As the Deng era approaches its end, concern abroad, particularly in East Asia, focuses on how the People's Republic of China (PRC) will cope with territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and India, and the continued quest for Taiwan. Meanwhile Chinese military modernization steadily increases the People's Liberation Army (PLA) air and sea power projection.(1) The question arises: might a beleaguered post-Deng leadership seek to strengthen its legitimacy through exploitation of Chinese nationalism and if so, how would this manifest itself in foreign relations?

Three types of nationalism may be distinguished in this regard: affirmative, assertive and aggressive. Affirmative nationalism centres exclusively on "us" as a positive in-group referent with pride in attributes and achievements. Assertive nationalism adds "them" as a negative out-group referent that challenges the in-group's interests and possibly its identity. Aggressive nationalism identifies a specific foreign enemy as a serious threat that requires action to defend vital interests. The concept of nationalism encounters academic controversy over "nation" as meaning "state" or "people."(2) However this problem is avoided by the use of both referents in PRC statements. "China," "motherland" and "the Chinese people" appear with random frequency in controlled media.(3) Consequently the emotive content is determined more by the context and subtext than by the specific term employed.

Nationalistic communications have different functional attributes. Affirmative nationalism fosters patriotism and targets attitude. Aggressive nationalism arouses anger and mobilizes behaviour. The implications for foreign policy are minimal in the first case but potentially major in the second. Assertive nationalism lies between the two, sharing attributes of each and tending towards either depending on its intensity. To the degree that it places greater emphasis on an external challenge and increases this over time, it may foreshadow aggressive nationalism.

Two domestic and three external causal factors are hypothesized to prompt nationalistic posture and policy. Factional politics impact when the more radical faction either dominates public media or privately forces a more moderate faction to adopt a more radical policy to protect its own position. Leadership instability impacts when ideological and political legitimacy are felt to be threatened, requiring a basic emotive appeal for unity and support. Foreign negotiations may call for a more assertive nationalistic posture as a bargaining tactic. External challenges, perceived or real, can threaten the leadership's definition of specific national interests. Finally, changes in the global power balance can be seen to threaten national survival.

These factors are not mutually exclusive. Domestic politics occur in a foreign policy environment with important feedback and interaction between the two sets of variables. A "worst case" combination of factors can induce a siege mentality, such as characterized PRC media pronouncements following the 4 June 1989 massacre. Domestic demonstrations challenged leadership legitimacy, Western criticism of their forceful suppression placed China in a pariah status, and erosion of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union seemed to threaten its survival in Asia. Intense affirmative and assertive nationalism followed.

The concatenation of domestic and foreign factors may also cause a crisis in national identity, further spurring assertive nationalism. The concept of national identity varies widely, depending on the level of analysis and the academic discipline brought to bear on the subject.(4) For the purposes of this article national identity emerges in how the policy-making elite perceives and articulates the image of China in its relationship with the outside world.(5) The concern is with how nationalism impacts on Chinese foreign policy in its formulation and implementation. To avoid the tactical manipulation of assertive and aggressive nationalism, statements directed abroad are excluded from examination. This does not preclude mainland media being utilized for foreign as well as domestic audiences, as when an article is repeated for foreign consumption. Nevertheless the primary target audience remains domestic, not foreign, in contrast with PRC affiliated publications in Hong Kong, foreign language broadcasts, and overseas editions of mainland media.(6)

The focus of this article is the period 1989-94, five years of persistent domestic and external challenges to the PRC leadership. A litany of alleged threats, including "spiritual pollution," "peaceful evolution" and "bourgeois liberalization," blamed perceived or potential threats on "the West" in general and "U.S. imperialism" in particular. However, articulation of these charges varied widely over time and among the media despite recurring crises at home and abroad. Public expressions of affirmative and assertive nationalism peaked in 1989-91. Yet in 1992-93 provocative American actions elicited minimally assertive responses precisely when high military officials privately demanded a tougher stance and "leftist" opponents challenged dependence on the United States.

The linkage between foreign and domestic policy disputes encompassed Deng Xiaoping's basic programme. Because of this domestic politics factor, the role of nationalism must be examined chronologically as well as substantively because the course of contention between Deng and his "leftist" opponents fluctuated. Following this trend analysis, the conclusion will highlight those causal factors that pertain to monitoring the prospective role of assertive or aggressive nationalism in post-Deng China.

After Tiananmen: June 1989 to February 1991

Throughout the second half of 1989, mainland media reiterated Deng Xiaoping's explanation for the April-June crisis: "This storm was bound to come sooner or later. This was determined by the major international climate and China's own minor climate [guoji de da qihou he, Zhongguo ziji de xiao qihou]."(7) Emphasizing the external rather than the domestic factor justified an assertive nationalism directed against the foreign threat. This gave Deng's "leftist" opponents political ammunition for attacking the open door and dependence on the world economy. Renmin ribao evoked past themes of China's humiliation and reaffirmed self-reliance: "For a country to shake off foreign enslavement and become independent and self-reliant is the premise for its development.... Although China was a big country before the liberation, it was slavishly dependent on others and could only be bullied by them."(8) Recalling that "a sign stating 'Chinese and dogs forbidden to enter' was hung on a public park on Chinese soil" questioned self-esteem and national identity.

Patriotism (aiguozhuyi) won attention as corollary to self-reliance.(9) One author stated: "Patriotism is a glorious tradition and lofty virtue of the Chinese nation.... One important ideological basis for the ideological trend of bourgeois liberalization is national nihilism and national betrayal"(10) (emphasis added). He noted, "modern China saw patriotic intellectuals with the Chinese spirit, like Zhu Ziqing, who 'would rather die of starvation than receive relief grain from the United States'."(11)

Assertive nationalism characterized a special series in the PLA newspaper, Jiefangjun bao. Attributing China's past defeats to the "lack of vigilance" as well as inferior weapons, the writer concluded, "once people lose their sense of country, of national defence, and of nation, total collapse of the spirit will inevitably follow."(12) National identity suffers as the "spiritual infiltration of hostile forces" produces "a slavish 'conquered people'." Therefore "we should foster the most precious national spirit of the Chinese nation, resurrect the spirit of patriotism, revive the will to build the nation." Another article warned, "peaceful evolution" is even more vicious, wicked, and more conducive to infiltration and deception" than other imperialist strategies aimed at socialist countries.(13) In the 1989 crisis "some reactionary forces in the United States openly intervened" by supporting "illegal organizations" of students and workers. One writer stressed the danger of "ideological and cultural infiltration. ..through economic and trade contacts and cultural exchange."(14) The Jiefangjun bao series' final title admonished, "Beware the Glint and Flash of Cold Steel in the 'Halo of peace'."(15)

One year after Tiananmen a dual approach addressed the foreign and domestic challenges. In April Deng analysed the collapse of Communism in East Europe and Mikhail Gorbachev's "betrayal" in the Soviet Union: "Under the present international situation all enemy attention will be concentrated on China. They will use every pretext to cause trouble, to create difficulties and pressures for us....The next three to five years will be extremely difficult for our Party and our country."(16)

Rather than encourage dissidents by publicizing this prognosis, Deng's secret assessment remained. Publicly regime spokesmen ignored the Tiananmen anniversary by promoting patriotism through two other commemorations: the 1919 May 4th movement and the 150th anniversary of the Opium War. Affirmative nationalism accompanied assertive nationalism when Jiang Zemin addressed 3,000 youths on 3 May 1990 in the Great Hall of the People. On the one hand he reiterated the standard goal of "hostile forces at home and abroad to subvert the socialist system in China through 'peaceful evolution,' to turn China into a vassal state dependent on the Western superpowers."(17) On the other hand he emphasized, "the patriotism we advocate is by no means a parochial nationalism. The development and progress of China is inseparable from the achievement in civilization scored by every country in the world...[we] need to learn and assimilate the excellent achievements in the creation of civilization scored by the people of every country in the world, including those who live under the capitalist system" (emphasis added).

