Antonia A. Atanassova

Working Papers

"Managerial Discretion and Corporate Philanthropy: Field Experiments in the USA and Bulgaria"

(JOB MARKET PAPER)

Abstract: This paper presents and tests two alternative models of the economic motivations for corporate philanthropy. I contrast a managerial discretion model where managers follow personal preferences when making corporate giving decisions with a profit maximization model where managers use charitable donations as a means of increasing profits. These theories make distinct predictions that I test using field experiments in corporate fundraising campaigns. In my first experiment based on a U.S. corporate fundraising campaign, I find support for the managerial discretion model. Specifically, the response rate of corporate donors significantly increases when personal incentives are offered to corporate social responsibility (CSR) managers. This responsiveness to personal incentives decreases as shareholder control increases, indicating that monitoring and better corporate governance moderate the agency costs associated with corporate philanthropy. In a second fundraising experiment in Bulgaria, I present two treatments that allow for the assessment of the relative importance of managerial personal benefit and corporate profit enhancement; I find that both are significant motives for corporate giving.

“Corruption with the Public Distribution System in Karnataka, India," joint with Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan

Abstract: Many redistributive programs target the poor. Corruption, discrimination, poor information, and politics, however, can make targeting difficult. This paper examines misclassification in the context of the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) in Karnataka, India. The purpose of the TPDS is to allow families living below the poverty line (BPL) to purchase certain commodities (rice, wheat, sugar, and kerosene) at subsidized prices. The government issues a set of criteria that objectively qualify a family for a BPL card, which has to be presented at the time of purchase of the subsidized items. The BPL card allocation process involves surveying of each household by a government team followed by verification process by the Gram Panchayat (GP) – the local political elite. We conducted an independent survey in several districts of the state of Karnataka in order to obtain an independent measure of BPL eligibility and information on connectedness to the GP. We find that connectedness to the GP increases the probability that the household owns a BPL card, even after controlling for eligibility. This result points to corrupt practices by the local political elite in terms of misallocating BPL eligibility in exchange for political favors.

”The Right Incentives: Laboratory Experiments on Gender and Motivational Strategies in a Public Goods Setting”

Abstract: Some of the most important questions about the design of institutions and the organization of society involve the provision of public goods. This paper uses insights from psychology and the methodology of experimental economics to put forth and test a hypothesis aimed at expanding our understanding of what motivates contributing to public goods and how it is related to gender differences. I define the price of giving in a public goods game to be the amount foregone by contributing a unit of endowment, instead of keeping it, relative to the total amount received by the other people in the group as a result of the contribution. There are two different ways to decrease the price of giving: decreasing the amount foregone when contributing (“premium mechanism”) and increasing others’ revenue from a unit contributed (“matching mechanism”). Using data from a laboratory experiment, I find that men are more likely to contribute in a public goods game under a matching incentive scheme, while women are more likely to contribute under a premium incentive scheme. Furthermore, I describe the male and female demand curves for altruism and the shifts induced by the two incentive mechanisms.

Work in Progress

“Premium vs. Matching Incentive Schemes in the Context of Charitable Fundraising Campaigns”

“Recipient Expectations and Social Comparison in Charitable Giving,” joint with Daylian Cain

“Corruption with the Health Care System in Bulgaria”