life of each.

The example of Heidelberg-Montpellier also illustrates how different parapublic bonds contribute to making some parts of the world hang together: aside from the manifold activities of the city twinships, including a Montpellier-Haus in Heidelberg and a Maison de Heidelberg in Montpellier, Heidelberg hosts an Institut Français, a French cultural institute sponsored as part of France’s cultural foreign policy. The two cities’ universities are connected with numerous exchange and cooperation programs, not least with blossoming summer and language programs. Heidelberg’s municipal administration estimates that about half of all ten- to twenty-year-old Heidelbergers have participated at least once in an exchange activity with Montpellier.\textsuperscript{44}

The activities and activity levels among partnerships range widely. Typically such activities include the exchange of high school students and the organization of joint sports activities, concerts, and other cultural exchanges. During the 1960s, exchanges between twin towns also began to include programs focusing on war veterans and former prisoners of war. Their characteristic slogans were “from enemies to friends,” or “prisoners into guests.” Reporting on the “daily life of the partnership” between Aachen and Reims, Peter Scholl-Latour provides an abstract of a twinship’s content:

After all – the enumeration is impressive: twelve high schools meet; singing choirs and ballet schools connect; Catholic women compete with members of the Protestant minority [in making contacts with their religious counterparts on the other side]. Reserve officers fraternize, as do short-hand radio operators, scouts, lawyers, hiking clubs, commerce associations, police officers, athletes, firemen, and stamp collectors. Former German and French prisoners of war have come together as well as cadets from both navies, even though the ports are far. The unions – DGB and Force Ouvrière – do not want to lag behind. The flying clubs of Aachen and Reims impress with show flights. Even the nudists jointly celebrate their nature cult.\textsuperscript{45}

Perhaps some of this activity appears trivial. Franco-German meetings over German beer and French wine (not to miss a few clichés) might appear vulgar to some spectators. But the point here is that such publicly funded or organized international parapublic activity embodies social meaning and serves an end: to anchor social value and purpose more broadly so that it may reflect and lend continuity to the relations among the states. It means something to the French and Germans, and that is all that matters.

Franco-German twinships comprise affiliations between the biggest French and German cities, such as the jumelages between Berlin and Paris, Hamburg and Marseille, and Cologne and Lille, as much as between a wide range of mid-sized cities with populations of some ten or hundred thousand. And there are many twinships between very small townships of a few thousand inhabitants. Typically, when entering one of these twinned towns, one finds a sign with a heading such as “municipality of Europe.” Below are the names and the emblems of the respective town’s

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\textsuperscript{42} See Azam 1998, 110.  
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{44} de l’Ain, de l’Ain, and Banoun 1996, 123.  
\textsuperscript{45} Scholl-Latour 1988, 124-125.
partner municipalities in other countries, where French and German connections far outnumber those with third countries. Frequently streets, squares, or plazas are named after the twin town, such as the Boulevard de Constance in Fontainebleau or the Montpellierbrücke and Montpellierplatz in Heidelberg. Driving through a small or very small French or German town, one often discovers in its center a street sign in the style of the respective other country pointing in the twin town’s geographic direction, presenting the twin’s name and indicating the numerical distance of a few hundred or a thousand kilometers.

Committed to an End: Institutes and Associations

A wide range of research and academic institutes, documentation centers, and associations, concerned in one way or another with Franco-German matters, constitutes the third pillar of the Franco-German relationship’s parapublic underpinnings. Henri Ménudier quite properly labels such institutions and associations “actors and mediators between France and Germany.”

In 1948, Carlo Schmid, Theodor Heuss, and Fritz Schenk founded the Franco-German Institute (Deutsch-Französisches Institut; DFI) in Ludwigsburg. Their guiding idea was that without a new intellectual base and new forms of dialogue, political cooperation would be impossible. They wanted the institute to encompass all domains of intellectual and public life in the two countries. In Heuss’s words, they wanted the institute to be “the quietly working power behind political endeavors.” The institute developed exchange programs for university students and young professionals, especially those training to serve in public offices. The DFI wanted to build “human infrastructure” for Franco-German affairs. The activities of the DFI, “in the area between society and politics,” have developed in several directions during the now more than fifty years of its existence. Its focus has remained on academic exchange and Franco-German interaction in public affairs. Since 1990 it houses the Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek, a principal center for documentation, information, and research on France and Franco-German matters.

The Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation (BILD), founded by the Jesuit priest Jean du Rivau in the summer of 1945, and its German twin, the Gesellschaft für übernationale Zusammenarbeit (GüZ), were among the first to work toward Franco-German reconciliation just after the Second World War. In light of the catastrophe that he had experienced, du Rivau wanted to contribute to mutual understanding and a more peaceful future, with the modestly formulated goal of “informing” French and Germans about each other. Very shortly after the War, he founded the publications Documents and Dokumente that became lasting forums for Franco-German exchange and, to some, central organs of Franco-German friendship. Du Rivau was among the first to bring German children to France so that they could learn about the lives of their neighbors. At his initiative in 1951,

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46 Ménudier 1993a, 299-336. See also Leblond 1997, 252-254. For more complete lists of such institutes and associations, see Auswärtiges Amt and Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Paris 1996; Oberlin 1988.
47 Kiersch 1993, 320.
48 Quoted in Bock 1998b, 200.
49 Kiersch 1993, 320, 321.
50 Bock 1998b, 193.
51 Kiersch 1993, 322-323. For a detailed history of the institute, its activities and goals, and its purpose within the net of institutionalization, see the contributions in Bock 1998a. See also Picht and Uterwedde 1998. On the broader issues of the parapublic underpinnings’ social purpose in a larger historical perspective, see Schmid 1988 (1949). Documents republished Carlo Schmid’s original text of 1949 at the occasion of the Franco-German Institute’s fortieth birthday in 1988. The equivalent of the DFI on the other side of the Rhine, founded in 1982 following the results of the thirty-seventh Franco-German summit meeting in Paris in 5-6 February 1981, is the Centre d’Information et de Recherches sur l’Allemagne Contemporaine (CIRAC). See Lasserre 1993; Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 65.
450 German children spent a month’s vacation with French families. In 1952 there were 900 children who stayed for two months; in 1953, 1,400. By 1964, BILD had arranged more than 10,000 family exchanges, 170 meetings among youth groups, 59 among political and union organizations, and many others.\textsuperscript{54} Joseph Rovan succeeded du Rivau as president of BILD. In the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, BILD and GüZ, in du Rivau’s spirit, continue to focus on youth exchanges, organizing meetings among French and German youth groups and organizing conferences and colloquia on Franco-German themes. 

Documents and Dokumente are in their sixth decade of publication.

The Federations of Franco-German Associations in France and Germany (FAFA; VDFG) are umbrella institutions for a wide collection of Franco-German associations, clubs, and unions in both France and Germany.\textsuperscript{55} They developed out of various sets of Franco-German connections and contacts after the Second World War, united in the goal of increasing Franco-German exchanges and improving Franco-German relations; they took on a formal structure in 1984.\textsuperscript{56} In the early 1990s, about two hundred associations from both countries participated in the FAFA / VDFG.\textsuperscript{57} The double organization advises about the creation of new city partnerships between the two countries, supports regional cooperation between France and Germany, promotes the teaching of the other language in each country, organizes seminars and colloquia as well as a yearly congress on issues concerning Franco-German matters, and publishes a magazine, \textit{actuel}, committed to Franco-German issues.\textsuperscript{58} The FAFA is designed to “support the development of existing associations and the creation of new ones,” as clarified in Article II of its statutes. Further, it aims at “deepening Franco-German cooperation.”\textsuperscript{59}

Aside from these institutes with their special focus on Franco-German matters, the German Goethe Institute and the French Instituts Français, among the two countries’ key instruments of foreign cultural policy, represent their respective cultures in the other country. In 1996, France sponsored nineteen French cultural institutes and cultural centers in Germany; and Germany seven Goethe institutes in France.\textsuperscript{60} The Goethe Institute and the Instituts Français are complemented by cultural institutes representing the corresponding city in many Franco-German town twinships, as well as the “Heinrich Heine House” in Paris.\textsuperscript{61} Finally, there are regional cultural representations, such as the Maison de Rhénanie-Palatinat in Dijon.\textsuperscript{62}

Another example of parapublic Franco-German interaction is the cooperation between the German Max-Planck Society and the French National Center for Scientific Research (Centre National

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 302-305. The director of the German Federal Press Office exclaimed in 1970, after having learned about du Rivau’s death: “There are two things that we will never forget about this man. The first is that at a time when everybody turned their backs and threw stones at us, he was the first who came to us. The second is that he who promoted for the first time in history a mass for a German chancellor in Notre-Dame-de-Paris.” See ibid., 304-305. The reference is to the mass in 1967 in Konrad Adenauer’s honor after the former chancellor had died.