One month later a Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) symposium commemorated 3 June 1840 as "the first day of the burning of the drugs" in the Opium War.(18) Renmin ribao repeated the standard line on "peaceful evolution" but echoed Jiang's affirmation of the open door policy: "While we must hold high the banner of patriotism, we should not indiscriminately reject anything foreign and close our doors to the outside world. Yet while we must open to the outside world we should not yield to any pressure and advocate total Westernization."(19) Hu Sheng, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the CPPCC forum that the Yihetuan "had an anti-foreign colour because it was not waged under the leadership of an advanced class. Nevertheless the Chinese people have long passed the early childish struggle period and understood that anti-foreignism is not a way out."(20) This implicitly tarred alarmist warnings of "peaceful evolution" with the xenophobic brush. Hu confidently affirmed "patriotism" could "cement millions upon millions of suffering people into a force capable of overcoming all difficulties and defeating all enemies."

But control over the media remained in "leftist" hands, continuing the assertive line while accommodating the affirmative theme.(21) In spring 1990 a Ban yue tan lecture series on patriotism emphasized China's ability to withstand any threat but sharply targeted both superpowers. An affirmative article declared: "Standing tall and feeling proud and elated, the Chinese people have worked hard to turn a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country into a socialist state with the beginnings of prosperity...have won their dignity with their own ability and wisdom."(22)

However the foreign threat persisted. First, "the United States ...mustered forces almost simultaneously from three sides Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina...to 'strangle' independent China 'in its infancy'." Then, "in the late 1950s, the Soviet leaders...flagrantly interfered in China's construction programme so as to force it to agree with their model" by withdrawing experts, contracts and plans. Finally "following the '4 June' incident last year, some Western countries, led by the United States" imposed sanctions and interfered in internal affairs, but the "anti-China tide" was repulsed. Likewise Jiefangjun bao asserted: "Since [the Opium War] Western capitalism has never stopped its aggression against China and its plundering of China. After the founding of New China they first imposed embargoes and blockades and made armed threats...even spread the flames of war to the banks of the Yalu River in an attempt to throttle New China in its cradle."(23) Now "peaceful evolution" is "in fact a kind of spiritual opium more misleading and deceptive than opium....We must not relax our vigilance against the imperialist armed aggression and 'peaceful evolution' conspiracy at any time." According to the PLA periodical, the definition of military threat by "Chinese military academic circles" includes jeopardy to "sovereignty," unlike American and Japanese definitions that allegedly omit this concern.(24) Thus the broader Chinese approach "refers to the negative effects, danger and harm done to national interests, including a nation's sovereignty, survival, security and development by another nation" (emphasis added). Two factors determine military threat: "First.. .fundamental contradictions or interest conflicts, such as opposing social systems and ideolologies as well as disputes in economic interests, territorial and ocean rights and interests which are the prerequisites for the rise of a threat.... Second...one side must be backed by powerful military strength, which is the condition for posing a threat" (emphasis added).

This expansion on the conventional definition of military threat implicated Sino-American relations in particular. Including intangible with tangible conflicts of interest widened the basis for military confrontation. The article, promoting an assertive and implicitly aggressive nationalism, warned: "Should a country...fail to have an insight into the [military] threat, while remaining indifferent, it would become passive and even lose its sovereignty and suffer humiliation." Thus national identity was ultimately at stake. This line of reasoning foreshadowed PLA protests reportedly advanced against Deng's "soft" U.S. policy in 1992-93.

Storm Clouds Gather: February to August 1991

The Gulf War precipitated a fresh debate over the implications for China of the concurrent rise of American power and decline of Soviet power. An American "new world order" backed by high-tech weaponry made "peaceful evolution" a greater threat. A sharply anti-American analysis by He Xin, reputedly close to Li Peng, was authoritatively circulated within the CCP.(25) This argued that China lies "in the way of the American goal of world unification." It enumerated eight U.S. stratagems for "ideological and political penetration of China" in the past ten years and warned, "the United States will undoubtedly devote all its energy to turning China into chaos and subjugating and dissecting China...causing a unified China to decompose into a number of tattered parts." He's charge that Washington wanted to "decompose" China underlay Beijing's response to President Bush's meeting with the Dalai Lama in the White House. Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu lodged a "strong protest" with Ambassador James Lilley, accusing the United States of encouraging and supporting the Tibetan leader who "tries to split China and undermine her unity of nationalities."(26) This constituted "gross interference in China's internal affairs."

With the steady erosion of Soviet Communist Party power and the successive fall of East European regimes, Deng Xiaoping addressed debate over the threatening implications for his reforms with a secret 24-character prescription: "Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership."(27) But assertive media attacks continued on American sponsorship of "peaceful evolution" and "bourgeois liberalization." Renmin ribao recalled former Secretary of State George Schultz telling a 1983 State Department conference: "We should not overlook the personages and organizations in Communist countries who are seeking peaceful evolution. It is our duty to morally and strategically help them in their struggle for freedom."(28) Consequently "anti-Communists of the U.S. monopoly capitalists offered covert and open support to those in China who advocated liberalization." Three "rounds of struggle" resulted against "spiritual pollution" in 1983, "nation-wide student unrest" in 1986, and "turmoil and rebellion" in 1989.

Qiushi, the principal CCP theoretical journal, followed with a virtual indictment of Deng's programme: "After China opened her door and carried out a policy of opening to the outside world, the capitalist corrupted ideas and ways of life kept pouring in through various channels in large quantity....The question of 'which will win out,' socialism or capitalism, is still not really solved. Therefore, we must...build a strong wall ideologically, effectively resist and overcome capitalist ideas."(29) Meanwhile Hu Qiaomu, addressing a high level Central Advisory Commission (CAC) symposium attended by key theoretical, propaganda and cultural figures, attacked those who "whitewash U.S. policies of aggression, expansion, subversion, and infiltration...saying that 'there is no fundamental conflict of interests between China and the United States'."(30) The unattributed quotation was presumably known by his audience to have been made by Deng Xiaoping.