\textsuperscript{55} Fédération des Associations Franco-Allemandes en France et en Allemagne, Vereinigung der Deutsch-Französischen Gesellschaften in Deutschland und Frankreich. See van Deenen and Koch 1993, 315. Such “associations” cover all aspects of social life, both private and public. For a list of many of them, whether or not FAFA / VDFG member, see Auswärtiges Amt and Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Paris 1996.

\textsuperscript{56} van Deenen and Koch 1993, 314-315.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 316.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 316-318.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 319.

\textsuperscript{60} Roche 1996, 222. See also Farçat 1993. For a history of the French and German cultural institutes in the respective other country and many details on this kind of Franco-German parapublic ties, see Znined-Brand 1999, 121-218. For a historical assessment of Franco-German cultural relations, see Picht 1981.

\textsuperscript{61} Leblond 1997, 252.

\textsuperscript{62} Hanimann 1999.
They formalized their joint activities in June 1981 with a treaty on the exchange of scientists and researchers and the organization of joint colloquia and conferences.\textsuperscript{63} A different kind of Franco-German parapublic scientific connection is the Franco-German Research Institute in the upper Alsacian town of Saint-Louis (ISL).\textsuperscript{64} The bi-national institute’s work, financed equally by the two states, is based upon a 1959 treaty between France and Germany.\textsuperscript{65} The ISL’s work focuses on basic defense technological research in the areas of ballistics, aerodynamics, electromagnetics, explosives, and laser technology.\textsuperscript{66} With its roughly five hundred French and German employees, about half of whom are scientists and engineers, it is the backbone of Franco-German scientific interaction in this area.\textsuperscript{67} The \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} stresses that it is considered “a singular example of lasting cooperation in defense research.”\textsuperscript{68} Detlef Puhl calls it a pacemaker of Franco-German cooperation.\textsuperscript{69}

The institutes and associations mentioned here far from exhaust the list of those committed to or concerned with Franco-German affairs. They represent many others including the \textit{Deutsch-Französische Forschungszentrum für Sozialwissenschaften (Centre Marc Bloch)} in Berlin, the \textit{Frankreich-Zentrum} at the University of Freiburg, and the German Historical Institute in Paris.\textsuperscript{70} In sum, massive youth exchanges, town and regional “twinships,” and an assortment of institutes and associations constitute the three pillars of Franco-German parapublic underpinnings. A variety of additional parapublic elements complements them.

\textbf{Other Parapublic Elements: Media Institutions and Prizes}

In addition to these three pillars, there are a variety of other threads that complete the web of the Franco-German relationship’s parapublic underpinnings. They comprise publicly supported Franco-German mass media institutions, most notably the Franco-German television channel ARTE. Other parapublic elements include a host of Franco-German prizes and Franco-German conferences on a wide range of topics under the tutelage of the coordinators for Franco-German cooperation.\textsuperscript{71}

At the fifty-second Franco-German summit on 3-4 November 1988 in Bonn, the French and German governments decided to establish a Franco-German cultural television channel that they would fund jointly.\textsuperscript{72} After the 59th summit of 21-22 May 1992 in La Rochelle, French and German governmental leaders announced that the Franco-German culture-channel ARTE would begin broadcasting on 30 May 1990.\textsuperscript{73} The event “opened a new stage in Franco-German cultural relations.”\textsuperscript{74} The “cultural channel” strives to show the cultural and artistic possibilities offered by television as a medium.\textsuperscript{75} It does so from a distinctly Franco-German angle. Article 2 of ARTE’s founding treaty states that the television channel should serve “the rapprochement among the peoples in Europe.” This publicly funded station presents both world news and weather, every evening, from a Franco-German perspective.

\textsuperscript{63} Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 66.
\textsuperscript{64} Krauth 1995. See also Kocs 1995, 80-81.
\textsuperscript{65} Krauth 1995, 76.
\textsuperscript{67} Krauth 1995, 76. See also Puhl 1989.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung}, 7 May 1984, 2.
\textsuperscript{69} Puhl 1989.
\textsuperscript{70} See, for example, Jeismann 1994; Sinz 1994; Veser 1995; von Weizsäcker 1994.
\textsuperscript{71} Kolboom 1987. For history and details, see there.
\textsuperscript{72} Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 98.
\textsuperscript{73} Ib., 116.
\textsuperscript{74} Wenger 1993, 257.
\textsuperscript{75} Ib., 258-261.
Aside from ARTE, a number of other press products constitute rudiments of the Franco-German public sphere. They include journals such as *Documents* and *Dokumente*, to which some have referred to as the central organs of Franco-German friendship. Other Franco-German media products include *La Tribune d’Allemagne*, a weekly review of the German press.76

A remarkable feature of the Franco-German parapublic fabric is a host of prizes awarded for contributions or achievements serving Franco-German cooperation, understanding, and friendship. They include, among others, the Adenauer-de Gaulle prize, the *Elsie-Kühn-Leitz-Preis*, a Franco-German translation prize, a Franco-German journalism prize, and the Robert Bosch Foundation *Frankreich-Preis / Prix Allemagne*.

Following a recommendation from the French and German Coordinators of Franco-German affairs, Foreign Ministers Genscher and Raimond founded with the exchange of notes the “de Gaulle-Adenauer prize at the Elysée Treaty’s 25th anniversary in January 1988.”77 The prize was to “honor special achievements” and “outstanding accomplishments” regarding Franco-German cooperation.78 The prize is to be awarded yearly to a French or German personality or institution. During the fifty-fourth Franco-German summit, France and Germany granted the accolade for the first time to the *Bureau International de Liaison de Documentation* in Paris and the *Gesellschaft für übernationale Zusammenarbeit* in Bonn, for their extraordinary achievements in Franco-German reconciliation and friendship.79 Chancellor Kohl spoke in honor of the two organizations in the presence of their representatives, Joseph Rovan and Franz Schoser.80

Further, there are two Franco-German translation prizes, the Gerard de Nerval Prize for translations from German to French, and the Paul Celan Prize for translations from French to German.81 These awards aim at supporting the spread of the other’s literature in one’s own country.82 A Franco-German journalism prize complements them. This honor, granted since 1983, is awarded for journalistic work on French, German, and Franco-German affairs in the two countries in the categories of television, radio, and printed press.83

Since 1986, the Federation of Franco-German Associations has awarded the *Elsie-Kühn-Leitz-Preis* for merits and achievements serving Franco-German affairs. Its recipients have included President of the European Parliament Pierre Pflimlin, Père Paul André, Peter Scholl-Latour, and Jacques Delors.84

Another very different Franco-German award is the Robert Bosch Foundation’s *Frankreich-Preis / Prix Allemagne*. The Foundation grants the prize to German school classes studying French and French school classes studying German for the planning and actualization of joint projects that serve the intensification of language learning, Franco-German affiliation, and mutual understanding.85

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76 The paper publishes select articles in French translation to make them accessible to a wider French audience. Compare for example the issue at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty. See *La Tribune d’Allemagne* 1988. On other mass media related to Franco-German affairs, see Leblond 1997, 252-253.
77 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1988, 85.
78 Ibid. See also Ménudier 1993b, 84.
79 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1989, 1037.
80 Ibid.
81 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1988, 88. The DVA Foundation in Stuttgart bi-annually grants another Franco-German translation prize, one each for a French and a German, for a translation project that bears relevance for an important present discussion in the neighbor country or of a work dealing with the Franco-German dialog. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 October 1998, 43.
Effects and Limits

What are the effects that parapublic underpinnings exert? What are their limits? The parapublic underpinnings of Franco-German relations have at least three kinds of partially overlapping effects. First, they provide resources for Franco-German matters most broadly conceived. Second, they cultivate and socialize their participants so as to produce and reproduce a specific type of personnel. Third, they generate and perpetuate social meaning and purpose. They construct international value. However, exactly the values that these parapublic underpinnings institutionalize make their limits salient.

First, in multiple ways, the varied elements of parapublic underpinnings provide resources and constitute forums for a diverse collection of activities concerning France and Germany and their relations. They instigate effort and channel energy for a very diverse set of Franco-German ends. They may, for example, provide their participants with language or social skills, with recognition and status, as well as with allocation of material resources.

Second, the parapublic fabric of Franco-German relations produces and reproduces personnel broadly committed to Franco-German ends. Through numerous programs and exchanges, it cultivates and socializes young people in particular into a web of signification and social purpose. This effect is not a coincidental by-product; it is fully intentional. Going back to Adenauer and de Gaulle’s plans to give Franco-German friendship a “viable content,” organizers of parapublic interaction are usually aware of the values and goals they purport.