Coincidentally, notable personages closely identified with official Washington questioned Beijing's claim to Taiwan. The concatenation of these remarks cited in mainland media supported He Xin's depiction of American stratagems as including "a hand in regional independence movements (first of all, those in Taiwan and Hong Kong)." In mid-July, speaking to reporters in Taiwan, James Lilley, ambassador until June, taunted the PRC national identity by declaring, "China today is

declining empire with twentieth-century nuclear teeth and a nineteenth century view of sovereign rights."(31) Specifically, Deng Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" proposal for unity with Taiwan is "overbearing" and an "outdated view of sovereign rights." Also, "China's notion of sovereignty has had trouble over the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong."(32) Two days later Natale Bellocchi, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, Washington's unofficial representative office, told American academics: "The people of Taiwan (despite their provincial identity) are developing a unique and separate 'Taiwan identity' (which is different from the 'Chinese' concept)."(33)

In the same month Stephen J. Solarz, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives' Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, reportedly claimed that "the Taiwanese have the right to autonomy based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the wake of World War II."(34) Finally, Senator Claiborne Pell, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed a "revised bill on the destiny of Taiwan," declaring that "the future of Taiwan should be settled under the condition of peace, being free from coercion and acceptable to the Taiwan people."(35)

Beijing's delayed response was fairly temperate considering that Ambassador Lilley had "touched the tiger's tail." On 9 October President Yang Shangkun, speaking at a massive rally commemorating the 1911 revolution, noted, "some foreign forces are instigating the Taiwan independence elements to split the motherland," and he bluntly warned: "We will absolutely not permit any foreign forces to interfere. We will never sit by and watch any act of separating Taiwan from China....Whoever plays with fire will perish by fire" (emphasis added).(36) These words recalled similar formulations before China's 1950 intervention in the Korean War and the 1962 attack against Indian forces in Tibet.(37) As such, they insinuated an aggressive threat into assertive nationalism, reflecting Beijing's sensitivity to the U.S.-Taiwan linkage highlighted in July. Apart from the specific issue of Taiwan, however, Yang stressed affirmative nationalism: "As long as the leading bodies uphold Marxism and adhere to the Party's basic line, we should not be afraid of peaceful evolution."(38) This exemplified Deng's differentiation between the tangible issue of national sovereignty on Taiwan and ideological issues associated with domestic reform.

The Storm Breaks: August to December 1991

On 19 August a futile hardline coup against Gorbachev signalled the virtual collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and ultimately of the Soviet Union itself. The event and its timing exposed domestic reform and the open door to fresh "leftist" attack just as relations with the United States worsened over Taiwan. High level orders reportedly banned public commentary on Soviet death throes. Privately, however, controversy raged within the CCP as a new assault was mounted against Deng's policies, reflected in a spate of articles elliptically referring to "the dramatic changes in the international situation."(39)

Regime pronouncements sounded an assertive nationalism reminiscent of the immediate post-Tiananmen period.(40) Vice-President Wang Zhen declared: "In the face of the changing international situation, we should have a firmer faith in socialism and Communism. The road is tortuous, and the struggle is sharp, but the prospects are undoubtedly bright and brilliant."(41) Renmin ribao warned, "under these circumstances China may have to bear greater pressure than before."(42) A wave of attacks targeted the United States or the codeword substitute, "Western hostile forces."(43) Renmin ribao admitted that these forces had "achieved success in some countries," therefore "now they are glaring like a tiger coveting its prey and are trying by all means to subvert and infiltrate China, putting their hopes of peaceful evolution on the younger generation.... As soon as a storm breaks out, there will be vacillation and some [1989 dissident leaders] could re-emerge as the supporters of the hostile Western forces."(44)

On 24 September Jiang Zemin, commemorating the 110th anniversary of Lu Xun's birth, summed up the uncompromisingly assertive themes:

International hostile forces will never stop using peaceful evolution against us for a single day. Bourgeois liberalization is an internal matching force which they use to carry out peaceful evolution. These kinds of hostile activities constitute a real threat to China's independence. sovereignty, development, and reform. In other words, peaceful evolution and bourgeois liberalization are aimed not only at overthrowing our socialist system but, fundamentally. at depriving us of our national independence and state sovereignty.(45)

Jiang spoke amid an intensive struggle prior to the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee at the end of November.(46) Just before that, however, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was due to visit Beijing, the highest-ranking American to arrive since Tiananmen. The human rights issue led the opposition to press Deng on the linkage between the American "peaceful evolution" strategy and the opening up policy. While the basic CCP struggle was over the pace and extent of economic reform, this linkage invited nationalistic exploitation of a highly sensitive issue.

In mid-September, prior to a CCP Central Committee Work Conference, Deng and his strongest opponent, Chen Yun, agreed on foreign Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng policy while disagreeing on reform and opening up.(47) They held that the United States had "added fuel to the flames" in Moscow and sought to "suppress China" through linking MFN and human rights. Beijing must be uncompromising, resisting pro-U.S. sentiment inside and outside the Party. If the Taiwan independence movement strengthened, economic action would come first, blockade second, followed by military force if necessary.

This account of concession by Deng accords with other developments thereafter, including Yang Shangkun's aggressively worded warnings on Taiwan. In particular the report helps to explain a second edict attributed to Deng at this time, instructing how to face recent events: "The city is under siege; the enemy is more powerful than we; regard defence as the main strategy."(48) This was more alarmist than his formula of the previous spring, abandoning "calm," but still specified defence, not offence, as the main strategy. It conceded to his opponents by defining the situation as dire but rejected their more assertive response. In addition, while the earlier formulation was distributed to the entire Party after the 19 August coup attempt, the tougher, tighter line only went to high-ranking cadres, presumably to limit its impact.(49)

At the same time a ten-point secret document, "Propaganda and Education Arrangements Regarding the Current Basic Principles and Policies Towards the United States," was drafted by the CCP Central Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(50) The dual authorship focused separately on foreign policy and domestic aspects but the overall thrust was explicitly anti-American, according with the alleged Deng-Chen agreement. Wang Zhen expounded on this theme to like-minded retired officials and generals in the CAC: "We have the experience of dealing with the Americans on the battlefield. They are nothing terrible.... The war theatre may be selected by the Americans...in Korea or Taiwan. They have nuclear weapons; so have we."(51) However Deng separately cautioned against "too tough" a stance and argued for "flexibility" in the forthcoming American talks.

Secretary Baker arrived on 15 November for three days, without the usual ceremonial banquets and extensive television coverage given foreign dignitaries. Amid a broad agenda, human rights took the greatest part of his 18 hours in discussion with CCP General Secretary Jiang, President Yang, Premier Li, Foreign Minister Qian, and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Li Lanqing.(52) Li pointedly told Baker: "The Chinese nation has a history of five thousand years and has a national characteristic of strong self-respect. Over the past 100-odd years, the Chinese nation has had its fill of aggression and devastation by foreign powers. We therefore highly treasure our independence and sovereignty."(53) Despite the premier's assertive posture, Deng's flexibility prevailed. Beijing confirmed earlier indications that it would sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and "observe the guidelines" of the Missile Technology Control Regime. China also agreed to ban the export of prison products and to protect intellectual property rights in copyright, computer software, sound recording and patents.

On human rights, Beijing responded to the list of 800 names of dissidents, presented to China in May, by accounting for those proven guilty, those under investigation, and those released, excepting those who "still cannot be found."(54) Beijing also agreed to grant exit permits to citizens not subject to criminal proceedings. The Foreign Ministry described the visit as successful, enumerating points of agreement without specifying areas of contention.(55) Although Deng did not receive Baker, he reportedly continued to lobby intensively behind the scenes for a carefully constrained approach to U.S. relations.(56)

1992: Deng Counter-attacks

Deng Xiaoping's ascendancy over his opponents influenced Qiushi. In July 1991 it had claimed "opening the door to the outside world" resulted in "capitalist ideas...pouring in" so as to require "a great wall ideologically."(57) No such linkage appeared in the January 1992 issue.(58) Likewise in July the battle lines were sharply drawn between "socialism or capitalism." But now it was a more diffuse confrontation over human rights that pitted "U.S. monopoly capitalists and their government...against socialism and the international proletariat." This shifted the balance from assertive toward affirmative nationalism.