Many of the activities organized or sponsored by Franco-German parapublic institutions have been aimed at a broad audience in both countries. However, many “multiplier programs (Multiplikatorenprogramme)” particularly target young people likely to assume so-called “multiplier positions” in their future careers – developing political, administrative, and private leaders, journalists, book traders, publishers, young artists, and personnel of museums, as well as those likely to take positions in European and international organizations.

Institutionalized relations among states have their staff. In manifold ways, the Franco-German relationship’s parapublic underpinnings have cultivated cohorts of such staff. Beginning with educational or training programs, these parapublic activities have immersed and socialized people in the framework of values and social purpose that they purport. For four decades, they have thus helped to generate a set of persons committed to Franco-German affairs.

For one, the presence of such groups of people reduces the likelihood of misunderstandings and information deficits. More importantly, however, such people are more likely to share the same frame of reference and assign similar values to the relations between the states for which they work. Finally, the cultivation of such personnel dampens the potentially disrupting effects that single changes in office, especially of particularly important positions, can have on the interstate relationship.

The success or efficacy rate of this parapublic effect is difficult to measure. The existence of persons in elevated positions on either side of the Rhine with experience in parapublic activity seems

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86 See, for example, Bellanger 1996; Meyer-Kalkus 1994.
88 Certain kinds of regularized working contacts among such persons, once they have arrived in administrative or political offices, may build upon and develop the parapublic base. On “regularized intergovernmentalism,” see Krotz 2002b.
89 Thus they contribute, as Olivier Pirotte put it, such that “the Franco-German dialogue transcends the succession of politicians that incarnate it.” Pirotte 1997, 10.
indicative of parapublic effects and legitimate parapublic effort. Evidence, however, typically remains anecdotal. Here is one such anecdote that illustrates how parapublic underpinnings undergird and feed institutionalized relations among states:

At a meeting between Federal Chancellor Kohl with French Prime Minister Cresson in January 1992, the latter explicated the reasons for her decision to move the ENA from Paris to Strasbourg, namely her objective to decentralize the French administration and to transfer important administrative units from Paris to the province, as well as her will to renew the ENA in order to make a European educational institution out of it and so to counteract the esprit de corps, the ‘enarchie’ of the ENA graduates, which she considered exaggerated. Chancellor Kohl reacted with humor. He understands the motives of Ms. Cresson very well. He too perceives the influence of the ENA as too strong. He himself, was ‘manipulated’ in the Chancellor’s Office at present from no less than five former German ENA students, who are his closest advisors.90

The third effect of the Franco-German parapublic web is the broadest and the most important one: Parapublic processes generate and perpetuate meaning and social purpose.91 Take the numerous Franco-German prizes as a case in point. It is clear that aims for which there are so many prizes must be “good.” Working toward Franco-German objectives, most broadly, means achievement. This is the purpose of a prize: the definition of a goal to be strived for. Accordingly, a prize means public acknowledgment for those who have done well in their efforts. Prizes define ends. Undermining or working against such good ends is “bad.” In the same vein, other parapublic elements, such as institutes and media with their value-charged agendas, often function as watchdogs for this frame of meaning and purpose. They are quick to point out difficulties, and they help to define what is success and what is failure, as well as what can be considered an achievement and what deserves criticism.

Parapublic underpinnings are geared to radiate into the public and intergovernmental sphere and to affect relations among states. The rhythm of the twinships with their regular exchanges across the Rhine, for example, seeks to “bring about that the heads of the state and the governments recognize the Franco-German friendship and make it one of the fundamental elements of their policies.”92

Parapublic underpinnings create and institutionalize significance and social purpose in relations among states in a number of ways. For example, they help shape perceptions of normality and baselines for normal expectations in inter-state affairs. Such socially constructed baselines of expectations may engender political pressures “to come up with something” or “with something new” in the public relations between the governments.

Further, they provide reasons to want and to do some things, and not to want and not to do others. They legitimize and make intuitive certain goals and actions; they delegitimize and make implausible others. They help to define ends that perpetuate and strengthen legitimate public goals. In the Franco-German case, they contribute to reproducing the Franco-German relationship as a legitimate goal and end in itself.

Finally, the signification and purpose that parapublic underpinnings breed are fragments of collective identity, however tenuous. Parapublic activity also delineates who belongs to whom. It thus contributes to forming rudiments of international collective identity.

90 Meyer-Kalkus 1994, 146, footnote 54. I thank Peter Katzenstein for bringing this anecdote to my attention.
91 In the sense that, for example, James March and Johan Olsen conceived of it. March and Olsen 1989, especially chapters 3 and 9. Similarly, see Jepperson 1991. On the same point with respect to Franco-German relations, see also Sverdrup 1994, 10.
92 Santini 1993, 334.
Via all of these pathways, parapublic underpinnings help to stabilize order in international affairs – understood not as the absence of conflict, but as regularization. They are social glue that supplements and temporally extends institutionalized meaning and purpose in the affairs among states. With the international value that it generates and reproduces, parapublic interaction contributes to the construction of a world with legitimate ends and proper goals.

At the same time, the Franco-German parapublic underpinnings reveal severe limitations if judged against the initial ambitions of their originators. To begin with, their impact is very indirect. Parapublic cultivation is gardening, not engineering. The harvest is not assured and never fully predictable.

Second, Franco-German parapublic interaction has not brought about a true international cross-border public sphere. At best, it has done so in a most rudimentary form. A few pockets usually involving various French and German elites notwithstanding, there is little of a Carolingian public sphere in which joint problems and differences in opinion would be commonly discussed. Just as there is no truly European society interacting in a Euro-wide public sphere, there is not a truly Franco-German one.93

Third, Franco-German parapublic activity has not succeeded in tearing down the “cultural wall” that separates French and Germans in many ways and that keeps them from “acting in concert” more fundamentally.94 The French and German domestic social compacts remain, in many respects, deeply dissimilar. The Franco-German parapublic underpinnings have done little to change that.95

Finally, while the parapublic underpinnings of the Franco-German relationship have developed into a structural element of European politics, French and Germans have remained deeply split in the ways they think of themselves as a collectivity and of their roles in the world.96 Notwithstanding tight Franco-German cooperation, basic French and German foreign policy orientations have continued to diverge fundamentally. France and Germany often deviate in their international goals and policies. Theirs is a close relationship between unlike collective personalities.

Paradoxically perhaps, the social value that they engender makes the characteristic limitations of the Franco-German parapublic underpinnings all the more salient. The parapublic underpinnings of Franco-German relations contribute to generating socially constructed baselines of expectations that the French and German states, both in their bilateral relations and in their policies in general, often fail to meet. With the social meaning and purpose that they promote and perpetuate, thus, they themselves also help to induce a frequent sense of disappointment or failure.97 These parapublic interaction patterns continue to remain efficacious. Simultaneously, difficulties, crises, and disappointments in the relations between France and Germany continue to persist.

The exact impact of the Franco-German parapublic underpinnings is difficult to measure. And yet, France and Germany attempt as much assessment as possible. A survey study prepared for the French general consulate, for example, estimates that the multiple exchanges have improved mutual knowledge and understanding as well as the image of one another’s respective countries.98 Other surveys over a period of years suggest that the French and Germans have a high opinion of and a

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93 Compare Cederman 2001b.
94 Kiersch 1993, 324. On the same issues, see further François-Poncet 1997, 17.
95 As former German President Richard von Weizsäcker suspects: “Perhaps, in the end, there is more friendship than understanding between our countries.” Quoted in Friend 1991, 43.
96 Krotz 2002a.
97 Compare Frisch 1993.
high degree of confidence in each other, a strong finding across age cohorts in both countries.\footnote{99} The Franco-German parapublic fabric has presumably contributed to such effects; simultaneously, stereotypes and clichés continue to blossom within each of the two countries.\footnote{100} Inconsistent with one another, both phenomena coexist in a social world, the components of which are often fairly decoupled.

**Transnationalism, Europeanization, Denationalization?**

This paper’s conceptual argument, empirical substance, and evaluation of parapublic effects and limits particularly speak to three distinct yet related literatures: on transnationalism, on Europeanization, and on denationalization through increased cross-border interactions in a seemingly globalizing world. What do we learn from this paper’s findings with respect to these recent bodies of research?

With respect to the new literature on transnational relations and global civil society, first and most importantly, this paper’s conceptual contribution and its empirical substantiation suggest that there is a third kind of international activity which is neither statal-public nor autonomous-private, and which does not properly belong to either category. Parapublic practices are non-public, non-intergovernmental international interchanges. At the same time, they are inadequately conceptualized as transnational links among citizens from different countries’ autonomous civil societies.