Still Deng pushed further. With his longevity uncertain and the 14th CCP Congress scheduled for October 1992, the octogenarian campaigned in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai from 18 January to 21 February. His activities went unreported at the time because his opponents still controlled the national media.(59) Nevertheless his remarks gradually became known in Hong Kong.(60) Bluntly attacking his opposition, Deng declared: "Now we are subject to influence from both Rightist and Leftist ideas. In the final analysis, however, we are handicapped by Leftist ideas. Rightism refers to 'upheaval,' while Leftism equates reform and opening to promoting capitalism. Rightism can ruin socialism and Leftism can do the same." This language was even harsher on "leftism" in the official version of Deng's remarks released in November 1993.(61)

Deng countered the furore over "peaceful evolution" with two basic points. First, the threat was neither present nor imminent because "hostile forces pin their hopes on the people of several generations following us.... When we people of the older generation are still around and have weight, hostile forces are aware no change can be effected."(62) Secondly, the threat was internal, not external: "If something wrong occurs in China, it will come from within the Communist Party." This fundamentally shifted blame from his 1989 assessment, where the "international climate" was the "major" cause of trouble. It reflected the duality of confidence and concern in the respective development of external and internal factors. On the one hand foreign relations had largely recovered from their post-Tiananmen low, although problems remained with the United States. On the other hand continued "leftist" resistance to the open door threatened to undermine Deng's reform programme and, in particular, relations with the United States.

A unique revelation in Beijing's most authoritative Hong Kong newspaper, Dagong bao, claimed a 2 March draft of Premier Li Peng's government report to the Fifth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress differed notably from the final version of 16 March.(63) Besides making no reference to "peaceful evolution," the official version dropped the phrase "despite the issues still pending before them" in reference to Sino-U.S. relations.(64) Comparing the two versions revealed Deng's success in countering the assertive nationalist opposition to reform and the opening up policy.

After the Congress, Deng explicitly rejected attacks on his United States policy, charging that "some in the party want to 'ally China with the north, support the north, and resist the United States'."(65) In rebuttal Deng noted "the situation in the 'north' is not clear yet." Furthermore: "China and the United States are different in political ideology, but there is no conflict between their fundamental interests. We do not have contention in politics, territory, or resources, or problems left over from history in other regions" (emphasis added). In fact, "U.S. presidents, from Nixon to Bush, all have had a good understanding of China." These sweeping statements directly reaffirmed the precise views specifically attacked by his "leftist" critics, most notably Hu Qiaomu, in 1991.

Deng also counter-attacked on the propaganda front. In March a six-page New China News Agency (NCNA) directive instructed reporters to avoid harsh criticism of the United States.(66) "We should adopt a 'careful and positive' policy, and report well on bilateral relations and exchanges between China and the United States." It explicitly ruled out the assertive nationalism of 1991: "As for U.S. words and deeds interfering in our internal affairs and harming our sovereignty we should expose this. But we should carry out a reasonable, beneficial, restrained struggle, and not use phrases such as 'Western hostile forces headed by the United States" (emphasis added). Further, "we should not mention names of U.S. leaders lightly," alluding indirectly to negative references to "Bushism."(67) Thereafter attacks on "peaceful evolution," the threat from "Western hostile forces," and "U.S. imperialism" sharply declined.

Deng had won a battle but the war continued. On 14 April the CAC petitioned the CCP Central Committee over eight points of concern. Deng had identified "leftism" as the main problem but the petition asserted, "the biggest danger is the 'rightist' tendency and bourgeois liberalization in the last ten years."(68) A second CAC line of attack struck at the open door policy: "We should not rely on the West in our construction, still less should we wish for Western assistance or co-operation. Trade, exchange, co-operation and credit cannot be separated from the actual political system or global strategy of hegemonist capitalist countries. Economics is the main means employed by hegemonist countries in carrying out blackmail, subversion, peaceful evolution and intervention" (emphasis added). The honorary club of retired officials and generals persisted in its die-hard opposition to dependence on the capitalist world.

Publicly, however, Deng's views prevailed. In August 1992 President Bush announced the intended sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, violating the laboriously negotiated 1982 agreement. Beijing's response was relatively low key, particularly when compared with its reaction to Paris announcing willingness to sell 60 Mirage fighters to Taiwan, when it closed the French consulate in Guangzhou and threatened to reject major French construction bids. The American provocation only prompted the PRC to leave the Missile Technology Control talks, a forum that had failed to halt Chinese missile shipments as demanded by Washington.

Domestic media assaulted Washington for violating international law, breaking its agreements and endangering relations by destroying "trust." But the long legal articles muted all assertive nationalism, let alone the aggressive nationalism implicit in President Yang's October 1991 statements linking "Taiwanese independence elements" with "certain foreign forces." Instead media treatment followed the NCNA directive, with "a reasonable, beneficial, restrained struggle." Affirmative nationalism carried the day.

1993: Deng Confronts the Military

As 1992 drew to a close the CAC no longer threatened, the 14th National CCP Congress having determined it had "basically accomplished its role as a transitional organization." However the potential military role in policy grew with its larger representation in the 14th Central Committee, increasing from one-sixth to one-quarter compared with the 13th CC and including one-third of the newly elected members.(69) Not since 1977 had the PLA constituted this high a percentage of the CC.

In December Deng reportedly reached a limited consensus with Peng Zhen, Wan Li, and key opponents Chen Yun and Bo Yibo.(70) After this gathering a larger meeting included leading Party and army officials, together with eight retired generals. The generals' presence was significant. Deng declared, "The whole Party and the whole Army, especially comrades in leading posts and old cadres and generals who have retired from active service... should unconditionally obey the leadership and instructions of the Central Committee...not flaunt their seniority or give themselves the airs of heroes...and be promoters of unity"(71) (emphasis added). His next words addressed the April 1992 CAC attack on foreign policy: "The policy towards the United States is correct instead of right deviationism. In the future we should still persist in not seeking confrontation and, under the principles of the three communiqus, avoid confrontation. It is necessary to make necessary concessions or give in a little. Should the United States coerce or challenge us, there would be nothing terrible about it, and we have reasons as well as capability to cope with it." This explicit affirmative stance was coupled with an assertive one: "Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet are China's internal affairs. We should never make concessions on matters of internal affairs and sovereignty and there is absolutely no room for compromise. Matters of principle should never be bartered away at any time. This is a basic national policy of a sovereign state."(72) By striking this careful balance, Deng sought to preserve his basic policy while protecting himself from military as well as civilian criticism.

The attempt failed. In mid-April 1993, 116 high-ranking PLA officers reportedly wrote a letter jointly to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission.(73) It called for an immediate enlarged Political Bureau meeting on the past policy of "tolerance, forbearance and compromise" towards the United States. Demanding a more assertive and possibly aggressive policy, it claimed that China's unilateral concessions had "impaired the dignity of the Chinese people, damaged the image of the Chinese nation, undermined the glorious tradition of the People's Liberation Army, and dampened the PLA's moral and combat effectiveness." By placing "dignity of the Chinese people" and "image of the Chinese nation" ahead of PLA considerations, the issue of national identity broadened the challenge beyond narrow organizational interests.

The indictment of American policy repeated the litany of charges in "leftist" articles of 1991, adding that the United States had "sold sophisticated weapons to Taiwan; incited the Taiwan authorities to advocate 'one China, one Taiwan' and 'two Chinas'"; and "brazenly supported...the splittist activities of the Dalai Lama." Therefore "it is necessary resolutely and forcefully to hit back at the rude acts of interference, subversion, and extortion by the U.S. hegemonists" (emphasis added). In this effort "officers and men of all the ground, naval and air units are ready to take orders from Comrade Xiaoping and the CCP Central Committee." Thus despite Deng's lack of official authority, the military pledged obedience to his "orders."