On the one hand, those individuals who carry out the activities of these parapublic underpinnings do not relate to one another as representatives of their respective states, nor are they subcontracted agents of their states. Parapublic interaction is also not transgovernmental, that is, networks of bureaucrats or coalitions among public officials in governmental sub-units who pursue their own agendas and act independently from, or even contrary to, national governments.\footnote{101}

On the other hand, however, parapublic activity is also not interaction among private citizens (however organized) of a more or less autonomous regional or global civil society. Those involved in parapublic interchange are not the types of (non-state) actors typically associated with transnational relations of the transborder society-world: multinational corporations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), epistemic communities, advocacy networks or other cross-border social movements, internationally operating religious groupings or organizations, or other loose coalitions among societal groups from different countries.\footnote{102} Finally, parapublic processes are not about trade, international production networks, migration, or tourism of the type focused on by recent studies on globalization.\footnote{103}

In short, there is a third type of international interaction with characteristic kinds of effects not adequately captured by state-centered or society-dominated perspectives on international affairs.\footnote{104} Separate from the international public practices of the “state world” and the transnational private activities of the “society world,” the parapublic underpinnings of international relations are a distinct kind of international practice.

\footnote{100} Stimac 1996.
\footnote{104} This holds true no matter whether statist and societist approaches are pinned against each other as competitive approaches or whether interstate affairs and transnational relations are presented as reciprocal and intertwined sets of different international processes. Risse 2002, 256; Risse-Kappen 1995b, 5, 14-16; Risse-Kappen 1995d, 280-284, 295. On INGO state-dependence, however, see Risse 2002, 260; Krasner 1995.
Parapublic underpinnings as a structural ensemble also differ from transnational relations in the way they affect international affairs. Transnational actors typically attempt “to influence policy outcomes and state behavior in specific instances in specific issue areas,” typically in specific and delimited time periods.\textsuperscript{105}

Parapublic processes and actors, on the other hand, rarely seek to directly influence state policy or endeavor to immediately bring about specific policy outcomes. Constructing international value in various ways, parapublic underpinnings affect international dealings more indirectly and in a more elongated fashion. Their effects are about diffusion and the slow permeation of meaning and people, rather than the mechanical production of specific decisions or outcomes. They are part of an international or regional systemic social structural context that helps to frame issues, that more generally and indirectly affects states’ interests and their external relations, and that helps to frame specific interstate relationships. Parapublic underpinnings are social processes that expand and operate on a more extended temporal plane.\textsuperscript{106}

Identifying distinct social processes with characteristic effects and limits, this paper’s findings also speak to the wave of recent work on various types of Europeanization. These diverse investigations on Europeanization can be distinguished according to the kinds of European(izing) causes and European(izing) effects on which they focus.

Regarding Europeanization’s driving forces, researchers have generally focused on the developments and processes on the European level within or tied to the EU frame as explanatory factors or independent variables of sorts.\textsuperscript{107} Regarding Europeanizing effects – that is, with respect to what Europeanizes (or not) or what is being Europeanized (or not) – researchers have focused especially on transformations (or non-transformations) in two large groups of empirical phenomena as outcomes or dependent variables: domestic structures broadly, and various kinds of European collective identities and forms of belonging.\textsuperscript{108}

Studies on the Europeanization of EU members’ national political configurations have focused on varied national political institutions; bureaucracies; political procedures and decision-making processes; state-society relations; subnational regional or federal arrangements; and policies in numerous issue areas.\textsuperscript{109} Another assortment of studies has investigated changes and non-changes in a variety of European and national collective understandings and spheres of belonging: political identities and communities among Europeans at the national or European level; prospects of a European demos; the national or “European sphere for public will and opinion formation”; regional civil society; and the Europeanization of European life at large.\textsuperscript{110}

With its focus on parapublic underpinnings, this paper centers on a set of European(izing) phenomena to which the growing Europeanization literature has paid only subsidiary attention. It highlights another layer of European processes and practices, outside and little connected to Europe’s EU integration. The set of parapublic activity identified here underpins the bilateral rela-


\textsuperscript{106} On different time frames and the social phenomena that they contain, see Braudel 1980; Koselleck 2000; Ruggie 1986; Ruggie 1989; Ruggie 1998b.

\textsuperscript{107} Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Dyson 2000; Goetz and Hix 2001; McAvan 2002; Mény, Muller, and Quermonne 1996; Olsen forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{108} For additional types of Europeanization, however, see Olsen forthcoming.


tions between France and Germany. This parapublic layer does have Europeanizing effects. These, however, pertain neither to the Europeanization of national public institutions, nor to the (potential) amalgamation of Europeans into a homogenizing European identity. The parapublic underpinnings scrutinized here relate to an additional and different kind of Europeanization.