The letter reportedly had support from Politburo member and CMC Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing and fellow CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Zhen. On 1 May they joined with more than 50 retired and active generals for a similar letter personally delivered to Deng by four of their octogenarian colleagues.(74) It called for a change in policy, lest "we follow in the steps of the former Soviet Union, resulting in a situation of state disintegration and social turbulence. We will then be condemned by history and China might once again be reduced to a semi-colonial country." Once again China's newly established national identity was at stake.

These documents closely paralleled the rumoured views of Chen Yun, suggesting that opposition to Deng had coalesced civilian and military factions. The threat had been anticipated by Deng's strong defence of policy in December. Its emergence, however, was timed to meet the annual crisis in Sino-American relations over linking MFN and human rights. In May Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord visited Beijing to discuss this problem with Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu. On 14 May Jiang Zemin allegedly summarized Lord's talk to the Political Bureau: "This is the coercive ultimatum resorted to by U.S. hegemonists."(75) Echoing Deng's December line, Jiang declared: "Our basic stance is: we want co-operation and not confrontation.... We will not yield to hegemonism and power politics. We are not afraid of their confrontation and challenge. For the motherland's sovereignty, independence and dignity, we are ready to pay a price."

Responding to the military petitions, Jiang further affirmed, "the position of the revolutionaries of the elder generation is...identical with that of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau, State Council and Central Military Commission."(76) This finessed the more assertive line of the petitions while saving face all around. However assertive nationalism underscored Peng Zhen's instruction: "Any condition attached to bilateral trade can be interpreted as an insult and challenge to China and the Chinese people. This is absolutely unacceptable. China does not rely on the United States for development.... If we do not want to be thrown into passivity, we should be prudent and firm."(77) Chen Yun struck a similar posture in his remarks as relayed by Jiang.

Deng stood firm on his previous policy. On 14 May Jiang reportedly relayed Deng's "latest instruction." First he conceded: "It now seems our policy towards the United States needs to be examined. It is true that we cannot be dependent on a certain big power in opening up and developing trade.... We will be easily subjected to interference, control, and blackmail by means of political factors." He then countered: "The central authorities have a plan to extricate ourselves from passivity within two to three years.... Problems of deviation to the right and worshipping the United States do not exist in our relations with the United States; thus it will be unsuitable to criticize and blame it from the high plane of principle."(78) Admitting "passivity" and promising unspecific changes in "two to three years" stalemated the debate but preserved the status quo. Deng had carefully differentiated two policy contexts. Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet concerned "internal affairs and sovereignty" that allowed "no room for compromise." Otherwise "not seeking confrontation" made "it necessary to make necessary concessions or give in a little." The latter situation arose on 23 July when Washington charged a Chinese ship, the Yinhe, with carrying embargoed chemical weapons materials to Iran. On 4 August Beijing issued a "stern denial" but proposed third-party inspection of the cargo. Meanwhile U.S. pressure persuaded Gulf countries not to permit the ship to dock, unload cargo, or take on fresh food and water for 20 days while American military ships and planes monitored its course.(79) On 4 September inspection in Saudi Arabia by Saudi, American and Chinese personnel found no embargoed chemicals.

Chinese statements correctly charged that interference with peaceful commercial shipping on the high seas violated international law. Yet China took no assertive action to protect its rights, instead offering third-party inspection. This fell far short of the type of response demanded by military petitions to Deng. Further, Chinese media avoided assertive rhetoric, instead dwelling on legal arguments to indict the "world cop" who threatened "justice, sovereign equality, and normal state-to-state relations."(80)

But more was to come. On 25 August Washington announced "class two sanctions" against China and Pakistan because of Beijing's alleged transfer of M-11 missiles in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Again China denied American intelligence claims but no public assertive response resulted. Once again PLA protestations reportedly attacked the policy described as "tackling the hard with the soft."(81)

Additional military petitions in August and September called for a much tougher stance against the United States and an accelerated development of China's naval and air capability. This linkage successfully exploited nationalism for bureaucratic advantage. In early September Jiang Zemin responded at a high-level PLA meeting by reiterating the Political Bureau Standing Committee "four nots" policy: "not wanting confrontation, not provoking confrontation, not dodging confrontation, and not being afraid of confrontation."(82) At the same time Jiang agreed "to accelerate the development of high-tech, advanced and sophisticated conventional weapons, as well as strategic nuclear weapons." In this context China held a nuclear test in September, despite President Clinton's appeal to abstain as part of a world-wide test ban. Deng's priority of economic development first, political confrontation second, remained intact, albeit through concessions to the military.

Another American challenge at this time involved the 2000 Olympic Games. In early August the House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the International Olympic Committee to deny Beijing its bid to host, arguing human rights abuse in China. Meanwhile Beijing unleashed a massive campaign at home and abroad to win its bid.(83) But when defeat came, the regime expressed "respect" for the decision, adding, "the Chinese people know that in the competition to host the Games there is one lucky city, but no loser."(84) No recrimination against Washington appeared in the media. Privately however attacks on the United States continued. In early October a national counter-espionage meeting reportedly heard State Security Minister Jia Chunwang declare: "The United States, Japan and Taiwan have organized the largest espionage networks. The United States carries out espionage activities by making use of hostile elements, diplomats and journalists, and exchanges of academic personnel."(85)

From 25 November to 5 December an unusually comprehensive closed gathering of military and civilian think-tank specialists presented some 60 papers on international relations. It agreed that until the next century, "U.S. hegemonism" will target China "to change the course of its ideology" by "ideological infiltration into China's upper strata [and] financial assistance to hostile forces both inside and outside Chinese territories" while it waits "for the opportune moment to stir up turbulence."(86)

In January Deng met again with top PLA officers to address policy concerns and post-Deng prospects.(87) He acknowledged: "Of course there are some countries hoping China will have great chaos, such as a civil war.... It is also possible that some people may try to make trouble in China with support from foreign countries and hostile forces.... Foreign countries and hostile forces have never stopped trying to make trouble in China." Therefore "it is correct for the leadership group of our Army to have such an awareness. This is in keeping with the objective situation."

Deng's change of tone from his rebuttal of PLA petitions earlier in 1993 answered the question of "whether or not China will plunge into chaos when our generation is gone."(88) As his own health deteriorated, he admitted to the possibility of "partial disturbances." This implied that the PLA might be critical in assuring the regime's survival. Under these circumstances, perhaps it seemed wiser to avoid direct confrontation of military views while not explicitly endorsing their call for harder line policy toward the United States.(89) Consistent with this approach, the PLA won a 12.5 per cent budgetary increase (after inflation allowance) for 1994, less than it requested but nevertheless significant.(90)

After his PLA session, Deng had a meeting with Chen Yun who reportedly said, "China should try to put an end to the passive state in Sino-U.S. trade and overcome right-opportunism in U.S. policy... [and] right deviation toward the United States."(91) In March the PLA delegation to the Second Session of the Eighth NPC reportedly criticized the Foreign Ministry and the State Council in this regard.(92) On 25 May the National Defence University and Academy of Military Sciences jointly held a conference on Chinese foreign policy and Taiwan. The broad attack on foreign policy encompassed Japanese militarism and British policy in Hong Kong but the bulk of criticism focused on the United States. Specific shortcomings included softening China's "principled stand" at the UN Security Council "to stay on good terms with the U.S.," inadequate protesting against U.S. "interference" on Tibet and Hong Kong, no counter-measures against the Yinhe incident, weak response to American weapons sales to Taiwan, and bowing to American intervention in China's Olympic bid.(93) This record of weakness resulted from trying "to obtain equal bilateral trade relations and so-called normal Sino-U.S. relations through compromise." A conference letter to the CCP Central Committee and State Council demanding Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's resignation was withheld by the heads of the two sponsoring organizations.

In June another PLA petition, allegedly signed by 80 "veteran and newly appointed military generals," called on the Political Bureau not to compromise with the United States in "matters of principle."(94) It virtually duplicated the 1993 document in its indictment of Washington's effort to "subvert, penetrate, interfere in and undermine China." As before, Jiang Zemin met high level officers to pledge: "China will not create confrontation with the United States or the West, but it will never compromise in the face of confrontation imposed by them. In the face of confrontation, China has no alternative but to fight back until our struggle is crowned with victory."

Conclusion

The record indicates that factional politics, the first of the hypotheses suggested at the beginning of this article, mainly accounts for the variation in Chinese assertive nationalism during 1989-94. June 1989 is unique in the threat to leadership stability (the second hypothesis). 1991 is unique in change in the global power balance (the final hypothesis). However external (American) challenges to national interests and identity (the fourth hypothesis) occur throughout the period. But public and private responses to these challenges vary depending on the relative strength of Deng Xiaoping and two sources of assertive nationalism: the "leftist" ideological faction and components of the People's Liberation Army.

These two sources of opposition often focused on different issue areas and had different bureaucratic bases and interests. However in potential coalition they posed a strong challenge to Deng who was weakening politically as his health visibly deteriorated. Fortunately for Deng, the "leftist" opposition to open door reform threatened China's access to technology, advanced weapons and military exchange, contrary to PLA interests. The two factions shared ideological concern because both saw chaos as the only alternative to "stability," that is, undiluted authority for the Chinese Communist Party. But here Deng agreed with his opponents. His key difference lay in denying that "peaceful evolution" was a serious threat so long as economic reform advanced material interests for most of the Chinese people.

Having ridden out the 1989-91 crises, Deng countered his opposition in 1992-94 on the entire domestic and foreign range of reform policy. On United States relations, Deng rebutted internal criticism and restrained media reaction. This explains the failure to exploit the Yinhe harassment and the missile sales embargo in 1993 despite the fact that PLA interests were intimately involved in both instances and PLA petitions explicitly called for a tougher posture. In short, Deng's repeated advice for "calm" and "not seeking confrontation" prevailed because of his unique authority and his success in economic reforms. Nevertheless, military pressures persisted on policy toward the United States, manifest in strongly worded petitions signed by dozens of high level officers. Deng's rhetorical concessions on the existence of a continued American threat and Jiang's budgetary concessions on military modernization sufficed for the moment. But this did not resolve the issues or remove the pressure. In mid-1994 senior generals voiced strong statements reportedly reflecting PLA criticism of policy toward the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and Sino-American relations.(95)

Three implications for future Chinese policy postures emerge from this review of 1989-94. First, the varying virulence of assertive nationalism is more a function of factional politics than of substantive issues. In the post-Deng era the composition of regime leadership, in particular the influence of the PLA, will determine the degree to which provocative U.S. policy on Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong will evoke affirmative, assertive or aggressive responses. All three issues will remain sensitive matters of Chinese sovereignty and national identity. In Deng's absence, competitive successor-aspirants may be tempted to exploit nationalistic sensitivities in order to coalesce support and weaken opponents. Remnant "leftists" and sincere nationalists can contribute to PLA assertiveness under circumstances where prolonged leadership instability prompts this coalition to advance its point of view.

Secondly, as China's military strength increases, assertive behaviour is likely to implement assertive rhetoric if this coalition prevails. In 1992 Premier Li Peng proposed setting aside the rival sovereignty claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei to the Spratly Islands while jointly exploiting South China Sea resources. He insisted nevertheless on China's claim. Meanwhile the build-up of PLA strength there continued as did its ability to project air and sea power over the area.(96) Domestic media depicted the islands as "the farthest end of the vast expanse of China's maritime territory," where pillbox signs read, "link one's heart to the motherland by forever defending the national gate."(97) Furthermore the area of 820,000 square kilometres serves as "China's largest tropical fishing ground as well as treasure islands of petroleum and natural gas resources...reputed to be a second Persian Gulf." This purported linkage of territorial sovereignty, national security and economic resources provides the PLA with a powerful political claim to policy as well as weaponry.

A third and contrary implication of the 1989-94 record is that virulent nationalism emergent from China's "century of shame and humiliation" is in itself a declining factor in Chinese foreign policy. Increased economic and military strength lessens the need to deter foreign exploitation of China's weakness. There is also less need to state China's rightful position as that position becomes secure, leading to what Michel Oksenberg in 1986 termed "confident nationalism."(98) Then came 4 June 1989.

Tiananmen serves as a reminder that much depends on the regime's ability to move from a planned economy to a market economy without destabilizing its domestic support. Much also depends on the regime's will and ability to adjust politically to the increasing demands of a nascent civil society for greater freedom of organization and expression. Legitimacy of the regime and national identity will be at stake. Under these circumstances an appeal to nationalism as a means of mobilizing unity will be assertive, if not aggressive. How this affects Chinese foreign policy will depend on how foreign powers relate to China at that time.

1. David Shambaugh, "Growing strong: China's challenge to Asian security." Survival, Summer 1994, pp. 43-59; also Chong-pin Lin, "Chinese military modernization: perceptions, progress, and prospects." Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 718-753.

2. For a systematic critique see James Townsend, "Chinese nationalism," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 27 (1992), pp. 97-120; also Lucian W. Pye, "How China's nationalism was Shanghaied," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January 1993), pp. 107-133.

3. Zuguo is translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS-CHI) as "motherland" although it is more precisely "ancestors' land." with somewhat different connotations. Similarly minzu evokes the ethnic "nation" as differentiated from guo as the state referent, both terms being translated in FBIS as "nation" or "national." Comparison of FBIS with the original text during 1989-90 showed sufficient correlation to justify reliance on the translated material. except as noted below. I am indebted to Kristina Mao for calling these aspects to my attention.

4. See Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (eds.), China's Quest For National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), in particular the editors' essay, "In search of a theory of national identity," pp. 1-32.

5. This combines elements from Peter Van Ness, "China as a Third World state." in ibid. p. 196 and Robert A. Scalapino, "China's multiple identities in East Asia: China as a regional force," ibid. p. 215.

6. I am indebted to Kristina Mao and Yong Deng for research assistance.

7. Deng Xiaoping speech of 9 June 1989, Jiefangjun bao, 28 June 1989, p. 1. Emphasis added by author.

8 "Only socialism can save China." editorial, Renmin ribao, 22 July 1989, p. 1.

9. Michael H. Hunt, "Chinese national identity and the strong state," in Dittmer and Kim, China 's Quest for National Identity, pp. 62-79, analyses aiguo as state-centred in the late Qing and Republican periods and therefore he substitutes the term patriotism for nationalism.

10. Ji Li, "A great spiritual pillar and lofty moral obligation," Shanghai Wenhui bao, 19 August 1989, p. 4.

11. Foreign Minister Chen Yi made a similar statement in May 1962, spurning President John F. Kennedy's implied offer of wheat. See Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976), p. 71.