The Franco-German parapublic processes indeed refer to “structures of meaning and people’s minds. … that give direction and meaning to common capabilities and capacities.” They also include “socializing institutions” that contribute to producing “a territorial identity and a cultural community with a sense of belonging, emotional attachment and shared codes of meaning.” But they do not seem to imply transformative effects on constitutive domestic structures.

The Franco-German parapublic experience of the past half century suggests that these practices, more than anything else, affect the meaning and purpose of the relationship between French and Germans as social collectivities and national compacts. Parapublic processes’ Europeanizing effects rest in the increased density of a certain type of transborder contact that constructs value and meaning among Europeans of different national origins.

However, there is nothing, at least in this paper’s findings, that would indicate that such a kind of Europeanization relates to the amalgamation of the French and German collectivities or is necessarily coterminous even with any kind of fundamental transformations within each of them or of these collectivities themselves. The parapublic processes documented here connect different units, national communities, without merging them, and without fundamentally transforming them. They do make Europeans more European, but without necessarily making them less national. This suggests that Europeanization and domestic resilience of national sentiment within the collectivities constituting Europe may be phenomena that will endure to unfold simultaneously.

A similar diagnosis applies to some recent writings on globalization and denationalization. Globalization “describes a process of transition towards one integrated global society and away from a cluster of merely internationalized societies.” The notion “refers to societal connectedness to the extent that societal borders lose importance or even dissolve.” One aspect of globalization is “societal denationalization” evolving through the “growing interconnectedness between societies.” “The condition of a society can be described as denationalized when transactions within national borders are no denser than transnational transactions.”

Whereas this paper documents dense transborder activity, its findings do not imply that the nature of the French and German communities would be contested, “as happens in the course of societal denationalization,” or that the distinction between the inside and the outside of national groupings would be called into question. The intensive Franco-German parapublic interactions have not undermined or denationalized the French and German domestic compacts. Nor have they generated a (Carolingian or other) postnational identity to compete with or replace French or German national sentiment.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it appears preposterous and ludicrous to many young French and Germans participating in Franco-German parapublic activity that, little more than

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111 Olsen forthcoming, 6-7 of paper draft.
112 Ibid., 12.
113 This finding seems to resonate with some recent quantitative findings on attitudes toward Europe, European identity, and intensity of national sentiment among Europeans. Compare Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1995.
114 For example, Beisheim et al. 1999; Held et al. 1999; Zürn 1998; Zürn 2002.
116 Ibid., 237. See also Zürn 1998, 65-76.
five decades ago, it was common in both countries to refer to the relations between France and Germany as “hereditary enmity.” With their participation in parapublic interaction, these people reproduce an institutional legacy from the past century’s second half, established as a reaction to yet other layers of European history.

None of the parapublic effects or limits rule out change either in Franco-German relations at large or in their parapublic underpinnings themselves. However, they make it less likely that there will be a dramatic change in either one, and they reduce the likelihood of sudden ruptures in this area of European politics.\textsuperscript{118} Parapublic underpinnings, as social relations in general, change when the interaction patterns and the meaning that they incorporate are reproduced differently over time.\textsuperscript{119}

Instituting and grounding Franco-German parapublic underpinnings after World War II was the work of two generations of French and Germans. After the catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century, they believed that the future must not be a repetition of social patterns that lead to battlefields. Perhaps especially because parapublic processes are a semi-societal substrate of international relations, they remind us how changeable is the meaning with which humans encounter each other, and how dependent on institutional context. They also remind us of the tenuousness of the institutional stage on which apparently mundane, daily human experience takes place. A socially constructed institutional reality, the parapublic underpinnings of Franco-German relations are historically contingent patterns of interaction and meaning. Like other social structures, they are human-made. And they need to be re-made in order to endure. Unless reproduced, the meaning and social purpose that Franco-German parapublic practices institutionalize is bound to dissipate.

\textsuperscript{118} Compare Sverdrup 1994, 117-125.

\textsuperscript{119} In a very empirical way, this paper hints at a metatheoretical orientation that views agents and structures as mutually constitutive: The Franco-German parapublic underpinnings perpetuate meaning structures, which in turn reproduce the several parapublic elements themselves. For example, these parapublic underpinnings produce exactly the legitimate meaning that keeps parapublic funding in various federal and other budgets out of political debates. They so render their own continuation as a legitimate social purpose by procuring a normality that goes without saying by keeping it outside of politicking.
References


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