12. Lin Folian, "Beware of 'soft sell' from outside." Jiefangjun bao, 2 November 1989, p. 2.

13. Qu Quanshen, "Beware of the 'peaceful evolution' scheme by hostile international forces," Jiefangjun bao, 7 November 1989, p. 3.

14. Bai Keming, "Questions and answers on studying Jiang Zemin's National Day speech," Jiefangjun bao, 9 November 1989, p. 2.

15. Wan Yaoting and Ma Guangwu, "Beware the glint and flash of cold steel in the 'halo of peace'," Jiefangjun bao, 1 December 1989.

16 "Deng Xiaoping sees the future for the CCP," Zhengming, Hong Kong, No. 151 (1 May 1990) as cited by Michael Yahuda, "Deng Xiaoping: the statesman," The China Quarterly, No. 135 (September 1993), p. 564.

17. "Patriotism and the mission of the Chinese intellectuals speech by Jiang Zemin at a meeting held by youth in the capital to commemorate 'May 4th' (3 May 1990)." Xinhua Domestic Service, 3 May 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 4 May 1990, pp. 8-13.

18. Xinhua in English, 3 June 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 4 June 1990, p. 44.

19. Editorial, "Hold even higher the great banner of patriotism -- in commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the Opium War," Renmin ribao, 3 June 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 4 June 1990, p. 13.

20. Hu Sheng, President of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, at Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee Forum on the 150th anniversary of the Opium War, Renmin ribao, 4 June 1990, in FBIS-CHI, 5 June 1990, pp. 24-27.

21. Lu Tao, "Inside story about major screening in Renmin ribao after 4 June," Hong Kong Jiushi niandai, No. 4 (1 April 1992), pp. 80-83, in FBIS-CHI, 17 April 1992, pp. 32-35.

22. "Independence -- a foundation for the prosperity and strength of the motherland." Ban yue tan, No. 9 (15 May 1990), pp. 19-21 in FBIS-CHI, 9 July 1990, pp. 34-36. This was the 14th of a lecture series on patriotism by the Ban yue tan editorial department. The next paragraph also comes from this article.

23. Zhang Zongxian, "Carry forward patriotic spirit, keep firm conviction in socialism commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Opium War." Jiefangjun bao, 5 June 1990, p. 3, in FBIS-CHI, 5 June 1990, pp. 18-21.

24. Niu Tianjin and Zhang Shijiang, "Rambling talk on military threat," Jiefangjun bao, September 1990, p. 3, in FBIS-CHI, 11 October 1990, pp. 4-6; also David Shambaugh, "The insecurity of security: the People's Liberation Army's evolving doctrine and threat perceptions towards 2000." Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-25; Bonnie Glaser, "China's security perceptions: interests and ambitions," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 9 (March 1993) pp.: 252-271.

25. Shih Yen, "He Xin submits written statement to CPC leadership to expose U.S. 'vigorous attempt to turn China into chaos, subjugate and dissect China'," Bai xing, No. 244 (16 July 1991), pp. 3-4, in FBIS-CHI, 24 July 1991, pp. 9-11; also South China Morning Post, 27 February 1991, p. 15, in ibid, pp. 5-6.

26. Xinhua in English, 18 April 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 18 April 1991, pp. 12-13.

27. Hong Kong Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991), pp. 84-86, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28-30. This text was widely reported in other Hong Kong media as well.

28. "Why must we unremittingly oppose bourgeois liberalization?" Dangdai sichao commentator article abridged from Dangdai sichao, No. 2 (1991), in Renmin ribao, 24 April 1991, p. 5, in FBIS-CHI, 26 April 1991, pp. 18-21.

29. Luan Baojuan, "Rambling talk on ideological, political work," Qiushi, No. 14 (16 July 1991), pp. 22-25, in FBIS-CHI, 15 August 1991, pp. 20-21.

30. Meng Lin, "Hu Qiaomu criticizes pro-American faction inside CCP," Jing bao, No. 169 (5 August 1991), pp. 54-55, in FBIS-CHI, 7 August 1991, pp.17-18. The internal quotation purportedly comes from a text of Hu's remarks that were otherwise paraphrased.

31. Xiao Xi (pseud.), "Mr James Lilley's statement and behaviour merit attention," Renmin ribao , 15 August 1991, p. 7, in FBIS-CHI, 15 August 1991, pp. 1-2. The quotations in this paragraph and the following one are translated from mainland media because the focus of analysis is the treatment of this material by Beijing.

32. "Long delay in reunification of Taiwan, mainland means many hitches; U.S. intervention is becoming more and more open," Taiwan, Shijie luntan bao, reprinted in Renmin ribao, overseas edition, 10 August 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 14 August 1991, pp. 3-4.

33. Ibid. Bellocchi spoke at the University of Pennsylvania, 18 July 1991.

34. Yu Liwen, "No one should interfere in China's internal affairs -- commenting on remarks made on Taiwan issue by James Lilley and others," Guangming ribao, 31 July 1991, p. 4, in FBIS-CHI, 13 August 1991, pp. 4-5.

35. Ibid.

36. Renmin ribao , 10 October 1991, pp. 1, 3 in FBIS-CHI, 15 October 1991, pp. 31-34. The rally was in the Beijing Olympic Centre.

37. See Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, ch. VI.

38. Suisheng Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's southern tour: elite politics in post-Tiananmen China," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8 (1993), p. 743.

39. For a detailed analysis see John W. Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the collapse of Soviet Communism," The China Quarterly. No. 133 (March 1993), pp. 1-26.

40. In addition to materials cited in this section, see Suisheng Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's southern tour," p. 744.

41. Renmin ribao, 26 August 1991, p.1, in FBIS-CHI, 29 August 1991, pp. 21-22.

42. Zhongguo tongxun she, 28 August 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 29 August 1991, p. 22; the article originally appeared in Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu.

43. See, for example, Lu Yang, "Imperialism compels China to take socialist road," Guangzhou Yangcheng wanbao, 21 August 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 29 August 1991, pp. 25-30; Li Zhun, "Heighten consciousness to oppose evolution." Renmin ribao , 22 August 1991, in ibid. pp. 22-23; Yan Zhaozhu, "No allowing wholesale Westernization -- studying Jiang Zemin's 'Speech at the Conference to Celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the CCP'," Guangming ribao , 26 September 1991; Jiang Shiyi, "A good text for adhering steadfastly to socialism -- some thoughts after watching the political educational TV series 'Moving toward internationalism'." Jiefangjun bao, 2 October 1991, p. 3.

44. Chen Yeping, "Having political integrity and ability, with stress on political integrity," Renmin ribao, 31 August 1991 as reported by Hong Kong Agence France Press, 1 September 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 3 September 1991, pp. 26-27.

45. Chuang Meng, "Deng puts forward new 12-character guiding principle for internal and foreign policies," Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991), pp. 84-86, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28-30.

46. See Hong Kong Ming bao, 8 October 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 9 October 1991, p. 19; also Jing bao, 5 November 1991, pp. 84-86, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28-30.

47. Lo Ping, "Salvation meeting between Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping," Zhengming, 11 November 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 15 November 1991, pp. 24-27.

48. Hong Kong Jing bao, 5 December 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 19 December 1991, pp. 21-26; this differs from the previous translation of Jing bao, 5 November 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 6 November 1991, pp. 28-30: "Enemy troops are outside the city wall. They are stronger than we. We should be mainly on the defensive." The later version accords more with the classical allusions.

49. Jing bao, 5 November 1991,

50. Lin Pai-niao, "CCP formulates new policy towards United States," Zhengming, No. 170, 1 December 1991, pp. 17-19, in FBIS-CHI. 2 December 1991, pp. 6-9.

51. Yueh Shan, "Wang Zhen takes advantage of winning to curse Deng Xiaoping," Zhengming, No. 171 (1 January 1992), pp. 20-21, in FBIS-CHI, 10 January 1992, pp. 23-24; remarks reportedly were made on 4 November 1991. The remainder of this paragraph is from this same article.

52. Statement by Secretary Baker at farewell press conference, Ming bao, 18 November 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 20 November 1991, pp. 8-9.

53. Wang Rujun, "Li Peng meets with Baker," Renmin ribao, 18 November 1991, pp. 1, 4, in FBIS-CHI, 20 November 1991, p. 4.

54. Chen Chien-ping, "Baker held 18 hours of talks with Chinese side during his two-and-a-half day visit," Hong Kong Wenhui bao, 18 November 1991, p. 1, FBIS-CHI, 18 November 1991, pp.23-24.

55. Renmin ribao , overseas edition, 18 November 1991, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 20 November 1991, p. 7.

56. For a detailed but unconfirmable account of Deng's purported advice to the participants in discussion with Baker, including Deng's own rationale for not joining in, see Lin Pai-niao, "CCP formulates new policy."

57. Luan Baojun, "Rambling talk."

58. Lang Yihua, "The practice of human rights in socialist society and the international human rights struggle," Qiushi, No. 1 (1 January 1992), pp. 10-15, in FBIS-CHI, 27 February 1991, pp. 31-36.

59. For a detailed recapitulation of media treatment of Deng's tour, see Suisheng Zhao, "Deng Xiaoping's southern tour," p. 741 and pp. 749-750.

60. CCP Central Document No. 2 (1992), Hong Kong Jingji ribao, 12 March 1992, p. 3, in FBIS-CHI, 13 March 1992, pp. 20-21. This version corresponds with that released officially by Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 5 November 1993, in FBIS-CHI 8 November 1993, pp. 21-26 except for expansion of various points in the later version.

61. This passage is longer and stronger in the subsequent official version, with "leftist" ideas "particularly deep-rooted" and "the 'leftist' things have done terrible harm to our Party in the past." Therefore while guarding against "rightism," "China should mainly guard against 'leftism'."

62. The later version read "imperialism" instead of "hostile forces."

63. Hong Kong Dagong bao, 20 March 1992, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 10 March 1992, pp. 19-20.

64. Compare Beijing Central People's Radio Network in Mandarin, 20 March 1992 in FBIS-CHI, Supplement, 20 March 1992, p. 12 with Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 3 April 1992, in FBIS-CHI, Supplement, 8 April 1992, p. 12.

65. Cheng Te-lin, "Deng says China will neither seek hegemony nor ally itself with the north," Jing bao, No. 177, 5 April 1992, p. 48, in FBIS-CHI, 6 April 1992, pp. 1-2. The remainder of this paragraph comes from this source.

66. South China Morning Post, 28 March 1992, p. 11, in FBIS-CHI, 30 March 1992, p. 2. The report was filed from Beijing.

67. See, for instance, Zhongguo qingnian bao cited in Hong Kong Agence France Press, 3 May 1991, in FBIS-CHI, 6 May 1991, p.1.

68. Yueh Shan, "Central Advisory Commission submits letter to CCP Central Committee opposing 'rightist tendency'," Zhengming, No. 175 (1 May 1992), pp. 13-14. The petition was titled "Our views and opinions on certain questions." The following paragraph also comes from this source.

69. Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Army in the succession to Deng Xiaoping," Asian Survey Vol. XXXIII, No. 8 (1993), pp. 758-59.

70. Lo Ping, "Deng tours South China again to boost opening," Zhengming, 1 February 1993, pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI, 27 January 1993, pp. 5-7. The first meeting reportedly occurred in Suzhou prior to the larger session of 19-20 December at Dongshan.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Lo Ping and Li Tzu-ching, "One hundred and sixteen generals write to Deng Xiaoping on policy toward United States," Zhengming, No. 188, 1 June 1993, pp. 14-16, in FBIS-CHI, 2 June 1993, pp. 33-36. The letter was reportedly signed by Zhang Wannian, Director of the General Staff Headquarters, Yu Yongbo, Director of the General Political Department, and Fu Quanyou, Director of the General Logistics Department, together with officers at various levels of different military regions, group armies and military academies. For a comprehensive study of the PLA see Michael D. Swaine, The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

74. The four reportedly were Song Renqiong, Qin Jiwei, Wang Enmao and Zhang Aiping, who "shed tears while they appealed to Deng." Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. For details see Xinhua in English, 5 September 1993, in FBIS-CHI, 7 September 1993, pp. 1-2 and Renmin ribao, 5 September 1993, p. 1, in ibid. pp. 2-3.

80. Chinese Foreign Ministry statement, Renmin ribao, 5 September 1993, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 7 September 1993, pp. 2-3.

81. Jen Hui-wen, "Background to China's 'four nots' policy towards the United States," Hong Kong Xin bao, 17 September 1993, p. 24, in FBIS-CHI, 17 September 1993, pp. 1-3; also Meng Lin, "Generals jointly sign petition on Yinhe incident," Jing bao, No. 10 (5 October 1993), p. 54, in FBIS-CHI, 13 October 1993, pp. 41-42.

82. Ibid.

83. Ming bao, 24 September 1993, in FBIS-CHI, 24 September 1993, p. 1.

84. Li Tieying in Beijing China Daily, 24 September 1993, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 24 September 1993, p. 2. Li is State Councillor and member of the CCP Political Bureau.

85. Zhengming, 1 November 1993, pp. 18-19, in FBIS-CHI, 8 November 1993, pp. 40-42.

86. Tsung Lan-hai, "CCP decides on its international archenemy," Zhengming, No. 195 (1 January 1994), pp. 118 in FBIS-CHI. 25 January 1994, pp. 4-6.

87. Lo Ping, "When I am no longer around, will China plunge into great chaos?" Zhengming, No. 196 (1 February 1994), pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI, 3 February 1994, pp. 26-29. The meeting was on 3 January.

88. Ibid.

89. Tai Ming Cheung, "Looking beyond the Party: the PLA and the changing domestic order to the year 2000," in James Lilley (ed.), Fifth Annual American Enterprise Institute Conference on the PLA (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1994), hereafter AEI Conference.

90. Ibid.

91. Lo Ping, "Deng and Chen have a secret talk in Hangzhou," Zhengming, No. 210 (1 July 1994), pp. 11-12, in FBIS-CHI, 26 July 1994, pp. 14-15.

92. Lo Ping, "CCP military attacks Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Zhengming, No. 210 (1 July 1994), pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI, 26 July 1994, pp. 33-36.

93. Ibid.

94. Hong Kong Xin bao, 8 July 1994, p. 23, in FBIS-CHI, 13 July 1994, pp. 1-2.

95. South China Morning Post, 25 June 1994, p. 10, in FBIS-CHI, 27 June 1994, pp. 40-41.

96. For details see John W. Garver, "China's push through the South China Sea: the interaction of bureaucratic and national interests," The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 999-1102; John Caldwell and Paul Godwin, "China's force projection potential: an assessment of the PLA's conventional military capability, 1994-2005." AEI Conference.

97. Beijing Central People's Radio Network, 6 June 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 21 June 1994, p. 9.

98. Michel Oksenberg, "China's confident nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1986-87), pp. 501-523.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.